Indian Strategic Studies

8 May 2026

UK Army Unveils Robot Assisted Warfare With Challenger Tanks, Drones And Autonomous Systems

The British Army has demonstrated how it intends to fight future high-intensity wars by integrating tanks, robotic systems, drones, and digital networks into a single combat force. This shift matters because it increases battlefield speed and lethality by enabling units to detect, decide, and strike faster than an adversary.

The live demonstration combined heavy armour with uncrewed reconnaissance, autonomous breaching systems, and networked command to show a force designed for continuous, multi-domain operations. It highlights a move toward layered, technology-driven warfare where survivability, tempo, and coordinated firepower outweigh reliance on individual platforms.

Tech has broken our entire world model, but we are in denial

Gabriel Elefteriu

Geopolitics is in flux, history has “returned”, there is war, political upheaval and technological disruption everywhere: These matters command an overwhelming share of global attention and public intellectual discourse. Yet the most important transformation for the collective destiny of mankind, the redefinition of the individual, is unfolding and deepening in relative quiet and with comparatively little debate.

We are not simply living through yet another Industrial Revolution – the fourth one, as technologists claim – or through just another great historical rearrangement of world order, as geopoliticians observe. However large their scope, these are true but not sufficient descriptions of our current moment.

What It Takes to Mobilize for War

Todd Harrison

Recent wars have exposed a reality that peacetime defense planning often understates: Stockpiles are finite, production does not surge overnight, and success in a protracted conflict depends as much on the ability to regenerate combat power as on the ability to win early battles. This report argues that mobilization readiness—the nation’s ability to convert resources into military power at speed and scale—is a central but underappreciated dimension of military readiness. Mobilization readiness rests on four foundations: economic strength, workforce capacity, industrial capacity, and political will.

The United States retains major advantages in each of these areas, but it also faces serious constraints, including mounting fiscal and debt pressures, limited industrial depth, accelerating technological complexity, and a fractured political environment. The core policy question is no longer whether mobilization matters, but whether the United States can mobilize credibly and at sufficient speed and scale to deter and, if necessary, prevail in a large-scale, protracted war.

What IBM's Quantum Computer Thinks About the Iran War

The processor was unambiguous. Iran de-escalates at ninety-eight per cent of measurement shots. Israel and the United States escalate at ninety-five. Saudi Arabia and the UAE de-escalate at ninety-six and ninety-seven. Hezbollah escalates at seventy-three. The Houthis split. Russia and China — encoded together as a composite Eastern bloc — lean into Iranian oil purchases at sixty-three per cent.

At the same time I ran a different question on the same chip. Thirty-two of the world’s most plurilaterally active economies. The G20 plus twelve middle-power architects of the post-WTO trade order. Same instrument. Same processor in Poughkeepsie. Different couplings.

7 May 2026

Azadi Ka Amrit Mahotsav

Azadi Ka Amrit Mahotsav is an initiative of the Government of India to celebrate and commemorate 75 years of independence and the glorious history of its people, culture and achievements.

This Mahotsav is dedicated to the people of India who have not only been instrumental in bringing India thus far in its evolutionary journey but also hold within them the power and potential to enable Prime Minister Narendra Modis vision of activating India 2.0, fuelled by the spirit of Aatmanirbhar Bharat.

The official journey of Azadi Ka Amrit Mahotsav commenced on 12th March 2021 which started a 75-week countdown to our 75th anniversary of independence and will end post a year on 15th August 2023. Following are the five themes of Azadi Ka Amrit Mahotsav.

Pakistan's Intelligence Operated Media

Pakistan’s architecture of press control did not arrive with one decree. It was constructed across seven decades, each layer added with impunity, each new tool made possible by the tolerance given to…

Jilted but Persistent: Growing PRC Assertiveness in Panama

Matt Brazil

Relations between Panama and the People’s Republic of China (PRC), only recently in good standing, have taken a turn for the worse in 2026. In February, Panama’s Supreme Court jolted the bilateral relationship by ruling that the concession granted to a subsidiary of the global ports, telecom, and retail conglomerate from Hong Kong, CK Hutchison, was unconstitutional. The company, controlled by the family of Li Ka-shing, had managed those ports since 1997; but its work in the canal was suspended and taken over by the government pending appeals (Caixin, January 30; BBC, January 31; 163.com, March 26).

Beijing’s reaction to the ruling was sharp. A February article signed by “Gang’ao Ping” , the pen name for the Hong Kong and Macau Work Office of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee , called the court decision “absurd, shameful, and lamentable” . It promised that Panama would “pay a heavy price” (Hong Kong and Macau Work Office, February 3). Retaliation quickly commenced.

China’s Legal Warfare Against Taiwan

Eyck Freymann

In October 2025, Chinese police opened a criminal investigation into Puma Shen, a sitting Taiwanese legislator, on charges of “separatism”—the first application of Beijing’s 2024 judicial guidelines targeting “Taiwan independence diehards.” Within weeks, People’s Republic of China (PRC) state media broadcast calls for his arrest via Interpol. Chinese social media accounts circulated satellite imagery marking his home and office in Taipei. Two months later, the PLA conducted its largest blockade exercise around Taiwan in years, with state media listing “leadership decapitation” among the drill’s stated objectives.

A year earlier, these developments would have seemed like escalatory fantasies. But they follow a pattern. In 2024, a PRC court sentenced a Taiwanese activist to nine years in prison on a charge of “separatism.” It was the first time Beijing had jailed a Taiwanese citizen under this charge. Later, a Taiwanese publisher received three years for “inciting secession” for books he published in Taiwan. The legal infrastructure Beijing has been assembling for two decades is being activated, in sequence, against progressively higher-profile targets. If the U.S. policy community wants to understand where a Taiwan crisis is most likely to begin, it should spend less time studying amphibious ship counts and more time reading PRC statutes.

The Limits of China’s NCO Corps and Future Warfare

Paola M. Delarosa-Lloret

Discussions of military modernization often emphasize visible indicators of power, including advanced weapons systems, cyber capabilities, and long-range precision strike technologies. Over the past two decades, China has invested heavily in these areas as part of a broader effort to transform the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) into a force capable of competing with peer militaries. These investments have improved equipment, joint doctrine, and technological integration across services. However, modernization involves more than acquiring advanced hardware. Military effectiveness ultimately depends on how organizations translate technological capability into coordinated action under conditions of uncertainty and friction.

China has also pursued significant personnel reforms, particularly among enlisted ranks. The PLA has expanded Noncommissioned Officers (NCO) responsibilities, strengthened technical training programs, and introduced policies to attract more educated recruits into long-term service. These changes reflect the growing recognition that modern warfare requires personnel capable of sustaining complex systems. A modern force cannot effectively employ advanced capabilities without an enlisted corps able to maintain, integrate, and operate them. As a result, China has invested heavily in developing a more professional and technically proficient NCO corps.

Experts Indicate Evolving Safeguards for Early Warning Counterstrike Posture

Alex Lewis Richter

The 2025 China Military Power Report, published by the U.S. Department of Defense, assessed that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) employs several large phased array radar stations and space-based infrared satellites to detect incoming intercontinental ballistic missiles and enable a counterstrike before an adversary’s nuclear first strike can detonate (Department of Defense [DoD], December 23, 2025). As with U.S.–Soviet experiences with false alarms during the Cold War, the PRC’s developing early warning counterstrike posture increases the opportunity for nuclear escalation through false signals, technical malfunctions, and misinterpretation of data under time-sensitive conditions.

To mitigate false alarms, the United States military employs “dual phenomenology” requirements in which two different information sources must confirm an incoming ballistic missile before launching a retaliatory strike. The United States depends primarily on space-based infrared satellites and radar installations for these purposes. Through the construction of large phased array radar systems and space-based infrared satellites, the PRC has also built the capacity to maintain dual phenomenology requirements before launching a retaliatory nuclear strike (Ta Kung Pao, January 27, 2025; DoD, December 23).

The Myth of the PRC’s Overseas Energy Vulnerability

Daniel Fu

The notion that the People’s Republic of China (PRC) remains excessively dependent on foreign energy imports has gained continued traction in Western policy discourse. Some analysts argue that U.S. military action against Iran would significantly undermine the PRC’s energy security, while others suggest that a U.S. naval blockade of the Strait of Malacca could serve as a credible instrument of military and economic deterrence against Beijing. Chinese scholars and policy experts largely perceive no such vulnerabilities. Few believe that any blockade of the Strait of Hormuz could be sustained over the medium, let alone long term, and many argue that the so-called “Malacca dilemma” (马六甲困境) has largely faded amid the PRC’s diversification of energy sources and rapid expansion of domestic energy capacity.

Even so, the PRC’s reliance on foreign energy remains substantial. According to World Bank data, China imported roughly 30 percent of its total energy consumption as of 2023, while the United States was a net energy exporter (World Bank, March 25, 2025). This structural dependence constitutes a real strategic vulnerability and helps explain Beijing’s sustained focus on energy security.

The Iran War Reckoning: Transactional Alliances, Bifurcation of Supply Chains and the Dawn of Multipolar World Order

Navroop Singh and Himja Parekh

In the shadow of the destructive 2026 US-Israeli war with Iran, the Middle East and global order have entered a volatile new phase. What began as a high-stakes military campaign to curb Tehran Loop and Petro Yuan pipeline has instead accelerated the very alignment it sought to prevent. A fragile ceasefire between USA & Iran on 7th April 2026 holds tenuously amid ongoing Israeli strikes in southern Lebanon targeting towns like Burj al-Qalawiyah and Faroun with airstrikes and artillery, justified by Israeli claims of Hezbollah’s non-compliance with disarmament agreements. Israeli Channel 12 reported that large shipments of ammunition and military equipment are arriving in Israel, while the Israeli Chief of Staff intensified coordination with US Central Command for potential resumed operations in Gaza and beyond.

Iran, meanwhile, has tabled a 14-point proposal for a prospective deal with America delivered via Pakistani intermediaries. The plan demands security guarantees against future aggression, full US troop withdrawal from Iran’s regional surroundings, release of frozen assets, compensation for war damages, comprehensive sanctions relief, a new Hormuz security regime, an end to the naval blockade, and broader regional peace encompassing Lebanon. According to media reports in Axios, the Iranian proposal lays out a one-month deadline for negotiations on a deal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz, end the U.S. naval blockade and permanently end the war in Iran an in Lebanon. The proposal further states that after such a deal is reached, another month of negotiations would be launched to try and reach a deal on the nuclear program

Is China Using Iran as a Proxy Against the U.S.?

Ted Galen Carpenter

Leaders of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have cleverly exploited U.S. policy blunders throughout the international system for at least the past three decades to enhance Beijing’s influence and erode Washington’s. The Trump administration’s mishandling of relations with Iran affords China a new opportunity, and it may prove to be the most significant one yet.

Indeed, the question arises whether Xi Jinping’s government is moving beyond passively taking advantage of chronic U.S. ineptitude in the Muslim world and is now actively using Iran and its Shia allies as proxies to create major strategic and economic headaches for the United States. There are indications that the answer is yes.

The Iran War’s Ramifications Have Only Just Begun

Nancy A. Youssef and Jonathan Lemire

President Trump, celebrating Tehran’s declaration that the Strait of Hormuz would reopen to commercial shipping, posted on Truth Social on April 17, “IRAN HAS JUST ANNOUNCED THAT THE STRAIT OF IRAN IS FULLY OPEN AND READY FOR FULL PASSAGE.” The opening didn’t last. But, in his haste, Trump had inadvertently spelled out possibly the most consequential result of his eight-week war: The Strait of Hormuz now looks, in practice, like the “STRAIT OF IRAN.”

Although none of the Trump administration’s goals—an end to Iran’s nuclear ambitions, destroying Iran’s missile capability, neutralizing proxy forces, regime change—has been fulfilled, the war has led to enduring changes. Two sweeping conclusions—one short-term, one longer—have become clear, experts in defense, diplomacy, business, and economics told us.

PRC Supply Chain Ecosystem Behind Iran’s Drone Campaign

Christopher Nye

In March 2026, Iran’s drone campaign consumed thousands of expendable unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). The critical technologies, manufacturing equipment, and components underpinning these platforms trace to the civilian manufacturing ecosystem of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), channeled through private capital acquisition, reverse engineering, and the systematic exploitation of dual-use trade ambiguities.

The PRC’s drone supply chain operates as a “manufacturing plain”—a flat landscape of interchangeable micro-enterprises, as distinct from the “mountain peak” defense contractors that sanctions are designed to neutralize. Individually targetable but collectively inexhaustible, with minimal staffing and nominal business scopes unrelated to aviation, these firms channel drone-applicable materiel to sanctioned end-users at scale.

Iran ceasefire owes to rapidfire depletion of key US weapons

Michael A Allen

The fragile US-Iran ceasefire announced on April 7, 2026, after 40 days of war came at an opportune time for the United States. Several reports indicate it is running out of weapons amid the conflict.

As a scholar focused on US military deployments, these reports are concerning and somewhat surprising. After all, the United States spends more money on its military – nearly US$1 trillion annually – than the next nine highest-spending countries combined. How can the US military be depleting its weapons against a largely isolated country that spends less than 1% of what the US does?

We Need A Guns And Butter Debate Over The Costs Of The Iran War – OpEd

Michael Hudson

I was the junior member of the Columbia University triumvirate headed by Seymour Melman and Terence McCarthy. We lectured widely, wrote in magazines such as Ramparts and newspapers. The New York Tribune still existed as an alternative to The New York Times, and regularly published our critiques in its interviews and on its editorial pages.

Those mid-1960s were the days! The antiwar movement had enough momentum to bring down Robert McNamara and Lyndon Johnson in 1968! Alas, that epoch seems long gone. There seems to be little hope that changing the party in power will change much. Neither feels much pressure to end the long-term strategy of war with Russia, China and Iran.

Opinion – Donald Trump vs Pope Leo XIV: Just War and the Emperor’s New Clothes

David Chandler

Just War theory has been at the heart of discussion of the US/Israel war on Iran over the last couple of weeks. This is great for theorists and students of international relations because Just War has been, and still is, central to the conception of international order. So much so that practically every leading philosopher, jurist and theologian has written on it. Just War theory has a long history, going back to the Ancient Greeks (Aristotle, 4th Century BCE) and the Romans (Cicero, 1st Century BCE) as a moral and ethical compass, seeking to limit and to regulate war and its practice. The basis of the international law of war is held to stem from these pre-modern beginnings, mediated and given additional content by Saint Augustine (4th Century) and Saint Thomas Aquinas (13th Century).

Today, Just War theory is normally reduced to a number of questions, divided into three temporal concerns: Jus ad Bellum (justice of war) including considerations of just cause, legitimate authority, right intention, last resort, proportionality and probability of success; Jus in Bello (justice in war) including the need to discriminate between civilian and military targets, proportionality to objectives and military necessity; and Jus post Bellum (justice after war) requiring a just peace settlement, reconstruction and holding perpetrators to account.

Russian And Chinese Support Keeping Iran’s Military Reconstruction Alive – Analysis

Alex Raufoglu

With tensions high and the prospects for a deal to end the US-Israeli war with Iran uncertain, analysts say a “two-way street” of support from Russia and China is a crucial element of Tehran’s ability to weather the effects of weeks of air attacks and keep its military machine running after severe losses.

At a forum hosted by the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on April 23, experts described deepening partnerships that have helped Iran replenish its military, improve targeting, and blunt Western operations during the conflict. “A decisive factor in the future of this contest will be Iran’s ability to resupply and reconstitute its own military capabilities,” said Grant Rumley, the institute’s senior fellow and director of its program on Great Power Competition and the Middle East.

The Policy–Reality Gap in the PRC’s Property ‘New Model’

Rena Sasaki, Yuutarou Usutani

Authorities are pushing a “new model” for the property sector, but a wide gap persists between a grim reality on the ground and officially sanctioned policy discourse. The “new model” is best understood as a stability-oriented governance package that combines selective completion and delivery of housing units, the containment of local fiscal and debt risks, and expectation management efforts that increasingly intersect with information controls.

The sector’s problems are a function of fiscal constraints that result from the end of the land-finance model, reduced demand due to weaker household finances, and information bottlenecks leading to households becoming more cautious.

‘Endgame’ For Iran’s Oil Sector? How US Blockade Could Reshape Tehran’s Calculus

Ray Furlong

Weeks of US and Israeli air strikes, sanctions, and restrictions have hit Iran hard, but it could be geology that eventually pushes it into making concessions in its ongoing standoff with the United States.

As the US naval blockade of Iran approaches the end of its third week, data from shipping and industry monitors suggests that tankers have been unable to move Iranian crude through the Strait of Hormuz toward markets in Asia.

This means that Iranian oil storage capacity is rapidly filling, and the clock is ticking before Iran will need to cease production. That’s the problem for Tehran, analysts say, as it tries to withstand US pressure to negotiate a peace agreement.

If an Autonomous Warfare Command Stands Up, Will It Actually Work? The Structural Questions Nobody Is Asking

Jason Bowers

The Department of War's FY27 budget proposes $54.6 billion for the Defense Autonomous Warfare Group (DAWG). DAWG in its current form is a coordinating organization rather than a unified command. It consolidated programs that previously sat under Replicator and adjacent efforts and provides a budget line and a coordination function, but it does not yet have the authorities of a unified command, the institutional independence of a separate service, or the force structure that would let it operate autonomous warfare capability rather than coordinate it. The institutional question worth working through is not whether DAWG works in its current form. It is whether the Autonomous Warfare Command (AWC) that DAWG eventually evolves into or is replaced by will work, and what the structural conditions are that determine the answer.

Standing up AWC on paper is a SECWAR and Congressional action. Making it actually work is a different problem. The structural questions that will determine whether AWC produces a real autonomous warfare capability or a coordinating body the services route around within a decade are not yet being asked publicly, and the answers will matter more than the budget number that has dominated the trade press coverage so far.

Where Are America’s Aircraft Carriers Now?

Peter Suciu

How Many Aircraft Carriers Does the US Have?

With 11 aircraft carriers in active service, the US Navy has more aircraft carriers than the navies of China, the UK, India, France, Italy, and Spain—combined!

The US Code, specifically 10 USC § 5062, mandates that the US Navy maintain at least 11 operational aircraft carriers in its fleet. Yet, the status and actual “availability” of the 10 Nimitz-class and one Gerald R. Ford-class aircraft carriers are not as cut-and-dry as they seem. Rarely are more than five or six deployed at a time.

The United States Navy’s oldest active supercarrier is now in the Atlantic after passing through the Strait of Magellan. The supercarrier is rounding South America as part of a homeport shift from Naval Base Kitsap, Bremerton, Washington, to Naval Station Norfolk, Virginia.

Why are Elon Musk and Sam Altman clashing in court?

Joel Mathis

It might be the ultimate clash of tech giants. Elon Musk and Sam Altman are in court this week, battling over the origins of OpenAI and its pivot from a nonprofit organization to a for-profit business. It’s a “deeply personal” civil trial, said The New York Times, featuring “two very different tales” of OpenAI’s founding.

Musk helped start the company as a nonprofit and contends it was “ripped from its promise of altruism” by Altman’s greed. It’s “not OK to steal a charity,” Musk said on the witness stand. Altman, OpenAI’s CEO, counters that the lawsuit is simply “sour grapes” for the success of OpenAI’s ChatGPT years after Musk parted ways in 2018, said the Times. Altman and OpenAI “had the nerve to go on and succeed without” Musk, said William Savitt, OpenAI’s lead counsel.

Hegseth: Autonomous warfare sub-unified command coming soon

Jon Harper

The U.S. military will soon have a new sub-unified command focused on autonomous warfare, Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth told lawmakers Wednesday.

Sub-unified commands, which combatant commanders can set up with the approval of the SecDef, are joint organizations designed to conduct operations and certain missions assigned to the geographic or functional combatant command that they fall under. The designation typically signifies that the organization’s mission is enduring and a high priority for military leadership.

Examples of sub-unified commands include Joint Special Operations Command (JSCOC), which falls under U.S. Special Operations Command, and the Department of Defense Cyber Defense Command (DCDC), which falls under U.S. Cyber Command.

Myanmar: Aung San Suu Kyi Transferred To House Arrest

The 80-year old state counselor was moved from Naypyidaw prison to “the designated residence” to serve the remainder of her sentence, state-run MRTV reported without specifying exactly where this residence was.

State media also showed a the first public photo of the former leader in several years. She was at a table with men in military and police uniforms. Suu Kyi has been in military custody since the February 2021 coup that dissolved Myanmar’s democratically elected parliament and installed a government headed by General Min Aung Hlaing.

Drones Are The Biggest Military Revolution In A Century

Michael Brown

Last week the future arrived twice. Russian soldiers surrendered to Ukrainian drones and a Ukrainian maritime drone launched interceptors to counter a Russian Shahed. Given these two never-before-seen military developments, it’s no surprise that former National Security Advisor H.R. McMaster commented that we have entered a new era of warfare. While the nature of war—a military means to achieve a political end—has not changed, the character of war is changing before our eyes.

There are many new technologies underlying this changing character of war such as the increasing capability of LLMs and a proliferation of sensors from space, but none exemplifies this changing character more than drones. And no conflict has brought this more to the forefront than Ukraine.

Top AI Companies Agree to Pentagon Deals for Classified Work

Amrith Ramkumar

In January, Dario Amodei answered a WSJ reader’s question about potential breakthroughs in AI development in an interview with WSJ Editor in Chief Emma Tucker. Photo: Maurizio Martorana for The Wall Street Journal

The Defense Department has completed agreements with eight technology companies, including many of the industry’s biggest, to use their artificial-intelligence capabilities in classified settings, boosting the Pentagon’s efforts to gain access to cutting-edge AI tools.

The department said Friday it was now capable of using in classified settings the technology and models from the ChatGPT maker, OpenAI; Alphabet’s GOOGL 1.35%increase; green up pointing triangle Google; Elon Musk’s SpaceX; Microsoft; Amazon.com; Oracle ORCL 2.81%increase; green up pointing triangle; Nvidia NVDA -1.00%decrease; red down pointing triangle; and a startup, Reflection AI. SpaceX owns Musk’s AI company, xAI.

Anthropic Mythos – We’ve Opened Pandora’s Box

steve blank

For a decade the cybersecurity community was predicting a cyber apocalypse tied to a single event – the day a Cryptographically Relevant Quantum Computer could run Shor’s algorithm and break the public-key cryptography systems most of the internet runs on.

We braced for a one-time shock we would absorb and adapt to. NIST (the National Institute for Standards and Technology) has already published standards for the first set of post-quantum cryptography codes.

It’s possible that the first cybersecurity apocalypse may have come early. Anthropic Mythos now tilts the odds in the cybersecurity arms race in favor of attackers – and the math of why it tilts, and how long it stays tilted, is different from anything our institutions were built to handle.

6 May 2026

The Limits of Pakistan’s New Counterterrorism Doctrine Against the TTP

Bantirani Patro

That cross-border air strikes have become an integral part of Pakistan’s counter-insurgency playbook is clear from the number of such attacks that have taken place in recent years. The most recent was in late February 2026, in which multiple Afghan cities, including Kabul and Kandahar, were attacked, resulting in intense border skirmishes between the Taliban and Pakistani forces that continued into the month of March. As both sides battled each other, the Pakistani Defense Minister Khawaja Asif declared an “open war” on Afghanistan.

Yet the Pakistan Army’s approach to countering the group within its own territory has garnered comparatively less attention. This is equally important, if not as sensational, due to the lack of an overt regional aspect. Alongside air strikes designed to penalize the Afghan Taliban for their continued support of the Pakistani Taliban, Pakistan has concurrently pursued security operations at home to contain the group’s activities. This piece clinically examines these small-scale operations and argues that they have laid bare Pakistan’s interprovincial tensions – which will encumber concrete action against the TTP – and that they are, by themselves, insufficient to counter militancy.

The Qabza State In Force Land, Power, and the Clearance of Islamabad

Yasmeen Bibi is a widow who works as a domestic helper in Islamabad. The first house the state demolished was in Saidpur Village, in the Margalla foothills, where her family had lived for decades. Sh…

New Tanks Mark PLA Army’s Integration of System Warfare at the Tactical Level

Joaquin Camarena

The MBT instructors’ comments indicate that the 112th HCAB will play a significant role in developing the doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to employ the ZTZ-99B effectively during military operations. Furthermore, the unit will serve as a test bed to develop the necessary TTPs for the ZTZ-99B to operate alongside the new Type-100 tank and the Type-100 infantry support vehicle (ISV). Ding and Guo’s statements further indicate that the 112th HCAB will receive the ZTZ-99B after the Chinese New Year, likely in March or April 2026.

Previously a part of the 112th Mechanized Infantry Division (the unit initially tasked with fielding the PLAA’s first batches of digitized mechanized platforms and developing TTPs for the army to carry out informationized combat operations in the early 2010s), the 112th HCAB appears once again to be a test bed for new capabilities. Brigade leadership must develop new doctrine and TTPs for the ZTZ-99B MBT to address differences from its predecessor: the ZTZ-99A. For instance, the ZTZ-99B will act as a node within the brigade’s battlefield information network that would quickly analyze and share data it gathers with other armored vehicles, dismounted infantry, or other units. This data-sharing node capability—a significant improvement over the ZTZ-99A that lacks the man-machine-environment, communications, and information systems—enables the ZTZ-99B to operate effectively with the Type-100 tank and the Type-100 ISV. The Type-100 armored vehicles would conduct battlefield reconnaissance and transmit the information gathered to the ZTZ-99B for dissemination to other units. The new vehicles, however, could also act as information-sharing nodes enhancing the situational awareness of tactical units.

Strategic Spaces of the Sino-Nepali Borderlands: Making and Breaking Trans-Himalayan Trade Relations

Galen Murton

Chinese infrastructure investment and development in Nepal are critical to the territorial integrity of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and strategically extend the power of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) into sensitive spaces of South Asia. While trade flows and investment patterns across the China-Nepal borderlands reflect asymmetrical power relations between Beijing and Kathmandu, a grounded, geographic review of the region reveals three key observations: a historical linkage between border resolutions and Chinese-facilitated infrastructure development in Nepal, an ongoing “corridorization” of Nepal that is both real and imagined, and a persistent oscillation of border openings and closings that challenges the mobility practices of local populations and yet also escapes the PRC’s enhanced controls. Attention to the Himalayan region, much like borderlands elsewhere in Asia, reinforces the adage to look to the margins to see the state in new and often overlooked ways, as “borders offer unique vantage points to produce decentered accounts of the state and denaturalized narratives of nationalist projects.”1

China’s “Fake” De-Dollarization

Brad W. Setser

That is the last disclosed data point, but careful analysis of the U.S. Treasury’s data essentially rules out a significant rise in the dollar share of China’s formal reserves. The U.S. data is consistent with either a bit of a fall or very aggressive use of non-U.S. custodians over the last five years.

So, China has de-dollarized? Not exactly.

The big fall in the dollar share of China reserves (from 79 to 59 percent) occurred between 2005 and 2012 (though China only disclosed the 2015 number) and during that period China’s toal reserves went from $800 to close to well over $3 trillion and its actual dollars continued to rise.

The Strange Case of Lebanon’s 'Ceasefire'

Guy P. Nohra

If you follow the Middle East, you have likely heard about Lebanon’s “ceasefire” with Israel.

Think about that for a moment. A country whose army, the Lebanese Armed Forces, has not been in direct military combat with Israel since 1948 is now negotiating a ceasefire and engaging in peace talks. To the untrained eye, this sounds like progress. The Lebanese people have suffered continuously since the civil war began in 1975. War, corruption, economic collapse—just about every hardship imaginable has touched the country.

So any mention of peace is naturally welcomed. But this is not what it seems. This is a shadow peace. The actual fighting is not between Lebanon and Israel. It is between Israel and a non-state actor: Hezbollah.

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