Jordan Becker, Amanda Monaghan
The liberal international order is dead. The institutions, incentives, and organizing principles that characterized the post-war international system no longer inform state behavior, especially that of the United States. This systemic change—most obviously exemplified by the return of Great Power politics, the resurgence of antidemocratic and populist movements within states, and the degradation of international norms that shaped international politics during the Cold War—corresponds to dramatic changes in state behavior as well. President Donald J. Trump’s second administration has accelerated this process, for example, by upending the US commitment to the postwar order as a response to the rise of multipolarity and the erosion of American hegemony. For better or worse, we are living in an unprecedented period of systemic and foreign policy change. The scope and scale of this change have raised several important questions about the durability, promise, and pitfalls of grand strategy as an intellectual and heuristic tool driving foreign policy. Can grand strategy serve as an effective anchor in the policy process, guiding decision-makers in this time of uncertainty and profound political change? Or is grand strategy a straitjacket that imperils the kind of flexible thinking needed to navigate a dynamic, multiplex international system? To address these broad questions, this working group convenes scholars from various disciplines and approaches to explore the sources and consequences of grand strategy. This paper proceeds as follows. First, I review the relevant literature to identify what grand strategy is—and what it is not—and how international and domestic structures can impede or facilitate its development. Next, I present the state of current research on grand strategy.1 Finally, I derive and offer a few policy implications and recommendations.
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