Joe Funderburke
Fifty days into the US war with Iran, a pattern has emerged that is both familiar and alarming: tactical military success has not produced strategic coherence, and the absence of a credible theory of victory has left the United States reactive, economically exposed, and diplomatically isolated. United States entered the Iran conflict without a defined political end-state. The national security interagency process was structurally marginalized in the lead-up to and execution of the campaign. The resulting deficit is now visible in the oscillating ceasefire negotiations, the unresolved Strait of Hormuz crisis, and the absence of any articulated framework for translating battlefield gains into lasting strategic outcomes. Corrective action is both necessary and still possible, but it requires restoring the interagency function that sound strategy demands.
The Gap Between Striking and Winning
On February 28, 2026, United States and Israeli forces launched Operation Epic Fury, striking nuclear infrastructure, missile production facilities, and regime leadership targets across Iran. The operation was tactically impressive and militarily significant. Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei was killed. Nuclear enrichment facilities were damaged or destroyed. Iran’s conventional military capacity was substantially degraded.
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