Richard Haass
For at least a decade, the conventional wisdom has been that direct attempts at regime change by the United States have ended in disaster. And for good reason. In Afghanistan, the very same Taliban that was dislodged in 2001 returned to power in 2021 after two decades of futile U.S. efforts. In Iraq, U.S. forces succeeded in permanently ending Saddam Hussein’s regime, but in no way was the result commensurate with the human, economic, strategic, and political costs. Then, in Libya, a U.S.-led NATO intervention intended to prevent the dictator Muammar al-Qaddafi from carrying out a massacre that may or may not have materialized wound up leading to his execution and the collapse of his regime. But there was no follow-up, and the regime’s demise produced chaos and what can best be described as a failed state.
This dismal recent track record lends a surprising, even head-spinning quality to the sudden revival of talk about regime change. And the longer history of such U.S. policies and operations sheds even more light on the promise and risks they involve. At the same time, it offers some lessons. What is clear is that regime change is easier to call for than to bring about. To lack a plan for what happens after a regime’s ouster is to court disaster. Finally, and perhaps most important, Washington must distinguish between regime change as a phenomenon that requires a reaction, and regime change as a deliberate policy meant to bring about a particular outcome.
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