Ian Easton
Main FindingsThe People’s Liberation Army (PLA) views deception as a force multiplier and war-winning weapon. The PLA leadership reserves a special place of veneration for wartime commanders who can employ deception to obtain surprise, something Xi Jinping refers to as “excelling at stratagem.”
In January 1955, the PLA launched a surprise attack on the Yijiangshan islands, then controlled by the Republic of China (ROC) government in Taipei. This campaign remains a case study in the People’s Republic of China (PRC) for how to conduct amphibious operations and catch defenders off guard.
Empirical historical research shows that amphibious operations, while complex and difficult to conduct, almost always achieve their objectives. The critical factor is the shock they cause, and that is often enhanced by deception.
PLA textbooks and field manuals explicitly link the difficulty of a future Taiwan invasion with the need to embrace unconventional approaches. They exhort officers at all levels of command to use deception.
Advanced intelligence and surveillance technologies do not make a surprise attack on Taiwan unachievable. A zero-warning invasion remains virtually impossible, but it is also unnecessary from the PLA’s perspective.
Chinese military researchers envision employing robots, containerized missiles, and unmanned amphibious vehicles to confuse and unbalance Taiwan’s defenders in a future war.
American and Taiwanese strategists should account for unique ways the PLA may attempt to achieve the element of surprise and plan against those courses of action.
War games, simulations, and field exercises that account for a surprise attack on Taiwan could generate insights and help senior leaders rethink the levels of risk associated with current and possible future defense postures.
Immediate steps should be taken to cope with deception and minimize reaction times so that any sudden amphibious landings on Taiwan, while dramatic, will not be decisive.
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