Myanmar’s Election Gamble

Andrew Nachemson

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A protester holds up a sign during a demonstration against Myanmar’s military coup in Yangon, Myanmar on February 14, 2021.Credit: Wikimedia Commons/MgHla (aka) Htin Linn Aye

Most conflict experts will tell you that one of the surest ways to escalate violence during a civil war is to hold an election.

Internal conflicts generally arise when important political stakeholders fail to agree on fundamental principles governing a country. In Myanmar’s case, the military wants to serve as the government, while the overwhelming majority of people want it to have no involvement in politics at all.

This irreconcilable difference came to a head when the military seized power in 2021, three months after losing a second consecutive election in a massive landslide, sparking an ongoing civil war. With the military now planning to administer its own election in several phases in December and January, it would be no surprise if it were to be marred by violence.

Counterintuitively, some diplomats and analysts are hoping the election could actually be a pathway to deescalation, even though major pro-democracy parties are banned and the polls will be tightly managed to ensure victory for the military and its chosen proxies.

This is because the 2008 military-drafted constitution divides power among different political offices, power that right now is centralized in the hands of the coup-maker, Min Aung Hlaing. Some in the diplomatic community hope that even a simulated election will diffuse power among different military figures, potentially opening a pathway to political reform or dialogue with opposition forces.

But the military regime’s internal logic for holding the election is something entirely different. The junta primarily intends to use it to cement its growing, begrudging acceptance by the international community, particularly by regional countries. After weathering nearly five years of armed resistance, many of Myanmar’s neighbors have come to the conclusion that the regime is here to stay. This is in some ways a self-fulfilling prophecy, as they now turn diplomatic efforts towards stabilizing the country under that accepted premise.