3 October 2025

September 2025 Issue Volume 18, Issue 9

Colin Clarke, Clara Broekaert, Brian Michael Jenkins, Kathleen Collins, Animesh Roul

The prospect of, and the potential outcomes and dynamics associated with, possible U.S. military action against cartels in Mexico is the subject of our feature article this month—a commentary by preeminent terrorism scholar Brian Michael Jenkins, who has been studying terrorism for over half a century. In it, he describes a complex landscape of actors—from the FTO-designated cartels to the Mexican government to opportunistic hostile foreign powers—with various motives, objectives, and potential counter-responses that could shape and complicate the trajectory of U.S. military involvement and the U.S. campaign. Jenkins urges for “a clear exposition of the objectives to be achieved; a comprehensive appreciation of the situation; a thorough review of all options; and an assessment of the potential consequences of U.S. actions—in particular, an effort to anticipate surprises and possible responses, including escalation and off-ramps; the formulation of concurrent strategies to augment military efforts in Mexico with increased law enforcement measures at home; and above all, ensure domestic law enforcement preparedness for possible cartel responses.”

In our feature analysis this month, Colin Clarke and Clara Broekaert examine the current state of al-Qa`ida, two dozen years after the attacks of September 11th. As they note, al-Qa`ida’s pivot toward franchising has come with both advantages and disadvantages for the group: “Franchising allowed al-Qa`ida to survive a sustained U.S. counterterrorism campaign that decapitated its leadership and drove it from its preferred safe havens. It also helped al-Qa`ida weather the Islamic State storm … But at the same time, the dispersion and franchising model has watered down what al-Qa`ida actually stands for, having a deleterious impact on group cohesion and brand identity.” Despite some ideological incoherence, however, they warn that ignoring al-Qa`ida would be a mistake. “If left unmolested, al-Qa`ida will likely continue to regenerate at a steady pace over time … biding its time until it can strike again.”

Kathleen Collins traces the origins and development of two primarily ethnic Uzbek fighter groups in Syria—Katibat Imam al-Bukhari (KIB) and Katibat Tavhid va Jihod (KTJ)—that were instrumental in supporting Hayat Tahir al-Sham during its campaign for Damascus last fall. She outlines “KIB’s and KTJ’s ongoing ties to al-Qa`ida and the Taliban and recommends that policymakers and counterterrorism experts consider the implications of their continued presence in Syria under the new regime, as well as the potential consequences if they leave Syria.”

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