Edan Morag
Many regard 2027 as the year in which the Chinese military could attack Taiwan—especially after former CIA Director William Burns said in 2023 that “as a matter of intelligence, we know that he [Xi Jinping] has instructed the People’s Liberation Army to be ready by 2027 to conduct a successful invasion of Taiwan.” Western research institutes, including Brookings, have used 2027 as a reference point in their analyses. Likewise, in regional assessments by countries close to China and Taiwan—such as Japan and India—2027 repeatedly emerges as a point of departure. This is despite the fact that no official Chinese authority has publicly declared 2027 to be the target year for unification with Taiwan. US intelligence may be correct, or it may not be; therefore, it cannot be stated with certainty that this is indeed Beijing’s target year. Nevertheless, this article analyzes possible reasons for this assessment and discusses what a 2027 contingency would mean for Israel’s security, foreign policy, and economic systems.
The unification of Taiwan with mainland China has long been an important objective of the CCP (Chinese Communist Party), but in recent years its importance seems to have increased, and it is now presented as part of China’s core national interests. However, at the same time, prospects for peaceful unification appear to be receding. In the past, Taiwan viewed itself as the “true China,” destined to reunite with the mainland and rule a unified China, but over the past few decades, this situation has changed. Taiwanese public opinion shows that more and more Taiwanese see themselves as a nation separate from mainland China: 64% in 2008, rising to 75% in 2015. According to a Pew Research Survey in 2024, the majority of Taiwanese are not interested in unification (60% prefer the status quo and about 26% prefer independence). In other words, the trend toward Taiwanese separation is expanding, while the desire for unification is steadily shrinking.
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