Exclusive satellite imagery shows China's rapid infra-push in Shaksgam Valley

Ankit Kumar

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Commercial satellite imagery exclusively sourced by India Today's OSINT team indicates China's claims over the disputed Shaksgam Valley may not be limited to political messaging. Beijing is rapidly extending its road network across the valley, supported by multiple construction and logistics sites which appear to have scaled up significantly over the last two years.

The latest high-resolution imagery from November 2025 shows new road alignments, construction support sites, possible cement production units, and ongoing tunnelling activity deep inside the valley.

Several of these new sites sit uncomfortably close to India's Siachen Glacier sector, prompting fresh concerns in Delhi. Earlier this week, China publicly reaffirmed its claims over the Shaksgam Valley shortly after India raised objections

What Do Chinese Analysts Say About the Thaw With India?

Namrata Hasija

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Just over a year ago, India and China reached an agreement on patrolling arrangements along the Line of Actual Control (LAC), covering legacy friction points in Depsang and Demchok. The deal effectively brought an end to years of military tensions on the border, which flared to life after a Chinese military operation in eastern Ladakh in 2020.

For Beijing, the recent diplomatic thaw with New Delhi – evidenced by the late 2024 border agreements and subsequent high-level dialogue – is not a sign of softened strategic intent, but rather a pragmatic, tactical maneuver designed to navigate a period of acute geopolitical stress. From a Chinese domestic perspective, the decision to manage the India relationship is largely viewed through the lens of China-U.S. strategic competition and economic interests. Within China, the discourse frames the current outreach not as genuine friendship, but as a cautious and conditional rebalancing aimed at preventing India from becoming an irreversible strategic partner of the United States while leveraging economic opportunities.

‘Not Your Father’s Afghanistan’: Is The West Tak­ing Its Eye Off The Al-Qae­da Ball? – Analysis

Graham Aikin

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On 19th September 2025, the US National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) released an unclassified intelligence product warning of the threat posed by Al-Qaeda. This is the first time such a threat assessment has been disseminated by the US intelligence community since the withdrawal of Western forces from Afghanistan in 2021 and highlights, along with other recent coverage detailed below, the risks posed by a resurgent al-Qaeda and other transnational jihadi terrorist groups. This piece will address Afghanistan’s role as a permissive safe haven and sanctuary for these groups, highlight some of the recent intelligence on their operational capabilities, and discuss diplomatic efforts and other initiatives that may offer some cause for optimism amongst observers of al-Qaeda’s re-emerging threat.

Background

Following the Afghan Taliban’s return to power 2021, Western intelligence services have suffered from a significant human intelligence (HUMINT) collection vacuum in Afghanistan and a limited ability to engage with in-country HUMINT sources. Operational limitations, and the fact that sources felt abandoned by the US and its coalition partners, has limited cooperation with Western ‘3-letter’ intelligence agencies such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the Secret Intelligence Service (SIS, aka MI6), who have had to rely on their regional liaison partners, such as the Jordanians, for in-country HUMINT collection.

Xi’s Taiwan Scorecard: Why 2026 Is Not the Year

Joe Keary

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A Chinese attempt at blockading or invading Taiwan in 2026 is unlikely. Instead, Beijing is likely to persist with its toolkit of coercive actions to erode Taiwan’s will and narrow its strategic options.

President Xi Jinping’s decision on whether to attempt to take control of the island democracy is driven by his own assessment of risk. While China’s military capabilities advanced rapidly in 2025, domestic and international considerations likely continue to complicate the case for using force against Taiwan.

The Quiet War With China

Paul F. Renda

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When most of us think of war, we picture bombs, soldiers, and fighter jets. The biggest fear in many people’s minds, especially during election seasons, is a nuclear war. But there is another kind of war happening right now, one that doesn’t use missiles but is just as important. It’s an economic war. In today’s world, the country that controls the global economy is the most powerful. And right now, the United States is in a serious long-term struggle with China for that top spot.

To understand this competition, we need to look at history. China has a civilization that goes back over 5,000 years. The United States, in comparison, is a young nation—only about 250 years old. America has been an incredible experiment in democracy and freedom. However, China’s long history has taught its people some hard lessons. Over thousands of years, China has been both the richest empire in the world and the poorest. That experience taught them how to survive when times are tough, how to be patient, and how to plan for the long term. It’s like the difference between a kid who grows up with every advantage and a kid who has to work hard for everything. The one who struggles often learns more about how the world really works.

China-Venezuela Fact Sheet: A Short Primer on the Relationship

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Venezuela has been one of China’s closest partners in Latin America. China’s relationship with Venezuela grew rapidly after Hugo Chavez was elected in 1998. In 2023, the two countries elevated their relationship to an “all-weather strategic partnership,” a high-level diplomatic designation that signals long-term cooperation across politics, trade, energy, and other areas.

Beijing has developed deep economic ties with Venezuela over the past two decades. Chinese policy banks loaned more to Venezuela than any other Latin American country; at least $10 billion in Chinese bank loans is outstanding. China also purchases most of Venezuela’s oil, which accounts for over half of Venezuela’s fiscal revenue, despite U.S. sanctions.

Why did Venezuela’s air defence fail in US’ Caracas raid?

John Hill

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The Russian-made air defence systems which Nicolas Maduro, the captured Venezuelan President, touted in October last year proved ineffective against US Special Forces on the night of the 3 January 2026.

There are widespread reports and analysis assessing the total failure of the Venezuelan military’s anti-air capability – which leans on the legacy S-300VM air defence system – to shoot down low-flying MH-47 Chinook helicopters.

However, American operational success must not encourage complacency among Nato, warned Dr Tom Withington, an associate fellow of the Royal United Services Institute in London and a senior non-resident fellow at the Nato defence college in Rome.

Strategic Snapshot: Russia–PRC Technology and Hybrid Operations

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Technological innovation is reshaping the modern battlefield. Russia and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) are combining conventional warfare with electromagnetic disruption, cyber attacks, digital influence campaigns, and unmanned and autonomous systems to target U.S. partners and allies. The frontline states of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) are under mounting pressure from these new technological threats. Russian violations of Polish, Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian, and Romanian airspace, as well as GPS spoofing and sabotage of critical undersea infrastructure, particularly fiber-optic cables, in the Baltic and Arctic regions, illustrate the expanding scope of targeting technology and its use for subversive means. These activities reflect a broader shift toward multi-domain warfare, where ambiguity and deniability are key assets.

Drone warfare is now a central feature of this evolving technological domain. Ukraine has become a world-leading drone producer and pioneer of maritime and autonomous systems since Russia’s full-scale invasion began in 2022. The PRC has also recently unveiled new unmanned systems capabilities for use in a Taiwan contingency, signaling its intent to operationalize lessons from Russia’s war in Ukraine.

How Venezuela turned massive oil wealth into economic ruin

John P Ruehl

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Following the dramatic seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro on January 3, 2026, Trump’s comments about taking control of Venezuela’s oil industry quickly triggered accusations of “neo-imperialism.”

Critics argued that pledges to share profits with Venezuela were little more than cover to protect the interests of America’s major oil companies. Yet despite the allure of Venezuela’s reserves, many of those major oil firms have been notably cautious, citing uncertainty over the country’s political trajectory and the durability of legal and financial protections.

The united West is dead

Mark Leonard

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The international liberal order is ending. In fact, it may already be dead. White House Deputy Chief of Staff Stephen Miller said as much last week as he gloated over the U.S. intervention in Venezuela and the capture of dictator Nicolás Maduro: “We live in a world … that is governed by strength, that is governed by force, that is governed by power … These are the iron laws of the world.”

But America’s 47th president is equally responsible for another death — that of the united West.

And while Europe’s leaders have fallen over themselves to sugarcoat U.S. President Donald Trump’s illegal military operation in Venezuela and ignore his brazen demands on Greenland, Europeans themselves have already realized Washington is more foe than friend.

The Greenland Expedition

Mick Ryan

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The following is a fictional narrative about an American expedition to Greenland in the coming year. It is written from the first-person perspectives of a military officer and civilian policy official in the Pentagon.

Eschewing the style of think tank papers, I have instead sought to provide a readable and more accessible account of what a very worst-case scenario for an American takeover of Greenland might look like. Indeed, any kind of military action should be considered worst case.

Like most others, I hope and expect that this troubling situation will be resolved in the coming months well short of military operations. But the world is an uncertain place, and there is no guarantee of that.

Trump Declares Anything Less Than U.S. Control of Greenland Is ‘Unacceptable’

Olivia-Anne Cleary

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President Donald Trump doubled down on his insistence that the U.S. annexes Greenland, arguing that any other alternative is simply “unacceptable.”

Repeating his stance that the annexation of the territory is needed for “national security” purposes, Trump on Wednesday morning insisted that NATO “should be leading the way for us to get it” claiming that “NATO becomes far more formidable and effective” with Greenland under the jurisdiction of the U.S.

Trump’s comments came hours before the Danish and Greenland foreign ministers, Lars Løkke Rasmussen and Vivian Motzfeldt, were set to engage in a high-stakes meeting with U.S. Vice President J.D. Vance and Secretary of State Marco Rubio at the Eisenhower Executive Office Building next to the White House.

How Much More Oil from Venezuela—and How Soon?

Clayton Seigle

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Venezuelan oil production could rebound under adequate political, legal, fiscal, and operating conditions.

The multi-decade history of Venezuelan oil production illustrates the collapse in productive capacity from its high point around 3.4 million barrels per day in the 1970s to less than 1 million barrels per day in the 2020s; this was caused by oil sector expropriations, chronic government mismanagement and underinvestment, and crippling sanctions.

In a modest growth scenario that assumes adequate political, legal, fiscal, and operating conditions, Venezuelan oil output could rebound to approximately 1.5 million barrels per day by 2028 as sanctions ease and damaged existing oil wells are refurbished.

Trump’s Greenland Ambition Is About U.S. Power, Not Alliances

Sir Robin Niblett

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Danish and other European governments are struggling to decide how to manage President Donald Trump’s latest demands that Greenland become part of the United States. This week, foreign ministers from Denmark and Greenland are making the case in Washington to Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Vice President JD Vance that Greenland’s security from Russian and Chinese encroachment would best be enhanced through joint investments by the United States and its European allies under the framework of NATO and the 1951 bilateral treaty between the Danish and U.S. governments. European leaders have recently suggested building a new NATO mission, “Arctic Sentry,” modelled on the ongoing “Baltic Sentry” mission.

Minerals at War: Strategic Resources and the Foundations of the U.S. Defense Industrial Base

Gracelin Baskaran and Samantha Dady

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Across major conflicts, the United States has repeatedly mobilized extraordinary state intervention—stockpiles, price controls, public financing, and foreign procurement—to overcome minerals supply shocks, only to dismantle these systems during periods of perceived stability. The historical record reveals recurring failures: overreliance on stockpiles absent industrial capacity, neglect of processing and refining, erosion of domestic expertise, and complacent assumptions about markets and allies. The post–Cold War drawdown marked the most severe rupture, hollowing out U.S. 

Minerals capabilities and amplifying dependence on foreign, and eventually adversarial, supply chains. This paper traces the evolution of U.S. critical minerals policy in twentieth-century military industrialization, illustrating how a position of resource dominance gave way to economic and national security vulnerabilities. The central lesson is clear: Critical minerals security is a permanent national security challenge that requires continuous stewardship, integrated industrial policy, and durable engagement with allies, not episodic crisis response or faith in market self-correction.

U.S. Cyber Capabilities to Deter and Disrupt Malign Foreign Activity Targeting the Homeland

Emily Harding

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Washington has failed to establish deterrence in the cyber domain, and our adversaries control the escalation ladder. Historically, U.S. foreign policy has rested on deterrence, with implied escalation dominance in any domain. But that foundation has failed in the context of cyber. U.S. responses to cyberattacks have been muted, and escalation dominance does not exist.

The U.S.’s offensive cyber capabilities are strong, perhaps unmatched. U.S. Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) has repeatedly proven its capability to disrupt adversary activity, when given the chance. This demonstrated skill, coupled with overall U.S. strength, makes deterrence in the cyber domain possible.

The two Americas

Damian Valdez

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Cuba in 1959 was both festive and sombre. Jubilation greeted the flight of the dictator Fulgencio Batista, who left the island as Che Guevara and Fidel Castro were poised to enter the capital, Havana. Soon after this, special tribunals in an old colonial fortress ran the juicios sumarios, short trials of former regime officials, which often ended with a death sentence and a firing squad. That year, my Mexican grandfather went to Cuba with a skilled cameraman to make a documentary about the Cuban Revolution. 

He met Raúl Castro, the leader’s brother and hardliner, among others. One day, he was on an internal flight over the island, which happened to be transporting batistianos, or members of the old regime, whose fate, no doubt, was not going to be merciful. Suddenly, they overpowered their revolutionary guards, known as barbudos (bearded ones), and grabbed their weapons. They then ordered the pilot to fly to the Dominican Republic, hoping that the country’s friendly dictator, Rafael Trujillo, might welcome them with open arms. The barbudo pilot told the batistianos: ‘I will land wherever you like on the island but not beyond.’ When the gun-wielding batistiano insisted, the pilot lifted his hands from the controls and said, llévatelo tú! (you fly it!). As the plane began to dive, the old regime hijackers had no answer and were check-mated. They landed in Cuba, to my grandfather’s relief.

Venezuela Uncovers the Limits of China’s Security Promise in Latin America

Emma Belmonte and Paulína Ovečková

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In recent months, the X account of the Venezuelan media outlet Polianalítica, followed by over 63,000 users, published a series of posts portraying Beijing as a steadfast political and security backer of Caracas. On November 24, a post claimed that “China announced it will provide military help to Venezuela if it faces foreign invasion.” Other X users flagged the claim as false, yet the post was reshared more than a thousand times. It generated a large number of mocking responses, as users quickly identified the announcement as ludicrous.

This episode proved both telling and ironic – less than six weeks later, Venezuela’s president was captured in a U.S. military operation. The Polianalítica post was a prime example of the distorted and often exaggerated perception of China’s role as a security actor in Latin America.

In Defense of the Aircraft Carrier

Wilson Beaver, and Robert Peters

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It has become fashionable to argue that aircraft carriers are becoming obsolete. Critics question their value in an era of technological advancement, when new capabilities such as advanced autonomous systems and hypersonic missiles increasingly render the US Navy’s biggest and most prominent ships “too large and too slow” to evade missiles and drones.

They point to the Ukrainian sinking of the Russian missile cruiser Moskva to claim that American carriers would stand little chance of survival during a conflict with China. The US Navy, they insist, should instead invest in various experimental drones and autonomous surface vessels.

These critics, however, are comparing apples to oranges. They’re drawing conclusions far beyond the lessons of the war in Ukraine—conclusions that have no bearing on US military requirements in a potential conflict with China in the Pacific.

Russia Continues To Equip Shahed Drones With Aerial Missiles, Suggesting Could Soon Target Commercial Or Military Aircraft – Analysis

Can Kasapoğlu

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Last week Russian and Ukrainian forces waged an average of one to two hundred tactical engagements per day, a slower operational tempo than in recent weeks. Still, increased aerial attacks from the Russian Aerospace Forces tested Ukraine’s defenses. Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy warned that the increase in Russian air activity could presage even larger salvos in the coming weeks. Amid harsh winter conditions, Ukraine struggled to repair its energy infrastructure and electrical grid to contend with Russia’s onslaught.

The front lines remained dangerous but largely static. Both Russian and Ukrainian drone warfare formations deployed low-cost robotic weapons 60 to 80 miles behind lines of contact, attacking tactical depth. As this report has previously noted, the Russian military’s specialized Rubicon drone unit is ramping up the operational tempo of its long-range strikes.

Ukraine’s Military Mobilization Challenge

Andreas Umland, and Jakob Hedenskog

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During the first months of Russia’s full-scale invasion that started in February 2022, many Ukrainian volunteers—male and female—joined the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU), including the Territorial Defense Forces, in order to rescue their fatherland. The AFU’s initial aptitude to push back the much larger Russian army surprised the outside world. Equally astonishing has been Ukraine’s ability to hold the frontline against Russia. Few other European nations would have been able to do so.

Nevertheless, since 2023, the recruitment of additional Ukrainian men and women for military service has become increasingly challenging for Kyiv. There is a growing gap between those who serve and those who have been able to evade mobilization. This injustice is demoralizing and creates growing problems for Ukrainian social-political cohesion.

Confronted with thorny problems, Trump turns to the military

Jack Detsch and Paul McLeary

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President Donald Trump threatened to unleash a familiar tool this week when he sought to stop protests against immigration agents in Minnesota: the military. His warning to send federal troops into the state came as administration officials debated whether to order Pentagon strikes against Iran and use troops to seize Greenland from Denmark. Faced with a domestic or international problem this term that he can’t resolve with traditional diplomacy or politicking, Trump has increasingly turned to the armed forces as an initial option rather than a last resort.

When Venezuela’s leader wouldn’t step aside, he sent special forces into the country to grab him. When he thought negotiating with Iran over its nuclear program wasn’t working, he ordered U.S. missiles to destroy their development facilities. And when he wanted to lower crime rates in Democratic cities, he deployed the National Guard.

Mark Carney in China positions Canada for ‘the world as it is, not as we wish it’

Amy Hawkins and Leyland Cecco

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Mark Carney’s trip to Beijing this week secured what he described as a “preliminary but landmark” trade deal and a recognition – welcomed by Beijing – that countries are operating in a “new world order”. Carney’s visit is the first time in nearly a decade that a Canadian prime minister has been welcomed in Beijing. It comes after years of a deep freeze in the relationship between Ottawa and Beijing that Carney wants to thaw, in order to reduce his country’s precarious reliance on the United States.

Guy Saint-Jacques, a former Canadian ambassador to China, said: “The main goal of trying to reset or recalibrate the relationship with China has been achieved during this trip.” That recalibration comes at a delicate moment for geopolitical alliances between North American countries and China. “Mr Carney is driven by a sense of urgency. And this urgency comes from the difficulties that we have with our neighbour to the south,” Saint-Jacques said.

America’s Special Forces Are Caught Up in the AI Craze

Stavros Atlamazoglou

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Special Operations Command hopes that AI can help during night raids—when it can quickly process information extracted from target sites, allowing for faster subsequent raids. US special operators are trying to use artificial intelligence to process data faster and improve the targeting process.

How AI Could Help Special Forces During “Sensitive Site Exploitation”

According to a special notice issued by the US Special Operations Command (SOCOM), US special operators are seeking industry information on facial recognition, speaker identification, and DNA profiling capabilities. Sensitive site exploitation is the process of gathering and processing intelligence gathered on the target to further the targeting process. Information can be gathered from both human and non-human sources.

“Virtual Reality” Training Could Be a Godsend for the US Army

Peter Suciu

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The Army has already begun some “virtual reality” training—using VR headsets to prepare soldiers to operate vehicles without needing them to be physically present at those vehicles’ location. Logistics are a perpetual pain for the United States military. Moving large numbers of military personnel across continents for exercises, or even for routine training, is a costly and time-consuming operation that usually reduces the time troops can spend for more useful purposes. To address this issue, the US Army announced this month it would begin to “train differently,” increasingly employing virtual and augmented reality (VR/AR).

How VR and AR Can Help Train US Troops

The new technology could further reduce temporary duty assignments (TDY), or short-term moves, which can last from days to months. AR/VR will allow training to be conducted at a soldier’s home station, explained Army Chief of Staff Gen. Randy George during a virtual town hall at Fort Drum, New York. According to a report from Task & Purpose, AR/VR could be used in classroom lessons to provide detailed insight into weapon systems and battlefield tactics. It could be employed at all levels of the service, from enlisted personnel to general officers.