John R. Harrell, James Villanueva, Peter Farese, Joe Hammond
In Army headquarters, commanders frequently leave a meeting without the knowledge they need to know to make decisions. This is mostly the result of insufficient or incomplete running estimates. Staffs often present raw, unrefined data without analysis and are unable to provide the knowledge commanders need to make decisions. Staffs across the Army need to better facilitate commanders’ decision-making during large-scale combat operations by focusing running estimates on assessments, conclusions, and recommendations along with associated risk and opportunities. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 5-0 The Operations Process defines a running estimate as “the continuous assessment of the current situation used to determine if the current operation is proceeding according to the commander’s intent and if planned future operations are supportable.” Field Manual (FM) 6-0 Commander and Staff Organization and Operations warns, “Failure to maintain running estimates may lead to errors or omissions that result in flawed plans or bad decisions.” Doctrinal publications emphasize the fact that running estimates must be current and relevant, must include analyzed information that is of value to the commander, and must provide recommendations for future decision. Most important, by providing accurate, relevant, and timely running estimates, a staff can assist their commander in identifying opportunities for exploitation which will be crucial to success in large-scale combat.
Refocusing Running Estimates
Staffs frequently present raw data, such as a combat power percentage, vehicle slant, or quantities of a class of supply, and believe that they are providing the commander what is needed to make a decision. Such items are merely data points often detached from current or future operations.
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