Brutality over precision’ — What the Army is learning from Russia in Ukraine

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Russian forces in Ukraine are learning that tactics based on “brutality” and quantity over quality can improve their fortunes, according to a 170-page report put out by the U.S. Army this month. Published last week, “How Russia Fights” lays out a series of hard lessons the U.S. troops are learning from Russia as its full-scale invasion of Ukraine steams towards its fourth year. The Russians have already reverted to Soviet form on the battlefield, favoring mass over maneuver, quantity over quality, capacity over capability, brutality over precision, and mobilization over readiness,” the report says.

Produced by the Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, it’s a rare look at how one part of the U.S. military is studying this war and what lessons can be taken from it. Based on events between Feb. 24, 2022, and June 30, 2024, it shows how Russia, despite sanctions, isolation, and battlefield losses, is rapidly adapting and refining a model of warfare that leverages mass, improvisation, and emerging technologies to sustain operations far longer than many expected.

One of the strongest themes in the report is how drones have become central to nearly every part of the Russian way of war. Quadcopter drones, often rigged with improvised explosives or thermobaric payloads, are used at every level of the Russian military. These systems are produced at scale, often through informal networks, and treated as expendable munitions. Russia is reportedly going through tens of thousands of drones per month, according to analysts and open-source tracking.

Drones are now directly tied into command and fire support. Fixed-wing systems like the Orlan-10 conduct intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance, or ISR. Targets are passed to artillery batteries or FPV drone teams that engage the target. Another drone confirms damage. In many cases, drones have replaced manned forward observers entirely. In contrast, Army units below the battalion level often don’t have their own drones, though efforts to fix that are underway.