India and the America First Arms Transfer Strategy

Kriti Upadhyaya

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It hasn't received much attention outside of the defense industry, but the executive order President Trump signed in February establishing the America First Arms Transfer Strategy has ushered in some profound changes in U.S. priorities.

The order reframes U.S. arms transfers as an instrument of industrial policy. Namely, it outlines using foreign purchases to rebuild domestic production capacity, prioritizes the platforms most critical to the U.S. National Security Strategy, and rewards partners who invest in their own defense. Applied to the Indo-Pacific, this framework shows India as an ideal defense partner under this defense strategy.

Pakistan Walks a Tightrope on Iran

Salman Masood

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When Pakistani Prime Minister Shehbaz Sharif met Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia, on March 12, nearly two weeks after the U.S.-Israeli war in Iran began, one photo from the meeting stood out.

In it, Pakistan Army chief Asim Munir is seated near the two leaders in combat camouflage. Munir’s attire seemed to reflect a country precariously balancing military mobilization and diplomacy—just as he was directing strikes in Afghanistan one moment and discussing the conflict in the Middle East with regional leaders the next.

China’s Energy Security Doesn’t Run Through Hormuz but Through the Electrification of Everything

Damien Ma

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The energy shock brought on by the Iran war is still percolating, but those shockwaves will not hit countries with equal intensity. The consensus believes China is well-positioned to withstand the shock, given the ample commercial and strategic petroleum reserves at its disposal (at least three months), so long as this does not turn into a forever war, which looks less likely with the ceasefire. The Chinese stock market performance also implies that investors have generally bought into this consensus.

But beyond China’s stockpiles, a basic reality appears to have been overlooked in the flurry of commentaries on the war’s impact on China. The country’s energy security isn’t really tied to oil or gas, for which the country does depend on imports. It has always been inextricably linked to coal. China consumes more than half of the world’s coal, and it is the main commodity that powers Chinese industry and the electricity system.

Desert Storm Made the PLA. What is the Iran War Making?

Commander Ander S. Heiles

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In January 1991, Chinese military officers watched CNN footage of the United States dismantling the Iraqi Army and experienced what one People’s Liberation Army (PLA) analyst later called a “psychological nuclear attack.” Desert Storm displayed every capability the PLA lacked, and China had no choice but to begin remaking its military from the ground up.

Two years later, China’s Central Military Commission codified these lessons in the Military Strategic Guidelines centered on “Local Wars Under High Technology Conditions” and acknowledged the PLA had been preparing for the wrong war. The Gulf War didn’t just scare China, it gave it direction.

Avoiding the Next Gulf War How America’s Allies in the Region Can Get Out of the Cross Hairs

Neil Quilliam

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Israel and the United States may have launched the war on Iran. But it is the Gulf Arab states that have borne the brunt of Tehran’s response. Since February 28, the Islamic Republic has rained down missiles and drones on Gulf hotels and airports. It has hit their oil and gas infrastructure. National energy companies in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar have declared force majeure because they cannot fulfill their contractual obligations.

For the Gulf countries, this conflict has been a reckoning. Although they are not saying it publicly, the war has caused leaders throughout the region to reassess their relationship

How the Iran War Will Upend the Global Economy

Henry Tugendhat

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In late March, both Israel and Iran attacked gas fields in the Persian Gulf, the most dramatic escalation yet in the Iran war. By striking upstream energy infrastructure, the belligerents have ensured that the war will have global ramifications lasting beyond the end of the conflict. Even if the recently announced cease-fire holds and the war ends soon, it could take up to five years to rebuild the infrastructure that was lost. And if the cease-fire fails and the war continues, so, too, does the risk of even further destruction. In a world of finite resources, it will be the

The five big sticking points in US-Iran talks

Paul Adams

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US Vice-President JD Vance is to lead the US team during the talks, while reports suggest Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi will co-lead Iran's delegation The venue is ready, the guards are in place and the kerb along the approach road has received a fresh coat of yellow and black paint.

As hosts of vital US-Iranian talks, the Pakistani government officials are making optimistic noises, emphasising that unlike many others, they enjoy the trust of both sides. The man heading the US delegation, Vice-President JD Vance, is also sounding upbeat. "If the Iranians are willing to negotiate in good faith," he said before leaving the US, "we're certainly willing to extend the open hand."

Crisis in Hormuz Exposes Fragility of the Rules-Based Order

Kurniawan Arif Maspul

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What has unfolded is not simply another Middle Eastern conflict. It is a moment that forces a reckoning. Within weeks of the initial strikes, maritime traffic through Hormuz collapsed from around 130 daily transits to barely a handful. Oil prices surged toward crisis levels, with some refiners reportedly paying near US$150 per barrel. The consequences have rippled far beyond the Gulf: inflationary shocks in Europe, fuel rationing risks in Asia, and deepening food insecurity across parts of Africa. The global economy, already strained, now teeters on the edge of systemic disruption.

Against this backdrop, Bahrain’s attempt to shepherd a UN Security Council resolution to restore freedom of navigation appeared, at least superficially, as a defense of the global commons. Yet the subsequent veto by China and Russia did more than block a diplomatic initiative — it reframed the narrative. Their argument was blunt: any resolution that ignores the precipitating use of force against Iran risks legitimizing aggression.

Iran ceasefire: too many brokers, too little leverage

Eric Alter

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Pakistan, with China’s help, brokered it. Turkey and Egypt shuttled the proposals. Qatar had been working the phones for weeks. When the ceasefire between the United States, Israel and Iran was announced on April 7, Pakistan had stepped forward as the lead mediator, pulling the disparate threads together. Within hours, attacks had resumed. Both sides declared victory. Israel’s campaign against Hezbollah continued as though the deal didn’t exist, because for that front, it didn’t.

This is diplomacy now: a single broker in the spotlight, yet no one is responsible for the final outcome. The machinery still generates the same paper trail of summits and communiqués. But something has changed in how it functions. The post-Cold War moment produced occasional bursts of genuine great-power brokerage — ugly and imperfect, but decisive when it worked.

The Iran War’s Real Lessons for China

Carter Malkasian

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In nearly six weeks of war with Iran, the United States’ and Israel’s military performance has been unexpectedly effective. Between the start of the war on February 28 and the start of this week’s cease-fire, U.S. and Israeli airstrikes destroyed thousands of targets in Iran. Although Iranian retaliatory strikes caused damage, American and Israeli air defenses worked well. Complete details about the targets the U.S. and Israeli militaries hit, the Iranian drones and missiles they intercepted, and the units they deployed are not yet public. But judging by the available information, it is likely that the two militaries’ methods and technology attained new levels of tactical effectiveness.

The performance should give pause to U.S. adversaries that have been watching the war in Iran unfold. Massive volleys of long-range drones and ballistic missiles are a preferred offensive tool of China, North Korea, and Russia, used to pound military bases and headquarters, sink fleets, and level civilian infrastructure. If a U.S. adversary were to undertake a war of aggression in Asia or Europe, its plan would be to launch strikes to try to neutralize U.S. and allied military forces, likely inflicting high civilian losses in the process, and then use that cover to carry out its war objectives. The success of high-end Western missile defenses against Iranian strikes calls such a plan into question. Ballistic missiles and drones may not be the decisive offensive weapons that many countries thought them to be. They could still be effective in a campaign of attrition and coercion—but this would be a slow process, not a path to quick victory.

Ceasefire or no ceasefire, the Middle East's reshuffling is not yet done

Jeremy Bowen

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The best hope for the ceasefire talks in Pakistan is that both the United States and Iran have strong reasons to call a halt to the war. The biggest obstacle to their success is a total absence of trust, no discernible common ground and the fact that Israel, America's full partner in the war, has hugely escalated its onslaught on Lebanon.

US President Donald Trump is already speaking about the war in the past tense. He has declared victory and needs an exit. Not only does he have a state visit from King Charles in the diary for later this month, followed by a summit with China's President Xi Jinping in May, there are midterm elections in November. With America's summer holiday season looming, Trump also needs petrol prices to fall back to where they were before he went to war. Royal visits, summits and elections do not mix well with wars.

How a Cease-Fire Can Lead to Disaster

Daniel Chardell and Samuel Helfon

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No sooner had the United States and Israel launched their joint war on Iran than observers began invoking a familiar historical analogy: that this Middle Eastern intervention echoed the fateful 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. As in 2003, Washington had initiated a war of choice against a long-standing adversary in the Persian Gulf, with the overt goal of toppling its regime. But for now, at least, that is where the parallel ends. Until the cease-fire announced on April 7, the United States largely confined its operations against Iran to the sky and the sea. President Donald Trump appears to have understood that

How the Iran War Will Upend the Global Economy

Henry Tugendhat

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In late March, both Israel and Iran attacked gas fields in the Persian Gulf, the most dramatic escalation yet in the Iran war. By striking upstream energy infrastructure, the belligerents have ensured that the war will have global ramifications lasting beyond the end of the conflict. Even if the recently announced cease-fire holds and the war ends soon, it could take up to five years to rebuild the infrastructure that was lost. And if the cease-fire fails and the war continues, so, too, does the risk of even further destruction. In a world of finite resources, it will be the

Deal or no deal, Iran war has birthed a new world order

RN Prasher

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The Iran war may have paused, if not finally ended. Iran has lost its leaders, half of its missile and drone stocks, and a substantial part of its military and civil infrastructure. Thousands of Iranians, a majority of them combatants, have been killed or injured. The US has lost a few aircraft, more to friendly fire than to enemy action. Some Americans, Israelis and Arabs have been killed. Countries of the Middle East have suffered damage to their water and oil infrastructure. Israel has suffered building damage, deaths and injuries.

The human and material losses sustained by Iran are much greater than those suffered by the rest. Such damage is the natural outcome of any armed conflict. There are intangible losses on both sides. The fissure between the Trump administration and Europe, already substantial, has widened. NATO members did not extend support to the US and largely remained on the sidelines.

Trump’s Strategic and Moral Failure in Iran

David Remnick

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Not many years ago, a ruthless man with an uneasy mind took power in his country and created a cult of personality. In the center of the capital, he erected a gold statue of himself that rotated with the sun. He stashed billions in a foreign bank. He closed the academy of sciences, the ballet, the philharmonic, the circus, and all provincial libraries. His autobiography became the nation’s spiritual guide. He banned dogs from the capital for their “unappealing odor.” He renamed the months: January for himself, April for his mother. 

He was fond of melons. The second Sunday of August became National Melon Day. Such was the world of Saparmurat Niyazov, Turkmenistan’s leader from 1985 until his death, by cardiac arrest, in 2006. For the Turkmen people, there was nothing comical about life under his dictatorship. He barred dissent and packed his jails with prisoners of conscience. The only consolation was that he could not impose his grandiosity on the globe.

America Has Lost the Arab World

Amaney A. Jamal and Michael Robbins

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Practically every person in the Middle East has been affected by the chain of events put into motion by Hamas’s October 7, 2023, attack on Israel. Tens of thousands of people, mostly Gazans, have been killed, millions have been displaced, and billions of dollars in damage has been inflicted. It’s not surprising, then, that the perspective of tens of millions of people has shifted.

Polling by Arab Barometer, a survey project that we co-lead with others, conducted in the months after October 7 showed a sea change in public opinion. As ordinary people in the region witnessed Israel’s devastating war

Quantum Power Parity: The Next Front in U.S.–China Strategic Competition

Toghrul Iskandarov

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Quantum power parity is a strategic situation in which rival great powers, in this case the United States and China, have amassed quantum capabilities to the point that neither side can grant the other a decisive technological edge without either attaining a lasting advantage. In contrast to nuclear parity, which is kept at bay by transparent warhead counts, mutually assured destruction doctrine, and formal arms-control treaties like the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the New START treaty, quantum parity is opaque and hidden by design, capabilities are a dual purpose, proliferate in civilian and commercial markets, and are not readily verifiable. This structural deviation has immediate implications for crisis stability. 

When decision-makers cannot predictably evaluate the quantum posture of an adversary, it is reasonable to expect that the tight decision-making timelines and information asymmetries eroded by quantum sensing and computing would amplify the risk of miscalculation, preemptive action, and the attenuation of the gravity with which nuclear parity was historically maintained. The thesis of this article, thus, is that quantum power parity is a less stabilizing equilibrium than nuclear power parity, and that the comprehension of this gap is indispensable to the adoption of sound policy.

NATO: No Action, Talk Only — The Alliance That Forgot How to Fight

Emzar Gelashvili

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On April 4, 1949, twelve nations gathered in Washington and signed the North Atlantic Treaty. The logic was elegant in its simplicity: the Soviet Union was expanding, Europe was exhausted, and America was the only power capable of holding the line. Collective defense would deter aggression. An attack on one would be treated as an attack on all.

It was, by any measure, one of the most successful security arrangements in history. For forty years, it worked. The Soviets did not march west. Europe rebuilt. The alliance held. And then the Soviet Union collapsed. This is where our story gets interesting.

US military bases in Gulf 'useless' after Iranian strikes, experts say

Yasmine El-Sabawi

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At least a dozen US military sites across the Gulf region have been so badly damaged by Iran's retaliation to US and Israeli attacks that their presence now creates significantly more vulnerabilities than it does benefits, a slate of Middle East experts argued on Thursday. The original revelation about the state of the bases was first reported in The New York Times last month, in which they were described as "all but uninhabitable".

The Trump administration has yet to acknowledge the extent of the damage sustained.

"This is the physical architecture of American primacy, and Iran has essentially rendered it useless in the span of a month," Marc Lynch, director of the Project on Middle East Political Science at George Washington University, said at the Arab Center Washington DC's annual conference. "We are not seeing a full and accurate reporting of the extent of damage that has been done to US bases in the region," he added.

The war on Iran: Nobody won, everyone paid

Mahjoob Zweiri

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On the 40th day of the war that Washington called “Epic Fury” and Tehran named “True Promise 4”, United States President Donald Trump and Iran’s Supreme National Security Council accepted a Pakistani-brokered ceasefire. Two weeks of ceasefire — no missiles, no air strikes — and a promise that negotiators would meet in Islamabad on Saturday, April 11, 2026.

For the first time since late February, ships would be allowed to pass safely through the Strait of Hormuz. The ceasefire explicitly incorporates Iran’s 10-point peace proposal, and for the first time since the war began on February 28, the world has something resembling a diplomatic roadmap.

America’s Attack on the Enemy Within: Victory for the Dark Quad’s Political Warfare Strategy

David Maxwell

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On 30 September 2025, along with the Secretary of War Pete Hegseth, President Trump addressed an unprecedented assembly of senior military leaders at Marine Corps Base Quantico and framed part of the national threat as an “enemy within.” Trump advocated that the military use U.S. cities as a “training ground.” While this could be interpreted as hyperbole, reporting and transcript excerpts make clear that the speech urged a closer marriage of domestic security and military resources. This message, when issued from the White House podium, lowers political and bureaucratic barriers that previously separated homeland governance from combat operations. 

Almost concurrently, the Department of War’s Irregular Warfare Center (IWC) launched a course titled Irregular Warfare Approaches for the Homeland, designed to teach counter-threat-network, counter-threat-finance, and other irregular-warfare practices oriented toward the domestic context. The IWC describes the course as a practical, self-paced curriculum intended to help homeland security professionals and military personnel understand and counter hybrid threats on U.S. soil. The combination of presidential rhetoric and institutional education is consequential: public political signaling can alter norms and expectations, while institutional training converts rhetoric into doctrine and habit.

How Tolls in the Strait of Hormuz Would Undercut International Law

Sachi Kitajima Mulkey

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Most of the countries in the world have agreed to an international treaty, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, that bans interfering with ships passing through the Strait of Hormuz. But neither the United States nor Iran has ratified the treaty. And now, both are saying they want to impose tolls on ships passing through the strait.

That would be illegal under the Law of the Sea, as the pact is widely known. The actions represent a significant challenge to a United Nations-brokered treaty that sets out a wide range of rules for behavior in waters that no single nation owns or controls.

On Monday, Donald Trump told reporters at a news conference that he would like the United States to impose a toll in the Strait of Hormuz, a vital shipping channel that Iran has been blocking since the start of the war. He was responding to the fact that Iran has been establishing tolls of its own on the waterway, and recently indicated that it intends to do so after peace is reestablished. Previously, U.S. officials have called these actions illegal.

Information Lethality Revisited: Strategic Influence and the Future of War

Bill Rivera

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In February 2019, the author, with Arnel David, argued in these pages that the United States military’s understanding of lethality was dangerously incomplete. The concept had become a defining priority of the Department of Defense (DoD)—appearing across modernization strategies, acquisition frameworks, and doctrinal literature—yet it was treated almost exclusively as a physical phenomenon: the ability to find, fix, and destroy enemy forces. We argued then that this was insufficient. To view lethality only through a physical lens limits its full potential. Lethality at the strategic level, we contended, must also include the capacity to break an adversary’s will to fight. And that capacity is increasingly exercised not through firepower, but through influence. We have used influence to support kinetic action. This paper argues that this order of events is inverted: kinetic action should operate within the framework of strategic influence, not the other way around.

The strategic competition between the United States and its rivals has intensified. The cost of kinetic warfare—in blood, treasure, and strategic credibility—has grown exponentially. Meanwhile, peer and near-peer competitors have continued to invest heavily in influence-based strategies, reshaping political environments, undermining alliances, and projecting power without firing a shot. The gap between what the United States understands as lethality and what its adversaries practice as strategy has not closed. If anything, it has widened.

Quantum Power Parity: The Next Front in U.S.–China Strategic Competition

Toghrul Iskandarov

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Quantum power parity is a strategic situation in which rival great powers, in this case the United States and China, have amassed quantum capabilities to the point that neither side can grant the other a decisive technological edge without either attaining a lasting advantage. In contrast to nuclear parity, which is kept at bay by transparent warhead counts, mutually assured destruction doctrine, and formal arms-control treaties like the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and the New START treaty, quantum parity is opaque and hidden by design, capabilities are a dual purpose, proliferate in civilian and commercial markets, and are not readily verifiable. This structural deviation has immediate implications for crisis stability. 

When decision-makers cannot predictably evaluate the quantum posture of an adversary, it is reasonable to expect that the tight decision-making timelines and information asymmetries eroded by quantum sensing and computing would amplify the risk of miscalculation, preemptive action, and the attenuation of the gravity with which nuclear parity was historically maintained. The thesis of this article, thus, is that quantum power parity is a less stabilizing equilibrium than nuclear power parity, and that the comprehension of this gap is indispensable to the adoption of sound policy.

The Iran War: A War With or Against the AI Sector?

Jean-Michel Valantin

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On the very first day of the Iran War, February 28, 2026, more than 1,000 Iranian targets were struck by US airstrikes. This is almost double the number of strikes carried out on the first day of the Iraq War, launched in 2003. The intensity and precision of these strikes are inextricably linked to the massive use of artificial intelligence (AI)by the American and Israeli militaries.

However, Iran is also involved in the militarization of AI, conducting drone and missile strikes in the air, while also investing heavily in cognitive warfare through the production of deepfakes on social media to destabilize public opinion among its adversaries.

But the interplay between the Iranian war and AI deepens further with Iranian strikes and Qatar’s inability to export liquid helium. Liquid helium is a chemical component essential for cooling the machines and photolithography plants that print the semiconductors needed for the computers and data centers of artificial intelligence companies. And Qatar accounts for more than 38% of global helium production.