2 February 2026

Adaptation and Collapse: Strategic Pragmatism and Systemic Rigidity in the Soviet and Chinese Revolutions

Chick Edmond

Revolutionary states have long sought to transform themselves into stable modernizers but rarely succeed. Why did China succeed and the Soviet Union fail? The key to answering this question is found in the capacity of each state's leadership to strategically adapt to changing conditions at home and abroad. The Chinese government demonstrated a capacity for ideological flexibility, for pragmatic domestic policy adjustment, and for international realignment, exemplified by the rapprochement with the United States during the early 1970s, which enabled sustainable modernization and globalization. In contrast, the Soviet Union maintained a rigid structure that constrained reform, and in many ways, contributed to its eventual collapse. A comparative case analysis using an integrated theoretical framework demonstrates how strategic adaptation and systemic rigidity reshaped the post-Cold War international order and continue to impact today's China-Russia relationships.

Two of the most ambitious revolutions of the twentieth century were undertaken by the Soviet Union and the People's Republic of China (PRC), both of which sought to establish new forms of socialist modernity based on centralized authority, ideological mobilization, and rapid industrialization. Yet, by the end of the Cold War, the two revolutions had ended in starkly different ways. The Soviet Union collapsed due to internal stagnation and external pressure, while China successfully emerged as a major player in the global economy despite facing numerous challenges throughout its early years.

No comments: