Masashi Murano
In December 2022, the Japanese government released a trio of major strategic documents—the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and Defense Buildup Program. As part of this review of Japan’s national security settings, Japan acquired long-range strike capabilities that the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) have not previously possess, assets which the Japanese government refers to as “counterstrike capabilities.”
On the face of it, the mere political commitment to acquire these capabilities was significant. Indeed, for a long time, constitutional restrictions, political norms, and a relatively benign strategic environment meant that Japan could afford to demur on the SDF’s power projection capability, even when assets like the Air Self-Defense Force (ASDF) F-2 fighter plane could be equipped with guided strike munitions like the Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). However, various other components needed in a mission package to penetrate deep into enemy territory and conduct strike operations were lacking. For example, the ASDF lacked escort jammers such as the EA-18G, while the number of aerial tankers required to expand the range and persistence of Japanese fighter options was also limited. Furthermore, what strike capabilities Japan did possess were limited in range. For instance, the Ground Self-Defense Force had not procured ground-based long-range missiles, with its longest-range land-based missile, the Type 12 surface-to-ship missile, limited to a range of approximately 200 km.
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