Brian Chow
When General B. Chance Saltzman, US Space Force Chief of Space Operations, unveiled the Competitive Endurance theory on May 7, 2023, he made a prescient statement: “We’ve seen a demonstration of a satellite grabbed by another satellite’s robotic arm and pulled out of its mission orbit, and it doesn’t stop at tests.” That warning resonates even more today. Over the past decade, I have studied this so-called space stalking threat—focusing on how China and Russia have advanced this anti-satellite (ASAT) capability under the guise of dual-use rendezvous spacecraft, and how the United States must counter it.
Currently, these space stalkers can follow US satellites at uncomfortably close ranges during peacetime. With a command from the ground, they could disable or relocate American satellites with minimal debris and limited international outcry. Under Gen. Saltzman’s leadership, the Space Force has commendably began to take long-neglected critical steps to confront this threat. But the reality is sobering: US preparedness in space has been outpaced for many years. As a result, late readiness remains the Achilles’ heel in countering space stalking.
Given that Gen. Saltzman is America’s strongest asset in deterring and defending against the space stalking threat, I propose a set of corrective measures for his consideration and that of other senior leaders—building on his foundational and ongoing work—to ensure timely readiness. Four years ago, then–Chairman of the Joint Chiefs Gen. Mark Milley testified that Chinese President Xi Jinping had challenged the People’s Liberation Army to accelerate plans to seize Taiwan from 2035 to 2027.
Based on public data, we estimated that within several years, China could deploy approximately 200 space stalkers capable of disabling around 100 of the West’s most critical satellites—severely degrading the space architecture that supports US military, civil, and commercial functions in both wartime and peacetime. Such an attack would seriously undermine any credible US intervention in a Taiwan crisis by neutralizing key satellite capabilities for early warning, communications, navigation, and surveillance.
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