16 June 2022

100 days of Russia-Ukraine conflict: How China's choices have damaged its external environment

Manoj Kewalramani 

Earlier this week, a lengthy front page commentary in the People’s Daily, the Chinese Communist Party’s flagship newspaper, bemoaned the deterioration of China’s external environment. The author warned that following the war in Ukraine, “instability, uncertainty and insecurity” were on the rise, and that the West, led by the US, was doubling down on policies aimed at “containing and suppressing” China.

Although the author called for focus on running internal affairs well and dismissed external factors as not being “decisive” in China’s pursuit of its goal of national rejuvenation, the assessment does reveal how deeply the war in Ukraine has adversely affected China’s strategic interests.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in late February had left China in an unenviable position of having to balance a set of competing interests. These included maintaining its close alignment with Russia; containing the economic costs of Western sanctions in terms of their impact on commodity prices, supply chains and Chinese enterprises; not appearing supportive of what was clearly a blatant violation of the territorial integrity of a sovereign state; avoiding the acceleration of bloc-style confrontation in the Indo-Pacific; and keeping the developing world on its side.

In response, Beijing has muddled through, achieving sub-optimal outcomes.

Ever since the war began, China has sought to preserve and deepen its strategic partnership with Russia. While talking about upholding the principles and purposes of the UN Charter and its position of respecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all countries, Beijing has refused to condemn Russia’s actions as an invasion. Instead, it has extended tremendous rhetorical support to Moscow.

Chinese diplomats and state media outlets have not only adopted the Russian narrative of NATO’s eastward expansion and the US’ quest to sustain its hegemony being the root cause of the conflict, they have also acted as agents of amplification for Russian disinformation.

China has also lent diplomatic support to Russia at different levels. For instance, Xi Jinping is the only leader of a major country to not have a conversation with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky since the war began. Beijing has also backed Moscow at multilateral forums, including the UNSC and UNGA, while demanding that the G20 meeting scheduled for November not be politicised. More recently, four Chinese and two Russian bombers conducted joint flights together around Japan and South Korea during President Joe Biden’s visit to Tokyo. This was the first such joint drill between the two countries since the war began.

While all of this indicates a deeper strategic congruence of interests as was outlined in the February 4 joint statement between Vladimir Putin and Xi Jinping, Beijing’s economic policies demonstrate that there are limits to the China-Russia partnership.

China-Russia trade from January to April expanded by nearly 26 per cent from a year earlier to hit $51.09 billion, with growth of Chinese imports, dominated by energy imports, far outpacing the growth of its exports to Russia. Reports also suggest that specific Russia-linked projects, such as the Russia-China Eastern Route gas pipeline, are progressing.

However, there is evidence that Chinese enterprises have been extremely cautious in terms of their dealings in order to avoid falling foul of Western sanctions. For instance, data show that Chinese technology exports to Russia have fallen significantly after the sanctions came into effect. Earlier this month, US Secretary of Commerce Gina Raimondo said that the US was not “seeing systematic efforts by China to go around our export controls.” Earlier this week, Secretary of State Antony Blinken confirmed that ”thus far we have not seen from China any systematic effort to help Russia evade sanctions, nor have we seen any significant military support from China to Russia.” Recent reports also suggest that the situation has led to some difficult exchanges between Beijing and Moscow.

Despite this, the strategic linkages between China and Russia are only likely to deepen. This is in large part because of their shared views on the threats posed by US policy. As Chinese deputy foreign minister Le Yuchen said in late March, the “Ukraine crisis provides a mirror” for observing the situation in the Indo-Pacific region.

Foreign Minister Wang Yi has also been blunt about Beijing’s view of the US’ Indo-Pacific Strategy being a zero-sum game that is aimed at splitting the region into bloc-style confrontation. Remarks such as these are indicative of the Chinese leadership viewing the events on the European front as having inter-linkages with the developments in the Indo-Pacific.

This threat perception adds to the complexity of Chinese efforts to balance its relationship with European countries outraged by the Russian invasion. China has sought to use the war in Ukraine as an opportunity to drive a wedge between the US and its European partners. Beijing has repeatedly highlighted that the war is a product of an out-dated security order in Europe and US policies cornering Russia. Instead, it has called for Europe to practice greater strategic autonomy and work towards building an “indivisible, sustainable, effective and balanced security mechanism.”

What this means from Beijing’s perspective is that the EU must emerge as a coherent geopolitical entity, which views European interests as distinct from American interests and accommodates Russian interests. China would then desire the same logic to be mirrored in the Indo-Pacific.

This message has not only failed to find resonance among European elites but has rather resulted in deep frustration in Brussels. This was evident in comments by the EU’s top diplomat Josep Borrell describing the April China-EU Summit a “dialogue of the deaf” and emphasising the importance of the “language of power” in dealing with Beijing. Since then, the critical language about China in the joint statement issued after the EU-Japan summit in May and Brussels’ first ever ministerial-level trade talks with Taipei earlier this week are indicative of hardening European attitudes towards China.

Chinese diplomacy over the past 100 days since the invasion of Ukraine has prioritised political and diplomatic support for Russia, limiting economic costs and seeking support for its own propositions in Europe and across the developing world. In this effort, it has achieved mixed outcomes.

While the developing world has been extremely cautious about choosing sides, China today faces a much-more united West, which views Beijing as an increasingly unfriendly - if not hostile - actor. In addition, it has to contend with intensified American engagement in the Indo-Pacific, as was evident by President Biden’s recent trip to East Asia. The core objective of this engagement, as US National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan recently argued, is to present the US as the “partner of choice” to states in the region.

While this is a far cry from an either/or proposition, one of the desired outcomes of this effort is clearly to constrain China’s influence. Such a situation creates fresh hurdles in the Communist Party’s efforts to achieve the strategic goal of national rejuvenation.

No comments: