18 December 2025

Afghanistan’s Uncertain Gamble for Economic Survival

Salman Rafi Sheikh

Afghanistan, in a desperate domestic struggle for mere survival amid an ongoing humanitarian catastrophe, a severe economic collapse, and a profound human rights crisis, is now caught in a dangerous geopolitical squeeze. India is maneuvering to exploit Kabul’s standoff with Islamabad, the United States is eyeing a return to Bagram amid its rivalry with China, and China remains Kabul’s closest ally, although its support is largely symbolic. Russia is the only state to formally recognize the Taliban, lending political legitimacy but offering little in the way of economic relief.

Meanwhile, Pakistan’s ongoing border closures are bleeding Afghanistan’s economy, cutting trade revenue by hundreds of millions of dollars every month. In response, the Taliban are seemingly pivoting toward Iran and Central Asia in search of alternative trade routes. But these routes come with high costs, fragile logistics, and uncertain returns.

Every move risks tipping the delicate balance between sovereignty and dependence, resistance and isolation, forcing Kabul to navigate a perilous path in a region where every alliance, every border, and every negotiation carries enormous stakes.

Top secret US report warns American forces would be drastically outmatched by China

Shweta Sharma

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The U.S. military is most likely to suffer a defeat at the hands of China if it tried to intervene in a war over Taiwan, a top secret Pentagon assessment report has found.Pentagon war games simulating a Chinese invasion of Taiwan have shown that Beijing could cripple U.S. fighter squadrons, major warships, and even satellite networks before they deploy effectively, the highly classified document, “Overmatch Brief”, warned.

Why China may be better placed than US in tussle for rare earths

Dewey Sim

During his Southeast Asia trip in October, US President Donald Trump sealed deals with Malaysia and Thailand on the same day – both aimed at securing and diversifying America’s supply chains for critical minerals and rare earthsTrump and Malaysian Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim agreed to step up cooperation on building and expanding critical minerals supply chains, according to a White House statement. They also agreed to strengthen the security of critical minerals and rare earths supplies in the two countries.

Using similar wording, the White House said the US would also “strengthen cooperation [with Thailand] on critical minerals supply chains development and expansion” and promote trade between the two nations in areas including critical mineral resource exploration, extraction, and processing and refining. The back-to-back deals reflect how resource-rich countries are becoming a key battleground in the contest between the US and China for control over rare earths and critical minerals. But Beijing could be better poised to court these economies than Washington, according to analysts, since China has long engaged with resource-rich nations – from Southeast Asia to Africa.

‘China threat’ narrative a ‘complete mislabelling’, economist Jin Keyu says

Sylvia Ma

A prominent economist has dismissed the “China threat” phenomenon as a “complete mislabelling”, arguing that the country has instead supported the global diffusion of technology by significantly lowering costs through production at scale.

Speaking at a summit on Tuesday, Jin Keyu – a professor of finance at the Hong Kong University of Science and Technology – also said China’s proposals for its next five-year plan indicate Beijing recognises the need to rebalance its economy and better harmonise with the rest of the world in a process she added will require patience.

“We have to recognise that the other angle is not China as a threat, but China as a great benefactor of the diffusion of technology around the world,” she said at the Global Supply Chain Business Summit in Hong Kong.

Economist Jin Keyu at a 2023 Ted Talk. Photo: Handout

She described China as a “huge contributor” to the proliferation of advanced technology, which she called “essential” for developing economies seeking to catch up with the rest of the world.

Jin attributed this to the country’s enormous manufacturing and innovation capacity, giving China the lion’s share of credit for the roughly 90 per cent drop in solar panel prices observed in recent years.

China Can Send 300 Thousand Troops to Taiwan Within 10 Days

Dmytro Shumlianskyi

Chinese amphibious vehicles land from the Type-075 UGV during an exercise. Photo credits: People's Liberation Army of China China’s landing ships can land 21,000 troops in the first wave of an attack, and 300,000 in 10 days if civilian vessels are mobilized. This is according to an analytical report by the Center for Transportation StrategiesThe confrontation around Taiwan could become the next hot spot on the current unstable geopolitical map of the world. Taiwan’s defense ministry has identified 2027 as the likely time for China’s invasion of the island.

Beijing’s main military power in the conquest of the island should be the navy, which China is actively building up. For example, China puts into operation 20-25 times more warships per year than the Royal Navy of the United Kingdom. Chinese main battle tanks are loaded aboard the commercial ferry Zhong Hua Fu Jing. Photo credits: China Military Online On December 4, 2025, China conducted its largest naval operation in the East China and South China Seas. The operation involved a hundred ships of the navy and coast guard.

Pronatalist Pivot Assessing China’s Policy Efforts to Boost Fertility

Kelly Atkinson, Tahina Montoya, Michael S. Pollard

China is experiencing declining birth rates and a rapidly aging population, resulting in a shrinking workforce and increased pressure on social services. The Chinese government has implemented a range of pronatalist policies aimed at reversing fertility decline, including the universal two-child policy in 2015 and the three-child policy in 2021, yet these policy measures have not corrected China’s plummeting total fertility rate or birth rate. The authors of this report assess China’s policy responses to demographic challenges from 2015 to 2025 and consider how China’s experience can inform U.S. policy responses to fertility decline and related demographic challenges.
Key Findings

China’s implementation of pronatalist policies has been highly unevenChina’s pronatalist policies have not reversed fertility decline or increased population growth to a sustainable rate, demonstrating the limits of state-led interventions in family decisionmaking.
China’s implementation of national fertility policies is highly uneven across regions, with national directives producing a patchwork of local practices that reflects administrative fragmentation and variable capacity.

How China Wins the Future

Elizabeth 

When the Chinese cargo ship Istanbul Bridge docked at the British port of Felixstowe on October 13, 2025, the arrival might have appeared unremarkable. The United Kingdom is China’s third-largest export market, and boats travel between the two countries all year.

What was remarkable about the Bridge was the route it had taken—it was the first major Chinese cargo ship to travel directly to Europe via the Arctic Ocean. The trip took 20 days, weeks faster than the traditional routes through the Suez Canal or around the Cape of Good Hope. Beijing hailed the journey as a geostrategic breakthrough and a


Iran Faces Critical Air Defense Gaps Against Israel At Home And Abroad

Paul Iddon,

A former Iranian president has said his country is highly vulnerable to Israeli airstrikes. He also indirectly acknowledged that Iran’s prior efforts to stand up air defenses against Israel in the regional countries between them have failed. He’s correct on both counts.

“The skies over Iran have become completely safe for the enemy,” said former Iranian President Hassan Rouhani earlier this month. “We no longer have real deterrence. Our neighboring countries – Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan – all have airspace controlled by the United States and Israel.”

Rouhani knows a thing or two about his country’s air defense. For one, he was the commander of Iranian air defenses from 1985 until 1991, which coincided with Iran’s lengthy and arduous war with Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. His two consecutive terms as president, from 2013 to 2021, coincided with Iran’s unveiling of several indigenous air defense missile systems, such as the Bavar-373 and Khordad-15. During his second term, Tehran sought to set up air defenses in neighboring states as an additional layer of defense against Israel’s powerful air force.

Trumps’ security strategy is making a hard pivot on China. Why now?

Jessie Yeung, Mike Valerio

When the Trump administration unveiled its new national security strategy (NSS) last week, many experts noticed one major shift: how it talks – or more importantly, doesn’t talk – about China. Gone are the sweeping declarations about China being “America’s most consequential geopolitical challenge,” as articulated by the Biden administration. Nor does it include much of the stronger language in the NSS of President Donald Trump’s first term, describing China in 2017 as challenging “American power, influence and interests.”

Instead, this latest document, one that every president submits to Congress outlining their foreign policy vision, emphasized the US-China economic rivalry above all – barely mentioning the concerns of authoritarianism or human rights abuses that had consistently peppered previous administrations’ reports. “There isn’t a single mention of great power competition with China. China is seen much more as an economic competitor,” said David Sacks, a fellow for Asia studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

At the Breaking Point: The State of the U.S. Foreign Service in 2025


America’s global leadership depends on a strong, professional diplomatic workforce. But in 2025, the U.S. Foreign Service faces an unprecedented crisis. Personnel losses, political interference, and the erosion of America’s soft power have pushed the diplomatic corps to a breaking point—just as global threats intensify.

To document the realities and challenges facing career diplomats in this moment of profound institutional strain, the American Foreign Service Association conducted a survey of its active-duty membership between August and September 2025. More than 2,100 diplomats responded—from entry-level officers to senior leaders, serving in Washington and at posts worldwide.

With the federal government’s own workforce survey discontinued earlier this year, AFSA undertook this study to fill the gap and ensure the voices of America’s diplomats are heard.
Read the Report

A drone ‘war is more silent and more deadly’ — and America is behind

Tom Mutch

Over the last year, the world’s attention has been focused on the U.S. administration’s chaotic push for a peace deal in Ukraine. The high drama of diplomacy between Trump, Putin and Zelensky has stolen the spotlight away from the gray, bloody realities on the battlefield. But the fact is that any settlement will be based on the realities on these frontlines.

It is here that the situation has been seriously deteriorating for Ukraine. The Russians, with a large advantage in manpower and munitions, are making serious advances into Ukrainian territory. New drone technology, and a lack of Western countermeasures, have aided them in slowly breaking down Ukraine’s weary troops.

The Ukrainian soldiers who had strapped the munitions to the drone hurried Stoyanova into the basement, where another group of soldiers are staring intently into screens, controllers in hands as if they were playing video games. These drone pilots are now Ukraine’s most crucial defense against the advancing Russians. Warfare has been revolutionized on these battlefields — and America is far behind in its understanding of how it operates.Ukrainian soldiers strapping munitions to a Vampire drone.

Russia Grapples with Western Hydrocarbon Sanctions

Sergey Sukhankin

The United States and European Union must persuade buyers of Russian goods to comply with sanctions to avoid repeating the pattern observed between 2014 and 2024, when international sanctions initially appeared highly threatening but ultimately had limited effects on the Russian economy.

In late October, the United States and the European Union introduced a new set of economic sanctions targeting the Russian Federation. The fuel and energy sectors emerged as the primary focus of these measures (see EDM, October 27). Western governments justified this approach because the sector—which is estimated to account for approximately 30 percent of total revenues in the Russian state budget—remains a crucial financial pillar sustaining Russian President Vladimir Putin’s regime and enabling its ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine (see EDM, March 24; Freedom, October 26; see EDM, February 27, November 4). There are numerous measures Russia may employ to circumvent these measures and mitigate their economic effects (see EDM, January 27, April 28). These include defensive and countermeasures that the Russian government could implement to reduce the intended harm of the sanctions and impose reciprocal costs on the principal architects of these policies.

Britain’s dangerous defence vacuum

Robert Lyman

Six months after its publication in June, the consensus is that it was half-baked at best. It’s easy to dismiss it as a piece of political theatre designed to burnish the Labour government’s wafer-thin defence credentials. A better conclusion is that it forms the recipe for action, rather than being the fully baked product. The document articulated a sensible direction of travel, but it was published – and remains – advice rather than policy – more aspiration than action.

For it to be useful as policy, it requires government determination to do things and government money to make these things happen. We haven’t seen much of either since June, apart from some superficial reordering of business. There might be something in the Defence Investment Plan to be announced early in 2026, but on past experience, I doubt it. The UK is skint, and a colour-coded pipeline of new opportunities is going to be a new lipstick on an old pig.

Orde Wingate, always audacious

Gordon F. Sander

He was slovenly, insubordinate, thin-skinned, self-possessed, and a sadist. He often took meetings in the nude. He munched on raw onions between meals and mused on such diverse subjects as yoga, the social beliefs of a hyena, and the behaviour of flies trapped under a tumbler.

He had a theory that men could store up energy like a camel and in between missions he would sleep for days or lie on the floor listening to symphonies on his dusty monograph, storing his ‘fat’, as he called it, for his next foray.

Guided by an inviolable belief in God and himself, in roughly that order, he led men into war in such far-flung places as Sudan, Palestine, Abyssinia and Burma, and left his mark on the peoples and military history of all those places, particularly Israel, where his name is still legend.

Moscow’s war bloggers and the grammar of dissent

Ksenia Rundin

The future of authoritarian information control depends on the cultivation of its critics.
Russian President Vladimir Putin delivers remarks during a face-to-face meeting with Russian war correspondents and pro-Kremlin bloggers. Credit: Kremlin Pool

On a June afternoon in 2023, Vladimir Putin, notorious for his paranoid distance from critics, sat down with military bloggers who had spent months lambasting his generals’ incompetence in Ukraine. They were a curated cocktail: state propagandists mixed with independent war correspondents, who command millions of followers. Together they constitute so-called ‘milbloggers’, or war bloggers.

The meeting was remarkably candid. One blogger complained that ‘the existing bureaucratic system’ promoted desk warriors, while talented commanders languished. Another criticised the defence ministry’s failure to deploy lifesaving electronic warfare equipment. They questioned why promised payments for destroyed tanks never materialised, why medical equipment was scarce in Donbass hospitals, and why conscripts were fighting in border regions.

The End of the Israel Exception

Andrew P. Miller,Danielle Del Plato

The bond between the United States and Israel has remained extraordinarily close for three decades. The United States has remained in lockstep with Israel through the heady days of the 1990s peace process with the Palestine Liberation Organization; the second intifada, the five-year Palestinian uprising that began in 2000; and then, over the next two decades, a series of conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon. The bond endured through Hamas’s October 7, 2023, terrorist attack on Israel and the ensuing war in Gaza, with two U.S. presidential administrations providing largely unconditional diplomatic and military support to Israel.

Trump’s Power Paradox

Michael Kimmage

In his first term as U.S. president and on the campaign trail for reelection in 2024, a variety of Donald Trump’s instincts were visible. One was an appreciation of power for its own sake. For Trump, it is power, not principles, that makes the world go round. Another was Trump’s view of prosperity as a talismanic organizing principle of foreign policy. “We are going to make America wealthy again,” Trump vowed in 2016. “You have to be wealthy in order to be great.” A third instinct was the close alignment of politics with personality. “Only I can fix it,”

The Price of American Authoritarianism

Steven Levitsky, Lucan A. Way, and Daniel Ziblatt

When Donald Trump won reelection in November 2024, much of the American establishment responded with a shrug. After all, Trump had been democratically elected, even winning the popular vote. And democracy had survived the chaos of his first term, including the shocking events at the Capitol on January 6, 2021. Surely, then, it would survive a second Trump presidency.

That was not the case. In Trump’s second term, the United States has descended into competitive authoritarianism—a system in which parties compete in elections but incumbents routinely abuse their power to punish critics and tilt the playing field against their opposition. Competitive authoritarian regimes emerged in the early twenty-first century in Hugo Chรกvez’s Venezuela, Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Turkey, Viktor Orban’s Hungary, and Narendra Modi’s India. Not only did the United States follow a similar path under Trump in 2025, but its authoritarian turn was faster and farther-reaching than those that occurred in the first year of these other regimes.

A senior Biden official turned ‘pale’ when he saw the classified assessment

Shweta Sharma

From reproductive rights to climate change to Big Tech, The Independent is on the ground when the story is developing. Whether it's investigating the financials of Elon Musk's pro-Trump PAC or producing our latest documentary, 'The A Word', which shines a light on the American women fighting for reproductive rights, we know how important it is to parse out the facts from the messaging.

At such a critical moment in US history, we need reporters on the ground. Your donation allows us to keep sending journalists to speak to both sides of the story.

The Independent is trusted by Americans across the entire political spectrum. And unlike many other quality news outlets, we choose not to lock Americans out of our reporting and analysis with paywalls. We believe quality journalism should be available to everyone, paid for by those who can afford it.

The Architects of AI Are TIME's 2025 Person of the Year

Charlie Campbell

The CEO of Nvidia enters a cavernous ­studio at the company’s Bay Area headquarters and hunches over a table, his head bowed.

At 62, the world’s eighth richest man is compact, polished, and known among colleagues for his quick temper as well as his visionary leadership. Right now, he looks exhausted. As he stands silently, it’s hard to know if he’s about to erupt or collapse.

Then someone puts on a Spotify playlist and the stirring chords of Aerosmith’s “Dream On” fill the room. Huang puts on his trademark black leather jacket and appears to transform, donning not just the uniform, but also the body language and optimism befitting one of the foremost leaders of the artificial intelligence revolution.

Still, he’s got to be tired. Not too long ago, the former engineer ran a successful but semi-obscure outfit that specialized in graphics processors for video games. Today, Nvidia is the most valuable company in the world, thanks to a near-monopoly on the advanced chips powering an AI boom that is transforming the planet. Memes depict Nvidia as Atlas, holding the stock market on its shoulders. More than just a corporate juggernaut, Nvidia also has become an instrument of statecraft, operating at the nexus of advanced technology, diplomacy, and geopolitics. “You’re taking over the world, Jensen,” President Donald Trump, now a regular late-night phone buddy, told Huang during a recent state visit to the United Kingdom.

(When) Will Israel Attack Iran Again?

Siamak Naficy

It is often said that peace between geopolitical competitors is not an agreement, but an intermission. Between one war and the next, capitals across the Middle East rehearse familiar scripts: missiles are replaced, alliances are recalibrated, and ghosts of deterrence float through every briefing room. Gaza bleeds quietly; Lebanon hums under the occupation that was never really lifted; and the Gulf monarchies, forever hedging, test how far wealth can insulate them from catastrophe.

The United States, for its part, still plays its strange double role — the restrainer and the accelerant. A superpower that deploys force to prevent war, but whose very presence guarantees that war will always remain an option.

The world watches the Strait of Hormuz for clues to the next shock. But if we’re honest, the question is no longer if the next Israel–Iran war will come. The question is when, and whether the next one will be the last that the region can survive.

Venezuela says Trump wants its oil. But is that the case?

Natalie Sherman and Shanaz Musafer

Venezuelan leader Nicolรกs Maduro says escalating pressure from the US comes down to one thing: Washington wants to grab the South American nation's vast oil reserves.

This week the American military seized an oil tanker, which was allegedly carrying Venezuelan oil being shipped in violation of US sanctions, and threatened action against other ships.

The move followed a series of military strikes on Venezuelan boats, which the US alleges are drug-trafficking vessels. President Donald Trump has called on Maduro to leave office, accusing him of sending narcotics and murderers to the US.

So is it Venezuela's oil that Trump really wants? And would it actually be worth it?

How much oil does Venezuela have?

It is true that with an estimated 303 billion barrels, Venezuela is home to the world's largest proven oil reserves.

Legal Reviews of War Algorithms: From Cyber Weapons to AI Systems

Tobias Vestner, Nicolรฒ Borgesano

States are obliged to conduct legal reviews of new weapons, means, and methods of warfare. Legal reviews of artificial intelligence (AI) systems pose significant legal and practical challenges due to their technical and operational features. This post explores how insights from legal reviews of cyber weapons can inform those of AI systems and AI-enabled weapons.

AI and cyber tools are similar and closely related. Both operate in the digital sphere and can be characterized as “war algorithms” when used for military purposes. In addition, AI can be used to control and deploy cyber weapons, while cyber weapons can be used to manipulate and counter AI systems.

This post addresses this correlation from the standpoint of legal reviews. It first delves into legal criteria relevant in the cyber domain that can help determine which AI-enabled tools deserve scrutiny, and how temporal considerations in legal reviews of evolving cyber weapons can inform when reviews of learning AI tools should be triggered.

Drones targeting European nuclear weapons infrastructure

Dr Daniel Salisbury

The drones were allegedly intercepted using a jamming system. French sources have been cautious in assigning culpability. Commander Guillaume Le Rasle, spokesperson for the maritime prefecture, also claimed that ‘sensitive infrastructure was not threatened’ by the suspicious flights.
High value nuclear targets
The submarine base at รŽle Longue is heavily protected because it handles nuclear warheads, missiles, and submarine nuclear-reactor fuel. France’s SSBN fleet carries around 240 of the country’s estimated 290 nuclear warheads, constituting most of its strategic deterrent. Recently, French forces have been at the centre of a debate over European nuclear deterrence amid concerns over Russian aggression and a withdrawal of support from the United States.

Events at รŽle Longue are the latest in a series of similarly mysterious flights over NATO nuclear bases as well as a range of other military and civilian targets.

Drones were observed over Kleine-Brogel Air Base in Belgium on three consecutive nights in early November 2025, prompting a helicopter deployment in response. Guards shot at ten suspicious drones seen over Volkel Air Base in the Netherlands in late November, although no wreckage was recovered. In December, two Dutch F-35s from Volkel scrambled to intercept an unidentified aircraft, reportedly a drone. Kleine-Brogel and Volkel are two of six bases located in five European countries (Belgium, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkiye) that together host 100 US non-strategic nuclear B61-12 gravity bombs.

Drone Dominance in Contact: sUAS Challenges and Adaptations at the Brigade Level

Daniel Temme, Clayton Cooper,Matthew Levengood

In accordance with the Secretary of War’s drone dominance policy, 2nd Brigade Combat Team (2BCT), 10th Mountain Division, is aggressively pursuing Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems (sUAS) employment within both collective and pre-deployment training. To account for the loss of organic reconnaissance capabilities as a result of the recent deactivation of cavalry squadrons and Military Intelligence companies across the Army, 2BCT stood up a Multifunctional Reconnaissance Company (MFRC) to provide 2BCT with modernized organic reconnaissance capabilities. As the only subordinate unit with trained UAS operators and maintainers, the MFRC incubated the brigade’s sUAS program before training sUAS operators in light infantry units across the brigade.

Throughout this process, 2BCT identified multiple obstacles that hinder the Army’s ability to rapidly integrate sUAS at scale. The focus of this field report is to articulate the challenges that cannot be solved at the brigade level. 2BCT identified four key obstacles and proposed solutions to the challenge of achieving drone dominance:

17 December 2025

The imperial past of Indian geopolitics

Ved Shinde

‘Every nerve a man may strain, every energy he may put forward, cannot be devoted to a nobler purpose than keeping tight the cords that hold India to ourselves,’ argued Lord Curzon, one of the few British viceroys in India to develop a lasting emotional attachment to the country. Curzon possessed a perceptive grasp of history and geography. It was geopolitics, for Curzon, that held the key to keeping India under British control.

In particular, having travelled across the larger Middle East in his formative years, Curzon understood the importance of the Persian Gulf for India’s westward security. Following in the footsteps of the Portuguese general Albuquerque, Curzon believed that a permanent British base in the Gulf could serve as a bridgehead to Bombay. The Persian Gulf is landlocked in all directions except the southeast. Mastery over the Gulf of Oman and the larger western Arabian Sea translated into control of the Persian Gulf. Geographically, Muscat is closer to Mumbai than Kolkata. If British ships could control the waterways of the Gulf, a seamless maritime highway would connect London’s interests in the larger Middle East to the Indian subcontinent. After all, other European powers had penetrated the East through the oceans. By the early twentieth century, when Curzon served in India as the Queen’s viceroy, Pax Britannica was writ large over the Persian Gulf. The cords of commerce connected the destinies of the Gulf sheikhdoms with the Indian subcontinent.

India: Leaning to One Side (Cautiously)

C. Raja Mohan

India’s fast-growing economy and expanding comprehensive national power make it more than a middle power; in fact, it has the potential to be a great power, albeit one facing significant constraints. As of early 2025, India’s aggregate gross domestic product (GDP) stands at just under $4 trillion in U.S. dollars and is growing at around 6% to 7% annually. It is on track to become the world’s third-largest economy by the end of the decade, but its low per capita GDP, at about $2,900, ranks 141st among about 190 countries. The vast divergence between India’s aggregate strength and per capita income is a result of its massive population of roughly 1.5 billion people. India’s challenges of nation-building are real and unlikely to disappear any time soon. Still, in global politics, aggregate size does matter, and it gives India a growing international salience. The strategic challenge for Delhi lies in leveraging its size to accelerate prosperity for its citizens amid intensifying competition between the world’s great powers.

Perceptions of India, both at home and abroad, began to change at the turn of the century as the country’s economic underperformance in the second half of the 20th century yielded higher growth rates generated by market reforms initiated in the early 1990s. The idea of India as a “developing” or “third-world” nation has given way to an image of a “rising India” that will inevitably take its “natural place” at the global high table. Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s government has set itself an ambitious goal to become a “developed nation” by 2047 — the centennial year of India’s independence.1 Reaching a per capita income of $12,000 to $15,000 (the lower threshold for developed status) by 2047 will be a demanding job,2 given the objective constraints India faces. These include the unfinished tasks of nation-building, a federal polity, a political class wedded to welfarism, and entrenched resistance to economic reform. Still, the country’s aspiration and commitment to its goal are likely to drive continuing growth and reinforce India’s upward trajectory in the international system, even if change comes at a measured pace.

China’s 2026 stimulus plan isn’t exports, it’s economic reform

William Pesek

TOKYO — There’s little doubt that China’s export engine is working its magic to get Asia’s biggest economy across the finish line to 5% growth.

Clearly, China blowing past his tariffs in 2025 to rack up a record $1 trillion trade surplus wasn’t on Donald Trump’s bingo card. Chinese leader Xi Jinping’s economy did it in just 11 months. That, while scoring yet another delay in trade deal talks – this one for 12 months. It means that the earliest the US president could hope for a ribbon-cutting ceremony with Xi is early 2027.

Yet, Xi’s Communist Party also knows that this same playbook won’t work in the 12 months ahead. Trump’s trade war is hitting US households hard, and demand from elsewhere is unlikely to enable China to export its way to 5% growth. This has Xi turning inward and relying on reforms to get households to deploy US$22 trillion in savings, which is key to ending deflation.

The Multipolar Mirage Why America and China Are the World’s Only Great Powers

Jennifer Lind

The churn of great-power politics shapes the world and touches, for good or ill, the lives of people everywhere. Wars among great powers have killed millions of people; victorious great powers have also set up international orders whose norms and rules affect global peace and prosperity. Great powers also intervene in other countries’ politics, covertly and overtly, sometimes violently. In other words, great powers matter.

Polarity—how many great powers there are—matters, too. Consider the past three decades of U.S.-led unipolarity. Freed from the constraining effects of a great-power rival, Washington deployed its forces around the world and conducted military actions in multiple countries, such as Afghanistan, Iraq, Libya, and Serbia. The dangers of bipolarity, however, are different. Superpowers in a bipolar structure compete obsessively, creating spheres and buffers by cultivating protรฉgรฉs and installing puppets. Multipolarity, meanwhile, in which three or more great powers are present, is said to be the most prone to war because alliances are precarious and the fluidity of alignments makes the balance of power harder to estimate.

China Coast Guard Increasingly Assertive

Ying Lu Lin & Tzu-Hao Liao

The China Coast Guard (CCG) led three intensive incursions into waters around the island of Kinmen in November. This marked a sharp escalation in operational assertiveness after a period of relative calm in October. Taiwan’s Coast Guard Administration (CGA) reported on November 20 that the 12th Patrol District from its Kinmen–Matsu–Penghu Branch detected a CCG vessel operating with its automatic identification system (AIS) disabled. This usually indicates hostile intent (CGA, November 20). The CGA responded by dispatching patrol ships to intercept the vessels. An hour later, four CCG vessels entered Kinmen waters from two directions, approaching from the southwest of Lieyu Township and the southeast of Liaoluo Bay in column formations. [1] The CGA deployed four patrol vessels to prevent the CCG ships from advancing deeper until the ships eventually withdrew.

These incursions reflect a broader shift in CCG tactics around Taiwan. Earlier operations typically employed “single-file” penetrations, but November’s actions featured east–west converging formations, testing Taiwan’s responsiveness to more complex maneuvers. By leveraging numerical superiority and larger-tonnage hulls, the CCG aims to impose continuous pressure on Taiwan’s offshore islands and to create conditions for isolating and encircling these outposts.

Taiwan Invokes National Security Law to Protect TSMC Trade Secrets

Meaghan Tobin and Xinyun Wu

In July, the Taiwanese engineer Wei-Jen Lo left his job after 21 years at the world’s leading computer chip maker, Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company. He soon started work at one of TSMC’s rivals: Intel, the struggling Silicon Valley chip maker that the Trump administration has wagered $8.9 billion to transform into the U.S. national champion.

Intel said that Mr. Lo’s decision to hop from one job to another was routine in a competitive industry. But in Taiwan, government prosecutors saw it as a potential threat to national security and started an investigation. Late last month, officials raided Mr. Lo’s homes in Taipei and Hsinchu, the heart of Taiwan’s chip industry, where they took computers and flash drives. A court also approved the seizure of Mr. Lo’s stocks and real estate.

The case is part of a new push by Taiwanese prosecutors to protect the trade secrets of the island’s world-beating chip makers. Taiwan is the source of most of the world’s advanced computer chips, which are essential to virtually everything from iPhones to cars. But as countries try to boost their domestic chip makers, the authorities in Taiwan are taking a stronger hand in protecting its prized technology.

Iran’s Water Crisis: A National Security Imperative

Scott N. Romaniuk & Erzsรฉbet N. Rรณzsa & Lรกszlรณ Csicsmann

Drought cycles are becoming more frequent and severe; this past autumn marked one of the driest periods in the last 20 years in contemporary Iranian history. For decades, national development policies assumed that engineering and extraction could overcome environmental limits. Today, those limits are reasserting themselves, and shortages are moving from rural peripheries into major cities, placing pressure on a political system already managing numerous economic, social, and national security challenges. Rising scarcity underscores the multifaceted ways in which water intersects with livelihoods, public trust, and national security, creating pressures that extend from rural communities to urban centers and shaping Iran’s domestic and regional policies.

These long-term pressures are not solely the product of climate variability. They reflect cumulative policy decisions, infrastructure choices, and social priorities that have consistently prioritized water-intensive agriculture, urban expansion, and industrial development. Iran’s national security is no longer defined solely by armies, weapons, or borders—it now hinges on something far more fundamental: water. Understanding these drivers is crucial to grasping how the country arrived at its current crisis, where domestic vulnerabilities intertwine with mounting regional tensions over shared water resources.

South Korea as a Rising Defence Exporter: Challenges and Opportunities

Dr Chung Min Lee

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, South Korea has emerged as one of the key sources of military equipment for NATO’s European members. South Korea deserves credit for building up its defence industries for the past half-century, and especially since the 2010s, but it faces an expanded threat envelope. How South Korea is going to meet an ever-growing menu of defence threats, and growing pressure from the US to assume a greater role in co-defending the First Island Chains, remains to be seen, but partnering with NATO will offer key dividends.

Direct European military assistance to South Korea in the event of a major conflict or even war is not impossible, but it is less likely given South Korea’s alliance with the US and its own increasingly sophisticated military arsenal. Nor is South Korea going to play a central role in helping to revitalise European defence modernisation. But at the margins, South Korean firms can play a key role in boosting European defence capabilities through joint R&D, European-based manufacturing of mid- to high-level weapons systems, and strengthening military supply chains.

If Trump Wants a “Golden Dome,” He Needs Elon Musk

Brandon J. Weichert

Elon Musk is set to win a massive $2 billion contract from the United States Department of Defense to build out the orbital sensor network that will form the backbone of the proposed Golden Dome national missile defense system. Consisting of more than 600 satellites, the satellite component of the Golden Dome will be the eyes and ears for the system. Placed in orbit, these systems will do more than detect and track incoming ballistic missiles. They will be used to identify and alert American defense planners to any potential hypersonic weapons and even drone swarms.

No One Comes Close to SpaceX’s Satellite Capabilities

Initially, the Trump administration was attacked by the Democratic Party in Congress for handing the massive contract over to Musk. After all, Musk is a special adviser to the president. SpaceX, Musk’s firm, winning that contract would appear to be political cronyism. In July, shortly after the Trump administration announced the Golden Dome, it made it clear that it was looking at multiple potential contractors to build the satellite sensing network that would undergird the Golden Dome system, not just Musk. At that time, both Trump and Musk had a falling-out that made it easier for the Trump White House to make clear their intention to look elsewhere for the satellites of the proposed Golden Dome system.

Why Russia is So Resilient

Irina Busygina and Mikhail Filippov

Putin’s system is often described as a hierarchy of power, a so-called power vertical, with direct centralized control flowing downwards from the Kremlin. In fact, the real operation of the system is more complicated.

While maintaining political control, the Kremlin delegates substantial authority to lower tiers of government. This delegation is an important source of Russia’s flexibility in times of war against Ukraine.

For many experts and practitioners, Russia’s remarkable resilience during the war with Ukraine came as a big surprise. The unprecedented wave of nearly 24,000 economic sanctions was expected to cripple the Russian economy by making it the most-embargoed country in the world. Instead, Russia’s businesses quickly spun around: trade with China, India, and the so-called Global South replaced closed Western channels, with natural resources providing the foundation for these new partnerships.