The Other Sides of Renegotiating the JCPOA Iran Nuclear Agreement

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So far, most of the debate over the JCPOA agreement has been a repetition of the original debates that took place while the current agreement was first being negotiated. The public side of this debate focused almost exclusively on preventing Iran from getting enough fissile uranium and plutonium for a nuclear weapon, and it made no effort to describe what kind of nuclear weapon or nuclear force posture would be involved, what delivery systems would be involved, or what level of nuclear weapons yield and nuclear force Iran would or could acquire in a breakout effort.

These negotiations also took place at a time when few estimated how quickly Iran’s missile and UCAV/drone forces could develop, how quickly it could acquire precision conventional strike capabilities, how much it could expand its regional ties and influence, and what the potential effects could be of new Russian and Chinese arms transfers to Iran’s other forces.

They did not attempt to address the overall stability of the future military balance in the Gulf and MENA region or to reach compromises that were valid at the time – assuming that the agreement would be the first step in achieving a broader level of stability in the region.

The U.S. withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran’s progress, and the increasing level of instability in the region have all changed these conditions. This does not necessarily mean that the JCPOA should not be revived, but it does mean that the JCPOA should be addressed in very different terms.

What kind of nuclear weapons can Iran design, partially test, and deploy?

Acquiring enough fissile material for one weapon is a “breakout” of a kind. It is not, however, any guarantee that a country can actually design and assemble a reliable weapon with a predictable yield and reliability – a weapon that Iran can trust to be almost totally reliable, and one that it can deploy in enough numbers to create a credible force.

There is a massive increase in the complexity of a nuclear weapon as one goes from a simple heavy gun device to a credible bomb that an aircraft can deliver or even to a low weight, reliable warhead. The yield in kilotons to megatons does matter, particularly given the uncertainties in real-world missile accuracy and launching a weapon when a country has never actually tested a weapon and still has a very low inventory.

So far, there has been virtually no discussion of how far Iran has gotten in weapons design, how credible its capabilities are to deploy a working and reliable weapon without a nuclear test, what level of yield it could reach, how long it would take to create a large enough inventory to matter, and how visible this effort would be.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has warned several times that Iran might also be initiating non-fissile tests of a nuclear weapons design – following in the footsteps of Pakistan. The IAEA has been extremely careful, however, to not even hint at what tests might be involved or to provide anyone with the elements of a nuclear weapons “cookbook.” The open-source literature on the subject is both dated and equally careful, and it does not provide a credible basis for estimating what kind of inspection would be needed to detect any given design and simulation efforts reliably and whether they are credible.1

North Korea’s early failures are a possible indication of the problems involved, but Iran has now been involved in such problems since the time of the Shah. There currently are not enough open-source data to compare the North Korean, Indian, Pakistani, and Chinese design efforts to show how much design data are now available to Iran or to indicate what kinds of credible non-fissile weapons testing Iran can conduct. There also is no indication that the present JCPOA negotiations are addressing any aspects of these issues.

What kind of bombs and missile warheads can Iran design, partially test, and deploy?

The design of a functional nuclear bomb and missile warhead for actual delivery is an equally serious uncertainty. Nothing in the JCPOA clearly lays out any way to detect whether Iran has conducted bomb or missile warheads using all the elements of a weapons design, including heavy metals or non-fissile uranium, to test a weapons design. Iran is, in theory, not supposed to develop missiles (and UCAVs) that can carry nuclear weapons, but this limitation borders on the ridiculous.

Iran’s present air force is far too limited in age, performance, and operational capability to compete with the forces of the U.S. and Arab Gulf states. Conventionally armed missiles/UCAVs are its key deterrent and warfighting forces, and those forces need to have large warheads and high range-payloads to be effective.

All of Iran’s longer-range missile and UCAV systems have warheads that can be loaded with an advanced nuclear weapon, and all are inherently dual-capable. All could be covertly converted to having nuclear capability, creating a massive lottery as to which Iranian systems in Iran’s growing missile forces and new “missile cities” could pose such a threat.

The JCPOA is often criticized for dodging this issue. What is far from clear is how anyone can expect Iran to accept an agreement that would deprive it of its most critical force element in deterring and defending itself.

How important are Iran’s conventional, precision-strike missile capabilities in substituting for a nuclear breakout?

At the same to time, no one negotiating the original JCPOA anticipated the speed with which Iran could develop a family of precision-strike, conventionally armed missiles and UCAVs that can attack critical military and civil targets in Israel and the Arab Gulf states – including air bases and critical infrastructure like water purification, desalination, electric generation, refinery, petro-chemical, as well as petroleum or gas transit and loading facilities – some of which have long-lead repair times and values in the hundreds of millions to billions level.

These are also systems that Iran has already transferred, to some degree, to the Hezbollah and Houthis – and that it might deploy to Syria or any area that it has dominated in Iraq.

This raises the issue as to whether Iran still needs to go beyond constantly showing the U.S. and its neighbors that it has a near-term nuclear breakout capability that gives it, at most, as much real-world strategic leverage as a small nuclear force when coupled to a major conventionally-armed, precision strike missile/UCAV force; Iranian influence of arms transfers and train and assist forces; and unconventional naval, air, and anti-ship/smart mine forces.

It also raises the issue that missile accuracy, warhead design, and reliability are as important as range-payload – particularly any calculations that are not based on highly classified intelligence on design and test data. One of the factors that reduce much of the think tank and open literature on Iranian missiles and UCAVs to near drivel is the lack of any real-world data on missile performance other than unverified range-payload and guidance platform accuracy data.

These issues are particularly important, given the real-world cost to the Arab Gulf states in buying missiles and layered air/drone/UCAV defenses. It will be especially true if Russia and China selectively or covertly sell Iran more advanced missiles and UCAVs weapon or technologies. The end result could drive other regional states to acquire their nuclear forces, a recent example is that the UAE’s first nuclear power reactor has just gone online.

How far can Iran go in centrifuge development and stockpiling centrifuges?

Iran has made potential advances in other areas. It is unclear from the open-source literature on the JCPOA as to how the negotiators assessed Iran’s centrifuge programs and development capacity. Iran has stated openly, however, that it has focused on new developments.

It seems doubtful that Iran could deploy a covert reactor to produce plutonium, although this might be possible. Suppose, however, that Iran makes major advances in centrifuge output, reliability, and power demands, as well as the ability to covertly transfer the output. It could then create multiple small underground or covert facilities and stockpiles or actually deploy more advanced centrifuges.

So far, no open-source reporting indicates that the negotiations are examining how credible such options are under the present JCPOA arrangements, or how far Iran has already gotten.

Are biological and chemical weapons an alternative?

Finally, the various open-source U.S. and other assessments of Iranian chemical and biological weapons (CBW) capabilities essentially dodge the chemical and biological aspects of Iran’s current capabilities. Iran did, however, become a declared chemical weapons state as part of its accession to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production, Stockpiling and Use of Chemical Weapons and on their Destruction.

It has not declared its chemical weapons inventories or capabilities, and there does not seem to be any open-source assessment of Iran’s capability to produce next generation chemical weapons. (Some of which may use ingredients not covered by the now-dated schedule of chemicals included in the Convention’s Schedule of Chemicals.)

The U.S. Director of National Intelligence (DNI)’s latest threat assessment of Iran’s chemical and biological capabilities was issued in 2020. It focused on nuclear weapons, briefly addressed chemical weapons, but did not address biological weapons at all. It stated that,2

We continue to assess that Iran is not currently undertaking the key nuclear weapons-development activities we judge necessary to produce a nuclear device. However, Iranian officials have publicly threatened to reverse some of Iran’s Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) commitments—and resume nuclear activities that the JCPOA limits—if Iran does not gain the tangible trade and investment benefits it expected from the deal.

In June 2018, Iranian officials started preparations, allowable under the JCPOA, to expand their capability to manufacture advanced centrifuges.

Also in June 2018, the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) announced its intent to resume producing natural uranium hexafluoride (UF6) and prepare the necessary infrastructure to expand its enrichment capacity within the limits of the JCPOA.

Iran continues to work with other JCPOA participants—China, the European Union, France, Germany, Russia, and the United Kingdom—to find ways to salvage economic benefits from it. Iran’s continued implementation of the JCPOA has extended the amount of time Iran would need to produce enough fissile material for a nuclear weapon from a few months to about one year.

Iran’s ballistic missile programs, which include the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the region, continue to pose a threat to countries across the Middle East. Iran’s work on a space launch vehicle (SLV)—including on its Simorgh—shortens the timeline to an ICBM because SLVs and ICBMs use similar technologies.

The United States determined in 2018 that Iran is in noncompliance with its obligations under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and we remain concerned that Iran is developing agents intended to incapacitate for offensive purposes and did not declare all of its traditional CW agent capabilities when it ratified the CWC.

The U.S. also cited Iran’s non-compliance in a State Department report in June 2020, but one that did not mention biological weapons. It stated that,3

Iran signed the CWC on January 13, 1993, ratified the CWC on November 3, 1997, initial declarations in 1998 and 1999. Previous lO(C) Reports and Compliance reports have addressed Iran's sulfur and nitrogen mustard production before entry into force. Iran did not declare any CW weapons or agent stockpiles.

Iran is assessed to have transferred CW munitions to Libya during the 1978-1987 Libyan-Chad war. Specifically, Iran is assessed to have transferred sulfur mustard-filled chemical weapons to Libya in 1987. After the collapse of the Gaddafi regime in 2011, the Libyan Government located newly found munitions suspected to be of a chemical nature, which are assessed to have originated from Iran in the late 1980s.

Iran clearly, however, has the capability to develop genetically advanced biological weapons, and its UCAVs and drones can easily be adapted to create highly effective and advanced line source systems for dispensing chemical and biological weapons. Covertly testing and weaponizing such agents is at least possible, and advanced biological weapons do have nuclear levels of lethality and could present major problems in detection until the results became apparent as mass casualties.

This report entitled, The Other Sides of Renegotiating the JCPOA Iran Nuclear Agreement, is available for download at https://csis-website-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/s3fs-public/publication/210407_Cordesman_JCPOA_Agreement.pdf?MiDtABPoD7YyAewI9DjNIa_kYMvYW65Z

Anthony H. Cordesman holds the Arleigh A. Burke Chair in Strategy at the Center for Strategic and International Studies in Washington, D.C. He has served as a consultant on Afghanistan to the United States Department of Defense and the United States Department of State.

Commentary is produced by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).