Maj. Christopher M. Salerno, U.S. Army
U.S. and Philippine service members download equipment from USAV SSGT Robert T. Kuroda (LSV 7) during Salaknib 2025 at Dingalan Bay, Philippines, on 6 April 2025. Combined joint logistics over the shore demonstrates the Philippine and U.S. forces’ critical capability of bringing vehicles and equipment to the shore in austere environments or when port facilities are unavailable and aims to enhance logistics, interoperability, communication, and cooperation between the United States and the Philippines. (Photo by Staff Sgt. Tristan Moore, 8th Theater Sustainment Command)
Distributed logistics across the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR) can directly support deterrence efforts and enable the joint force to campaign more effectively within the region. As the National Defense Strategy states, “For logistics and sustainment, we will reinforce our capability to quickly mobilize and deploy forces and to sustain high-intensity joint denial operations despite kinetic and non-kinetic attack and disruption.”1 First, the Department of Defense’s (DOD) efforts to create a contact force within the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) disruption zone demands a resilient sustainment infrastructure, which requires distributing formerly consolidated bulk supplies across the region. Second, this distribution requires a diplomatic effort to gain regional access agreements. Finally, distributed logistics directly enable deterrence by denial and resilience. The National Security Strategy describes how today’s decisions will lay the foundation for the necessary advantages to win in this competitive era.2 Establishing a distributed logistical footprint across the USINDOPACOM AOR requires significant investment over the next decade to support U.S. efforts.
Background
Secretary Lloyd Austin’s decision in the spring of 2022 to permanently shut down and drain the Red Hill Underground Fuel Storage Facility in Hawaii presents an opportunity to redesign the United States’ logistical infrastructure within the region.3 Red Hill contained 250 million gallons of fuel across twenty bulk containers underneath a mountain range.4 Built in the 1930s, Red Hill was the U.S. government’s initial response to concerns about the vulnerability of above-ground fuel storage facilities, which can be exposed to kinetic and nonkinetic effects across all domains.5 They specifically present a risk in the Pacific region as it consists of long sea lines of communication, and depending on a single bulk storage site undermines any sustained U.S. efforts in the region. The Defense Logistics Agency recognizes the dangers inherent in consolidated bulk stores.6 In his Red Hill announcement, Austin said, “The distributed and dynamic nature of our force posture in the Indo-Pacific, the sophisticated threats we face, and the technology available to us demand an equally advanced and resilient fueling capability.”7 This is true not only for fuel but also for the entire sustainment infrastructure. The decision to build a resilient logistical distributed infrastructure will now form the backbone of the successful U.S. joint operations concept for competing and winning in the region.
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