15 February 2026

Orbital geopolitics: China's dual-use space internet

Altynay Junusova, Rebecca Arcesati

Satellite internet has become a commercial and geopolitical focal point. Satellite communications promise to deliver connectivity to underserved areas, while bypassing the limitations of terrestrial networks. Concerns about the vulnerability of these critical networks have intensified since the recent sabotage of subsea cables in the Baltic Sea and the waters around Taiwan, for example.1 Satellite internet requires minimal ground infrastructure, thus offering a more resilient, reliable, and widely available option. This explains why this dual-use infrastructure is not just vital for civilian communications but increasingly also for militaries worldwide. While Russia’s war on Ukraine has exposed the pitfalls of relying on commercial providers,2 US-based SpaceX’s Starlink network of satellites in low Earth orbit (LEO) offers unparalleled speed, affordability, and redundancy.

Starlink’s effectiveness and its use in Ukraine have spurred China’s military to closely study LEO as a strategic subdomain of space.3 Beijing is investing massive resources in building an independent and complete space-based internet, encompassing low, medium, and high orbits and integrating technologies such as artificial intelligence (AI) and the Internet of Things (IoT). The state-led projects Qianfan (literally “Thousand Sails,” 千帆星座, also known as SpaceSail) and Guowang (“National Network,” 国网) together aim to place 27,992 broadband satellites into LEO – 15,000 and 12,992 by 2030, respectively. Additional private sector-led constellations, if successfully deployed, would bring the number to over 50,000 satellites.


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