Robert S. Hinck
The 2022 U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) and National Security Strategy place integrated deterrence as the centerpiece of U.S. strategy. Integrated deterrence—which “entails working seamlessly across warfighting domains, theaters, the spectrum of conflict, all instruments of U.S. national power, and [America’s] network of Alliances and partnerships”—is to be tailored to specific circumstances and applies a coordinated, multifaceted approach to reducing competitors’ perceptions of the net benefits of aggression relative to restraint.1 As this lengthy description suggests, integrated deterrence draws on multiple approaches to deterrence to create a holistic strategy in pursuit of American national interests.2 It represents a far broader view than previous U.S. approaches to deterrence—one that can succeed if made actionable.
While the strategic vision laid out in the NDS is praiseworthy in its scope and direction, criticisms remain.3 First, operational concerns include the apparent tasking of the Department of Defense (DOD)—now the Department of War (DOW)—with the execution of integrated deterrence. This tasking is problematic given the stated intent to align all instruments of national power, not just the military. It also leads to doubt as to whether the interagency community is capable of coordinating a unity of effort
No comments:
Post a Comment