Macdonald Amoah
The piece argues that “contested logistics” is being framed too narrowly as wartime distribution, when the decisive contest often happens earlier in a “prelogistics” phase inside mines, refineries, and factories. It warns that wargames and analyses highlight ports, bases, and routes under fire but often assume industrial capacity is waiting to be activated, which creates a strategic blind spot. Recent US experience with pandemic disruptions and Chinese export controls illustrates upstream choke points. The article claims China can nonkinetically constrain US surge production by dominating midstream processing of critical materials, creating delays and caps on output long before a crisis.
Comment:
Let's apply the new executive order on arms transfer to this (this piece was obviously written before the executive order came out). If China can win by delay and constraint, then the first shots may be paperwork, export controls, and processing bottlenecks, and we will call it “logistics” only after it is too late. If "prelogistic" is the real fight, then deterrence is partly a bet on permitting, capital, and qualification timelines that move slow and break late.
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