2 May 2026

Buy What It Can, Steal What It Must: China's Campaign to Acquire Frontier AI Capabilities


Artificial intelligence (AI) sits at the center of U.S.-China competition, and both governments treat leadership in AI as a national security priority. But AI is not a single technology; rather it is a technology stack in which each layer depends on the one beneath it. 1 Semiconductor manufacturing equipment produces advanced AI chips; those chips support the machine-learning frameworks used to build, train, and run AI models; and those models power the applications people actually use. 

Beijing wants control of the full AI stack, not just competitive applications. Xi Jinping reiterated that goal at an April 2025 Politburo study session on AI, calling for China to master core AI technologies and build a hardware and software system that China completely controls.2 China first set that direction in its 2015 “Made in China 2025” directive and its 2017 national AI strategy; Beijing has reaffirmed it in both the 14th and 15th Five-Year Plans.3 Beijing is pursuing that autonomy to strengthen its military, harden itself against foreign pressure, and keep the technologies underpinning future economic and military power under Party-state control.

How Open-Source, Real-Time Data Can Defeat China at the Edge of Its Influence


The game of global influence has changed. China has undertaken a concerted effort over the last two decades to establish a web of interlocking influence structures, including economic power, media influence, health diplomacy, and digital investments. These efforts have intentionally focused down to the local level, where relatively small investments can win over allies hungry for resources.

A talented cadre of thought leaders spent the last year working on creative solutions to adapt U.S. strategy to this new era through a CSIS-hosted discussion series entitled “25 Gamechangers for 2025.” The series was originally intended to include 25 leading thinkers working together to solve this wicked problem, but the number of participants grew to 58, encompassing experts in national security, special operations, technology, public influence campaigns, and counternarcotics.

The Iran War Is Starting to Expose Cracks in China’s Economy

Keith Bradsher

Rising oil and natural gas prices from the war in Iran are beginning to weigh on the Chinese economy, further slowing already anemic consumer spending and hurting critical export sectors.
Car sales fell in March and plunged further in April. Restaurants and hotels are seeing fewer customers as households turn cautious. In southern China, thousands of toy factory workers protested last week after their employer collapsed under rising plastic costs and ongoing tariffs in the United States.

The emerging signs of strain underscore how even China, with vast strategic oil reserves and massive investments in renewable energy, is not immune to the forces pressuring economies worldwide.

Why the UAE Walked Out on OPEC—and What It Means for the Cartel

Steven A. Cook

The United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced on Tuesday that it is withdrawing from the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The decision, effective Friday, ends a fifty-eight-years membership in the cartel and deals a symbolic blow to an economic alliance that is strained by the pressures of regional war and fractured diplomacy.

The Emirati government has long taken issue with the quotas and price controls instituted by the cartel, and so it views this as in its best interest. The UAE’s departure has raised some pointed concerns about OPEC’s long-term cohesion, but it remains to be seen whether this change will have a serious effect on the cartel.

Iran Has Become Incompatible with Gulf Security

Dr. Mohamed ELDoh

The fragile ceasefire that followed the recent US-Iran confrontation has brought temporary operational calm to the Gulf, but it has not restored regional peace and stability. Beneath the surface, something far more consequential has shifted: the complete collapse of trust between Iran and its Arab neighbors.

For decades, Gulf states navigated a difficult but pragmatic relationship with Tehran, balancing deterrence with engagement and rivalry with de-escalation. That equilibrium is now clearly broken. This conflict did not merely escalate tensions. It redefined Iran’s role in the regional security architecture, from a revisionist competitor to a direct, systemic threat to regional stability and safety.

Tremors in the Middle East: UAE’s OPEC Exit and the Iran War reshaping the Global Order

Navroop Singh and Himja Parekh

The Middle East stands at a historic inflection point. On April 28, 2026, the United Arab Emirates’ abrupt withdrawal from OPEC and OPEC+ effective May 1 has dismantled the cartel’s third-largest producer at a time when the U.S.-Israeli war with Iran has already closed the Strait of Hormuz, spiked global oil prices above $110 per barrel, and triggered emergency dollar-swap requests from Abu Dhabi. This is no mere technical dispute over quotas. 

It crystallizes a deeper fracture: the failure of an audacious Israeli-American regime-change gamble against Tehran, the acceleration of Saudi-Emirati proxy wars from Sudan to Somaliland, and the UAE’s exposed vulnerability as a resource-poor financial entrepôt now tethered exclusively to Washington and Tel Aviv. What follows unpacks the sequence of strategic miscalculations, the intensifying Gulf rivalry, and the sweeping geopolitical realignments that have left Abu Dhabi increasingly vulnerable

How the War Saved the Iranian Regime

Danny Citrinowicz

In early February, according to The New York Times and other outlets, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu convinced U.S. President Donald Trump that airstrikes could help catalyze an anti-regime rebellion within Iran. But after the Israeli and U.S. militaries launched a war on the Islamic Republic at the end of the month, eliminating Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and other key regime figures, the Islamic Republic did not collapse. Instead, internal pressure appears to have consolidated it around hard-line elements.

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The 2027 Defense Budget Request: The Good, the Bad, and What to Watch

Elaine McCusker

The White House Office of Management and Budget (OMB) released the fiscal year 2027 (FY 2027) budget request top line and summary information on Friday, April 3, 2026. As congressional staff and stakeholders await detailed program and budget information from the Pentagon and other federal departments and agencies in the coming weeks, following are a few initial observations on the requested defense budget and what to watch as details are released and evaluated.

Mercenaries At The Frontier: Dissecting An Emerging Regional Security Challenge In South And Southeast Asia – Analysis

Md. Himel Rahman

Two years earlier, while the author was conducting key informant interviews (KIIs) for his thesis on private military contractors (PMCs), a retired senior officer of the Bangladesh Army had opined that the conflicts in South and Southeast Asia are different in nature from the conflicts in Africa, West Asia, and East Europe, and PMCs are unlikely to play an important role in this region. However, recent events, such as the arrest of one United States (US) and six Ukrainian citizens in India on the charge of mercenary activities, demonstrate the growing involvement of PMCs in the multitudes of complex conflicts in this region. Taking into account the recent phase of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), this development demonstrates the emergence of a new and complicated threat to the national security of regional states.

Carriers Fading Beyond the Horizon

Sergey E. Ivashchenko

Naval power in the twenty‑first century has gradually moved away from large formations built around massive industrial‑era giants such as battleships and aircraft carriers. It has become distributed, autonomous, and networked. The aircraft carrier — a symbol of the industrial age — can no longer serve as the core of a fleet: it is too expensive, too vulnerable, and too dependent on infrastructure. Modern warfare requires not center‑dependence, but the absence of one — a multitude of autonomous elements that cannot be decapitated with a single strike.

This article describes the transition from a carrier‑centric model to a post‑carrier architecture built on autonomous systems, distributed strike matrices, and a new doctrine of maritime power projection. The material presented here outlines one possible pathway for the evolution of naval power in the twenty‑first century, serving as an analytical model that, under certain conditions, may develop into a doctrinal framework.

Orbits of Influence: Emerging Threats to U.S. Space Security and Foreign Policy Implications

Kari A. Bingen

Chairman Self, Ranking Member Keating, and distinguished Members of the Subcommittee, thank you for the invitation to appear before you today to discuss “Orbits of Influence: Emerging Threats to U.S. Space Security and Foreign Policy Implications.”1 I was privileged to work with this Committee while a staffer on the Armed Services Committee and saw firsthand the impact of your work.

As successive administrations have stated, our ability to access and use the space domain is a vital national interest.2 We have long benefited—technologically, economically, societally, militarily, and diplomatically—from our dominance in space. But that advantage is eroding. The United States must take steps now—with urgency and purpose—to maintain that leadership before we are outmatched in space.

Economic Warfare Reimagined: Insurance as a Tool of U.S. Strategic Influence

Matthew Flug, Tom Johansmeyer

The U.S. is losing the war on sentiment in the Global South, where the world’s most economically vulnerable countries rely on larger powers for economic support and security. Russia and China have capitalized on this dynamic by seizing the economic initiative in this region, often at the expense of the U.S. To close the gap, the U.S. needs to refine its understanding of economic warfare. By embracing unorthodox strategies and innovative tools, the U.S. can more effectively wield economic power to win influence back from its adversaries.

Our occasional paper, published by Joint Special Operations University, outlines one such innovative tool called “insurance as economic security” (IAES). IAES leverages insurance to mitigate economic security challenges and allow the U.S. to improve engagement with the Global South. This approach could become a relevant, viable risk mitigation since the U.S.’ ability to deliver foreign aid atrophied in 2025. Moreover, IAES can be implemented without direct reliance on U.S. taxpayer funds.

Asia’s oil shock nightmare has only just begun

William Pesek 

TOKYO — As the US-Israeli war on Iran drags on indefinitely, Asia is realizing the extent to which 2026 is a major game-changer for a region that had been “the main driver of global growth.” This is the International Monetary Fund’s characterization. But what a difference two months of hostilities in the Middle East make for Asian economies from Japan to Indonesia.

Since bombs began falling on Tehran on February 28, the resulting surge in the costs of energy and fertilizer — and the coming jump in food prices — has governments scrambling to sandbag their economies. Unfortunately, many are already running out of plays. Typical responses like subsidies, curbing fuel use and asking those who can work from home to do so aren’t doing the trick.

Strategic Snapshot: Forty Years Since Chornobyl Nuclear Disaster


April 26, 2026, marked the fortieth anniversary of the Chornobyl nuclear disaster. The explosion and fire that destroyed Reactor 4 at the Chornobyl Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) on April 26, 1986, exposed systemic failures in Soviet governance, secrecy, and crisis management, which centered in Moscow, while contaminating large areas of Ukraine and neighboring states with radiation. Forty years after the Chornobyl nuclear power plant disaster, Moscow continues to weaponize nuclear energy against Ukraine (see EDM, May 2, 2025).

Russia has weaponized Ukrainian nuclear sites since the beginning of its full-scale invasion. In February 2025, a Russian drone caused 15 square meters (approximately 161 square feet) of damage to the New Safe Confinement structure covering Reactor 4 of the Chornobyl NPP (Telegram/@mindovkillia, February 18, 2025). Russian forces occupied the NPP from February 24 to March 31, 2022. During the occupation, heavy military vehicles disturbed contaminated soil, leading to detectable rises in radiation levels. Ukrainian staff also reported signs of radiation exposure among Russian soldiers, who reportedly soon arrived at a Belarusian medical center specializing in radiation treatment (Militarnyi, March 31, 2022).

The U.S. Economy Was Shaky Before the Iran War. Now It’s in Real Trouble.

Roger W. Ferguson Jr.

Roger W. Ferguson Jr. is the Steven A Tananbaum Distinguished Fellow for International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations. Maximilian Hippold is a research associate at CFR.

Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz after the February U.S. and Israeli attack has sparked a global economic supply shock. The resulting damage could exceed the disruptions caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Despite a two-week ceasefire, traffic through the strait has hardly resumed to the level that President Donald Trump had promised, and countries around the world have started to feel the effects.

The U.S. Economy Was Shaky Before the Iran War. Now It’s in Real Trouble.

Roger W. Ferguson Jr.
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Iran’s closure of the Strait of Hormuz after the February U.S. and Israeli attack has sparked a global economic supply shock. The resulting damage could exceed the disruptions caused by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in 2022. Despite a two-week ceasefire, traffic through the strait has hardly resumed to the level that President Donald Trump had promised, and countries around the world have started to feel the effects.

Asia has been hit particularly hard: more than 80 percent of the oil that typically transits the strait goes to the region, which means several countries have had to implement fuel-saving measures because of the conflict. In Bangladesh, garment factories are sitting idle; Pakistan has begun closing schools; and countries like the Philippines and Sri Lanka have shortened the workweek. Even wealthier economies such as Australia and South Korea have started to encourage conservation efforts.

DeepSeek V4 Signals a New Phase in the U.S.-China AI Rivalry

Chris McGuire

Chinese artificial intelligence (AI) startup DeepSeek released a version of its long-awaited V4 large language model on Friday. It’s the most significant update since the release of the version that rattled global tech markets more than a year ago. Like DeepSeek’s previous models, V4 is open source, meaning it is available for anyone to download, use, and modify. The company claims the new model rivals leading closed-source systems from American firms—like Anthropic’s Claude, OpenAI’s ChatGPT, and Google’s Gemini—on major benchmarks, while outperforming its rival open-source models.

The release has again trained attention on the intensifying U.S.-China AI competition. Adding to the tension, the White House’s science and technology office has accused foreign entities—primarily Chinese ones—of conducting large-scale efforts to extract knowledge from U.S. frontier AI models, a broadside widely seen as directed at DeepSeek.

Gulf States Retain Advantages in the AI Race Despite War

Justin Alexander

This paper was initially completed in late February 2026, presenting a broadly optimistic view that the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are well-positioned to play a major role in the development and implementation of artificial intelligence (AI). The Gulf states were quick to recognize the importance of AI, and their ambitions are already visible in large-scale initiatives by state-backed entities, particularly in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), Saudi Arabia, and Qatar. This paper provides a structured assessment of the actions and investments related to AI that have been taken by the Gulf states over the last few years and provides an analytical framework for understanding their structural advantages and assessing their next steps. Their potential in AI is based on interlocking enablers that include committed political leadership, vast capital reserves, abundant low-cost electricity, access to talent, strategic geographic connectivity, conducive business environments, and diversified international partnerships.

These enablers are underpinned by the deep structural relevance of AI for the region’s own economy, with anticipated impacts that are more clearly net positive than is the case for most countries globally. This is because AI can support a shift away from low-skilled expatriate labor and enhance efficiency across the public and private sectors. Data centers also underpin demand for the region’s energy production.

Generative AI as a weapon of war in Iran

Valerie Wirtschafter

On February 28, 2026, a joint U.S.-Israeli military campaign struck Iranian nuclear facilities, military infrastructure, and leadership targets in what was officially dubbed Operation Epic Fury. Social media quickly flooded with false footage of the conflict, including massive explosions in Tel Aviv, successful Iranian missile strikes on U.S. warships, and satellite imagery purporting to show damage to American military bases in the Gulf.

Some of this footage was recycled from unrelated conflicts, including in Ukraine, and even from video games. Yet some of it was entirely fabricated and created with now ubiquitous generative artificial intelligence (AI) tools that can produce even more realistic content at scale. Several observers of the space emphasized the unprecedented volume of AI-generated content and its increasing sophistication.