Jorge R. Kravetz
In December 2020, the United States experienced one of the most sophisticated cyber espionage attacks in its history: the SolarWinds supply chain breach. Information technology (IT) management software from the company SolarWinds was compromised by the introduction of malware through its network performance monitoring platform. The attackers, identified as being from the Russian Foreign Intelligence Service, accessed the infrastructure of numerous organizations, including U.S. Government agencies and private-sector companies, compromising sensitive data. The prolonged infiltration of critical systems revealed notable deficiencies in existing deterrence strategies.1
This incident parallels other historical espionage cases, such as Operation Ivy Bells during the Cold War, in which U.S. intelligence operatives covertly intercepted Soviet underwater communications cables for years without detection.2 These examples illustrate a recurring challenge: both cyber and traditional intelligence special operations frequently evade conventional deterrence measures. The question that motivates this research is how the deterrent effects of cyber operations and their potential failures relate to the deterrent effects of traditional intelligence special operations.
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