Jyri Lavikainen
This paper analyses the role of theatre nuclear forces in NATO deterrence in the current and future threat environment. Drawing on established principles of deterrence theory and nuclear strategy, it argues that credible extended deterrence rests on flexible response strategy and on the ability to deny an adversary victory while threatening it with unacceptable costs. This requires a full spectrum of nuclear and non-nuclear capabilities, as well as a credible and effective doctrine for their potential employment.
In the contemporary threat environment, characterized by the prospect of multi-theatre wars, NATO’s nuclear posture – premised on assumed conventional superiority – is insufficient. A credible flexible response strategy now requires the US and NATO not only to posture nuclear forces to counter limited Russian nuclear use, but also to ensure the defeat of Russia’s conventional forces. Such a mission would entail fielding larger and more diverse theatre nuclear forces. The paper reviews potential capability options and concludes that an additional in-theatre standoff nuclear capability is likely necessary for a credible flexible response strategy.
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