Indian Strategic Studies: 03/31/26

31 March 2026

After Modi: Political Leadership and the Future of Indian Foreign Policy

Rohan Mukherjee

By the time of India’s next national election in 2029, Prime Minister Narendra Modi will be 78 years old. At present, it is unclear whether he will run for another term. It is equally unclear who within his party, the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), might succeed him when he eventually retires. In the latter scenario, the BJP itself may be in a difficult electoral position without Modi’s personal charisma and mass following. This unclear line of succession in the BJP could lead to India’s current political opposition, led by the Indian National Congress party, winning the first election of the post-Modi era and consolidating power for itself and its allies with an eye on future electoral cycles.

Against this backdrop, this essay identifies two individuals from within Modi’s own party and from within the opposition as representing the next generation of India’s political leaders. They are Yogi Adityanath, who is a seasoned BJP leader and currently chief minister of Uttar Pradesh (India’s most populous state), and Rahul Gandhi, who is de facto leader of the Congress party and leader of the opposition in the lower house of parliament. Both Adityanath and Gandhi are in their early 50s, at least 20 years younger than Modi, and therefore positioned for long periods of rule, making them “next generation” in terms of age and political longevity as well. Both have already spent long periods in politics, though neither has held a position in the executive branch of government at the national level.

The Infantry Division Transformed: Four Fighting Principles

James "Jay" Bartholomees and Greg Scheffler

The US Army is rediscovering the division as the warfighting formation. During the post-9/11 wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the brigade combat team became the Army’s primary warfighting unit. Brigades trained, deployed, and fought largely independently. Company commanders and platoon leaders were responsible for integrating attached fire support teams, engineers, intelligence collectors, and signal assets into maneuver formations. Successful integration depended on early collaboration, integrated leader development, and habitual relationships. When these conditions were absent, integration became improvisation under the pressure of final manifest call and line-of-departure actions.

Modern battlefields demand longer ranges, more sensors, and tighter coordination between warfighting functions. Many of those capabilities that were previously pushed to the tactical edge now sit at the division level. Consolidating capabilities such as artillery, intelligence, signal, cyber, and electronic warfare at this level reflects the realities of the changing character of warfare—and makes the Army more lethal and more optimized for the modern battlefield, particularly in the long-range joint fight of the Pacific.

Pakistan’s Afghan Frankenstein: The beast is loose and Europe is unsuspecting

Konstantinos Bogdanos

Is Pakistan finally facing the monster it created? Is Europe prepared for the consequences? The answer is in the smoke rising over the Durand Line. For decades, the Islamabad establishment has played a dangerous game, nurturing the Taliban as a strategic depth agent against India. Today, this plan backfires, and the resulting explosion of violence threatens to send a fresh wave of illegal immigration toward the already strained borders of the European Union.

The “open war” declared by Defence Minister Khawaja Asif marks the end of a thirty-year illusion. The apprentice has not only left the master. He has now turned openly against him. The March 16 strike on Kabul was the moment masks fell. When Pakistani warplanes hammered a rehabilitation centre in the heart of the Afghan capital, the “Islamic brotherhood” of the two neighbours officially ceased to be.

The Gulf States in the Shadow of the War with Iran

Yoel Guzansky

The war with Iran has placed the Gulf states, against their will, at the heart of the confrontation. Iran identified the Gulf states as an “underbelly” and potential lever of pressure on the United States to shorten the duration of the campaign. Nevertheless, despite the Iranian attacks on their territory, they have thus far refrained from openly joining the campaign and have preferred a cautious policy: allowing other forces to operate from their territory while undertaking limited offensive actions with plausible deniability.

This policy reflects their concern that Iranian attacks against them will intensify, along with uncertainty regarding the American war objectives. From the perspective of the Gulf states, a key test of the campaign’s outcome is not only the extent of the damage inflicted on Iran, but also, and above all, whether a regional-international framework will emerge that can prevent Iran from rebuilding its capabilities. This article examines the central question of the extent to which the war undermines the logic underlying the hedging strategy that the Gulf states adopted toward Iran or whether it precisely underscores its necessity. It also assesses the implications of the war and the reality that will emerge in its wake for Israel’s relations with the Gulf states while presenting possible opportunities and risks that may limit their realization.

"Iran Must Only Succeed Once to Trigger a Catastrophe"

Claus Hecking

For days, U.S. President Donald Trump has been trying to end the blockade of the Strait of Hormuz imposed by Iran as a result of the war. He has ordered military facilities on Iran’s oil-loading island of Kharg to be bombed. He has threatened to destroy the oil terminals. And he is calling on other countries to send warships into the Strait of Hormuz.

S. Clinton Hinote is a retired three-star U.S. Air Force general. In the mid-2000s, under U.S. President George W. Bush, he developed scenarios for a possible war against Iran. He says that every military option for securing the Strait of Hormuz involves risks that would be difficult, perhaps impossible, to eliminate.

Bottling the World Economy

Adam Hanieh

Amid the destruction of the US–Israeli war against Iran, much of the world’s attention has fixed on the Strait of Hormuz, the narrow passage through which roughly a fifth of the world’s oil and liquefied natural gas passes. In normal times ships traversing the Strait—which runs between Oman and the United Arab Emirates on one bank and Iran on the other—follow a pair of two-mile-wide lanes for inbound and outbound traffic, separated by a two-mile buffer. Shortly after the onset of the war Iran began attacking commercial vessels and laying mines in the waterway, effectively shutting it to most marine traffic. As of March 18 around 3,200 ships were stranded in the Gulf, with only a handful of tankers permitted to pass each day.

The disruption of this vital artery has sent markets into convulsions, with the international price benchmark for Brent crude oil briefly surging to nearly $120 a barrel on March 9, its highest level since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine sparked panic. Donald Trump has urged Western allies to help escort tankers through the Strait in an effort to keep prices in check, so far finding no takers; more recently he has threatened to strike Iran’s power plants if its government refuses to reopen the waterway. Oil, in this sense, has become a proxy for the war’s nearly incalculable costs.

Prepare for turbulence - how a prolonged Middle East conflict could reshape how we fly

It was once a humble outpost in the world of global aviation, a dusty overnight halt for luxury flying boats making the arduous journey from the UK to far-flung parts of the British Empire, such as India and Australia. By the 1960s, it had a simple runway made of desert sand, used as a refuelling stop by airliners en route to arguably more exotic destinations.

Yet today, Dubai is one of the key pillars of the industry, and Dubai International Airport (DXB) is its beating heart. In 2024, more than 92 million passengers made their way through its gleaming, marble-floored halls and sparkling, brightly lit shopping malls.

‘Everything After This Will Be Harder’: Gen. Stanley McChrystal on Iran

David French

Did President Trump fall for the myth of surgical warfare? Gen. Stanley McChrystal joins the columnist David French, both veterans of the Iraq war, to discuss what may have been overlooked in the planning of Operation Epic Fury. McChrystal, who retired from the Army in 2010, argues that the United States often overestimates the decisive power of aerial bombing while underestimating the weight of historical grievance. And the general weighs in on the current culture of bravado coming from the secretary of defense, Pete Hegseth.

‘Everything After This Will Be Harder’: Gen. Stanley McChrystal on IranDavid French talks with the retired general about the “great seduction” America fell for in Iran. Below is a transcript of an episode of “The Opinions.” We recommend listening to it in its original form for the full effect. You can do so using the player above or on the NYTimes app, Apple, Spotify, Amazon Music, YouTube, iHeartRadio or wherever you get your podcasts.

USS Gerald Ford limps out of hot war and into embarrassment. Why?

Dan Grazier

A March 12 fire that injured 200 sailors is just the latest embarrassing incident in the history of the USS Gerald R. Ford. The vaunted aircraft carrier has become a case study demonstrating how such a program will fail when policymakers prioritize economic and political concerns over military effectiveness. Navy leaders pulled their premier ship from the front lines after the laundry room fire and sent it to the island of Crete, where it will undergo urgent repairs for at least a week.

Construction on the Ford began in 2009, but the ship wasn’t commissioned until July 2017. Even then, the ship was far from ready for service. It took another five years for the Navy to put the ship to sea on its first operational deployment.

The Countdown to a Ground War

Thomas Wright

Donald Trump announced this week that the United States and Iran had made significant progress in negotiations, and he was allowing five days to reach a deal. Tehran denied that it was talking with Washington at all. This is not, in any meaningful sense, a negotiation: It is a countdown.

The timing is not coincidental. Thousands of Marines and much of the 1st Brigade of the 82nd Airborne are en route to the Middle East. Trump may intend the talks to act as cover for an escalation decision already made. Even if he doesn’t, the structural reality is the same: When the deadline expires, he will be close to having significant ground-combat capability in the region and a collapsing diplomatic process to justify using it.

Ukraine signs deal with Saudi Arabia offering drone expertise

Vitaly ShevchenkoKyiv

President Volodymyr Zelensky says Ukraine has signed a deal with Saudi Arabia to share its drone defence expertise and technology. Zelensky said Saudi Arabia was facing the same type of ballistic missile and drone attacks from Iran that Ukraine had been resisting for more than four years from Russia. "We are ready to share our expertise and systems with Saudi Arabia and to work together to strengthen the protection of lives," he said in a post on X.

Ahead of a meeting with Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Zelensky posted that the defence deal laid the foundation for future contracts, technological cooperation and investment. "Saudi Arabia also has capabilities that are of interest to Ukraine, and this cooperation can be mutually beneficial," the Ukrainian president added. Zelensky said he had also discussed with Mohammed bin Salman reports that Russia was assisting Iran's regime, as well as developments in the fuel market and energy co-operation.

The world is rediscovering chokepoints — and they are not just geographic

Duncan Wood

Commercial vessels are pictured offshore in Dubai on March 11, 2026. New attacks hit three commercial ships in the Gulf on March 11, with one of the vessels in flames as Iran pressed its campaign against its oil-exporting neighbours, threatening shipping in the Strait of Hormuz and plunging the global energy economy into crisis. (Photo by AFP via Getty Images).

As Middle East tensions rise, the Strait of Hormuz has again become a focal point for policymakers and markets. Roughly one-fifth of globally traded oil passes through that narrow waterway. Any disruption reverberates immediately through global energy prices and, ultimately, the wallets of American consumers.

But focusing solely on Hormuz risks missing the bigger picture. The real story of the global economy in 2026 is not a single chokepoint. It is the proliferation of chokepoints: across geography, infrastructure, industry and even the digital world. These bottlenecks form the hidden architecture of the global economy. And increasingly, they are becoming the terrain on which economic competition and geopolitical rivalry are fought.

When the war is interested in you

Karl Pfefferkorn

German President Frank-Walter Steinmeier may not be interested in the war with Iran, but that war is certainly interested in Germany. The oil and gas it desperately needs flows through the Straits of Hormuz, which can be secured only by the US Navy. The ballistic missile attack on Diego Garcia shows Iran’s strategic reach now encompasses Berlin, Rome and Warsaw. The nightmare scenario under which an economically weak Iran could blackmail the mighty European Union is forestalled only by the layered ballistic missile defense constructed at great cost by the United States, which includes satellites, ground based radars, and interceptors both ashore and on US ships based in Rota, Spain (hello Pedro Sanchez, and welcome to the party!). The two-stage rockets fired by Iran are clearly sized for use with an atomic weapon, should the current campaign fail to end the nuclear ambitions of the Islamic Republic.

Rather than express gratitude for American defence against this alarming new Iranian capability, Steinmeier parroted Germany’s traditional faith in international law and the moribund Joint Consultative Plan of Action negotiated by President Obama. That this deal would have ended all restrictions on uranium enrichment a full year ago, and never placed any limits on Iran’s ballistic missile programmes troubles Steinmeier not at all. Apparently words on paper have a magical power far superior to the tawdry complexities of missile defence. The possibility that the inadequacies of the JCPOA encouraged rather than hindered the covert development of hostile capabilities is a notion beyond the sentimental yearnings of the German President.

The War in Iran Could Become Like the War in Ukraine

James F. Jeffrey

When the United States and Israel started bombarding Iran in late February, U.S. President Donald Trump and his advisers likely believed that they could debilitate the regime and the situation would stabilize quickly, as occurred with the military operation to remove Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro in January. Given the repeated failure of nuclear talks with Iran and the Israeli desire to neutralize Tehran’s growing missile arsenal, Trump and his advisers likely reasoned that acting now was better than later for a conflict that would eventually have to be fought. Washington had already built up forces in the region, and the Iranian regime, which faced an emboldened Israel and rising domestic unrest, was weaker than it had been for decades.

But what has transpired looks more like Russia’s war in Ukraine than Washington’s quick intervention in Venezuela. The fierce Iranian response has led to a war of attrition and possible stalemate similar to the conflict in Ukraine. The United States, like Russia, does not have an obvious way to achieve a decisive victory and risks getting mired in an endless war.

How the Army’s most tech-forward units are practicing for war

JENNIFER HLAD

SCHOFIELD BARRACKS, Hawaii—Inside a mud-splattered tent, the Army’s vice chief and the commander of the 25th Infantry Division watched on two giant TV screens as the division attempted to repel an enemy attack from the sea. Just outside, the service’s first launched-effects battery used an unmanned reconnaissance glider that arrived about a month before to provide a picture of the simulated assault, while the division’s new HIMARS rocket launchers shot down “enemy” drones.

“We have old stuff, we have new stuff, and we’re fighting in a new way,” said Col. Dan Von Benken, the division’s artillery commander. It was the last day of a two-week Joint Pacific Multinational Readiness Center exercise, and this constructed amphibious battle was the end of a scenario in which the soldiers worked with partner forces to defend an archipelago and take back islands seized by the enemy.

Israel’s Lebanese Campaign Will Backfire

Shira Efron

Israel began planning its operation in Lebanon months ago when it became apparent that since the November 2024 cease-fire, Hezbollah had not depleted its rocket and missile arsenal, that it had rebuilt its command structure and restored its ability to fight and that, despite promises, the Lebanese government had not fully disarmed the terrorist group. On March 2, after Hezbollah joined the Iranian counterattack and fired at the Galilee, Israel seized the opportunity to go on the offensive.

It’s widely agreed that action against Hezbollah — an internationally recognized terrorist group and a Shiite Muslim political party in Lebanon’s multisectarian society — is necessary. However, a prolonged Israeli military operation, the destruction of state infrastructure and a wider presence in southern Lebanon, as Israeli officials now propose, could further undermine weak Lebanese institutions, turn the country’s people against Israel and further entrench Hezbollah’s resistance narrative. That’s precisely the opposite of what Israel and the region need.

Iran’s Long Game Decades of Preparation Are Paying Off

Narges Bajoghli

Judging by the metrics of conventional conflict, Iran is not faring well against the United States and Israel. Its adversaries are destroying crucial targets in Iran, killing its commanders and degrading its military assets. But these are the wrong measures for assessing Iran’s position in the war. The right measure is not even an assessment of whether Iran is absorbing punishment well—which it is. The question that will matter when the fighting ends is whether Tehran is achieving its strategic objectives. And on that count, Iran is winning.

This outcome is not accidental. Tehran has been preparing for this war for nearly four decades, since the new revolutionary government faced its first major military test in the Iran-Iraq War, which lasted from 1980 to 1988. And it is now executing a strategy that has managed to neutralize key U.S. and Israeli air defense batteries, severely damage U.S. military bases in the Persian Gulf, inflict substantial economic pain, and drive a wedge between the United States and its Gulf allies. The Iranian regime, in other words, is not just surviving the U.S. and Israeli bombardment. The serious economic and political problems it is creating for its adversaries are, on a strategic level, giving Iran the upper hand.

The U.S. and Iran Are Fighting a Massively Asymmetrical War

Nancy A. Youssef and Missy Ryan

The Iran war started as a test of military capabilities and stockpiles, and the United States and Israel had the clear advantage. The U.S. brought some 20 ships and submarines to the fight—including two aircraft carriers—50,000 troops, and hundreds of planes and drones. President Trump declared that he would decide when the war would end, claiming after just days that the U.S. had won.

But the momentum of the now three-week war has shifted dramatically since Iran effectively shut the Strait of Hormuz, stranding tankers that usually carry one-fifth of the world’s oil supply through the channel. Trump responded by dispatching reinforcements. Three amphibious ships, carrying more than 5,000 Marines and sailors, are traveling from Asia and will be in the Gulf as soon as Friday, defense officials told us. The Pentagon is preparing to dispatch 2,000 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division, and more troops may soon get orders to deploy.

Iran Is Putting a ‘Toll Booth’ in the Strait of Hormuz

Keith Johnson

One month into his war on Iran, U.S. President Donald Trump is now scrambling to secure something that was not previously insecure—the Strait of Hormuz—turning it into the central thrust of the war’s uncertain endgame.

Iran, or more specifically its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), has taken effective control of the world’s most important shipping lane and choke point, through which normally passes one-fifth of the world’s oil and natural gas as well as even more of its fertilizer and helium.

The United States Has Become a Rogue State

Stephen M. Walt

The second Trump administration has been far more disruptive, damaging, and dangerous than most observers—including me—expected, and the tragically inept war with Iran is driving that point home in spades. As a result, every country in the world is having to figure out how to deal with an increasingly rogue United States. Ask yourself: If you led Saudi Arabia, Brazil, Germany, Indonesia, Nigeria, Denmark, Australia, etc., what would you do?

Here’s why this is a hard problem. The United States is still very powerful, even if it is now pursuing policies—misguided mercantilism, mindless attacks on science and academia, overt hostility to immigrants of all sorts, doubling down on fossil fuel dependence, wasteful military spending, chronic deficits, etc.—that will weaken it over time. For the moment, however, other states still have to worry that U.S. power could be used to harm them either intentionally or inadvertently.

Libya, Iran, and the Limits of Airpower

Christopher S. Chivvis

For the last few weeks, U.S. policy in Iran has been following a pattern reminiscent of the war it fought 15 years ago in Libya. That was the last time that the United States conducted an air war to change a regime in a large, oil-rich, and Muslim country.

If Iran continues to follow Libya’s pattern, then the world is in for long and dangerous days ahead. Now that the regime has survived the initial U.S. and Israeli salvo, Washington has no good options. Attacking civilian infrastructure, as U.S. President Donald Trump recently threatened to do, would end any chance of a pro-U.S. uprising in Tehran. Inserting ground forces to stem the attacks on energy markets would only compound the war’s cost. Finally, negotiating a cease-fire, while still the best choice available, would publicly confirm the limits of the Trump’s power at home and abroad.

The post-Cold War order is over – what do we do now?

MICK RYAN

The previous document had shortfalls including its failure to learn from modern war. It did not once mention Ukraine, a consequential protracted conflict that has up-ended many assumptions about modern war and deterrence. Japan and Taiwan have absorbed those lessons, updated their procurement plans and restructured their forces. Australia, not so much.

That oversight cannot continue. We are living through an accelerating convergence of threats, including the rise of Chinese military and economic power, the resurgence of Russian aggression, and a technological revolution in drones and artificial intelligence moving faster than governments can absorb. Australia is also adrift in a new interregnum: the post-Cold War order is over, and the world that comes next has not yet fully revealed itself. In that void, the weak, the feckless and the unprepared will pay a high price.

Israel’s Lebanese Campaign Will Backfire

Shira Efron

The fighting between Israel and Hezbollah in Lebanon, for now, runs parallel to the U.S.-Israeli war on Iran. But Lebanon will become a main arena when the campaign against Tehran ends.

Israel began planning its operation in Lebanon months ago when it became apparent that since the November 2024 cease-fire, Hezbollah had not depleted its rocket and missile arsenal, that it had rebuilt its command structure and restored its ability to fight and that, despite promises, the Lebanese government had not fully disarmed the terrorist group. On March 2, after Hezbollah joined the Iranian counterattack and fired at the Galilee, Israel seized the opportunity to go on the offensive.

The Gaza Doctrine

Neve Gordon

On Friday, March 13, nearly two weeks into the Lebanese front of “Operation Roaring Lion,” Israeli forces bombed Burj Qalaouiyah, a village in the country’s south. The strike destroyed a health care center, killing twelve doctors, paramedics, nurses, and patients; The New York Times reported that “only one severely injured worker survived.” Among the victims, according to the journalist Lylla Younes’s reporting for Drop Site, was a paramedic who had spoken last fall at a memorial service for several colleagues killed by an Israeli airstrike during the previous war in Lebanon. “Even if we are killed one by one,” he reportedly said then, “we will not abandon our duty.”

The US and Israel’s illegal war on Iran, launched in the late stages of negotiations to renew a nuclear deal, spread quickly to Lebanon. Hezbollah joined the fray on the second day, after a US–Israeli strike killed Ali Khamenei in Tehran. Israel has conducted near-daily airstrikes in Lebanon in the fifteen months since the two countries signed a truce, killing more than three hundred people, but since March 2 its fighter jets have been relentlessly bombing south Lebanon, Beirut, and other cities; it recently launched a ground incursion in the south. Where in Iran the US and Israel are operating side by side, in Lebanon Israel has taken the lead, with the US providing arms and other support.

'A game-changing moment for social media' - what next for big tech after landmark addiction verdict?

Zoe Kleinman

A jury in LA has delivered a damning verdict for two of the world's most popular digital platforms, Instagram and YouTube. It ruled those apps are addictive, and deliberately engineered that way – and that its owners have been negligent in their safeguarding of the children who have used them. It's a sombre moment for Silicon Valley and the implications are global.

The tech giants in this case, Meta and Google, must now pay $6m (£4.5m) in damages to a young woman known as Kaley, the victim at the centre of this case. She claimed the platforms left her with body dysmorphia, depression and suicidal thoughts. Both companies intend to appeal, with Meta maintaining a single app cannot be solely responsible for a teen mental health crisis.

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