19 January 2026

Thinking Carefully About Iran at a Dangerous Moment


A few days ago, I got a message from a West Point classmate. He knows my background, knows where I’ve spent most of my adult life—Special Forces, the Pentagon, the intelligence community—and he didn’t dress it up. He asked me straight out: “Are you tracking what’s happening in Iran, and what do you think we should do?”

That question stuck with me.

Not because I don’t have views on Iran—I’ve had them for decades—but because it forced me to stop reacting to headlines and start thinking through the problem the way we were trained to: clearly, sequentially, and without comforting illusions. Iran is dangerous. The protesters are brave. U.S. rhetoric is escalating. And the margin for error is shrinking.

If We Want to Help the Iranians, We Should Disrupt the IRGC

Gary Anderson

President Trump is considering military intervention to protect Iran’s legitimate protesters from the regime. I am not necessarily recommending intervention, but if we do, I have some thoughts on how it should be done. Unlike Venezuela, where targeting President Maduro was seen as a critical first step to modifying the government, the center of gravity of the Iranian regime is the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). It is the glue that holds the rotting edifice together. The frightened old men who constitute the Grand Ayatollah and his Guardian Council are nothing without them, nor are the various ministries that comprise the executive branch of the government; they are technocrats and bureaucrats who have no real power outside their narrow responsibilities.

The IRGC is more powerful than the regular armed forces or the police. If it is nullified, the regime collapses under pressure from the mob. Unlike the Taliban and ISIS, the IRGC is very vulnerable to both air and cyber attack. In contrast to the Iranian nuclear program, the IRGC’s internal security forces have to operate in the open from fixed bases to intimidate the general public. We know where their key facilities are. They are not well hardened underground. Their Quds Force special operators are primarily geared toward supporting overseas terrorist groups; they may be relatively covert, but that limits their usefulness against civilian demonstrators.

Is Iran Headed Towards a Persian Spring?

Gordon Gray

Synopsis and Key Points: Former U.S. Ambassador to Tunisia Gordon Gray draws striking parallels between the current 2026 protests in Iran and the 2011 Arab Spring.

-Following the collapse of Syria’s Bashar al-Assad in December 2024, Gray argues that Tehran faces a similar existential crisis driven by economic ruin and a loss of dignity. While the regime has survived five uprisings since 2009 due to the loyalty of the IRGC, Gray warns that “brittle” autocracies eventually shatter.

How Trump’s Foreign Policy Gambits Are Reshaping the World

Brian Bennett and Nik Popli

Four weeks before the beginning of his second term as President, Donald Trump abruptly floated the idea of taking back the Panama Canal. It had been a quarter-century since the U.S. formally ceded to Panama ownership of the channel connecting the Atlantic and Pacific oceans. With one social media post, Trump threw a seemingly stable relationship off-kilter, accusing Panama of overcharging U.S. ships for passage and recklessly permitting China too much influence in the canal’s operations.

Looking back, it was an early sign of how America’s relationship with the rest of the world was about to be shaken to its core. Trump’s maximalist threat sent his foreign policy advisers scrambling. Within days of his Inauguration, military planners started work on options for taking the canal by force, according to a former Trump Administration official. “We’re going to take it back, or something very powerful is going to happen,” Trump warned. Ultimately, no military operation was necessary. Panama’s President José Raúl Mulino quickly and quietly agreed to a number of concessions, including re-examining Chinese investment in the country.

Trump Is Making China Great Again

Catherine Rampell

SOMEONE ALERT the Norwegian Nobel Committee: Against the odds, Donald Trump has succeeded in peacefully uniting the world. Unfortunately, the world has been united against us. 
This Pax (Ex) Americana era was illustrated Friday, as Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney wrapped up a trip to China. This wasn’t just any old visit, either: It marked the first time a Canadian PM had been to the world’s second-largest economy since 2017—and based on the glamorous video Carney’s team released, it was a smashing success for Beijing.

Carney and Chinese President Xi Jinping unveiled a “new strategic partnership” between the two countries. Among the key planks of this agreement, China will reduce tariffs on Canadian canola seed, peas, and lobsters. It will also allow visa-free travel for Canadians, who are apparently eager for new tourism destinations.1 Canada, in turn, will allow 49,000 Chinese electric vehicles into its market at lower tariff rates.

The Stain of American Timidity

Mike Nelson
Source Link

In the summer of 2003, I was a newly promoted captain in the 82nd Airborne trying to convince an Iraqi Shiite university professor to take more of a leadership role in the emerging district council we were establishing in Rashid, the southern portion of Baghdad. While U.S. forces had taken control of the Iraqi capital to celebrations and the toppling of statues, there was still an air of uncertainty about the future. Saddam Hussein had not been captured yet, and there was a fear he would return to power if America lost interest in transforming Iraq. Those we were asking to stand up and stick their necks out had questions—namely, could they count on Americans to help them rebuild Iraqi governance?

As we sat in the sweltering heat, the professor recounted to me that his father and older brother had risen up against Saddam in 1991 when asked to by President George H.W. Bush—part of a larger uprising by Shias and Kurds in the aftermath of the Gulf War—only to have those populations suffer massive casualties in a brutal crackdown by the Ba’athist government, while the U.S. largely sat idly by and observed. Eventually, these led to Operations Provide Comfort, Northern Watch, and Southern Watch to enforce no-fly zones and provide humanitarian aid—but the damage was done. Tens of thousands of civilians lay dead. This professor went on to say we had done the same thing to the Czechs in 1968 and the Hungarians in 1956.

Trump and the Special Operations Panacea Reflections on the aftermath of the raid to capture Nicolas Maduro

Tim Ball

US Air Force crew chiefs watch as F-35A Lightning II’s taxi following military actions in Venezuela in support of Operation Absolute Resolve, Jan. 3, 2026. (US Airforce)

The recent raid to capture Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro appears to have been a nearly flawlessly executed special operation. Conducted by the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) with interagency support, the raid demonstrated the professionalism and expertise of America’s special operations community and will likely be used as a case study in the training of future special operators. While the raid’s tactical success is unquestioned, its aftermath raises the same historical issues with not only the use of special operations forces, but US-sponsored regime change as well. Even in the hands of disciplined civilian policymakers, competent special operations forces can appear as a tempting panacea, available to solve national security woes without the full commitment of the US military.

Trump’s Threats to Greenland Raise Serious Questions for NATO

Lara Jakes

Over the past year, President Trump has pushed NATO with threats and coercion to make divisive changes. Now he is threatening to seize control of Greenland, potentially with military force, which has heightened concerns that he will destroy the trans-Atlantic security alliance.

Leaders in Europe and Canada, which have depended on the United States for nearly 77 years as the alliance’s largest partner, are determined to not let that happen. Greenland is a semiautonomous territory of Denmark, which is a founding member of NATO. Top diplomats from Greenland and Denmark will defend the territory from Mr. Trump’s ambitions at the White House on Wednesday.

Trump Renews Threat on Greenland Before Meeting at White House

Amelia Nierenberg

The foreign ministers of Denmark and Greenland are expected to meet on Wednesday with Vice President JD Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the White House, with tensions rising over President Trump’s push to buy or take over Greenland.

It will be the first such meeting between the three governments over Greenland, a semiautonomous Danish territory. Apparently emboldened by the success of the U.S. military operation that led to the capture of Venezuela’s leader on Jan. 3, Mr. Trump said last week that he was “going to do something on Greenland, whether they like it or not.”

Information Advantage in the Indo-Pacific to Fight Digital Guerrilla Warfare and State-Sponsored Disinformation

Priya Batchu

The 1st Theater Information Advantage Detachment (TIAD) originated at Fort Shafter, Hawaii, on November 7, 2025. The 65-soldier Unit reflects the Army’s aggressive play for a tactical edge to fight digital guerrilla warfare in the Pacific’s gray-zone environments.

The 1st TIAD is a theater-level Army formation that supports U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, U.S. Army Pacific, Special Operations Command Pacific (SOCPAC), and other units of INDOPACOM. Special operations is one of the most information-sensitive elements in the U.S. military, so the 1st TIAD is in a unique position to support SOF.

Strategic Disruption from Orbit: Space-Based Capabilities for Irregular Warfare in the Indo-Pacific

Trent Keipour

During World War II, U.S. forces in the Pacific faced a vast and challenging expanse. Islands were isolated, supply lines were stretched thin, and intelligence was limited to the speed of ships, aircraft, or radios. Today, although the geography and the challenges that come with it remain unchanged, technological capabilities have advanced significantly. Warfighters now look beyond the horizon for an advantage; in fact, they look to orbit, where space has become the ultimate high ground. From that vantage point, modern forces gain essential capabilities in communication, navigation, intelligence, and targeting—capabilities that increasingly influence outcomes in conflict and require new strategic approaches for future operations.

This technological evolution is unfolding as the character of competition in the Indo-Pacific continues to shift. The region is increasingly shaped by irregular forms of competition including coercive infrastructure development through China’s Belt and Road Initiative, illegal fishing, gray-zone maritime pressure from state-affiliated militias, and malign operations designed to undermine democratic institutions. Yet many frontline partners, small island states, and midsized regional powers lack the surveillance, communication, and intelligence infrastructure to compete in this space.

The Balance of Nuclear Deterrence in Europe after the Cold War

Chick Edmond

Cold War-era nuclear deterrence is arguably the most complicated and challenging security concept faced by European states. With the rise of multipolar world order, the ways in which modern European states apply deterrence have evolved dramatically due to ongoing tensions in Ukraine and rapid advancements in technology.

To safeguard sovereignty, states continue to utilize all instruments of national security, and in many cases, acquiring or upgrading nuclear weapons. Such as how the United States and the Soviet Union amassed enormous nuclear arsenals to promote national security domestically and internationally in response to rising tensions and competition for global influence during the Cold War.

Maneuver to Victory: The Ideal Post-Operation Venezuela – Breaking the Cycle of Failed Interventions, Before the Mid-terms

Donald Vandergriff

The perfect post-3 January scenario for Operation Absolute Resolve (often referred to in strategic discussions as Operation Venezuela), from my perspective as a longtime advocate of mission command, maneuver warfare, and the generations of war framework, would represent a decisive break from the failed attrition-based approaches and prolonged occupations seen in past U.S. interventions.

The January 3, 2026, operation—codenamed Operation Absolute Resolve—captured Nicolás Maduro and his inner circle in a precision coup de main, blending 3rd Generation maneuver (rapid, decentralized exploitation) with 5th Generation enablers (information dominance, cyber-shaping, and non-kinetic isolation of the regime). This avoided the quagmires of 2nd Generation firepower-heavy occupations seen in Iraq or Afghanistan.

Did A Mysterious “Sonic Weapon” Really Aid Delta Force In Capturing Maduro?

Joseph Trevithick

Aviral and as-yet totally unsubstantiated claim that U.S. forces used a mysterious “sonic weapon” that left security forces bleeding and stunned during the recent operation to capture Venezuelan dictator Nicolas Maduro has been getting a ton of attention. The allegation – amplified, but not expressly confirmed by the White House – does add to years now of persistent rumors of weapons very loosely similar to this description being in use globally, with separate news on that front having broken just today. When it comes to the United States, this has been further fueled by decades of known work on directed energy weapons, including ones intended to produce novel auditory and less-than-lethal effects.

The sonic weapon claim looks to originate with a video posted on TikTok on January 9 by an individual who goes by Varela News (and who uses the handle @franklinvarela09). The Spanish-language clip is a purported interview with a member of the Venezuelan security forces who was involved in the response to the U.S. operation in Caracas just over a week ago. The contents of the clip gained wider traction online after Mike Netter shared an English transcription in a post on X that same day. Netter is a political commentator and advocate who describes himself as the “main proponent” of the failed 2021 effort to recall California Governor Gavin Newsom. He is now Vice Chair of an organization called Rebuild California and hosts a radio show on KABC, a Cumulus Media station that broadcasts in the Greater Los Angeles area.

AI Applied to Tackle Energy Conundrums For Modern Battlefields

Josh Luckenbaugh

The United States is determined to be the global leader in artificial intelligence, and just as important as the models themselves is having the computing power to run them. Both government and private sector entities are pursuing AI solutions that would work in the energy-constrained environment of the modern battlefield.

The Trump administration is looking to expand the country’s AI infrastructure. The Energy Department in July 2025 selected four sites — Idaho National Laboratory, Oak Ridge Reservation, Paducah Gaseous Diffusion Plant and Savannah River Site — where it will look to house AI data centers and energy generation projects.

The Trump Doctrine

Seth Cropsey

The U.S. attack on Venezuela, much like its attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities last summer, was an operational masterstroke that undermines China, Russia, and Iran. It may undermine deterrence. America’s adversary’s may conclude that the Trump Doctrine, which has now been employed twice, means the U.S. acts with decision only when the United States faces a sufficiently vulnerable enemy, and only if it can fulfill specific operational criteria. China, in particular, may assume it can simply present too thorny a target for American power to crack. The solution is for the Trump administration to move beyond tailored strikes, and to wage a large-scale effort against America’s enemies through economic, intelligence, and alliance means.

The raid that captured Venezuelan narco-terrorist-in-chief Maduro was an instance of spectacular planning. Only the United States could have conducted Operation ABSOLUTE RESOLVE. The U.S. used technical means and high-end human intelligence sources from a clandestine team inserted into Venezuela months before the strikes to build a detailed picture of Maduro’s daily habits. It combined this with a likely offensive cyber effort that disabled Venezuelan electricity just as the operation began. In turn, U.S. carrier aviation and aircraft deployed from the American homeland simultaneously jammed and attacked Venezuelan radars and air defense systems, creating a corridor for U.S. Delta Force operators to insert into Caracas, capture Maduro and his wife, and extract him within 30 minutes. Some luck was involved, of course, with one helicopter taking damage from low-level anti-air fire. But any threat that Venezuelan defenses posed was mitigated to the greatest possible extent.

The Guardian view on Europe’s crisis of self-confidence: a new mindset needed for new times


Another week, another set of dilemmas for Europe’s beleaguered political class to deal with. On Wednesday Brussels is due to outline the terms of the €90bn loan it has promised to Ukraine, amid internal tensions over whether Kyiv can use the money to buy US as well as EU weapons. On the same day, the US secretary of state, Marco Rubio, is due to meet ministers from Denmark and Greenland, as Donald Trump continues to insist that the US will take ownership of the latter “one way or another”. And as the body count of protesters rises in Iran, the EU is under mounting pressure to do more than merely “monitor” the situation, as the European Commission president, Ursula von der Leyen, somewhat feebly put it over the weekend.

Beyond the crisis management, a deeper reckoning is overdue after a tumultuous beginning to 2026. It has long been a truism that there is a profound mismatch between the EU’s economic heft and its geopolitical clout. But only a year into Mr Trump’s second term, the disjunction looks unsustainable in the “America first” era.

The Trouble With Regime Change What History Teaches About When and How to Pursue It

Richard Haassuary 

For at least a decade, the conventional wisdom has been that direct attempts at regime change by the United States have ended in disaster. And for good reason. In Afghanistan, the very same Taliban that was dislodged in 2001 returned to power in 2021 after two decades of futile U.S. efforts. In Iraq, U.S. forces succeeded in permanently ending Saddam Hussein’s regime, but in no way was the result commensurate with the human, economic, strategic, and political costs. Then, in Libya, a U.S.-led NATO intervention intended to prevent the dictator Muammar

A massive Arctic military buildup will center on Greenland

Caroline Kennedy-Pipe

Donald Trump is clearly in a hurry to dominate the political narrative in his second term of office. He began 2026 with strikes in Syria against Islamic State groups, the kidnapping of Venezuelan president Nicolás Maduro, threats to intervene in Iran and the declaration that the US would take control of Greenland – by hook or by crook. Of all these the plan to add Greenland to the US either by negotiation or by force is easily the most controversial as it could lead to the break-up of the NATO alliance.

Greenland, the world’s largest island and a part of the kingdom of Denmark, has an abundance of critical minerals offering wealth and business opportunities. But the US president is also making a big deal out of the need to secure Greenland for US national security. He has repeatedly spoken of danger from Russia and China, whose ships, he says, stalk the island’s waters, most recently on Wednesday.

The Army Built an AI Talent Pipeline—But It’s Filled with Career-Killing Roadblocks - Modern War Institute

Nathaniel Fairbank

The Army is losing exactly the kind of artificial intelligence talent it insists it needs to win the next war. Only four of the seven Army Artificial Intelligence Scholars recently considered for on-time promotion to major were selected. That sub-60 percent promotion rate stands in sharp contrast to a population in which more than 80 percent of captains normally promote on time, with additional officers selected early. Not one of these scholars, nor any of the thirteen in the year group immediately behind them, was selected early. The three officers the Army declined to promote were not marginal performers: Collectively educated at West Point, Princeton, MIT, and Carnegie Mellon, one was among only three officers selected in 2021 for the program’s most technically rigorous track.

In practical terms, the Army chose not to promote officers—barely three years after finishing graduate school—in whom it had invested more than $350,000 each (counting tuition and the cost of pay and benefits while in school). In its first measurable test, the Army’s flagship AI talent pipeline produced worse promotion outcomes than the force at large, despite drawing some of the service’s most academically and technically competitive officers.

Grok is in, ethics are out in Pentagon’s new AI-acceleration strategy

Patrick Tucker

Seven projects are to lead the charge to embed artificial intelligence ever more deeply in military affairs.n The Pentagon’s third AI-acceleration strategy in four years sets up seven “pace-setting projects” that will “unlock critical foundational enablers” for other U.S. military efforts, the department announced Monday.

The six-page document also directs the department’s many components to fulfil a four-year goal to make their data centrally available for AI training and analysis. It omits any mention of ethical use of AI and casts suspicion on the concept of AI responsibility while banning the use of models that incorporate DEI-related “ideological ‘tuning.’”

18 January 2026

Russia and India Formalize Arctic Partnership

John C. K. Daly

During Russian President Vladimir Putin’s December 2025 visit to New Delhi, Russia formalized Indian military access to Arctic naval ports, training in polar operations, and logistics support under a five-year agreement, deepening Russia–India military cooperation in the Arctic.

The two countries also committed to developing key transport routes, including the Northern Sea Route, the International North–South Transport Corridor, and the Chennai–Vladivostok Eastern Maritime Corridor, aiming to shorten shipping distances between Europe and Asia.

Canada’s China Gambit: Strategic Fantasy Meets Geopolitical Reality

Stephen Nagy

Here’s the reality: diversifying economic relationships is prudent policy, but the notion Canada could meaningfully balance American pressure through Chinese partnership is strategically questionable and empirically unsound. In fact, Canada’s relationship with its southern neighbor runs far too deep, China presents an unreliable alternative, and Canada’s capacity for broader global engagement is limited.

A Relationship Greater than any Single Government

The scale and depth of the Canada-US bilateral relationship defy comparison. Over $900 billion in annual trade flows across the world’s longest undefended border. Integrated continental defense architecture—formalized through NORAD and deepened through decades of intelligence sharing—forged irreplicable institutional bonds. What’s more, hundreds of thousands of informal connections between businesses, universities, civil society organizations, and families transcend any single government’s policy preferences.

Managed Rivalry or Strategic Reset Between China and the U.S.?

James Durso

In December 2025, Wu Xinbo, Dean, Institute of International Studies, Fudan University and advisor to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, used the pages of Foreign Affairs, to propose a “grand bargain” between China and America.

Wu argues that U.S.–China relations have reached a pivotal moment that requires a comprehensive reset to prevent long?term confrontation. He proposes starting with economic cooperation—easing U.S. technology restrictions and increasing Chinese market access—while managing geopolitical tensions in Asia and exercising mutual restraint over Taiwan. He believes both countries must clarify their roles in the international order and accept coexistence to stabilize the relationship.

PLA Justice Mission 2025 Further Rehearses Taiwan Invasion Operations

K. Tristan Tang

The PLA launched another military exercise in late December 2025, with force scale and deployment locations broadly similar to previous drills.

The exercise nonetheless signaled an effort by the Eastern Theater Command to sustain year-round readiness, likely in response to Xi Jinping’s directive to achieve the capability to conduct operations against Taiwan by 2027.

Compared with earlier exercises, this drill advanced invasion-related rehearsals, including scenarios involving the seizure of the Penghu Islands and parts of eastern Taiwan.

Xi Projects Confidence in Shorter New Year’s Speech

Arran Hope

Exuding confidence, Xi’s new year’s eve speech heralded the start of a new five-year plan, praised advances in artificial intelligence and other emerging technologies, and declared that the country’s comprehensive national power had reached a new stage.

Military matters were unusually prominent in the speech, with the September 2025 military parade in Beijing eulogized near the beginning of his remarks. He also used this section to praise the establishment of “Taiwan Retrocession Memorial Day.”

The Iranian Regime Could Fall But a U.S. Strike Would Prop It Up

Jamsheed K. Choksy and Carol E. B. Choksy

Many thousands of Iranians are again risking their lives to protest their authoritarian, theocratic regime. And as it has done during previous protests, the regime is responding by cutting off the country’s Internet access, unleashing violence on its citizens, and blaming foreign scapegoats. The protests’ death toll is rising: Iran Human Rights, a Norway-based nongovernmental organization, estimates that over 600 demonstrators have been killed nationwide since late December.

Perhaps emboldened by his recent ouster of Nicolás Maduro, the Venezuelan leader, U.S. President Donald Trump has repeatedly vowed to launch military strikes if Tehran continues to repress protest. The United States “will start shooting too,” he warned on January 6, if Iranian protesters keep getting killed. Tehran’s heavily armed troops and militias have brutally suppressed previous demonstrations, and there is a genuine need to prevent a larger massacre. Moreover, the Islamic Republic appears more fragile than ever after last June’s 12-day war. The regime seems incapable of addressing the root causes of the economic crisis that has driven its people to the streets; protests have spread from Tehran to every corner of the country, revealing Iranians’ widespread lack of faith that their current leaders can set the country on a better course.

Navigating with StarLink-Signals in GPS-Denied Environments: Part 1

Benjamin Cook

These days, for weirdos like me, it’s really hard to figure out where to look as first. In Ukraine, the Russians have secured Sviatohirsk and are meanwhile infiltrating towards the last ‘big’ and ‘constructed’ Ukrainian defence line south of Zaporizhzhya (those who meanwhile understand how this war ‘works’, know of what ‘importance’ are such ‘field fortifications’).

In Iran… or around it: the king/majesty Dumpf of the USA seems to be setting up ‘help’ for protesters AFTER these have been massacred en masse by the IRGC-regime - to the degree where the protesting all but ceased - while at the same time ICE-ing protesters at home. And Israel is so horny to prompt him into an all-out attack on Iran - in order to distract from its continued genocide on Palestinians - that Netanyahu can’t care less if Dumpf is regularly dinning with Holocaust-deniers, and his aides are already openly considering a similar ‘turkey shot’ like when Israel has bombed all of Syria AFTER the fall of the Assadist regime.

War Spending Accelerating Russian Infrastructure Collapse

Paul Goble

Most of the Russian Federation is situated in the Far North—permafrost underlies 60 percent of its territory. Cold weather during winters puts a strain on infrastructure, including flight and road delays and breakdowns in the delivery of heat, electricity, and even water to many homes, schools, hospitals, and other facilities. Russians have learned to expect this, although in the past they sometimes have bitterly joked that it is hard to believe the Kremlin’s promises that it is ready to cope with a nuclear war, something that has never happened, when it cannot deal with winter, something that occurs every year (Window on Eurasia, January 7). This year, these problems have become much more serious as a result of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s war against Ukraine. 

Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian targets have destroyed key portions of Russian infrastructure (Sibir.Realii, January 6). Moscow has diverted most of the funding it had provided to reinforce and repair Russian infrastructure to its war efforts (The Moscow Times, January 4; Govorit Nemoskva, January 10). As a result, developments this year have become a political issue, sparking small but widespread protests by those most immediately affected (see EDM, December 22, 2025). Commentators and even Duma politicians have criticized the Kremlin, warning that because of the war and Putin’s policies, Russia faces not only temporary problems but is on the way to an infrastructure collapse that will likely take decades to recover (see EDM, October 16, 2025; The Saratoga Foundation, January 1; Dialog.ua; Charter97, January 6).

Moscow Uses Oreshnik for Psychological Pressure

Yuri Lapaiev

On the night of January 8–9, the Russian army launched a strike on a critical infrastructure facility in Ukraine’s Lviv oblast. The target was located around 70 kilometers (43.5 miles) away from the Polish border (Radio Svoboda, January 9). Later, the Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) was able to locate and identify fragments of the missile used in the attack. 

According to preliminary investigation data, it was an intermediate-range ballistic missile (IRBM), Oreshnik, which Russia had already used once to strike Ukraine in 2024 (see EDM, November 21, 2024; SBU, January 9). The Russian Ministry of Defense officially confirmed the strike, stating that the Russian Armed Forces had launched the Oreshnik medium-range mobile ground missile system against critical targets in Ukraine. The Ministry of Defense emphasized that this was a response to the alleged “terrorist attack by the Kyiv regime on the President of the Russian Federation [Vladimir Putin’s] residence in Novgorod oblast, carried out on the night of December 29, 2025” (Telegram/@mod_russia, January 9).

The Greenland Expedition

Mick Ryan

The following is a fictional narrative about an American expedition to Greenland in the coming year. It is written from the first-person perspectives of a military officer and civilian policy official in the Pentagon.

Eschewing the style of think tank papers, I have instead sought to provide a readable and more accessible account of what a very worst-case scenario for an American takeover of Greenland might look like. Indeed, any kind of military action should be considered worst case.

Like most others, I hope and expect that this troubling situation will be resolved in the coming months well short of military operations. But the world is an uncertain place, and there is no guarantee of that.

Will the U.S. Strike Iran? The Factors Shaping Trump’s Decision

Nik Popli

As nationwide protests shake Iran and security forces respond with lethal force, U.S. President Donald Trump has raised the prospect of American intervention, reviving a familiar question in Washington: what, exactly, would U.S. action in Iran look like—and to what end?

Publicly, the Administration has kept its options deliberately broad. The White House says that Trump has been briefed on military and nonmilitary alternatives, from cyber operations to targeted strikes, but has not yet reached a decision.

Yet on Tuesday, Trump signaled that he may soon authorize U.S. military strikes against the country’s leadership, calling on Iranians to keep protesting and promising that “help is on its way.”

Israel nearly struck Iran twice in recent weeks, former IDF intelligence chief claims

SHIR PERETS

Israel came close to striking Iran twice in recent weeks due to mutual miscalculations and fears of a surprise Israeli operation, former Military Intelligence Directorate chief Tamir Hayman said in an interview with 103FM on Monday.

According to Hayman, Iran’s preparations created a “coordination imperative” between Israel and Washington. He said recent near-escalations were the result of miscalculation risks, which in turn strengthened military cooperation between the IDF and US forces.

CNA Explains: What a US intervention in Iran could look like as Trump considers options

Chelsea Ong

As Iran's deadly crackdown on anti-government protests continues, US President Donald Trump faces a delicate moment as he weighs how best to respond.

The US military is considering "very strong options" against Iran, Trump said on Sunday (Jan 11), adding that it "looks like" Tehran had crossed his previously stated red line of protesters being killed.

More than 600 people have been killed, according to a rights group on Jan 12.

The mass protests in all of Iran's 31 provinces, triggered by an economic collapse, pose the biggest threat to the rulers of the Islamic Republic in decades.

Would Trump’s threatened strikes help Iran’s protesters or boost the regime?

Bilal Y. Saab

Donald Trump has once again threatened to attack Iran if it continues to use lethal force against the protest movement, which is growing by the day. ‘I tell the Iranian leaders: You better not start shooting, because we’ll start shooting, too,’ the US president said at a recent meeting with oil executives. On Sunday the president warned the US was considering ‘very strong options’ and claimed that Iran was seeking negotiations.

Already, Trump’s close national security aides are debating the merits of the use of military force, with one US official saying that ‘many think major kinetic action at this stage would undermine the protests’. Senior US military officials are also cautioning the president that more time is needed to prepare for such strikes.