Andrew Latham & Tani Gangal
On September 17, 2025, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan signed a Strategic Mutual Defense Agreement—an Article 5-style pledge that treats aggression against one as aggression against both. The text is terse by design, and the rollout was theater with a purpose: senior civilians and Generals put shoulder-to-shoulder to signal that this is deterrence, not diplomacy by press release. The pact’s power lies in what it makes unmistakable—collective defense—and what it leaves deliberately unclear: whether the deterrent shadow extends to a nuclear dimension.
Officials on both sides have floated and then walked back suggestive lines, tightening adversaries’ risk calculus while avoiding any explicit breach of nonproliferation red lines. No basing, transfer, or nuclear clause is disclosed; the ambiguity itself is the signal.
That ambiguity is a feature, not a flaw. Riyadh and Islamabad want a credible ceiling of risk without irreversible steps like forward-basing warheads on Saudi soil. There is no explicit nuclear provision, and Pakistan’s arsenal remains sized and postured primarily for its rivalry with India—realities that argue for disciplined signaling over dramatic announcements. Extended deterrence by insinuation complicates an adversary’s planning while preserving freedom of action for both capitals.
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