4 May 2026

Expanding Frontiers: China’s Military Push Beyond the First Island Chain

Joe Keary, Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan & Linus Cohen

China’s defence and security presence beyond the Western Pacific is set to intensify over the next decade, expanding its access, influence and operational reach across the Indo-Pacific.

In the Southwest Pacific, Beijing is likely to build its position through security cooperation, infrastructure development and a more regularised presence, while activity across the Indian Ocean and Australia’s maritime approaches is likely to become more frequent, capable and strategically purposeful.

We are not likely to see sudden military breakthroughs or dramatic shows of force. Rather, Beijing has a deliberate, long-term strategy – one that prioritises persistence and gradual advantage. China is seeking to normalise its presence across the Indo-Pacific in ways that expand its freedom of action, complicate the calculations of others and incrementally shift the strategic balance in its favour.

CNA Explains: Why the UAE is quitting OPEC – and what it means for oil markets

Firdaus Hamzah

SINGAPORE: The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) will have one fewer member from Friday (May 1) after the United Arab Emirates (UAE) announced its decision to leave the oil cartel.

The 65-year-old organisation produces about 40 per cent of the world’s crude oil and has long wielded significant influence over global energy prices. The UAE said it plans to continue pursuing its goal of gradually increasing crude production, in line with demand and market conditions.

The Oil Supply Shock Will Scar the World for Years

Tsvetana Paraskova

The Middle East’s oil production and the global economy will take months and even years to recover from the worst crude supply shock in history.

Two months after the U.S. and Israel bombed Iran on February 28, the Strait of Hormuz remains closed for most tanker traffic, forcing more than 10 million barrels per day (bpd) of crude output shut-ins across the Middle Eastern oil producers. The disrupted energy flows triggered a global race for alternative supply, and sent energy prices soaring with the prospect of slowing global economic growth and even leading to a global recession if the world’s most critical oil chokepoint stays mostly inaccessible for another three months.

The two-month-long closure of the Strait of Hormuz is longer than analysts had expected at the start of the war. Most assumed back then that the Strait would open by April and producers could restart shut-in wells in May.

Iran Already Scrambling For Oil Storage After Two Weeks Of US Blockade

Tyler Durden

Trump's blockade is having a predictable effect on Iran's economy and oil industry, with reports that the regime is scrambling to repurpose old and rusty tankers as floating storage. Kharg Island is hitting capacity and the results could lead to disaster for Iran's oil wells.

The regime is reportedly moving to expand crude storage at the island, where around 90% of their energy exports are processed, by reactivating a 30-year-old crude carrier called M/T Nasha. It's a bad sign for Iran, indicating that the country’s main oil hub is nearing its onshore storage limit. Maritime analysts say the vessel, which had been anchored empty for years, is being repositioned as floating storage to absorb crude that still has to move out of the system.

Keeping talks with US sputtering along, Iran may be looking for time, not a deal

Stav Levaton

The latest stutter steps to plague US-Iran talks — marked by cancellations and missed meetings in Pakistan — have sharpened a central question hanging over the high-stakes negotiation: Is this a temporary breakdown, or evidence that the two sides are not negotiating at the same table at all?

Plans for the sides to gather in Islamabad over the weekend fell apart on Saturday, with Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi leaving Pakistan and US President Donald Trump telling his negotiators to turn back at the last second and describing the trip and the talks as a waste of time. This came after Tehran earlier rejected attending a planned second round of direct talks.

Trump’s $1.5 Trillion Defense Budget Request: Unhinged, Unaffordable, and Unnecessary

Steven Kosiak

The Trump administration’s 2027 budget request, submitted on April 3, calls for funding defense at $1.5 trillion. It is difficult to overstate just how massive an increase in defense spending this would represent — or how unhinged it seems to be from reality and sober policymaking.

The 2026 defense budget already included a $150 billion increase from 2025. The latest request would involve a further increase of some $450 billion, marking an increase in “real” terms (i.e., inflation-adjusted) of 40 percent from 2026, and a 58 percent increase from 2025. Moreover, it would establish a defense budget that is some 90 percent higher — again, in real terms — than both the peak of the Cold War and the average base defense budget of the past 25 years (see Figure 1). It is also important to understand that the administration’s request — like all base budget requests — is intended only to cover the Pentagon’s peacetime manning, operating, and modernization costs. It is in addition that the administration plans to request a further $200 billion to cover Iran war costs.

A New Era of U.S.-China Interaction: From Competing to Racing

Evan S. Medeiros

This essay examines the U.S.-China trade war in 2025 as a possible turning point in the U.S.-China competition, arguing that the trade war created new power dynamics around a supply chain race that centers on leveraging chokepoints in critical minerals and advanced technologies.

Note: The author would like to thank the following colleagues for their superior research assistance: Jessica Shao, Davis Di, and Henry Wessel. This is the final essay in a series of four essays in 2025–26 on trade policy made possible by the generous support of the Hinrich Foundation.

King gets ovation for Congress speech warning of volatile world

Sean Coughlan

King Charles stressed the value and importance of the "indispensable" UK and US partnership in a well-received speech to Congress in Washington DC. Speaking in the US Capitol, the King warned the two nations had to stand together in a "more volatile, more dangerous" era - and he delivered some hard truths about the need to back Nato.

"We meet in times of great uncertainty, in times of conflict from Europe to the Middle East which pose immense challenges," he told the chamber, filled with US lawmakers. It was the biggest diplomatic moment of his reign, against a backdrop of deepening political tensions between the US and the UK - and in the end, he got a standing ovation before he'd spoken.

BREAKING: Air Force Academy Female Insubordination Threatens Secretary Of War During Global Conflict - Former Superintendent Lt Gen Michelle Johnson Reportedly Leads Charge Against 'Old White Men' Recently Elected To USAFA AOG

L Todd Wood

CORRECTION: We initially wrote that Charlie Kirk was on the USAFA AOG Board of Directors. That was an oversight. It should have read the USAFA Board of Visitors and has been corrected.

In a flagrant display of insubordinate Marxist ideology, the U.S. Air Force Academy terrazzo was overun last Friday with hundreds of females from a USAFA affinity group for women that literally threatened the Secretary of War during the ongoing conflict in Iran.

2026 Global Counterspace Capabilities Report

Victoria Samson and Kathleen Brett

Space security has become an increasingly salient policy issue. Over the last several years, there has been growing concern from multiple governments over the reliance on vulnerable space capabilities for national security, and the corresponding proliferation of offensive counterspace capabilities that could be used to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy space systems. This in turn has led to increased rhetoric from some countries about the need to prepare for future conflicts on Earth to extend into space, and calls from some corners to increase the development of offensive counterspace capabilities and put in place more aggressive policies and postures.

We feel strongly that a more open and public debate on these issues is urgently needed. Space is not the sole domain of militaries and intelligence services. Our global society and economy is increasingly dependent on space capabilities, and a future conflict in space could have massive, long-term negative repercussions that are felt here on Earth. Even testing of these capabilities could have long-lasting negative repercussions for the space environment, and all who operate there. The public should be as aware of the developing threats and risks of different policy options as would be the case for other national security issues in the air, land, and sea domains.

America’s Counterterrorism Wars

Peter Bergen, David Sterman, Melissa Salyk-Virk

​Editor’s note: This report was originally published on ​J​une 17, 2021, building on prior presentations of this data. The data and figures within are updated on an ongoing basis. The surrounding analysis and text have not been updated since the original publication. Readers should refer to the figures for the most current information.

This project tracks America’s counterterrorism wars​, including the drone war in Pakistan, air and ground operations in Yemen and Somalia, as well as the internationalized air war in Libya. It draws on news reports, official government statements, and available reporting from NGOs and other organizations. See the full methodology and also find detailed source information within each figure.

ASEAN’s Unwanted Conflict: Thailand-Cambodia Border Hostilities in 2025

Gregory V. Raymond 

As strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region intensifies, some region-watchers are attracted to the idea of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) playing a more central role in reducing tensions, preventing escalation, and resolving disputes peacefully. When two ASEAN member states are unable to resolve border tensions without resorting to the use of force, however, the credibility of that proposition falls into doubt. 

Regrettably, over the course of 2025, Thailand and Cambodia saw an old border dispute reignite with little warning and escalate rapidly to the use of heavy weaponry and airpower across their shared 800-kilometer border, inflicting civilian casualties and displacing hundreds of thousands. While the days of active military fighting were relatively few—and the level of casualties well beneath the toll of 1,000 fatalities that many scholars use to define war1 —the militarized dispute was unexpected and unwelcome.

Are we heading for ‘super El Niรฑo’ – and what could we expect?

Gabrielle Canon

There is a high likelihood that the phenomenon known as “El Niรฑo” will emerge this summer – and it could be exceptionally strong. A so-called “super El Niรฑo” could supercharge extreme weather events and push global temperatures to record heights next year if it develops, according to experts.

Meteorologists are keeping a close eye on the climate patterns developing in the Pacific Ocean that will enable stronger predictions about what’s to come in the year ahead. A strong El Niรฑo would put 2027 in the running to break global heat records, and could produce a series of devastating effects, ranging from supercharged rainstorms to drought depending on the region of the world.

Building the Knowledge and Skills the U.S. Air Force Needs for Strategic Competition with China

Miriam Matthews, Cristina L. Garafola

Despite clear strategic guidance identifying China as the primary pacing threat, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) lacks a coordinated, scalable, and sustained approach for developing and utilizing China-relevant expertise—such as language skills, cultural understanding, and regional knowledge—across its workforce. This gap raises concerns about the USAF’s ability to effectively anticipate and compete with China in a complex, evolving strategic environment.

In this report, the authors assess how the USAF develops, recognizes, and applies China-relevant expertise, drawing on interviews with airmen and educators, policy and document analysis, and historical case studies. The findings reveal that China-focused expertise remains limited in scale, unevenly recognized, and inconsistently applied, despite sustained strategic emphasis on competition with China.

Mobilisation and Training for War: Preparing to Break Glass

Nick Reynolds and Paul O’Neill CBE

This paper examines the critical need for the UK to prepare its armed forces for rapid mobilisation and training in response to escalating security threats in Europe. ​It highlights the challenges of increasing the number of people, equipping them and expanding the capacity and effectiveness of the training systems while offering actionable recommendations to enhance readiness and ensure effective force expansion. ​

The armed forces need to:Develop detailed mobilisation plans, defining roles for Volunteer and Strategic Reserves. ​Increase training capacity through distributed centres and civilian infrastructure. Accelerate training pipelines by using civilian skills and individualised learning approaches. ​

Navy Awards $282.9M FF(X) Frigate Contract to HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding

Mallory Shelbourne

The Navy issued HII’s Ingalls Shipbuilding a $282.9 million contract award Tuesday to do lead yard work for the new frigate based on the Coast Guard’s National Security Cutter. A Pentagon announcement noted that the Navy did not compete the contract and said the work should wrap up in April 2028.

The award comes after former Navy Secretary John Phelan cancelled the Constellation-class frigate program last year and opted to pursue a new frigate based on the NSC Legend-class hull built at Ingalls.

The Navy’s Fiscal Year 2027 budget submission, formally unveiled last week, projected the service purchasing one FF(X) in FY 2027, another in FY 2029 and two in FY 2031. The service wants the lead ship in the water by 2028, which is why it pursued the sole-source strategy, according to the FY 2027 shipbuilding justification documents. The soonest the ship would deliver to the Navy is in June of 2030.

Donald Trump’s Lose-Lose Negotiations with Iran

Isaac Chotiner

On Saturday, President Donald Trump called off a trip to Islamabad that two of his chief negotiators—Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff—were planning to make in the hopes of ending the war in Iran. That conflict, including Israel’s campaign in Lebanon, has cost thousands of lives and caused untold worldwide economic damage, and shows no signs of ending, despite the fact that Trump has extended a ceasefire that he declared earlier this month. Iran is still keeping the Strait of Hormuz largely closed; the United States is still blockading Iran’s ports; and Iran and the U.S. do not appear any closer to an agreement on Iran’s nuclear materials.

I recently spoke by phone with Ali Vaez, the director of the Iran Project at the International Crisis Group. During our conversation, which has been edited for length and clarity, we discussed what’s really keeping the two sides from reaching a deal, how the leadership of the Iranian regime has changed since the killing of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and why this war is likely to continue being a lose-lose situation for both sides.

Sovereign AI and ROK-U.S. Cooperation

Hackyoung Bae

The Lee Jae-myung administration’s pursuit of sovereign AI reflects an effort to secure national control over critical technologies—semiconductors, data infrastructure, foundation models, and defense AI. But unlike China’s indigenous innovation strategy that pursues autonomy through isolation, South Korea seeks technological resilience through trusted interdependence. By evaluating South Korea’s development and strategies in AI and related technologies through an own-cooperate-access framework, we can see that Seoul’s approach represents a distinct form of “cooperative sovereignty” that can be compatible with its U.S. alliance partner. South Korea excels in memory semiconductors and foundry capacity but lags in AI accelerators, cloud infrastructure, and defense AI. Cooperation on R&D, supply chains, and the establishment of shared governance norms through mechanisms within the U.S.-led alliance architecture can reinforce democratic values and regional stability.

AI Implications for Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear Defense Policy and Programs

Rebecca K.C. Hersman, Lauren Blackwelder, John V. Parachini

The U.S. Department of War’s rapid integration of artificial intelligence (AI) must account for how AI is reshaping the chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) risk landscape to strengthen decision advantage, enhance CBRN defense, and deter AI-enabled threats. AI’s integration introduces both opportunities and risks: It can enhance detection, decisionmaking, and crisis response yet also enable more-sophisticated or destabilizing CBRN capabilities for state and non-state actors.

These dual-use dynamics complicate traditional understandings of offense-defense balance, arms races, and strategic stability. In response, this paper presents a strategic analytic research agenda derived from five workshops convened with experts in AI safety and CBRN deterrence. The research agenda identifies key research priorities to advance understanding of AIxCBRN interactions, strengthen policy and strategic frameworks, and improve mechanisms for risk assessment, crisis management, and deterrence. It also emphasizes the need for cross-sector collaboration to ensure responsible innovation and resilience in the face of accelerating technological and geopolitical competition, particularly between the United States and China.