Indian Strategic Studies: 04/13/26

13 April 2026

Why Africa Is Key to New Delhi’s Strategic Autonomy

The ongoing military conflict involving Iran, Israel, and the United States has once again exposed that war and conflict not only carry significant human costs but also reveal deep structural vulnerabilities in the global economic and energy systems. The conflict has raised concerns about further escalation amidst the closure of the Strait of Hormuz, a critical chokepoint, triggering volatility in oil and natural gas markets. As a result, major oil and gas producing states in the Gulf region have declared force majeure due to the lack of export pathways. While the objective of the US and Israeli-led “Operation Epic Fury” remains clear—that is, to limit Iran’s ability to project military power beyond its borders—the tactical approach adopted to achieve this has been to paralyze Iran’s command and control structure, particularly among its top political and military leadership. The early, coordinated, and targeted strikes appear to have functioned as “decapitation strikes,” aimed at disrupting decision-making and reducing Iran’s ability to coordinate a response, thereby weakening its ability to conduct retaliatory attacks against the United States, Israel, and their allies.

Iran’s strategy appears to be simple and focused on prolonging the conflict rather than pursuing rapid escalation and imposing high costs not only on the United States and its allies but globally by targeting critical infrastructure in the region. Iran is doing so by expanding the geographic scope of the conflict and striking targets in multiple Gulf countries aligned with the United States and rapidly destabilizing global maritime trade networks.

How lessons from Iran war could shape mainland China’s calculus on Taiwan

Mark Magnierin

New York Published: 12:01am, 7 Apr 2026Updated: 2:20am, 7 Apr 2026 Whether it wraps up quickly or drags on, the repercussions of the US-Israeli war on Iran will echo for years, reshaping warfare, geopolitics, energy security and global perceptions of American tactical and strategic power. In the first of a three-part series, Mark Magnier looks at how the Iran war may alter Beijing’s approach to potential conflict over Taiwan, asymmetrical weaponry and the United States as an adversary.

The US military is formidable, well-disciplined, projects deadly force rapidly and is tactically impressive. However, its drone warfare has struggled – even as concerns over inflation and casualties reduce support for a protracted war potentially benefiting an authoritarian system not subject to electoral pressure. These are among the lessons the People’s Liberation Army is likely to draw as it studies the Pentagon’s tactics and strategy in the Iran war, with an eye to any eventual Washington-Beijing conflict over Taiwan, according to analysts and former Pentagon and CIA officials.

How China Dominates the World’s Critical Minerals Production

Kyle McCollum

Critical minerals are mined all over the world but the majority of the supply ends up passing through China. For a broad range of key metals and minerals, China is either the largest miner, the dominant refiner, or both. This is true for rare earths, lithium, cobalt, graphite, nickel, and many other metals and minerals that are essential to defense, energy and high-tech applications.

It is less about where ores are dug out of the ground and more about where they are turned into usable components. In other words, Chinese processing plants are essentially the gatekeepers of global supply. Australia and South America host much of the world’s lithium, while Congo supplies the lion’s share of cobalt and copper. But the rocks themselves can’t become a battery or magnet without intensive downstream processing and refining. China built those downstream industries at scale over decades through state support and investment.

China and the Iran Negotiations

George Friedman

The United States and Iran have been engaged in indirect negotiations in Pakistan on ending the Middle East conflict. Indirect talks are always complex and only sometimes effective, but they do have their benefits. President Donald Trump can publicly say that talks are ongoing and that they are promising, soothing some Americans who object to the war, while Iran’s leadership can reasonably deny that negotiations are underway, projecting strength at home.

Also present at the talks are representatives from Turkey, Egypt and Saudi Arabia, Muslim nations that have reasonably good to excellent relations – and thus influence – with the U.S. and sometimes Iran, as well as an interest in ending the war. There is something for everyone, but it is still unclear that these talks will be the vehicle for resolving the conflict.

What is most interesting is that China, which had criticized the U.S. attack on Iran, has now entered the talks. The Chinese assigned their ambassador to join the discussions, and together with Pakistan they called for an end to the war based on five principles:

Claiming Victory, While Admitting Defeat: There Is No Easy Way To Open Hormuz – OpEd

Alastair Crooke

Bloomberg: “It is arguably Iran that has secured the most significant strategic victory … There is every sign that Tehran’s ability to control the Strait is increasing” The defeats which the West keeps on having “[are] above all … intellectual”. And “not being able to understand what they are seeing – means that it’s impossible to respond effectively to it”. So Aurelien has argued. But “the problem goes beyond the fighting on the battlefield, to seeing and understanding the nature of asymmetric wars and their economic and political dimensions”.

“This is particularly the case for Iran, where… Washington appears to be incapable of understanding that the ‘other side’ does have a strategy with economic and political components – and is implementing it”. “[In line with the western obsession with trivia], all the media concentration recently has been on the movement of U.S. troops to the region and their possible uses, as though that, in itself, was going to decide something. Yet in fact, the real issue is the development and deployment by the Iranians of a new concept of warfare, based on missiles, drones and defensive preparations, and the inability of the West, with its platform-centric mentality, to understand and process these developments [i.e., fully assimilate the strategy behind asymmetrical warfare]”.

Kharg Island: Iran’s Oil Lifeline and a Tempting U.S. Target

Will Merrow

Kharg Island, a small coral island in the northern Persian Gulf responsible for handling approximately 90 percent of Iran’s crude oil exports, has become a flash point in the United States and Israel’s widening conflict in Iran.

The U.S. military carried out a fresh round of strikes on the island on April 7, hitting more than fifty military targets. Speaking to reporters, Vice President JD Vance—who the White House may deploy in potential peace talks—argued the strikes didn’t mark “a change in strategy.” The attacks came ahead of an 8 p.m. Eastern Time deadline issued by President Donald Trump for Iran to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, the choke point for nearly one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas supply. While the strikes did not hit critical oil infrastructure, the price of crude oil still spiked 3 percent after the attack, hitting almost $116 per barrel, and Brent crude jumped to more than $110 per barrel.

Europe Has Leverage in the Iran War. It Should Use It.

Liana Fix

Europe is far from a passive bystander in the Iran war. The continent faces rising energy prices, suspended U.S. sanctions on Russia boosting Moscow’s war chest, and a dwindling U.S. weapons stockpile—particularly air defense systems that are urgently needed in Ukraine and for Europe’s own defense. But those are just the issues at the surface.

The Iran war is also spilling into the debate over the United States’ commitment to NATO—which is of existential importance to Europe. A transatlantic rift over Europe‘s limited support for U.S. operations in Iran could undermine transatlantic support for Ukraine as Russian aggression endures. This tempest of factors will precede NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte’s arrival in Washington on Wednesday, as he attempts to calm tensions over European non-involvement in Iran.

Iran Is Under Pressure, But Change Will Come from Within

Dr. Sofey Saidi

Recent commentary on Iran has begun to shift. After years of treating the Islamic Republic as durable and largely stable, analysts are now acknowledging sustained protest, social unrest, and the presence of organized resistance. That shift is overdue. Iran is under pressure from within. If change comes, it will come from within Iranian society, not from external design.

But as the conversation adjusts, a different problem is emerging. Some observers have moved too quickly from recognizing pressure to assuming outcome. The language of inevitability has started to creep in. Change is not only possible, it is presented as imminent and assured.

That leap is not analysis. It is assumption.

Over the past year, protest activity in Iran has shown a degree of persistence that is difficult to ignore. Labor strikes, economic grievances, and localized demonstrations have continued despite repression. The role of women and youth has been particularly visible, shaping both the tone and the reach of dissent. These developments matter not because they are dramatic, but because they endure.

How the Ukraine and Iran Wars Became Intertwined

Seth J. Frantzman

On March 28, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky traveled to the Persian Gulf for meetings with countries that have been under Iranian drone and missile attacks for a month. In the UAE, he met with President Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, and in Saudi Arabia, he met with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. He also went to Qatar. The trip highlights how the conflicts in Ukraine and Iran are linked. In both conflicts, Iranian-designed drones have played a key role. In addition, the meetings show how regional powers, especially those that are partners of the West, can play a key role during wartime.

There has been tension between the White House and Kyiv in the past, and this has also spilled over into questions about US policy toward Europe and Ukraine compared to Iran. This matters because it’s possible to view both the Ukraine War and the Iran War as compartmentalized, in different regions and involving different countries. One could view the Ukraine war as primarily a European war, while the Iran War is linked to the Middle East.

Answering the 10 most important questions about the Iran war

Martin Gurri

Donald Trump excels as a cheerleader, not as a teacher or explainer. He’s a man bereft of doubt, who has trouble understanding the uncertainties that haunt the rest of us mere mortals.

And of course, the vast anti-Trump alliance has a stake in sowing confusion.

The president has a mighty voice, but his opponents are just as loud — and they believe that promoting an American catastrophe, if it hurts Trump, would be for the greater good. So allow me, good reader, to cut through the Trumpian boasts, the fog of war, Democratic hysteria and media falsifications, and offer you simple answers to the 10 most important questions about the Iran war. The B1 bridge in Karaj, Iran, seen damaged by a strike on April 3, 2026, as the US-Israeli war with Iran continues.

What to Know About Iran’s ‘Selective’ Closure of the Strait of Hormuz—and Why It Matters

Miranda Jeyaretnam

As the hours count down to President Donald Trump’s deadline for Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz or face U.S. bombs on its civil infrastructure, the first of seven stranded Malaysian ships safely passed through the narrow waterway that has effectively been closed to most of the world. “We had said that the Islamic Republic of Iran does not forget his friends,” the Iranian Embassy in Malaysia said in a post on X on Monday, announcing the ship’s passage.

Days after the U.S. and Israel attacked Iran in late February, Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) said the strait was “closed” to the U.S., Israel, and countries that supported their attacks. The effective closure of the strait has led to major disruptions to the world’s energy flows, sending oil prices above $100 per barrel and threatening to cripple many economies that rely on energy from the Middle East. Prior to the start of the war, around 135 vessels transited through the Strait of Hormuz per day. That number fell dramatically to a total 116 crossings between March 1 and March 25, according to the Financial Times.

Ukraine is losing the war: Implications for Europe

Tyyne Karjalainen

Since President Trump’s re-election, Ukraine and its European allies have quietly scaled back their objectives in countering Russia’s aggression. They are preparing to accept shifting borders in Donbas, while demands for accountability for Russia’s war crimes and for Ukraine’s right to join alliances have also diminished. For Ukraine, the main problem is that there is no peace in sight. The prolonged war means that Ukraine remains outside not only NATO but also the EU. Ad hoc coalitions cannot replace the benefits that formal alliances and institutions provide.

The implications for Europe are manifold. Ukraine’s fate illustrates how regional and global powers are abandoning established international rules also on the European continent. European states are particularly vulnerable to this erosion, as their security strategies rely heavily on agreements and cooperative frameworks. mEuropean security has become increasingly intertwined with Ukraine’s security. Europe will suffer if Russia achieves its objectives or if Ukraine fails to recover from the war.

Now We Know What a Modern War Looks Like

Lloyd J. Austin III

Throughout my 41 years in the United States Army and my four years as the secretary of defense, I routinely held after-action reviews. Our military never stops learning and never stops asking: What worked, what didn’t, and how do we get better? That ensures America’s military remains the best and deadliest fighting force in the world.

The U.S. military must also learn from the war with Iran, which is already one of the most consequential conflicts in decades. Although the strategic outcome is still far from certain, our service members are performing with exceptional professionalism and skill. We can already start drawing some key lessons. The Iran war is strikingly different from America’s other recent wars in the Middle East and Afghanistan. The Iran war looks far more like the Russia-Ukraine war, with its proliferation of inexpensive, one-way attack drones, rapid advancements in surveillance and targeting, huge use of munitions and the expansion of the battlefield well beyond traditional military targets.

A $500 Drone Can Destroy a $5 Million Leopard 2 Tank — Ukraine Proved That the Era of the Standalone Main Battle Tank Is Over

Brandon Weichert

A Royal Danish Army Leopard 2 tank fires at a target during a live-fire exercise at the 7th Army Joint Multinational Training Command's Grafenwoehr Training Area, Germany, July 04, 2014. The 7th Army JMTC provides dynamic training, preparing forces to execute Unified Land Operations and contingencies in support of the Combatant Commands, NATO, and other national requirements. (U.S. Army photo by Visual Information Specialist Markus Rauchenberger/released), However, this Cold War masterpiece was tested in a major drone war in Ukraine, and the Leopard-2 MBT significantly underperformed for Ukraine due to the new warfare paradigm today.

And it’s not just the MBT being phased out because of the new drone warfare paradigm on today’s battlefields. The underperformance of the Leopard 2 in Ukraine is just one example of many Cold War-era legacy systems being phased out in real combat situations. More importantly, these unexpected losses of Cold War legacy systems are happening faster than modern militaries can adapt.

Trump’s “Bridge and Power Day” is damning for America

Mick Ryan

On Easter Sunday, the President of the United States formally announced that his military would destroy Iranian power plants and bridges on Tuesday unless Iran reopened the Strait of Hormuz. The post was signed with his full name and title. It was, by any reasonable definition, a declaration of intent to conduct a specific category of military strike against civilian infrastructure on a specific day.

At a press conference on 6 April, Trump doubled down on these threats, while also offering deluded statements about Iranian communications being intercepted saying “please keep bombing”.

The potential legal and ethical problems are grave. The US Department of Defense Law of War Manual permits strikes on power grids and bridges when they make an effective contribution to enemy military action and when the military advantage outweighs civilian harm. But it also requires that the advantage be military, not political. Threatening to destroy a country’s power supply to force a diplomatic concession is not a military advantage under any honest reading of that standard.

Transforming NCO Professional Military Education

Tammy Everette,Sean McCracken, Janina Simmons

The Chief of Staff of the Army, General Randy George, unveiled continuous transformation as a focus area for the Army in October 2023 during the annual Association of the United States Army (AUSA) convention. Since then, the United States Army Noncommissioned Officer Academy (USANCOA) operationalized that focus area with meaningful and impactful change.

Formerly known as the Noncommissioned Officer Leadership Center of Excellence (NCOLCoE), the institution officially changed its moniker to USANCOA on 6 March 2026. So why the change? The obvious answer is because the Army directed a name change that was intuitive and represented the mission of the institution. NCOLCoE, in itself, was not intuitive and didn’t truly represent the mission of the organization. According to Army Regulation 5-22 The Army Force Modernization Proponent System, a center of excellence is a force modernization proponent, responsible for DOTMLPF-P integration. That was not the mission of NCOLCoE. Instead, the organization was renamed USANCOA to unite all NCO Professional Military Education (PME) under one academy for the Army and to represent what the organization is for – training and education of NCOs across the Army.

Weakened and Reluctant, Yemen’s Houthis Belatedly Enter War

Ismaeel Naar

The Iran-backed Houthi militia in Yemen always vowed to defend its Iranian patrons in the event of a regional war. So, when Israel and the United States attacked the Islamic Republic in February, many expected the group to join the fight immediately.

Instead, the Houthis waited.

For nearly a month after the war began, they stayed largely on the sidelines. And when they did finally launch a missile at Israel on March 28, it was not the opening of a new front, as many expected, but appeared to signal that while yes, they may be joining the war, they were doing so cautiously. The hesitation, experts say, suggested that the movement has been weakened by last year’s sustained 55-day bombardment of U.S. and Israeli strikes — and forced into a careful calculation about how much of its dwindling arsenal it could afford to spend.

A Flawed Formula for Peace in Ukraine Trump Can’t End a War With a Real Estate Transaction

Samuel Charap and Jennifer Kavanagh

The U.S.-led talks to end the war in Ukraine have been placed on hold. The Trump administration’s focus on Iran might be the proximate reason, but it is not the underlying cause. In truth, the negotiations had already stalled because of a more serious problem: the way the United States has structured the peace process.

To this point, the Trump administration has centered the talks on a core bargain. In order to end the war, Ukraine will cede more of its land to Russia—specifically, the nearly 20 percent of the Donbas Kyiv still controls—in exchange for security commitments from the United States and Europe. “The Americans are prepared to finalize [security] guarantees at a high level once Ukraine is ready to withdraw from Donbas,” said Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky in a March interview. Or, in U.S. Vice President JD Vance’s formulation, “the Russians want certain pieces of territory, most of which they’ve occupied but some of which they haven’t. So that is really where the meat of the negotiation is. The Ukrainians want security guarantees, the Russians want a certain amount of territory.”

Avoiding the Next Gulf War How America’s Allies in the Region Can Get Out of the Cross Hairs

Neil Quilliam and Sanam Vakil

Israel and the United States may have launched the war on Iran. But it is the Gulf Arab states that have borne the brunt of Tehran’s response. Since February 28, the Islamic Republic has rained down missiles and drones on Gulf hotels and airports. It has hit their oil and gas infrastructure. National energy companies in Bahrain, Kuwait, and Qatar have declared force majeure because they cannot fulfill their contractual obligations.

For the Gulf countries, this conflict has been a reckoning. Although they are not saying it publicly, the war has caused leaders throughout the region to reassess their relationship with the United States and its president, Donald Trump. Many Gulf monarchs had welcomed the reelection of Trump because they liked his transactional foreign policy style. Unlike other recent presidents, Trump paid little heed to the Gulf’s spotty human rights record and was happy to advance economic deals without concern for conflicts of interest. Some Gulf governments even felt they had sway over Trump: in May 2025, for example, Saudi Arabia persuaded him to lift sanctions on Syria and to back the country’s new president.

Israel isn’t just responding to threats – it’s reshaping the Mideast

Spyros A Sofos

Discussions about Israel’s role in the Middle East still revolve around threats and responses. Yet recent developments suggest that Israel isn’t only reacting to events, but is increasingly shaping the conditions in which they occur. This involves both direct interventions that affect the security and cohesion of neighbouring states — as seen in its policies on Syria and Iran — and the cultivation of regional relationships that sustain ongoing tension.

Understanding how these two dynamics interact is key to making sense of the region’s current trajectory. They’re distinct but interconnected. Together, they expand Israel’s room to maneuver and redefine its regional position. What’s emerging is a more assertive approach to regional order in the Middle East, combining the use of force, selective military interventions, security partnerships and the management of surrounding political conditions.

Tehran Does Not Need a Battlefield Victory to Win

Joe Buccino

Tehran's supreme leader is dead, its ballistic missile and drone capability significantly degraded, its navy destroyed, its nuclear sites rubble — and Iran is winning. This is consistent with a trend throughout modern war history: the side with more firepower loses if it does not tie a political end state to its military strategy. This was true of the French in Indochina, the Soviets in Afghanistan, and the United States in Vietnam. Superior firepower fails when it is untethered from a political end state.

What those conflicts shared was not a failure of military prowess from the more muscular, modern, and advanced force but rather a failure of imagination. In each case, the more powerful military could not see that its weaker adversary wins merely by surviving beyond the more powerful adversary’s will. The Iranian regime has long understood this. It’s clear that the Trump administration does not.

Ukraine’s Lesson for Trump: Military Dominance Opens Waterways

Anastasiia Malenko

KYIV, Ukraine—As the Trump administration grasps for a way to reopen the Strait of Hormuz without sending in ground troops, attention is turning to the United Nations-backed deal struck with Ukraine and Russia in 2022 to try to restart critical grain exports.

Months of negotiations led to the deal that unblocked the vital maritime export channel for a time, but in the end it took military force to keep it open. Ukraine’s sea drones pushed the Russian Navy to retreat from shipping lanes in 2024, allowing agricultural exports to return to near prewar levels.

US has struck Iranian military targets on Kharg Island. Here’s what we know about it

Billy Stockwell

The US said it struck military targets on the key Iranian oil export hub of Kharg Island, although the strikes did not target oil facilities, according to one US official. Vice President JD Vance acknowledged the recent US strikes on Kharg Island but said they did not mark “a change in strategy” ahead of President Donald Trump’s 8 p.m. ET Tuesday night deadline for Iran to open the Strait of Hormuz.

Iranian damage assessments following the strikes found most of the oil transport hub’s infrastructure intact, according to a report from Iranian state-affiliated media, citing local sources. Iran’s semi-official Mehr News Agency reported that maritime infrastructure on the island, which handles around 90% of Iran’s oil exports, suffered little damage during US bombing and continues to operate as normal.

The 2027 ‘China Invades Taiwan’ Question Isn’t Settled

Reuben Johnson

Aviation Boatswain’s Mate (Aircraft Handling) 3rd Class Anika Ramos directs the launch of an F-35B Lighting II, attached to Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 242 during flight operations on the flight deck of the America-class amphibious assault ship USS Tripoli (LHA 7) in the South China Sea, Dec. 11, 2025.

U.S. Intelligence Says No Taiwan Invasion by 2027. Critics Say That’s Naive

The subject of China’s plans to invade Taiwan provokes steady debate, and arguments over the matter broke into the public arena once again this past week. Sparking the new round of debate was the annual report on global threats by the Director of National Intelligence (DNI), which, according to some China experts, is wrong to assess the Chinese military does not plan an assault on Taiwan by 2027.

Russia’s Unmanned Systems Forces Become Wildcard In Moscow’s Military Modernization – Analysis

Hlib Parfonov

Russia’s Ministry of Defense has moved to formalize the country’s rapidly expanding drone capabilities under a newly established branch of the armed forces—the Unmanned Systems Forces (USF) (Войска Беспилотных Систем; Войска беспилотных систем (ВБпС)) (Komsomol’skaya Pravda, November 12, 2025; RBC, November 28, 2025). The creation of this independent branch reflects a broader doctrinal shift driven by the demonstrated battlefield utility of first-person-view (FPV) drones, multirotor copter-type unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and fixed-wing platforms during the ongoing war against Ukraine. The move also mirrors parallel organizational steps taken by Kyiv, signaling that both belligerents now view dedicated drone formations as a permanent feature of modern combined-arms warfare.

On March 1, 2025, the Russian Ministry of Defense formally established the Headquarters (HQ) of the Chief of the Unmanned Systems Forces (Upravleniye nachalnika voysk BpS; Управление начальника воиск ВпС). This decision was made to direct the inter-service development, equipping, training, and employment of USF across the armed forces. Simultaneously, a Military-Scientific Committee for Unmanned Systems was suggested to provide scientific and technical guidance on unmanned air, ground, and maritime platforms throughout their lifecycle—from development through retirement (TASS, November 13, 2025).

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