The European Union’s schoolmarm in chief, Ursula von der Leyen, has called her unruly charges together this week in Copenhagen, where she will rap knuckles and extract commitments needed “… to enhance our readiness and have the tools to be able to react to threats when needed.” Exactly what tools the EU could employ to deter an aggressive Russia remains unclear, although they will certainly depend on money. Lots of money. Talk of a “drone wall” to protect all of eastern Europe from future airborne incursions is cheap, but the reality remains beyond the EU’s technical or financial capacity. As von der Leyen knows, cash is pretty tight in Europe. France is struggling to cut its staggering deficit, and even Germany recognises that its welfare state is not financially sustainable.
The EU as a whole is embroiled in a vicious backroom fight over its next seven-year budget, with the net takers resolved to retain their benefits, and the net payers determined to limit new spending. Commission plans to amalgamate farming subsidies and regional development aid under general national accounts are rightly seen by the primary recipients as a prelude to eventual cuts to these programmes, and they are fighting hard to preserve their traditional entitlements. Looming over this dispute is the impending need to begin repayment of the massive pandemic rescue loans incurred by Brussels, an obligation estimated to exceed 15 per cent of the bloc’s annual spending. At the same time, the EU is scratching around in the sofa cushions for the additional €9 billion Ukraine needs by the end of the year to continue basic government operations. Not exactly an ideal time to pass the hat for new and expensive military commitments needed to “react to threats when needed”.
But what other than cash does the EU bring to European security? It doesn’t command military forces, procure equipment, or possess a planning staff worth the name. NATO remains the indispensable security provider for Europe, with decades of experience in arranging national military budgets in the service of a common defence. Donald Trump managed a neat trick in arranging for EU states to buy American equipment for Ukraine. But additional EU monies funnelled through NATO will happen only over strenuous French objections. NATO cannot discriminate against American suppliers, and will use any EU money as it sees fit, which may well favour US defence contractor Raytheon over French defence corporation Thales. Were the EU able to issue debt and pour funds directly into defence programmes, it could claim an equal voice at NATO in how those monies were used.
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