The Force We Need: Stand-off and Penetrating Airpower

Col. Mark Gunzinger, USAF (Ret.) and Heather Penney

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Decades of force cuts and deferred modernization have left the U.S. Air Force unable to simultaneously deter nuclear attacks, defend the U.S. homeland, and defeat Chinese aggression at acceptable levels of risk. Years of insufficient resources have also eroded the Air Force’s ability to conduct long-range, penetrating attacks against China’s centers of gravity and deny the operational sanctuaries the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) needs to generate air and missile attacks against U.S. bases in the Pacific. The net result: China holds a decisive advantage in combat mass that cannot be overcome by the United States and its allies and friends.

It is not enough for the U.S. to simply prevent the PLA from seizing ground on the shores of Taiwan. That by itself will not guarantee victory. A war-winning strategy must also deny sanctuaries to the PLA—including sanctuaries on China’s mainland—and enable U.S. forces to degrade China’s ability to launch long-range air and missile salvos that could cripple U.S. joint force operations in the Pacific.

But such a war-winning strategy requires a war-winning force structure to ensure the U.S. has the capability and capacity to defeat a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and deny the PLA sanctuaries from attacks.

The Air Force will soon field next-generation bombers and fighters with the range, survivability, and payload capacity to deny sanctuaries to PLA forces wherever they are. But these will be of little value unless the service acquires enough of them. Multiple studies have concluded the USAF needs at least 200 B-21 Raider bombers to meet operational demand for penetrating strikes. Stealthy F-47s and F-35As, supported by uncrewed Collaborative Combat Aircraft (CCA) and F-15EX stand-off strike aircraft, are also required at scale. Yet the Air Force is acquiring new fighters below the sustainment rate necessary to maintain its combat inventory. Delaying or truncating any of these acquisition programs now would create a fragile force unable to take the fight to China—a force incapable of achieving peace through strength or of winning should deterrence fail.