Indian Strategic Studies

1 April 2026

After Op Sindoor Losses, How Pakistan Reworking Its Asymmetric Aerial Doctrine To Counter India’s S-400 Air Defence Shield

RonitBisht

Following the intense aerial clashes of Operation Sindoor in May 2025, the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) has initiated a sweeping transformation of its combat strategy. Prompted by the reported destruction of multiple fighter jets and a critical Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft, Islamabad is abandoning its historical reliance on conventional fighter-to-fighter engagements. Instead, the military is pivoting towards asymmetric tactics, stand-off strikes, and network disruption, aimed squarely at bypassing India’s formidable S-400 Triumf long-range air defence shield.

The Rear-Tier Buffer ZoneWhile Islamabad has officially dismissed reports of heavy aircraft losses as exaggerated, its recent military deployments suggest a more cautious reality. Crucial, high-value platforms—specifically refuelling tankers and AEW&C surveillance planes—have been relocated far from the Indian border. By shifting these assets deep inland to military facilities like Pasni and Jacobabad, the PAF intends to keep them safely out of the S-400's lethal engagement range.

Were Foreign Nationals and Myanmar Rebel Groups Plotting an Attack Against India?

Rajeev Bhattacharyya

A morning drill at the military headquarters of Chin National Front (Camp Victoria) in Myanmar’s Chin State.Credit: Rajeev Bhattacharyya

The arrest of six Ukrainian nationals and a U.S. citizen in India for entering the northeastern state of Mizoram without permission and engaging with rebel groups in Myanmar has put the spotlight on the covert entry and activities of foreign nationals to restricted zones in the country and their journeys to neighboring Myanmar.

The National Investigation Agency (NIA), the anti-terror agency handling the case, has alleged that the group was making efforts to train some ethnic armed organizations (EAO) linked to insurgent outfits in India’s Northeast, as well as supplying the EAOs with weapons from Europe, including drones. All the accused have been booked under the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act.

Why Africa Is Key To New Delhi’s Strategic Autonomy – Analysis

Raghvendra Kumar

(FPRI) — The ongoing military conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States has once again exposed that war and conflict not only carry significant human costs but also reveal deep structural vulnerabilities in the global economic and energy systems. The conflict has raised concerns about further escalation amidst the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint, triggering volatility in oil and natural gas markets. As a result, major oil and gas producing states in the Gulf region have declared force majeure due to the lack of export pathways.

While the objective of the US and Israeli-led “Operation Epic Fury” remains clear—that is, to limit Iran’s ability to project military power beyond its borders—the tactical approach adopted to achieve this has been to paralyze Iran’s command and control structure, particularly among its top political and military leadership. The early, coordinated, and targeted strikes appear to have functioned as “decapitation strikes,” aimed at disrupting decision-making and reducing Iran’s ability to coordinate a response, thereby weakening its ability to conduct retaliatory attacks against the United States, Israel, and their allies.

Caught Between Pakistan and the Iran War: What Comes Next for Afghanistan?

Mustafa Saqib

In the rugged geography of the Hindu Kush, isolation has long been a tool of survival. But for the Taliban-led administration in early 2026, that isolation has become a trap. Afghanistan currently finds itself physically and economically squeezed by two volatile fronts. To the east, a long-simmering border dispute with Pakistan has boiled over into what Islamabad officially declared an “open war” on February 27.

To the west, a high-intensity conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States has turned Afghanistan’s primary alternative trade route into a high-risk combat zone. The conflict in Iran, triggered by massive Israeli-U.S. strikes on February 28, has escalated into a sustained naval and aerial campaign. With U.S. carrier strike groups enforcing a partial blockade on Iranian ports to neutralize drone launch sites, maritime trade in the Gulf of Oman has effectively stalled.

War, Shipping, And Bangladesh As A Risk-Absorbing Maritime Node

Jianbo Wu

When risk rises along the artery through which a significant share of the world’s energy flows, the first-order effects are familiar: insurance premiums climb, routes are reconsidered, and freight rates begin to move. But beneath these adjustments lies a quieter disruption — one that exposes a structural weakness in the global maritime system. The issue is not simply whether goods can move. It is whether the system can replace capacity fast enough when it is strained.

For decades, global shipbuilding has been organized around efficiency and scale. The world’s largest yards — clustered in China, South Korea, and, to a lesser extent, Japan — have steadily moved up the value chain, concentrating on technologically complex, capital-intensive vessels. China alone now accounts for more than half of global shipbuilding output, with order books stretching years into the future. Capacity has never been more advanced. It has also rarely been less flexible.

China deploys 42 ships and hundreds of oceanic sensors to prepare for submarine warfare against the US Navy.

China deployed a network of 42 research vessels and hundreds of oceanic sensors to map subsea environments across the Pacific, Indian, and Arctic oceans, building a detailed operational dataset to support submarine warfare against the U.S. Navy.

The multi-year campaign combines seabed mapping and real-time environmental monitoring to enhance underwater navigation, concealment, and sonar performance in strategically contested maritime zones. Spanning across key chokepoints and naval corridors near Taiwan, Guam, and the Malacca Strait, this new capability directly strengthens China’s anti-submarine warfare and operational framework by enabling precise prediction of sonar conditions and optimized submarine operations in regions used by US and allied naval forces.

Beijing tightens drone rules, citing ‘low-altitude security’ concerns

Liu Zhen

Citing security concerns, Beijing will significantly restrict drone sales, storage and transport after tightening regulation of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in the Chinese capital’s airspace, according to state media.

Beijing has banned the sale or lease of UAVs and 17 designated “core components” to any person or organisation unless granted public security approval, according to the regulation approved by the municipal legislative body on Friday.

Bringing new drones or core components into Beijing’s administrative area would also be forbidden, state news agency Xinhua reported. It noted there would be an exception for drones that had already undergone real-name registration and were being carried by verified owners.

China’s 15th Five-Year Plan

Erik Green

On 12 March 2026, China concluded its annual ‘Two Sessions’ – a large political meeting of delegates from China’s legislative body, the National People’s Congress, and its advisory body, the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference. At this year’s gathering, delegates approved China’s 15th Five-Year Plan (FYP), which outlines the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP) developmental objectives for 2026–30. This was President Xi Jinping’s third FYP as leader, delivered at a time of slowing economic growth, internal instability following last year’s widespread anti-corruption campaign and global uncertainty due to the ongoing war in Iran.

The 15th FYP highlights several points of continuity in the CCP’s strategic ambitions – namely its aim to achieve technological supremacy and self-reliance. More importantly, however, the FYP also emphasises a growing concern regarding internal and external risks that may threaten these ambitions and outlines how the CCP plans to mitigate them. As the CCP faces an increasingly unpredictable external environment as well as continued challenges at home, it is investing in enhanced early-warning and risk-monitoring systems. To achieve these ambitions and coordinate risk assessments, improvements in centre–local party relations and information flows will be key.

Winning in Iran Requires More Than Military Success

Craig Wonson

Over the past several weeks, coverage of the conflict with Iran has followed a consistent pattern. Media reports have focused primarily on airstrikes, missile sites destroyed, drones intercepted, and other visible measures of military activity. While this coverage captures viewers’ attention and offers a snapshot of events, it risks reinforcing the perception that tactical military success equates to "winning," even as the strategic outcome remains unclear.

No military strategy can succeed without success at the tactical level. Tactical actions are complex, demanding, and often conducted at great risk, requiring a high degree of competence and professionalism. Yet the issue is not whether such actions matter. It is how they align with broader objectives that contribute to a desired political endstate.

Iran War Weekly Update – 28 Mar 2026

During the past week of Operation Epic Fury, U.S. and Israeli military operations continued to degrade Iranian military capability while strategic challenges became more pronounced. The United States and its partners maintained a high operational tempo, targeting missile infrastructure, naval assets, and military production facilities. However, Iran’s leadership structure has demonstrated resilience, and Tehran continues to leverage its geographic control of the Strait of Hormuz to exert pressure on global energy markets. Diplomatic activity increased, with competing ceasefire proposals reflecting widening gaps between Washington and Tehran over acceptable end-state conditions. Meanwhile, regional escalation risks remain elevated as proxy activity persists in Lebanon and Iranian missile and drone attacks continue against Gulf state infrastructure.

At the operational level, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) reports significant degradation of Iranian naval and missile capabilities. However, strategic objectives remain less clearly defined, raising questions regarding the long-term trajectory of the conflict. Economic effects, alliance cohesion challenges, and growing munitions expenditure pressures suggest that the conflict may be entering a transitional phase where political outcomes increasingly shape military decision-making.

Exclusive: U.S. can only confirm about a third of Iran's missile arsenal destroyed, sources say

Phil Stewart, Idrees Ali, Jonathan Landay and Erin Banco

One of the sources said the intelligence was similar for Iran's drone capability, saying there was some degree of certainty about a third having been destroyed.

The assessment, which has not been previously reported, shows that while most of Iran's missiles are either destroyed or inaccessible, Tehran still has a significant missile inventory and may be able to recover some buried or damaged missiles once fighting stops.

The intelligence stands in contrast to President Donald Trump's public remarks on Thursday that Iran had "very few rockets left". He also appeared to acknowledge the threat from remaining Iranian missiles and drones to any future U.S. operations to safeguard the economically vital Strait of Hormuz.

Reuters first reported that he is weighing whether to escalate the conflict by deploying U.S. troops to Iranian shores along the Strait.

"The problem with the straits is this: let's say we do a great job. We say we got 99% (of their ⁠missiles). 1% is unacceptable, because 1% is a missile going into the hull of a ship that cost a billion dollars," Trump said at a televised Cabinet meeting on Thursday.

How risky would a US assault on Iran’s Kharg Island be — and why might Trump consider it

Billy Stockwell

Even as US President Donald Trump has declared the “war has been won” with Iran, amphibious warships, landing craft and thousands of Marines and sailors are being deployed to the region. The deployment has caused speculation to swirl over whether the US plans to capture Kharg Island, a coral outcrop off Iran’s coast and an economic lifeline for Tehran that handles roughly 90% of the country’s crude oil exports.

Even if Washington successfully took the tiny but strategic island, experts have questioned whether this would give the US enough leverage to force Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz amid a spiraling global energy crisis.

The Strait of Hormuz Is Burning, But China Is Not Panicking

James Char

On paper, the ongoing Israeli-U.S. offensives against Iran have turned into a nightmare for many countries due to the concomitant oil and gas crunch. As the factory of the world, China should be no different given roughly half of its crude oil and condensate imports come from the Gulf producers: Iran, as well as Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and others.

Regarding the blockaded Strait of Hormuz at the center of the world’s attention, about 20 percent of global oil and 20 percent of liquefied natural gas (LNG) trade flows through the chokepoint – with roughly 80 percent of the volume sold to Asia. However, in the weeks since the conflict began on February 28, Beijing has appeared self-assured.

The West Is Losing To Iran, And Not For The Reasons You Think – OpEd

Suminda Jayasundera

Four weeks ago, the United States and Israel set out to break Iran. Today, Iran is battered, leaderless, and more isolated than it’s ever been — and somehow, it’s still winning.

Think about what’s been accomplished: Khamenei assassinated, air defenses shredded, nuclear facilities in ruins. By any conventional military scorecard, that’s an overwhelming result. And yet Iran has already made its most consequential move: it’s closing the Strait of Hormuz. Not with a navy. With cheap drones and a willingness to absorb whatever gets thrown at it. Oil prices are spiking. The global economy is running out of runway. The decapitation worked. The strategy didn’t. And understanding why gets at something the West has fundamentally misread about Iran — not just in this campaign, but for decades.

U.S. Security Guarantees Under Scrutiny In Gulf States

James Durso

The Arab states of the Persian Gulf have suffered major economic and security costs in the wake of the U.S./Israeli attack on Iran. Iranian missile and drone retaliation hit airports, ports, and energy infrastructure, disrupting aviation, trade, tourism, and hydrocarbon exports, and damaging the Gulf’s reputation as a stable business hub.

Attacks on shipping and energy facilities, such as the disruption at Fujairah port and the Shah gas field in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), show how quickly a U.S./Israel war on Iran can spill over onto Gulf territory. Or “What happens in Iran doesn’t stay in Iran.” UAE businessman Khalaf Ahmad al-Habtoor, a former business partner of U.S. president Donald Trump, publicly castigated Trump, “You have placed the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council [GCC] and the Arab countries at the heart of a danger they did not choose…Who gave you permission to turn our region into a battlefield?” If Habtoor represents elite thinking in the Gulf, and local sources confirm he does, Gulf countries will reduce their future exposure to the U.S. They might:

The Iran War Is Reshaping Asia’s Energy Security Strategies

Joshua Kurlantzick

In a matter of weeks, the Iran war has generated massive uncertainty about the future of the Middle East and rocked the global economy. The price of oil has skyrocketed as Tehran has essentially closed the critical Strait of Hormuz and many oil and liquefied natural gas producers in the Persian Gulf have shuttered or cut back operations. Every major stock market has fallen since the war started, and central bankers, economists and policymakers have projected that a drawn-out war could cause inflation to spike and undermine economic growth worldwide.

According to the International Monetary Fund’s managing director, Kristalina Georgieva, a 10 percent increase in energy prices that lasts a year would increase global inflation by 40 basis points and slow global economic growth. Indeed, the war has already plunged the world into its “largest-ever” disruption in oil supplies, according to the International Energy Agency.

Here’s how the US military could reopen the Strait of Hormuz — from boots on the ground to air assaults

Caitlin Doornbos

WASHINGTON — As President Trump cranks up pressure on Iran, Pentagon brass are quietly lining up a wide menu of military options — which could put US boots on the ground in a major war for the first time in nearly half a decade. For now, Trump is pursuing a dual-track strategy: building overwhelming military pressure while leaving the door open to a deal — even extending a Friday deadline for Tehran to meet US demands.

Meanwhile, thousands of US troops, including elements of the elite 82nd Airborne Division, are surging into the region alongside Air Force, Navy and Marine assets — a show of force designed to box Tehran into negotiations while preparing for a potential clash. What’s more, the Pentagon is reportedly considering a plan to send an additional 10,000 troops to the Middle East amid the war with Iran, according to the Wall Street Journal.

Iran targets US public opinion with online information war

Joanna YORK

When President Donald Trump announced in a social media video on February 28 that the United States and Israel had launched strikes on Iran, he kickstarted a war that has engulfed the Middle East. But he also sparked an online information war that analysts say has been dominated by the use of AI-generated content to spread fake news about the conflict

One study from Clemson University in South Carolina found that, within 24 hours of the US and Israel launching attacks on Iran, dozens of social media accounts affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps had begun posting Iranian propaganda about the war, some of which reached an audience of millions.

America Needs Cognitive Civil Defense

David Maxwell

Thucydides showed that fear, honor, and interest move states. Clausewitz taught that war is a continuation of politics by other means. Mao described politics as war without bloodshed and war as politics with bloodshed. Sun Tzu wrote what is of supreme importance is to attack the enemy’s strategy. These were not ancient observations. They are field manuals for today. The battlefield has expanded. It now sits inside the mind.

A democracy stands on what its citizens believe is true. If they cannot judge truth, they cannot judge policy. If they cannot judge policy, they cannot guide power. An adversary does not need to win elections or battles. He only needs to erode trust. Russia proved this. Its operations did not seek one vote or one law. They sought doubt. Doubt in media. Doubt in institutions. Doubt in each other. So ask. What does an enemy want us to think? What decisions does he want us to make? What actions does he want us to take? If we cannot answer, we are only reacting and already losing.

One month into Iran war, some Trump objectives are unfulfilled as he looks to wind down the conflict

MICHELLE L. PRICE

WASHINGTON (AP) — President Donald Trump has listed five objectives that the U.S. wants to achieve before ending its war with Iran. Now, one month into the conflict, he has suggested the U.S. may soon be “winding down” the operation, even though some of his key aims remain undefined or unfulfilled.

Trump last week outlined five goals for the massive air campaign. That’s up from four laid out by his staff since the war’s start on Feb. 28 (and up from the three generally enumerated by the Pentagon and Secretary of State Marco Rubio). Though the Trump administration has said its objectives are clear and unchanging, the list of priorities has expanded and shifted as the war has taken a toll on the global economy, tested alliances and raised unanswered questions about the planning for the conflict, its justification and its aftermath.

How Trump’s Plot to Grab Iran's Nuclear Fuel Would Actually Work

Caroline Haskins

President Donald Trump and top defense officials are reportedly weighing whether to send ground troops to Iran in order to retrieve the country’s highly enriched uranium. However, the administration has shared little information about which troops would be deployed, how they would retrieve the nuclear material, or where the material would go next.

“People are going to have to go and get it,” secretary of state Marco Rubio said at a congressional briefing earlier this month, referring to the possible operation.

There are some indications that an operation is close on the horizon. On Tuesday, The Wall Street Journal reported that the Pentagon has imminent plans to deploy 3,000 brigade combat troops to the Middle East. (At the time of writing, the order has not been made.) The troops would come from the Army’s 82nd Airborne Division, which specializes in “joint forcible entry operations.” On Wednesday, Iran’s government rejected Trump’s 15-point plan to end the war, and White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said that the president “is prepared to unleash hell” in Iran if a peace deal is not reached—a plan some lawmakers have reportedly expressed concern about.

Transforming Army Education: The Leadership Laboratory

David Duckett

Modern warfare is characterized by continual change, driven by rapidly evolving technology and the growing interconnectedness worldwide. To achieve success in this complex environment, as outlined in the Army’s operating concept, the United States Army requires a new model of leadership. Leaders must demonstrate agility, adaptability, resilience, and innovation to navigate uncertainty and ambiguity. The predictable battlefields of the past have evolved into multidomain operational environments where information, cyberspace, and cognitive factors are as decisive as traditional combat power. This environment requires not only tactical proficiency but also cognitive dominance.

In response, Army University is spearheading a fundamental transformation of military education in order to better deliver warfighting capability to the operational force. This initiative moves beyond time-worn instructional models to forge the critical and creative thinkers the Army needs for 2030 and beyond. This is not a superficial update to curricula but a shift in the approach to adult learning, moving away from lecture-based instruction to a student-centric model. The new paradigm prioritizes intellectual agility over rote memorization, active problem-solving over passive reception of information, and collaborative learning over solitary study. It recognizes that in the twenty-first century, the ability to learn, as well as unlearn, is the most critical strategic advantage.

How Iran Aims To Win The War

Neville Teller

The success or failure of the US-Israeli military operation in Iran hangs in the balance. It is very largely dependent upon how ”success” is finally adjudged.

Since February 28 the Iranian regime has sustained a massive armed offensive, and as a result its resources and its infrastructure have been substantially depleted. US President Donald Trump has on several occasions detailed the vast losses Iran has incurred, and hinted that he is on the verge of declaring victory. At other times he has indicated that he has considerably more in reserve by way of military power, including the possible use of American troops, to be used in loosening Iran’s grip on international shipping in the Strait of Hormuz, and ensuring the unconditional surrender of the regime.

Trump has been criticized for the apparent inconsistency of his various statements, which to some seem ill considered. They are, however, just as likely to be a deliberate strategy aimed at keeping the enemy, and perhaps the world at large, guessing as to his calculated and detailed plans for the end-game.

Gulf Leaders Didn’t Want the Iran War. They Need Trump to Win It Anyway.

Steven A. Cook

Throughout four weeks of war, Iran has continued to make the United States’ Gulf partners pay a price for Operation Epic Fury and Israel’s Operation Roaring Lion. The Iranians have fired thousands of missiles and dronesat their neighbors, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) bearing the brunt of the assault. There is also significant damage to energy infrastructure in Bahrain, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia.

From the first days of the conflict, part of the Islamic Republic’s strategy was immediately clear: inflict significant pain on Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia so that they would in turn pressure the United States (and by extension, Israel) to end the hostilities. It was a miscalculation. Gulf leaders did not want the war and have privately expressed frustration with the United States and Israel for causing chaos in the region, but they have not pressured President Donald Trump to stop the U.S. attacks. Instead, Saudis, Emiratis, Qataris, and others have closed ranks with each other, signaled that they have a considerable stake in the war’s outcome, and counseled the Trump administration not to end military operations prematurely.

Mapping the damage: Iranian strikes on the GCC

Ellen Clarke

Since the US and Israel began their air campaign against Iran, the Islamic Republic has launched wide-ranging drone and missile attacks against all six GCC states. The damage inflicted is intended to put pressure on them, spread the cost of the war and expose the limits of US capabilities and will. Iran’s decision to strike its neighbours will reshape how they define their security and defence priorities.

While only a few of the more than 4,000 Iranian projectiles launched against the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states have hit their intended targets as of 19 March 2026, they have sent shockwaves across global energy, industrial and financial markets. Iran had already targeted energy infrastructure in 2019 and the United States’ military sites in the Gulf in 2025, but its current response is qualitatively and quantitatively different and has firmly crossed red lines that the GCC had hoped would be safeguarded by their diplomacy and ostensible neutrality. Iran has systemically targeted military, energy and other economic sites as part of a strategy of asymmetric warfare that has left no country unaffected. The United Arab Emirates (UAE) and Kuwait have been disproportionately attacked, while Oman and Qatar, Iran’s traditional interlocutors, have also suffered material damage.

31 March 2026

After Modi: Political Leadership and the Future of Indian Foreign Policy

Rohan Mukherjee

By the time of India’s next national election in 2029, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be 78 years old. At present, it is unclear whether he will run for another term. It is equally unclear who within his party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), might succeed him when he eventually retires. In the latter scenario, the BJP itself may be in a difficult electoral position without Modi’s personal charisma and mass following. This unclear line of succession in the BJP could lead to India’s current political opposition, led by the Indian National Congress party, winning the first election of the post-Modi era and consolidating power for itself and its allies with an eye on future electoral cycles.

Against this backdrop, this essay identifies two individuals from within Modi’s own party and from within the opposition as representing the next generation of India’s political leaders. They are Yogi Adityanath, who is a seasoned BJP leader and currently chief minister of Uttar Pradesh (India’s most populous state), and Rahul Gandhi, who is de facto leader of the Congress party and leader of the opposition in the lower house of parliament. Both Adityanath and Gandhi are in their early 50s, at least 20 years younger than Modi, and therefore positioned for long periods of rule, making them “next generation” in terms of age and political longevity as well. Both have already spent long periods in politics, though neither has held a position in the executive branch of government at the national level.

The Infantry Division Transformed: Four Fighting Principles

James "Jay" Bartholomees and Greg Scheffler

The US Army is rediscovering the division as the warfighting formation. During the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the brigade combat team became the Army’s primary warfighting unit. Brigades trained, deployed, and fought largely independently. Company commanders and platoon leaders were responsible for integrating attached fire support teams, engineers, intelligence collectors, and signal assets into maneuver formations. Successful integration depended on early collaboration, integrated leader development, and habitual relationships. When these conditions were absent, integration became improvisation under the pressure of final manifest call and line-of-departure actions.

Modern battlefields demand longer ranges, more sensors, and tighter coordination between warfighting functions. Many of those capabilities that were previously pushed to the tactical edge now sit at the division level. Consolidating capabilities such as artillery, intelligence, signal, cyber, and electronic warfare at this level reflects the realities of the changing character of warfare—and makes the Army more lethal and more optimized for the modern battlefield, particularly in the long-range joint fight of the Pacific.

Pakistan’s Afghan Frankenstein: The beast is loose and Europe is unsuspecting

Konstantinos Bogdanos

Is Pakistan finally facing the monster it created? Is Europe prepared for the consequences? The answer is in the smoke rising over the Durand Line. For decades, the Islamabad establishment has played a dangerous game, nurturing the Taliban as a strategic depth agent against India. Today, this plan backfires, and the resulting explosion of violence threatens to send a fresh wave of illegal immigration toward the already strained borders of the European Union.

The “open war” declared by Defence Minister Khawaja Asif marks the end of a thirty-year illusion. The apprentice has not only left the master. He has now turned openly against him. The March 16 strike on Kabul was the moment masks fell. When Pakistani warplanes hammered a rehabilitation centre in the heart of the Afghan capital, the “Islamic brotherhood” of the two neighbours officially ceased to be.

The Gulf States in the Shadow of the War with Iran

Yoel Guzansky

The war with Iran has placed the Gulf states, against their will, at the heart of the confrontation. Iran identified the Gulf states as an “underbelly” and potential lever of pressure on the United States to shorten the duration of the campaign. Nevertheless, despite the Iranian attacks on their territory, they have thus far refrained from openly joining the campaign and have preferred a cautious policy: allowing other forces to operate from their territory while undertaking limited offensive actions with plausible deniability.

This policy reflects their concern that Iranian attacks against them will intensify, along with uncertainty regarding the American war objectives. From the perspective of the Gulf states, a key test of the campaign’s outcome is not only the extent of the damage inflicted on Iran, but also, and above all, whether a regional-international framework will emerge that can prevent Iran from rebuilding its capabilities. This article examines the central question of the extent to which the war undermines the logic underlying the hedging strategy that the Gulf states adopted toward Iran or whether it precisely underscores its necessity. It also assesses the implications of the war and the reality that will emerge in its wake for Israel’s relations with the Gulf states while presenting possible opportunities and risks that may limit their realization.

"Iran Must Only Succeed Once to Trigger a Catastrophe"

Claus Hecking

For days, U.S. President Donald Trump has been trying to end the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz imposed by Iran as a result of the war. He has ordered military facilities on Iran’s oil-loading island of Kharg to be bombed. He has threatened to destroy the oil terminals. And he is calling on other countries to send warships into the Strait of Hormuz.

S. Clinton Hinote is a retired three-star U.S. Air Force general. In the mid-2000s, under U.S. President George W. Bush, he developed scenarios for a possible war against Iran. He says that every military option for securing the Strait of Hormuz involves risks that would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to eliminate.

Bottling the World Economy

Adam Hanieh

Amid the destruction of the US–Israeli war against Iran, much of the world’s attention has fixed on the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow passage through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas passes. In normal times ships traversing the Strait—which runs between Oman and the United Arab Emirates on one bank and Iran on the other—follow a pair of two-mile-wide lanes for inbound and outbound traffic, separated by a two-mile buffer. Shortly after the onset of the war Iran began attacking commercial vessels and laying mines in the waterway, effectively shutting it to most marine traffic. As of March 18 around 3,200 ships were stranded in the Gulf, with only a handful of tankers permitted to pass each day.

The disruption of this vital artery has sent markets into convulsions, with the international price benchmark for Brent crude oil briefly surging to nearly $120 a barrel on March 9, its highest level since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sparked panic. Donald Trump has urged Western allies to help escort tankers through the Strait in an effort to keep prices in check, so far finding no takers; more recently he has threatened to strike Iran’s power plants if its government refuses to reopen the waterway. Oil, in this sense, has become a proxy for the war’s nearly incalculable costs.

Prepare for turbulence - how a prolonged Middle East conflict could reshape how we fly

It was once a humble outpost in the world of global aviation, a dusty overnight halt for luxury flying boats making the arduous journey from the UK to far-flung parts of the British Empire, such as India and Australia. By the 1960s, it had a simple runway made of desert sand, used as a refuelling stop by airliners en route to arguably more exotic destinations.

Yet today, Dubai is one of the key pillars of the industry, and Dubai International Airport (DXB) is its beating heart. In 2024, more than 92 million passengers made their way through its gleaming, marble-floored halls and sparkling, brightly lit shopping malls.

‘Everything After This Will Be Harder’: Gen. Stanley McChrystal on Iran

David French

Did President Trump fall for the myth of surgical warfare? Gen. Stanley McChrystal joins the columnist David French, both veterans of the Iraq war, to discuss what may have been overlooked in the planning of Operation Epic Fury. McChrystal, who retired from the Army in 2010, argues that the United States often overestimates the decisive power of aerial bombing while underestimating the weight of historical grievance. And the general weighs in on the current culture of bravado coming from the secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth.

‘Everything After This Will Be Harder’: Gen. Stanley McChrystal on IranDavid French talks with the retired general about the “great seduction” America fell for in Iran. Below is a transcript of an episode of “The Opinions.” We recommend listening to it in its original form for the full effect. You can do so using the player above or on the NYTimes app, Apple, Spotify, Amazon Music, YouTube, iHeartRadio or wherever you get your podcasts.

USS Gerald Ford limps out of hot war and into embarrassment. Why?

Dan Grazier

A March 12 fire that injured 200 sailors is just the latest embarrassing incident in the history of the USS Gerald R. Ford. The vaunted aircraft carrier has become a case study demonstrating how such a program will fail when policymakers prioritize economic and political concerns over military effectiveness. Navy leaders pulled their premier ship from the front lines after the laundry room fire and sent it to the island of Crete, where it will undergo urgent repairs for at least a week.

Construction on the Ford began in 2009, but the ship wasn’t commissioned until July 2017. Even then, the ship was far from ready for service. It took another five years for the Navy to put the ship to sea on its first operational deployment.

The Countdown to a Ground War

Thomas Wright

Donald Trump announced this week that the United States and Iran had made significant progress in negotiations, and he was allowing five days to reach a deal. Tehran denied that it was talking with Washington at all. This is not, in any meaningful sense, a negotiation: It is a countdown.

The timing is not coincidental. Thousands of Marines and much of the 1st Brigade of the 82nd Airborne are en route to the Middle East. Trump may intend the talks to act as cover for an escalation decision already made. Even if he doesn’t, the structural reality is the same: When the deadline expires, he will be close to having significant ground-combat capability in the region and a collapsing diplomatic process to justify using it.

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