Sarah Faris
The need to adjust U.S. deterrence policy to the particular values and perceptions of the Soviet leadership was well-established during the Cold War.[1] However, the need for “tailoring” deterrence to a variety of opponents and potential opponents in the “Second Nuclear Age” was recognized soon after the Cold War. Doing so mandates adjusting U.S. deterrence strategies to a broad range of opponents via a close and ongoing understanding of their respective values, perceptions and calculations—their decision-making frameworks. This “tailoring” approach to deterrence was introduced very early in the post-Cold War period in a briefing by Professor Keith Payne at U.S. Strategic Command.[2]
This article defines deterrence “tailoring” and identifies factors that should be considered under the tailoring framework. It also addresses why tailoring is necessary—as opposed to basing deterrence planning on generic “rational actor” expectations of opponents’ behavior. As an illustration of why tailoring is necessary, this article includes several case studies discussing the ways in which leaders’ decision making can be influenced by a variety of factors, including their cultural, ideological, and religious priorities. The need to tailor U.S. deterrence strategies follows directly from this diversity in decision-making frameworks.
Tailoring
Tailoring consists of adapting deterrence strategies to opponents’ decision-making frameworks, and the context of the engagement. This means that the character of U.S. deterrence threats, how and when they are communicated, must be based on an understanding of factors driving opponents’ perceptions and decision making. Opponents’ diverse decision-making frameworks will shape how they respond, in potentially unique ways, to U.S. deterrence strategies and red lines. Consequently, understanding these frameworks, to the extent practicable, and structuring U.S. deterrence strategies accordingly, can be critical to their reliability and effectiveness.[3] The contrary approach to deterrence assumes that opponents’ responses to U.S. deterrence threats and red lines are generally predictable because their behavior will follow a generic “rational actor model” of behavior. Historical studies, however, demonstrate that this approach is prone to failure because leaderships often do not follow a generically predictable pattern of decision making and behavior.[4]
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