The Brown Sahib’s Bond Roadshow​

Brief.pk

Pakistan’s government is launching a new sovereign bond roadshow in London to secure international borrowing. Finance Minister Muhammad Aurangzeb, the former head of JP Morgan’s corporate banking business, is leading this foreign capital campaign to attract international investors. This international financial outreach occurs as the Pakistani military expands its control over domestic assets, land, and mineral resources.

The dual track highlights a deep structural divergence. While civilian leaders seek external debt, domestic wealth is increasingly securitised under military custody. This consolidation shifts domestic power. Consequently, international investors face a complex landscape where sovereign debt is managed by civilian technocrats while the state's primary economic assets remain under direct military administration. This dynamic complicates long-term fiscal reforms and sovereign risk assessments, raising concerns about the ultimate ownership of the nation's sovereign wealth and the sustainability of its debt-driven economic model under intense domestic political strain.

The Force We Cannot Count

Small Wars Journal | Tahir Azad

China’s People’s Liberation Army Rocket Force is rapidly expanding its nuclear arsenal while maintaining a highly ambiguous dual-capable missile structure that blurs the line between conventional and strategic strikes. This expansion, projected to exceed 1,000 operational warheads by 2030, severely compresses decision-making windows for regional adversaries during a crisis.

Historically, Beijing separated warheads from launchers in peacetime, but the transition toward silo-based deployment and a launch-on-warning posture fundamentally alters this traditional restraint. Systems like the road-mobile DF-26 and the hypersonic DF-17 bypass regional air defences, holding key bases in Japan and India at risk. Warning times are now dangerously short. Consequently, the integration of the long-range DF-27 hypersonic glide vehicle into active service forces neighbouring states to re-evaluate their defensive postures under the constant threat of rapid, unannounced strikes. Despite recent internal leadership purges, the service continues to accelerate its long-range capabilities, leaving Western analysts struggling to accurately quantify its true operational readiness.

The U.S. Has Weapons in Space. Now What?

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace | Chris O’Meara

The United States has publicly acknowledged the deployment of operational, orbit-based space control weapons designed to defend joint forces against adversary capabilities. This unprecedented disclosure by Air Force Secretary Troy Meink aims to signal deterrence to China and Russia, both of which are rapidly expanding their own anti-satellite (ASAT) programs.

While the Outer Space Treaty of 1967 only prohibits weapons of mass destruction in orbit, conventional ASAT technologies remain legally permissible for self-defence. However, the normalization of orbital weaponry risks accelerating a dangerous space arms race. Debris from kinetic physical ASAT tests, such as Russia's controversial 2021 demonstration, threatens critical global infrastructure like GPS. Space is now a contested warfighting domain. Consequently, allies like the United Kingdom are establishing dedicated orbital warfare units, while the international community struggles to establish verifiable multilateral bans to prevent catastrophic disruptions to civilian services on Earth.

AI Almost Started a U.S.–China War — and No One Seems to Care

The Intercept | Sam Biddle

A U.S. Special Operations Command analyst using a large language model to generate intelligence reports nearly instigated a military conflict with China this past spring. The artificial intelligence system produced an entirely false report claiming a Chinese vessel in the Middle East was transporting nuclear weapons components, prompting rapid American preparations for a forceful interception.

This near-miss occurred amid aggressive Pentagon efforts to accelerate the integration of experimental autonomous technologies into safety-critical national security infrastructure. While Silicon Valley executives warn of hypothetical existential threats from rogue superintelligence, they simultaneously secure lucrative defense contracts to deploy unproven software. Speed takes priority over reliability. Consequently, the rapid deployment of unreliable targeting systems raises the risk of accidental escalation between nuclear-armed states. Experts warn that automating target generation at scale reproduces errors faster than human supervisors can verify them, transforming software hallucinations into immediate geopolitical crises.

Hegseth Delivers State of the Force Address, Outlines Series of New Initiatives

War Department | Matthew Olay

Secretary of War Pete Hegseth announced six major military initiatives during his "State of the Force" address at Marine Corps Base Quantico on September 30, 2026. These sweeping reforms aim to rapidly institutionalize autonomous capabilities, secure domestic supply chains, and expand military commissioning programs to preserve American deterrence against near-peer adversaries.

This strategic pivot responds to shifting paradigms of modern conflict by prioritizing technological dominance and organizational resilience. Key initiatives include establishing the Autonomous Warfare Command to accelerate robotic integration and launching Project Meridian to study future warfare domains. Additionally, the Fortress America program will harden domestic bases to run on independent power. The department also plans to construct a new self-sustaining installation hosting up to 25,000 troops. We fight to win. To support these efforts, the America's Corps of Cadets program will expand officer training to six additional universities, while a new Office of Religious Affairs will report directly to the secretary to streamline spiritual support.

Hegseth announces Autonomous Warfare Command

DefenseScoop | Staff Writer

U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced the launch of the Autonomous Warfare Command to accelerate the adoption of robotic and unmanned assets across the joint force. This new command, designated AutoWarCom, aims to bypass severe technical and procurement bottlenecks currently hindering the deployment of affordable drone swarms. The initiative responds directly to rapid advancements in AI-enabled targeting observed in Ukraine.

To prepare for full establishment by Oct. 1, 2027, Hegseth established Project Agincourt to prototype fast-adaptation acquisition cycles linking frontline operators with commercial entrepreneurs. Defense Innovation Unit Director Owen West and Navy SEAL Senior Chief Max Strasiser will lead this transitional effort. Meanwhile, Chief Technology Officer Emil Michael will commission Project Meridian to identify future warfare domains. This project is co-directed by Elon Musk, Palmer Luckey, and Newt Gingrich. This is no theory. Military departments will also phase in new occupational specialty frameworks to support the shift.

Defeated by physics

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists | Lisbeth Gronlund, David Wright

The Pentagon's $3.2 billion Golden Dome initiative, launched via a January 2025 executive order, aims to deploy space-based interceptors to destroy ballistic missiles during their boost phase. This ambitious missile defence architecture seeks to neutralize near-peer threats from Russia, China, and North Korea before they can deploy complex midcourse countermeasures.

However, historical precedents like Ronald Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative demonstrate that space-based boost-phase interception remains constrained by orbital mechanics and mass requirements. Booz Allen Hamilton's "Brilliant Swarms" proposal envisions 2,000 lightweight interceptor-satellites weighing just 40 to 80 kilograms. Physics refutes this design. A viable kill vehicle requires at least 95 kilograms of mass, excluding its booster rocket. Furthermore, solid-propellant missiles like North Korea's Hwasong-18 burn out in just 170 seconds, leaving an incredibly narrow window for interception. Consequently, maintaining such a constellation requires replacing thousands of satellites every four to five years due to atmospheric drag, creating unsustainable long-term costs.

Hegseth plans ‘Autonomous Warfare Command’

Defense One | Bradley Peniston

Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth announced plans to establish the Autonomous Warfare Command by October 1, 2027, to scale robotic capabilities across the joint force. This new four-star combatant command will inherit planning from the Pentagon's unmanned systems portfolio manager, which is being renamed Project Agincourt under the leadership of Owen West.

This structural shift aims to accelerate the deployment of robotic weapons by bypassing traditional acquisition bottlenecks. To support this transition, the military services will create new job classification frameworks for autonomous warfighters. Hegseth also launched Project Meridian, an advisory committee led by Elon Musk, Palmer Luckey, and Newt Gingrich, to identify future warfare domains. Additionally, a homeland defense initiative called FORTRESS America will build a massive new base to enhance domestic resilience. The initiative targets foreign dependencies. This effort includes stockpiling critical munitions, medicine, and blood to secure the homeland against potential supply chain disruptions.

The Good, Bad, and Dangerous in Hegseth’s Pentagon Overhaul

Foreign Policy | David Ignatius

U.S. Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has launched a sweeping reorganization of the Pentagon by purging senior military leaders and proposing radical technological reforms to counter modern threats. His initiatives aim to bypass traditional procurement and promotion structures to accelerate the integration of autonomous systems, risking deep institutional instability across the armed forces.

This disruptive campaign stems from long-standing frustration with a sclerotic defense bureaucracy that has repeatedly failed to anticipate the rapid global proliferation of drone warfare. To address these gaps, the proposed reforms include establishing an Autonomous Warfare Command and launching a 120-day review of artificial intelligence capabilities. The purge has already ousted 26 generals. While critics warn that bypassing merit-based promotions compromises military readiness, proponents argue that partnering with private innovators like Palmer Luckey is essential to outpace Chinese technological advances.

DIA Releases Will To Fight Analytic Framework

Defense Intelligence Agency

The Defense Intelligence Agency released its updated, unclassified Analyzing Will to Fight analytic framework on September 30, 2026, to help the intelligence community assess foreign combatant resolve across the conflict spectrum. This second edition integrates intangible military capabilities like leadership, culture, and innovation into traditional force assessments.

By evaluating these non-material variables alongside physical assets, analysts can determine if a competitor's psychological determination is the primary driver of their strategic success. This methodology addresses the core intelligence question of what missions a foreign force can accomplish under specific circumstances. To ensure high-quality outputs, the guidance strictly adheres to Intelligence Community Directive 203 Analytic Standards by prioritizing observable evidence and well-reasoned arguments. The framework applies during peace and war. Ultimately, this foundational overview supports both snapshot assessments and future-oriented analysis, while helping the public understand functional threats to United States national security.

Project Agincourt and the New US Autonomous Warfare Command: An Initial Assessment

Futura Doctrina | Mick Ryan

The United States Department of Defense has announced Project Agincourt, an initiative to establish a new four-star Autonomous Warfare Command by October 1, 2027. This command will possess directed manpower, budget, and acquisition authorities to transition current Pentagon drone and innovation efforts into dedicated military career pathways for officers and enlisted personnel.

Led by the Direct Reporting Portfolio Manager for Unmanned Systems, the transition addresses the rapid pace of technological development observed in active conflicts like Ukraine. The command aims to unify autonomous vehicle exploitation across land, air, and maritime domains while accelerating counter-drone technology development. The pace of war has changed. It will support geographic combatant commands, including Pacific Command and Central Command, by fostering closer collaboration with the defence industry to shorten the cycle between identifying operational problems and deploying solutions. This institutional shift offers a standardized model for Western allies to emulate.

How the Intelligence Community Can Shape AI Trust with New Terminology

The Cipher Brief | Jerry Laurienti

The United States Intelligence Community must establish standardized terminology to build trust in artificial intelligence systems integrated across national security agencies. As machine learning models become central to geospatial intelligence and strategic analysis, the lack of common definitions for AI reliability, explainability, and data lineage creates operational friction.

This linguistic standardization aims to align human analysts with automated systems, ensuring that intelligence products derived from AI remain verifiable and credible for policymakers. By defining precise metrics for algorithmic confidence, the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency and partner organizations seek to mitigate risks associated with automated decision-making. Trust remains the ultimate currency. Consequently, establishing a shared vocabulary across the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Office of the Director of National Intelligence will govern how the broader enterprise validates synthetic data, manages model drift, and maintains decision advantage against adversaries leveraging their own cognitive technologies.

The AI Autocrat

Foreign Affairs | Seva Gunitsky, Bruce Schneier

Russian television editor Marina Ovsyannikova disrupted a live Channel One broadcast in March 2022 to protest Moscow’s invasion of Ukraine, exposing the vulnerabilities of state-controlled media. Holding a hand-drawn sign behind the anchor's head that read 'Stop the war. Don’t believe propaganda. They’re lying to you!' and shouting 'No to war!', the editor was quickly dragged away.

Since this high-profile disruption, tighter security measures and a pervasive climate of fear have successfully prevented subsequent on-air protests across the country. In October 2024, Margarita Simonyan, one of Russia’s chief propagandists, gave another explanation for why no one has protested on Russian television since that incident. State censorship has intensified. Authors Seva Gunitsky and Bruce Schneier contextualise these events within a broader framework, examining how emerging artificial intelligence and surveillance technologies simultaneously empower and imperil modern dictators.

PRISM

PRISM, Fall 2026, v. 12, no. 1 

• Misleading Orbits: How the Three-Body Problem Distorts Strategic Thought
• Message Resonance Across Cultures: Toward Evidence-based Assessment
• The Cognitive Domain Is the Main Effort: Why the United States Needs a United States Information Warfare Command
• Inside Russia’s Proxy Ecosystem: Proxy Curators and Handlers Within the Russian State
• Reflexive Control in Financial Markets: Detecting Doctrinal Influence Operations in the Cognitive Battlespace of Global Finance
• From Ore to Leverage: Lithium, Threat Finance, and Hybrid Competition
• Regulatory Arbitrage and Regional Security Spillovers: Counter-Threat Finance Dynamics in Southeast Asia
• Can the Weak Resist the Strong? Venezuela’s Hybrid Asymmetric Options Against U.S. Coercion
• The Contested Kinmen Model: Infrastructure as Irregular Warfare in the Taiwan Strait
• Defending with One Hand: How U.S. Cyber Policy Constrains Private Cyber Defense
• Preparing Populations for Hybrid Attacks Against Critical Infrastructure
• The War on Drugs: Insights from the Reagan Era
• Regime Change, Major Powers, and the Prospects for Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran Part I: A Very Brief History of What Makes Regime Change Operations Successful
• Regime Change, Major Powers, and the Prospects for Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran Part II: What are the Prospects for Venezuela, Cuba, and Iran?

The world has moved on. But it need not stay this way forever

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists | Cory Doctorow

The National Customer Rage Survey of 2025 reveals a sharp rise in consumer anger and stress caused by the systemic decline in product and service quality across Western economies. This widespread platform decay, termed 'enshittification' by author Cory Doctorow, stems from corporate strategies that prioritize short-term shareholder profits over user satisfaction.

Historically, corporate monopolies were constrained by robust antitrust enforcement, which prevented firms from becoming too large to regulate. However, the systematic dismantling of consumer, environmental, and labor protection agencies has eroded these critical regulatory guardrails. Market outcomes now govern society. This shift enables modern monopolists to exploit users and workers alike, transforming market competition into a political crisis that cannot be resolved through consumer choices alone. Restoring the rule of law and antitrust enforcement remains essential to reclaiming a functional, equitable digital and physical infrastructure.

From importer to exporter: Oil shocks and the US economy

Brookings Institution | Diego Känzig, James Stock, Luca Zanotti

The United States economy has achieved unprecedented resilience against global oil supply shocks, transforming from a vulnerable net importer into a robust net exporter as of 2019. This structural shift, driven by the shale revolution, means sudden price spikes no longer trigger domestic recessions, fundamentally altering the geopolitical leverage of energy-exporting adversaries.

Prior to 2010, major disruptions from the 1973 OPEC embargo to the early 2000s consistently caused recessions and spiked unemployment. However, during the 2011 Libyan Civil War and the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war, the domestic market avoided contraction. Instead, elevated prices now generate domestic income and stimulate manufacturing, construction, and services. This is a major shift. Consequently, the Federal Reserve can aggressively raise interest rates to counter inflation without fearing immediate economic collapse. Even during the 2026 Iran War, which drove crude prices from $72 to $117 a barrel, the domestic economy maintained its expansionary trajectory.

The vanishing advantage of specialization

Brookings Institution | Luis Garicano

Artificial intelligence tools are accelerating a shift toward corporate self-reliance by enabling non-experts to perform highly specialized tasks in-house, significantly reducing the need for companies to outsource work to external professional services. According to a paper by Luis Garicano of the London School of Economics presented at the fall 2026 Brookings Papers on Economic Activity conference, specialized firms historically spread the high fixed costs of acquiring knowledge across multiple clients.

AI lowers these fixed costs. This shift directly threatens the business models of specialized firms employing 5.9 million people across six key occupations, including lawyers, accountants, software developers, and management analysts. Preliminary data from 2022 to 2025 shows a rapid decline in the share of these professionals employed by specialized external agencies. While niche firms will still handle highly complex, rare problems, the reduction in routine outsourced tasks risks creating a "broken ladder" for entry-level professionals. Consequently, educational institutions and regulatory frameworks must adapt to these shifting labor dynamics.

The Saudi economy can hold out through year’s end—even if oil exports drop to zero

Atlantic Council | Khalid Azim

Recent attacks on Saudi Arabia’s East–West oil pipeline and a Houthi offensive have severely disrupted the kingdom's oil exports, forcing a drop from 10.9 million barrels per day in February to 6.2 million in August. A complete cessation of oil exports through the end of 2026 would cost Riyadh $75 billion.

This extreme stress scenario would expand the fiscal deficit to 7.6 percent of GDP and the current-account deficit to 5.7 percent. Riyadh possesses deep financial buffers. With net foreign assets of $463.9 billion and low sovereign debt at 32.1 percent of GDP, the state can easily finance the shortfall through borrowing or drawing down central government deposits of 414 billion riyals. While Saudi sovereign credit remains resilient, a prolonged export halt would remove four to five million barrels per day from global markets, driving up energy prices and inflation worldwide.

How the bad science of AI doomerism is good for big business

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists | Sara Goudarzi

Anthropic and OpenAI are leveraging unscientific existential risk narratives to inflate their market valuations and secure regulatory advantages, according to industry critics. High-profile resignations of researchers like Jacob Coxon and Jan Leike have fueled public fears of an uncontrollable superintelligence. This doomer narrative serves as a powerful marketing tool for these multi-billion-dollar firms.

Historically, these companies emerged from the effective altruism and longtermism movements, which assign arbitrary probabilities to human extinction. Critics argue that focusing on hypothetical AI apocalypses distracts from immediate, tangible harms. These include environmental degradation, labor exploitation, and flawed military intelligence systems. A recent CNN report revealed that an AI-assisted intelligence report nearly triggered a US military operation against a Chinese vessel. Such real-world failures are already occurring. Yet, tech executives use existential warnings to advocate for self-regulation through aligned bodies like Model Evaluation and Threat Research. This strategy effectively crowds out independent public oversight.

Why is AI so contentious?

Brookings Institution | Martin Beraja, Noam Yuchtman

The Brookings Papers on Economic Activity fall 2026 conference featured research by Martin Beraja and Noam Yuchtman examining why artificial intelligence remains highly contentious despite its economic potential. A Pew Research Center survey reveals that 50 percent of United States adults feel more concerned than excited about daily artificial intelligence integration.

This widespread public ambivalence stems from a deep-seated moral grievance. The authors term this the technology's "original sin." Developers built these models using the words, creations, and expertise of human creators without obtaining their consent. Consequently, conventional policy remedies like universal basic income, retraining programs, or development pauses fail to address this core ethical violation. Resolving this friction requires novel public or private frameworks that restore ownership and attribution to the original creators. Without these mechanisms, public resistance to technological adoption will likely persist, complicating future commercial deployment across the global economy.

Whitepaper on Coordinating Vulnerability Response in the Age of AI

Center for Cybersecurity Policy and Law | Ari Schwartz, Caitlin Clarke, Timothy McGiff

The Center for Cybersecurity Policy and Law and the Cybersecurity Coalition released a whitepaper on September 24, 2026, detailing how artificial intelligence is accelerating software vulnerability discovery. This rapid influx of AI-generated findings has shifted the primary operational bottleneck from vulnerability discovery to validation, prioritization, and remediation. Open-source software faces particularly acute coordination challenges due to fragmented ownership and limited maintainer resources.

In response, private-sector clearinghouses like Athena, Akrites, and Lightwell Clearinghouse Premier have emerged to absorb and route these findings. The federal government is also participating through Gold Eagle, a cross-sector initiative. Coordination remains difficult. The report proposes a unified framework of interoperability principles and policy recommendations to harmonize these public and private efforts. Ultimately, these measures aim to establish a government-backed safety net that supports rather than duplicates existing private-sector infrastructure, securing the broader software supply chain against automated threats.

Adversarial artificial intelligence

RAND Corporation | Irene van Droffelaar, Kiran Suman-Chauhan, James Black, Thomas Kenchington, Angus Cooper, William Mitchell Reid

Adversarial artificial intelligence attacks targeting military systems and critical national infrastructure present severe risks to global strategic stability. A study commissioned by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (FCDO) and conducted by RAND Europe warns that these disruptions can compromise defense credibility, alter the offense-defense balance, and trigger accidental nuclear escalation.

The research, published on September 29, 2026, examines five distinct scenarios where the integration of machine learning into command, control, and communications (C3) systems introduces critical vulnerabilities. Attribution remains extremely difficult. This systemic ambiguity, compounded by the rapid democratization of technology to non-state actors, significantly increases the likelihood of miscalculation during international crises. To mitigate these escalation risks, the report urges governments to treat adversarial AI as a strategic stability risk, establish clear red lines, enhance dual-use command resilience, and create dedicated communication channels with strategic competitors to prevent unintended conflict.

How might future C2 and counter-C2 systems affect strategic stability?

RAND Europe | Henri van Soest, Maria Chiara Aquilino, Scott Warnier, James Black

Emerging non-nuclear command and control (C2) technologies are accelerating military digitisation while introducing critical vulnerabilities that threaten global strategic stability. Rapid integration of artificial intelligence, advanced sensing, and commercial cloud infrastructure expands the cyber attack surface, heightening the risk of crisis miscalculation. Legacy military procurement systems and siloed data structures frequently impede the adoption of these modern capabilities.

Consequently, armed forces increasingly rely on civilian telecommunications networks, commercial satellites, and subsea cables beyond direct state control. This dependency complicates attribution and crisis management during multi-domain operations. Redundant systems can mitigate disruption. However, the opacity of automated decision-making tools and the vulnerability of retaliatory systems create dangerous incentives for pre-emptive strikes. To mitigate these escalation risks, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth and Development Office is exploring soft governance measures, including shared research, interoperability standards, and crisis-communication channels to build trust before technologies become entrenched.

New weapon seekers track targets at hypersonic speeds without GPS

Atlas News

Hypersonic weapon seekers capable of tracking targets without GPS guidance represent a critical technological advancement designed to overcome electronic warfare vulnerabilities in highly contested environments. These newly developed seeker technologies allow missiles traveling above Mach 5 to maintain precise terminal targeting fidelity even when satellite signals are completely degraded or actively jammed by adversaries.

GPS-denied navigation is now a primary operational requirement for modern high-speed precision munitions. Traditional radio-frequency and optical seekers often struggle with the extreme thermal and plasma shielding effects generated at hypersonic velocities. Alternative guidance systems must therefore rely on advanced onboard processing or alternative signal tracking. Survivability depends on autonomous targeting. This capability directly addresses the growing prevalence of sophisticated electronic jamming systems deployed by near-peer competitors. Ultimately, these non-GPS tracking systems ensure that hypersonic strike platforms remain highly lethal and reliable during high-intensity conflicts where satellite access is heavily contested.

Novel effectors

RAND Corporation | Stuart Dee, Mattias Eken, Zsofia Wolford, Sarah Winder, Conlan Ellis, Harper Fine, Clara Le Gargasson, Evie Graham, James Black

Hypersonic missiles, directed-energy weapons, and autonomous systems are maturing rapidly, compressing military decision-making windows and heightening global escalation risks. These novel effector technologies reduce attribution and proliferate widely, complicating international deterrence. Divergent operational assumptions among major global powers exacerbate these dangers, particularly where non-nuclear systems threaten nuclear command and control infrastructure.

A study commissioned by the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office reveals that binding international governance remains highly unlikely due to low diplomatic convergence on acceptable constraints. Instead, states must rely on targeted transparency and confidence-building measures to manage acute miscalculation risks. The United Kingdom possesses distinct competitive advantages in this landscape. Sovereign ownership remains highly selective. By leveraging domestic strengths in directed-energy systems and hypersonic subsystems, the Ministry of Defence aims to project global norm-setting influence while collaborating through frameworks like AUKUS to secure critical dual-use innovations and sustain long-term technological superiority.

AI Over-Trust and Diminishing the Joint Targeting Cycle: Why Doctrinal Discipline Matters More Than Artificial Intelligence

Small Wars Journal | Jesse R. Crifasi

Project Maven and other artificial intelligence-enabled decision-support systems are rapidly accelerating the Joint Targeting Cycle, but they risk eroding critical human judgment across the modern battlefield. This technological integration compresses planning timelines, tempting commanders to bypass established doctrinal processes for faster engagements, which ultimately compromises meaningful human control.

Historically, the six-phase targeting methodology relied on deliberate human analysis to translate strategic objectives into precise military actions. However, algorithmic mediation now pre-filters intelligence, introducing compounded cognitive uncertainty before recommendations reach commanders. Automation bias further encourages staffs to accept these machine-generated outputs without sufficient scrutiny. Speed does not improve reasoning. To preserve accountability under DoD Directive 3000.09, the Joint Force requires strict doctrinal discipline, ensuring human discernment actively interrogates algorithmic assumptions throughout target development rather than merely at the final point of weapon release, thereby preventing flawed machine logic from dictating lethal operational outcomes on the battlefield.

AI Over-Trust and Diminishing the Joint Targeting Cycle: Why Doctrinal Discipline Matters More Than Artificial Intelligence

Small Wars Journal | Jesse R. Crifasi

Artificial Intelligence-enabled decision-support systems, including platforms derived from Project Maven, are rapidly accelerating the Joint Targeting Cycle across modern battlefields. However, this rapid automation risks introducing systemic operational vulnerabilities by eroding critical human discernment. Commanders face a growing temptation to sacrifice deliberate analytical judgment for faster engagements, creating an illusion of control.

This technological shift introduces algorithmic mediation and automation bias, which systematically shape how targeting data is prioritized and presented. Consequently, unverified assumptions accumulate across successive phases, culminating in compounded cognitive uncertainty where machine-generated recommendations appear deceptively complete. Data does not equal understanding. To preserve meaningful human control under Department of Defense Directive 3000.09, the Joint Force must establish deliberate human intervention points early in the targeting process. Ultimately, maintaining strict doctrinal discipline across all six phases is essential to prevent commanders from surrendering independent judgment to opaque, machine-mediated conclusions during high-stakes operations.

Building an Edge in Modern War With Fast Following

Futura Doctrina | Mick Ryan

The Australian Defence Force (ADF) can secure a decisive military edge by systematically adopting 'fast following,' a strategic practice where a military copies and improves an adversary's innovations. This approach allows forces to let opponents absorb the initial development risks and costs before rapidly fielding superior, adapted versions of those technologies.

This adaptive cycle is highly visible in the war in Ukraine, where both belligerents continuously emulate each other's tactical and technological advancements. For example, Russia localized Iran's Shahed-136 drone as the Geran-2, while Ukraine rapidly copied Russian fiber-optic drones first deployed during the 2024 Kursk offensive. Speed is now the decisive variable. Institutional emulation has also accelerated, with Moscow establishing its own Unmanned Systems Forces in November 2025 to match Kyiv's pioneering 2024 force structure. To institutionalize this capability, Australia requires dedicated intermediaries like Ukraine's Brave1 to connect frontline operators with private developers and rapid procurement pipelines.

Future C2 and Counter-C2 systems

RAND Corporation | Henri van Soest, Maria Chiara Aquilino, Scott Warnier, James Black

Non-nuclear command and control (C2) systems are undergoing rapid digitisation that threatens to undermine global strategic stability by accelerating operational decision-making beyond human capacity. While artificial intelligence, advanced sensing, and commercial cloud infrastructure strengthen resilience, they simultaneously expand cyber attack surfaces and elevate the risk of pre-emptive crisis miscalculation.

Legacy military structures, siloed data systems, and divergent organizational cultures currently hinder the seamless integration of these automated technologies. Counter-C2 tools favour disruption. Consequently, reliance on commercial satellite networks introduces unaligned private incentives and complicates attribution during counter-C2 operations like jamming or cyber-attacks. To mitigate these vulnerabilities, the UK Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office recommends that allied defence ministries establish interoperable data standards, map critical commercial dependencies, and preserve national sovereignty. Ultimately, soft governance measures, including shared allied research, joint experimentation, and robust crisis communication channels, offer the most viable pathway to prevent pre-emptive escalation.

Iran's nuclear program remains shrouded in mystery as the regime debates ditching non-proliferation

Deutsche Welle | Elina Farhadi

Iran's nuclear program has entered a highly critical phase as Tehran debates withdrawing from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) amid escalating tensions. Following the 2026 military strikes by the United States and Israel, satellite imagery reveals that Tehran is actively rebuilding underground facilities at Natanz and Parchin to shield its stockpile of uranium enriched to 60%.

This reconstruction follows the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, which has triggered a profound reassessment of the country's long-standing security doctrine. While President Masoud Pezeshkian has offered diplomatic concessions, hardline military figures are increasingly pushing to abandon international oversight entirely. The IAEA remains barred from critical military sites. Consequently, the expiration of the Islamabad Memorandum of Understanding and the referral of Tehran to the UN Security Council have heightened regional escalation risks. With Mojtaba Khamenei remaining silent on the traditional religious fatwa banning atomic weapons, intelligence agencies warn that verifying Tehran's ultimate weaponisation timeline is now virtually impossible.