Sean Durns
“Generals,” French Prime Minister George Clemenceau allegedly said during World War I, “are always fighting the last war.” A century later, his warning should again be heeded.
2026 will mark four years since Russia invaded Ukraine, remaking the map of Europe and, in many respects, war itself. Taiwan, under threat from China, would be wise to look carefully at what it can and cannot learn from the conflict.
In some ways, the war in Ukraine resembles World War I. The latter was infamous for its static front lines, trench warfare, and the use of new battlefield weapons, from airplanes to mustard gas to advancements in artillery and small arms. It took time for many of the powers to adapt their 19th-century tactics to the new, and more monstrous, terrain of the 20th.
At war’s end, both winners and losers sought to imbibe its lessons. Some, notably France with its Maginot Line fortifications, learned all of the wrong ones. Many expected the next war to also be primarily static. Others recognized that new technologies would allow for wars of maneuver and offense. Militarily, World War II bore scant resemblance to its predecessor. Those who clung to old tactics and outdated technologies paid a heavy price.
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