The author of this report addresses the mismatch between the challenges that the U.S. Navy is likely to face in the international arena over the next decade and beyond and the Navy’s likely force structure. Over several decades, the Navy’s force structure has gotten smaller, although the overall capabilities of its ships and submarines have improved and expanded. In this report, the author considers potential force structure shortfalls and suggests possible adjustments that can be made to how the Navy approaches force structure development. The author recommends that particular emphasis be placed on platforms that are capable of being deployed in sufficient numbers to provide a persistent presence before crises develop.
The findings discussed in this report are based on research conducted from October 2023 to October 2024. Previously, the author spent several years researching the U.S. Navy and its interactions with potential adversaries, particularly the forces of the People’s Republic of China (PRC). In this report, the author applied this previous work to what is viewed as a significantly changed set of circumstances from those that drove the development of Navy force structure up to this point in history. This was an exploratory project intended as a roadmap for future study.
The U.S. Navy’s historical missions included presence and crisis response below the level of general war. These historical missions have provided options for decision-makers throughout the Navy’s history. The PRC invested in maritime military and paramilitary forces that allow it to coerce without resorting to high-end force. The Navy’s force structure is purportedly optimised for a major conventional battle, but military exercise results have cast doubt on the actual relevance of much of its force for such a campaign.
Small surface combatants may have significant value in crisis response and presence. However, the industrial base is not well positioned to produce them. The requirements process that the Navy employs is consensus-based and does not account for capabilities that lack significant community sponsorship. The force has insufficient capacity to meet either worldwide presence or crisis response requirements.The Navy is unable to meet the sustainment demands associated with a large and dispersed force structure.
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