If Nato doesn't stand up to Putin, it is finished

By Con Coughlin World Last updated: March 25th, 2014

For anyone who still takes the security of the West seriously – and I fear I am in a distinct minority – the manner in which Russian President Vladimir Putin has effortlessly achieved his audacious land grab in the Crimea should serve as a dramatic wake-up call for Nato.

And yet, to judge by the mood music coming from the meeting of Western leaders in The Hague this week, the likelihood of Nato doing anything to dissuade Moscow's macho man from undertaking any further acts of military adventurism in central Europe or the Baltic states does not seem at all encouraging.

Booting Putin out of G8 is, admittedly, a step in the right direction. But it is hardly likely to deter a megalomaniac who believes it is his destiny to rebuild the Russian Empire, even if it means doing so at the expense of Moscow's weaker neighbours.

But if we are to prevent the Russian leader from undertaking further incursions, then we need to have an effective deterrent in place to dissuade him from doing so.

That is the role Nato is supposed to play. Its very existence, after all, is predicated on its ability to protect its member states from outside attack.

But at a time when President Obama shows little interest in maintaining the transatlantic alliance that has kept the peace since the Second World War, and with European governments – our own included – more interested in cutting defence spending that adopting a realistic strategic approach, the omens are not looking good.

When faced with a crisis, the default position of Nato member states, as we have seen recently over Libya and Syria, is to bicker amongst themselves over how to respond, rather than coming up with an effective programme that safeguards its interests.

But if Nato leaders fail to come up with an adequate response to Putin's new mood of military aggression, they might as well dissolve the alliance and start negotiating peace terms with Moscow.

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** Putin's Challenge to the West

Russia has thrown down a gauntlet that is not limited to Crimea or even Ukraine.
By
ROBERT M. GATES
March 25, 2014

Russian President Vladimir Putin has a long-festering grudge: He deeply resents the West for winning the Cold War. He blames the United States in particular for the collapse of his beloved Soviet Union, an event he has called the "worst geopolitical catastrophe of the 20th century."

His list of grievances is long and was on full display in his March 18 speech announcing the annexation of Crimea by Russia. He is bitter about what he sees as Russia's humiliations in the 1990s—economic collapse; the expansion of NATO to include members of the U.S.S.R.'s own "alliance," the Warsaw Pact; Russia's agreement to the treaty limiting conventional forces in Europe, or as he calls it, "the colonial treaty"; the West's perceived dismissal of Russian interests in Serbia and elsewhere; attempts to bring Ukraine and Georgia into NATO and the European Union; and Western governments, businessmen and scholars all telling Russia how to conduct its affairs at home and abroad.


Russian President Vladimir Putin. Getty Images

Mr. Putin aspires to restore Russia's global power and influence and to bring the now-independent states that were once part of the Soviet Union back into Moscow's orbit. While he has no apparent desire to recreate the Soviet Union (which would include responsibility for a number of economic basket cases), he is determined to create a Russian sphere of influence—political, economic and security—and dominance. There is no grand plan or strategy to do this, just opportunistic and ruthless aspiration. And patience.

Mr. Putin, who began his third, nonconsecutive presidential term in 2012, is playing a long game. He can afford to: Under the Russian Constitution, he could legally remain president until 2024. After the internal chaos of the 1990s, he has ruthlessly restored "order" to Russia, oblivious to protests at home and abroad over his repression of nascent Russian democracy and political freedoms.

In recent years, he has turned his authoritarian eyes on the "near-abroad." In 2008, the West did little as he invaded Georgia, and Russian troops still occupy the Abkhazia and South Ossetia regions. He has forced Armenia to break off its agreements with theEuropean Union, and Moldova is under similar pressure.

Last November, through economic leverage and political muscle, he forced then-President Viktor Yanukovych to abort a Ukrainian agreement with the EU that would have drawn it toward the West. When Mr. Yanukovych, his minion, was ousted as a result, Mr. Putin seized Crimea and is now making ominous claims and military movements regarding all of eastern Ukraine.

Ukraine is central to Mr. Putin's vision of a pro-Russian bloc, partly because of its size and importantly because of Kiev's role as the birthplace of the Russian Empire more than a thousand years ago. He will not be satisfied or rest until a pro-Russian government is restored in Kiev.

He also has a dramatically different worldview than the leaders of Europe and the U.S. He does not share Western leaders' reverence for international law, the sanctity of borders, which Westerners' believe should only be changed through negotiation, due process and rule of law. He has no concern for human and political rights. Above all, Mr. Putin clings to a zero-sum worldview. Contrary to the West's belief in the importance of win-win relationships among nations, for Mr. Putin every transaction is win-lose; when one party benefits, the other must lose. For him, attaining, keeping and amassing power is the name of the game.

U.S. Navy Holding Submarine Exercise in Arctic Simulating Attacks on Russian Subs

March 26, 2014

Cold War Echoes Under the Arctic Ice

Julian E. Barnes

Wall Street Journal, March 25, 2014

BENEATH THE ARCTIC OCEAN—Five hundred feet below the Arctic ice cap, the USS New Mexico’s crew filled two torpedo tubes. “Match sonar bearings and shoot,” ordered the skipper, Cmdr. Todd Moore. The air pressure rose sharply as a simulated torpedo headed toward its simulated target: a Russian Akula-class submarine.

The Arctic exercise, one of two over this past weekend, was intended as a show of U.S. force for the benefit of America’s allies, defense officials said. The drills were arranged before Russia’s annexation of Ukraine’s Crimea province, these people said, but have taken on new geopolitical significance as tensions soar between East and West.

The simulated attack came amid a new era of increasingly cold U.S. relations with Moscow. U.S.-Russian cooperation in the Arctic came to a sudden halt after the U.S. recently canceled a joint naval exercise in the northern waters and a bilateral meeting on Coast Guard Arctic operations. The U.S. also put on hold work on an Arctic submarine rescue partnership.

"This trip had a slightly different cast to it because hunting mythical submarines took on more urgency," said Sen. Angus King (I., Maine), who came as an observer. "This is the only ocean where we confront each other."

Defense officials said they chose a Russian simulated sub as the target because that was the only other nation that operates in the Arctic. Moreover, these people said the exercise wasn’t a signal that the U.S. sees a military conflict on the horizon.

Russian officials didn’t respond to a request to comment.

Across the Arctic Ocean, the U.S. has been conducting ice exercises with submarines since 1947. During the 1980s, the Navy had three ice camps a year, a frequency that declined rapidly after the Cold War’s end. The Navy is considering a renewed commitment to the Arctic as a retreating ice sheet opens up new sea lanes and makes oil exploration more feasible.


The U.S. held weekend submarine drills beneath the Arctic ice cap, involving the use of a provocative simulated target: A Russian sub. Julian Barnes was there and joins the News Hub with details.

As part of the exercise, which took place 150 miles off the north coast of Alaska, the Navy sent two subs beneath the Arctic Ocean to test their ability to operate, punch through the ice, find other submarines, hide and fire their torpedoes. The Navy publicized its exploits on social media.

Adm. Jonathan Greenert, chief of naval operations, who viewed the exercise, said showcasing American subs’ ability to operate and to collect intelligence in any corner of the world undetected is critical to U.S. security. The U.S. has a fleet of 72 subs compared with Russia’s approximate 60.

"If our allies and friends are reassured, that is a deterrent," said Adm. Greenert. "It is about being able to get to any area of the world and people understanding that we can."

The same weekend, 440 U.S. Marines concluded another Arctic exercise, this one in northern Norway with other allied troops, near the Russian border.

Norway says it plans to continue cooperating with Russia on search-and-rescue missions in the Arctic, but is reviewing its military-to-military cooperation with Moscow, said Norwegian Defense Minister Ine Eriksen Soreide. Norway is building a $125 million pier to help make it easier to move American and North Atlantic Treaty Organization military gear in and out of the country, U.S. defense officials said.

Ms. Soreide said she didn’t want to remilitarize the border. “At the same time we do have, and want to have, situational awareness for our own country and the alliance,” she said in an interview.

Across the Arctic Ocean, Ice Camp Nautilus, this year’s base, was named after the first sub to transit the Arctic in 1958. Basically a tent and some temporary wooden shacks perched on a cracked and shifting chunk of ice, the camp conducted a variety of Arctic experiments and tests, including the ability of a new Navy satellite system to send and transmit classified data more reliably in the high north than older satellites.

This year, the first ice exercise since 2011, the Navy sent two subs—the USS New Mexico and the USS Hampton, an older Los Angeles class.

Inside the New Mexico, many of the crew was trying to pay close attention to Crimea. But underwater for weeks at a time, the crew was cut off from news reports, save for what comes from an encrypted, very-low-frequency radio signal that penetrates the ice and delivers a news report a page and a half long.

Petty Officer Third Class Christopher Willis, who was drawn to undersea service by devouring tales of submarine prowess in the Cold War, was skeptical there would be a submarine shooting war soon. The real importance of America’s undersea fleet is its intelligence gathering, he said.


"It is not about putting warheads on foreheads," he said. "It is about finding out things."

Adm. Greenert said that despite tensions with Russia, he didn’t foresee a return to a military competition in the Arctic and hopes to restart cooperation.

THE CRIMEAN CRISIS FROM THE KREMLIN’S PERSPECTIVE

March 25, 2014

by Fortuna's Corner

SPIEGEL INTERNATIONAL

http://fortunascorner.com/2014/03/25/the-crimean-crisis-from-the-kremlins-perspective/

‘Dear to Our Hearts’

The Crimean Crisis From The Kremlin’s Perspective

By Matthias Schepp

The EU and US have come down hard on Russia for its annexation of the Crimean Peninsula. But from the perspective of the Kremlin, it is the West that has painted Putin into a corner. And the Russian president will do what it takes to free himself.

Last September, Vladimir Putin invited Russia experts from around the world to a conference, held halfway between Moscow and St. Petersburg. At the gathering, the Russian president delivered a passionate address. “We will never forget that Russia’s present-day statehood has its roots in Kiev. It was the cradle of the future, greater Russian nation,” Putin said. He added that Russians and Ukrainians have a “shared mentality, shared history and a shared culture. In this sense we are one people.”

At the time, German and European leaders still believed that it would be possible to bind Ukraine to the European Union by way of an Association Agreement and to free the country from Moscow’s clutches. But Putin had long before made the decision to prevent such an eventuality.

Indeed, he had already used the Crimean Peninsula as his stage for a symbolic and vaguely menacing appearance in the summer of 2012. Astride a three-wheel motorcycle, a black-clad Putin was photographed at the head of a group of staunch nationalist bikers. Like a group of modern-day knights, they tore across Ukrainian territory. Even then it was clear who Putin thought was the true leader of Ukraine: himself.

Putin knows that the vast majority of Russians are on his side when it comes to his Crimean policy. His cool and calculated — and thus far remarkably peaceful — annexation of the peninsula led to celebrations across Russia. After all, the conviction that Crimea — with its “Hero Cities” of Sevastopol and Kerch in addition to Russia’s Black Sea fleet — is Russian soil is widespread and shared even by many in the opposition camp. These are places, Putin said in his address last week, that are “dear to our hearts” and for which Russian soldiers fought and died. Even Nobel Peace Prize laureate Mikhail Gorbachev said last week that the West should accept the results of the Crimea referendum. “This should be welcomed instead of declaring sanctions,” he said.

The Russians Capture the Last Ukrainian Warship in Crimea, the CHERKASSY

March 26, 2014

One-Ship Ukraine Navy Defies Russia to the End

Philip Shishkin

Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2014


The Russian navy sank ships in Crimea’s Donuzlav Lake in an attempt to keep Ukrainian ships from leaving. Itar-Tass/Zuma Press

NOVO-OZERNE, Ukraine—Its escape to the open seas blocked by sunken ships, the Ukrainian minesweeper Cherkassy weaved and lurched in a narrow gulf on Tuesday afternoon with a symbolic, if inevitably brief, distinction: the last Ukrainian military vessel in Crimea not yet seized by the Russian navy.

From the banks of the gulf cutting into the western flank of the peninsula from the Black Sea, the Russians watched the trapped, constantly moving ship, then dispatched patrol boats to chase and bump the stubborn vessel in several unsuccessful capture attempts.

All other Ukrainian vessels blockaded in the same gulf, known as the Donuzlav Lake, had been seized in recent weeks.

On Tuesday night, the Russians tried again to seize the minesweeper. There was gunfire, explosions and smoke grenades, while helicopters hovered above the craft.

Officials at the Russian military base on the gulf declined to comment during the standoff on Tuesday.

The maritime drama has made enemies of sailors from two navies that have long trained, lived and studied together.

Born of a single Soviet mother, the Russian Black Sea Fleet and its Ukrainian counterpart went their separate ways after the breakup of the Soviet Union, splitting up old Soviet ships between the two of them.

Although Crimea remained part of independent Ukraine, Moscow continued to use the peninsula as headquarters of its Black Sea Fleet, under a treaty signed with Kiev.

Once Moscow moved to annex Crimea from Ukraine this month, the Black Sea Fleet was turned into a logistical base to assist in the takeover, in part by funneling troops into the streets of Crimea. One Ukrainian military analyst described the Russian fleet as a “Trojan horse.”

The Kremlin has long worried about having part of its navy based in a country pursuing closer ties with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, which Moscow views as a strategic foe.

Russia solved that problem by seizing Crimea and badly damaging Moscow’s relations with the West.

In the process, Russia also expropriated the underfunded Ukrainian navy.

Pivot to Europe

Published on The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org)

Source URL (retrieved on Mar 26, 2014): http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/pivot-europe-10130

March 26, 2014

John R. Deni

As leaders in western capitals continue to hope that Russian president Vladimir Putin will not extend his invasion further [3] into Ukraine, or worse to the Transnistria region of Moldova, discussion has increasingly focused on what concrete measures the United States and its NATO allies might take in response. Certainly economic sanctions—stronger than what’s been done to date—must be part of the policy response, but U.S. leaders can also take other steps to bolster NATO allies now concerned with their own security, including deploying U.S. troops to Eastern Europe.

In 1949, the first Secretary General of NATO, Lord Hastings Ismay of the United Kingdom, declared that the purpose of the alliance was to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans down. Although most of Europe no longer fears Germany as they did in Ismay’s time, keeping the Russians out and the Americans in remains vital to many U.S. allies across Europe. In a reminder that all politics—even international politics—is local, those NATO countries closest to Russia, especially the Baltic countries, Poland and Romania, have been most vocal in calling for a strong response from the West, including bolstering the U.S. presence in Europe.

So far, the West’s policy response has been fairly mild—certainly sanctions on several individuals and a bank are necessary, but they’re far from sufficient, judging from the reaction in Moscow, on the ground in Crimea, and along Ukraine’s eastern border. Similarly, efforts to expel the Russians from the G8 have been met with a dismissive shrug from Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov, who reportedly said, “so be it [4].” If it matters to Russia to matter in world affairs—and this seems to be the animating feature of Russian national-security policy over the last fifteen years—then excluding it from international institutions or other gatherings will have an impact, but a limited one at best.

More effective will be efforts to undermine the very basis for Russia mattering in the world—namely, its economic strength, which is underwritten largely by resource extraction. For this reason, targeting the Russian oil industry will be most effective, through a combination of sanctions and efforts to drive the price of oil down. Such steps, along with others designed to make continued Russian interaction with the global economy more difficult and more expensive, will take time but could ultimately have a significant impact on decision-makers in Moscow.

In the meantime, the United States should consider a number of other moves designed to reassure nervous American allies in Eastern Europe, deter the Russians from further adventurism, and signal to authorities in Moscow that the days of accommodating its boorish behavior are over. Augmenting the U.S. contribution to the Baltic air-policing mission and immediately increasing what has been an occasional, short-term U.S. Air Force presence in Poland have been welcome steps along these lines, but Washington and its allies should consider going further.

AMERICA IN DECLINE

March 25, 2014

by Fortuna's Corner

By Barry Shaw

When Barack Obama was running for president he promised, some say threatened, to fundamentally change America. The doubters now say he has fundamentally ruined America. Whichever way one views it, America is in serious decline.

For a president that promised to reduce the national debt, Obama has added a massive seven trillion dollars to that debt. Under his presidency, America has accumulated as much new debt as it did in its first 227 years.

He heads an Administration that produces food stamps, pries into people’s private lives, and sets government agencies against political opponents. Obama is following the guidebook of Saul Alinsky, “Rules for Radicals,” and is putting Alinsky’s primer into practice from the White House. The results of his experiment are devastating.

Under Obama, prices and taxes rose while take home pay fell 7%. Government hand-outs increased dramatically as the national debt has exploded. Recent estimates put 50 million Americans on food stamps, and millions without healthcare.

Obama, the community organizer, preferred social justice over a robust market place, but, under his presidency, people are worse off today than they were back in 2009 when he promised them change. By the end of the first quarter of 2014 America had six million people not only unemployed but also not even looking for jobs, the vast majority under the age of 55. This implies they had given up all hope of finding work. More than forty million Americans lived below the poverty line.

Increasingly, America is becoming a nation of dysfunctional families. 41% of babies are born out of wedlock. Under America’s first black president, American blacks are increasingly unemployed, and 72% of black kids are born out of wedlock, a terrible indictment of American society. The corrosive results of government hand-outs are now rampant in America. A nanny-state produces a population of dependency, not independence or an entrepreneurial spirit.

Obama has ratings in the 30s and falling on issues such as security, healthcare, economy, jobs, transparency in government, and the US image abroad. It seems that Obama doesn’t care. Deep into a second term, this lame duck president is determined to press on with his failed agenda, even if it takes executive powers to do it. American democracy is in jeopardy as Obama takes steps that are clearly unconstitutional.

The president’s credibility is trashed, and a major part of that is his failure to launch the unpopular healthcare policy that carries his name, “Obamacare.” March 2014, saw the thirty-first delay in a public display of total inefficiency.

WHY PUTIN SHOULD THANK OBAMA

March 25, 2014

by Fortuna's Corner 

Source Link

Why Putin Should Thank Obama

By Jack Matlock

Jack Matlock is a career diplomat who served on the front lines of American diplomacy during the Cold War and was U.S. ambassador to the Soviet Union when the Cold War ended.

Igor Oleynik, CEO of International Business Publications in Washington, DC, has sent me a spoof letter from Putin to Obama. Like most satire, it is over the top in some of its points, but it does illustrate the obvious fact that the way the Ukrainian situation has been handled by the Obama Administration has in fact strengthened President Putin’s hand at home.

It is hard for me to believe that this was President Obama’s intent. So the question arises: have the pressures of domestic politics so blinded the Administration to the consequences of its actions abroad that it has lost the presumed American virtue of pragmatism?

Now the tongue-in-cheek draft letter:

Dear President Obama:

It was a real pleasure for me to communicate with You over the phone during

the past month. I am really grateful to You for devoting so much time to the

problems of strategic importance, which have been worrying Russian people

and myself for many decades. Now, I have to say that mostly because of Your

dedication, efforts and help, some of our problems started to move towards

resolution. There are too many problems You have helped us to resolve to be

listed in this letter. In this short letter I would like to mention only

several problems and global issues which You have helped us to resolve

lately.

1. Thank You very much for Your efforts for making a neo-fascist revolt in

Ukraine possible. (We know that You and Your associates have spent a great

deal of money and efforts for doing this). By financing the efforts of

Ukrainian neo-fascists to overthrow the elected President of Ukraine – Mr.

Yanukovich – by force. By doing this, You and Your colleagues did a lot for

reviving Russian patriotic feelings, uniting all political forces in Russia,

moving forward the process of political and spiritual consolidation of the

diverse Russian society. Also, from the bottom of my heart, I would like to

express separate thanks for making me the undisputable leader of the

Russian-speaking world worldwide.

It's the Geoeconomy, Stupid

Published on The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org)

Source URL (retrieved on Mar 26, 2014): http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/its-the-geoeconomy-stupid-10125

Peter S. Rashish

March 26, 2014

President Obama will meet his European Union counterparts in Brussels on March 26 for a summit that will attempt to provide a needed boost to the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) [3]. TTIP, which aims to create the largest free-trade agreement in history, is attracting its share of critics after less than a year of negotiations. While TTIP will inevitably leave some grievances unanswered given the ambition and complexity of the issues under discussion, it is crucial that the talks succeed.

Unlike any previous free-trade agreement, TTIP is not only about tearing down barriers to the exchange of goods and services, but also fundamentally about geoeconomics—about creating rules of the road for global economic governance that enhance U.S. security.

In the future, successful U.S. global engagement will require a level playing field for private companies with their state-run competitors; limitations on governments’ control of energy flows; secure platforms to transfer commercial and personal data; restrictions on local-production and domestic-content requirements; high environmental standards; and protections for intellectual property that reward innovation.

The U.S. has tried to pursue these new, twenty-first-century rules for the global economy in a multilateral context through the nearly fourteen-year-old Doha Round of negotiations in the World Trade Organization. Because of the rise of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and other countries with different views of how to structure international economic relations these talks have yielded only lowest-common-denominator results.

While the U.S. engages in the G20, its deliberations are concerned mostly with fiscal and monetary questions like the right currency values or fiscal austerity vs. fiscal stimulus, and it is an essentially consultative body. And specialized global agencies like the World Intellectual Property Organization or the World Health Organization suffer from the same heterogeneous membership that has plagued the WTO. None of these fora currently offer the right kind of opportunities for the U.S and the EU to forge binding, high-standard global economic rules.

It is true that neither the U.S. nor the EU can make globally relevant rules alone, but together these two large, economically advanced and like-minded commercial heavyweights (who constitute 45 percent of world GDP) have the heft to create new structures that other trading partners will find it hard not to adopt. TTIP is a rational response by the United States to the increasing diversity of the international economic system.

That is all the more true as the alternative to TTIP is not the status quo. A number of Asian countries are pushing for a Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) that includes China, India and Japan, and that does not reflect the high-standard rules that the U.S. should prefer. If it gains momentum, Russia and other neighboring countries may knock at the RCEP door. A race could soon begin to decide who sets global economic rules.

TTIP not only has a key role to play to help maintain and strengthen a fair and open global economy. It is also a crucial element in U.S. policy towards Europe.

Asia Needs America More Than Europe

Source Link

Harry White

March 26, 2014

Obama has announced sanctions on Russia, because that’s what you do these days when you have no options, but don’t want to look weak. From Asia, what really matters is the sense of strategic latitude it will inspire in Beijing, and the pessimism it will arouse in Tokyo. Both of these sentiments will make America’s job in Asia harder. And if the president keeps overreaching in his response to crises, the trend of emboldening potential adversaries and worrying its allies will continue.

Perhaps the most striking thing for Washington about the events centred on Crimea, is that it’s only America’s second-biggest problem. There are a few reasons for that.

First off, there are no threats of armed force being used by Russia against any allies of the United States. Several of the territorial disputes in East Asia are risky, though the ones between China and allies of Washington are handled more carefully, for unlike in Ukraine, America is obliged to go to war to protect them if it comes to blows.

America’s allies in Europe are fundamentally more than capable of taking care of themselves, despite being disorganised. Western Europe’s major powers are formidable. Germany’s economy alone is much larger than Russia’s, and the EU’s GDP is more than six times the size of Russia’s. Russia’s economy is to the EU what Belgium’s economy is to Russia’s. Of course the exercise of military power is about more than economics, but economics is the foundation.

Asia is different. A Europe suddenly deprived of the United States would still be in a very strong position. An Asia deprived of the United States would not. That’s both because of the size of China relative to other powers in Asia, and because Asia’s middle powers would not work together in the same way that we could expect even of Europe. In short, Tokyo needs Washington in a way Berlin doesn’t.

So more is riding on American resolve in Asia than it is in Europe. Both because America’s alliances in Asia are at issue, and because of the real need for Washington’s help in more than just the short term should everything turn nasty.

From the point of view of Asia, the disparity between the approach adopted by Washington and its capacity to change the situation centred on Crimea is worrying. Just last week the US President said: “We will stand with Ukraine and the Ukrainian people in ensuring that territorial integrity and sovereignty is maintained.” It was optimistic then, and looks foolish now. Secretary Kerry’s visit to Kiev looks to have been either detached from reality, or self-consciously without serious political purpose.

N.S.A. Breached Chinese Servers Seen as Security Threat

ASIA PACIFIC

By DAVID E. SANGER and NICOLE PERLROTH

MARCH 22, 2014

Huawei's offices in Shenzhen, China. CreditForbes Conrad/Bloomberg, via Getty Images

WASHINGTON — American officials have long considered Huawei, the Chinese telecommunications giant, a security threat, blocking it from business deals in the United States for fear that the company would create “back doors” in its equipment that could allow the Chinese military or Beijing-backed hackers to steal corporate and government secrets.

But even as the United States made a public case about the dangers of buying from Huawei, classified documents show that the National Security Agency was creating its own back doors — directly into Huawei’s networks.

The agency pried its way into the servers in Huawei’s sealed headquarters in Shenzhen, China’s industrial heart, according to N.S.A. documents provided by the former contractor Edward J. Snowden. It obtained information about the workings of the giant routers and complex digital switches that Huawei boasts connect a third of the world’s population, and monitored communications of the company’s top executives.

One of the goals of the operation, code-named “Shotgiant,” was to find any links between Huawei and the People’s Liberation Army, one 2010 document made clear. But the plans went further: to exploit Huawei’s technology so that when the company sold equipment to other countries — including both allies and nations that avoid buying American products — the N.S.A. could roam through their computer and telephone networks to conduct surveillance and, if ordered by the president, offensive cyberoperations.Photo

Ren Zhengfei, founder of Huawei, is seen as a Chinese version of Steve Jobs.CreditDmitry Lovetsky/Associated Press

“Many of our targets communicate over Huawei-produced products,” the N.S.A. document said. “We want to make sure that we know how to exploit these products,” it added, to “gain access to networks of interest” around the world.

The documents were disclosed by The New York Times and Der Spiegel, and are also part of a book by Der Spiegel, “The N.S.A. Complex.” The documents, as well as interviews with intelligence officials, offer new insights into the United States’ escalating digital cold war with Beijing. While President Obama and China’s president, Xi Jinping, have begun talks about limiting the cyber conflict, it appears to be intensifying.

The N.S.A., for example, is tracking more than 20 Chinese hacking groups — more than half of them Chinese Army and Navy units — as they break into the networks of the United States government, companies including Google, and drone and nuclear-weapon part makers, according to a half-dozen current and former American officials.

If anything, they said, the pace has increased since the revelation last year that some of the most aggressive Chinese hacking originated at a People’s Liberation Army facility, Unit 61398, in Shanghai.

AIR-SEA BATTLE IN ORBIT

March 25, 2014

by Fortuna's Corner

Center for International Maritime Security

Special Analysis Weeks•Dead Ends Week – April 2014

The Hunt for Strategic September

LEO-ASAT15

Tactical Concepts

Air-Sea Battle in Orbit

March 21, 2014 Matthew Hallex 2 Comments

The threat of China’s Anti-Access and Area Denial (A2/AD) systems looms large in the minds of U.S. military thinkers and planners. The threat posed to U.S. naval forces by anti-ship ballistic missiles, submarines, and swarms of small combatants are well known to the readers of this blog. Air-Sea Battle, however, will not simply be fought in the air and seas of the Asia-Pacific but in space as well. The Air-Sea Battle Concept recognizes that “all domains will be contested by an adversary—space, cyberspace, air, maritime, and land.” While space is usually thought of as an Air Force domain, the Navy can make an important contribution to ensure the success of U.S. operations.

Space systems are a key source of U.S. military advantage. The United States has been uniquely successful in leveraging satellite communications, space-based intelligence capabilities, and the GPS constellation to enable global power projection and precision strike. This tremendous success has also made the United States particularly vulnerable to attacks on its space assets. Seeking to exploit this vulnerability China has invested heavily in counter-space systems. The potential of China’s counter-space program was illustrated most clearly by its successful test of a direct ascent anti-satellite weapon in 2007, destroying an obsolete Chinese satellite and filling low earth orbit with thousands of pieces of debris.

While the dependence of U.S. forces on space systems is relatively common knowledge, less appreciated is China’s increasing dependence on space to accomplish its own military missions. China uses space assets not to enable global power projection (at least, not yet) but as key parts of its A2/AD kill chain. China is building a maritime reconnaissance-strike complex, much like the one fielded by the Soviet Union during the cold war, including optical and radar imaging satellites as well as electronic intelligence satellites, that will allow it to locate U.S. ships at sea. Weather satellites will also aid China’s over-the-horizon radars tracking U.S. ships in the Western Pacific. Once Chinese satellites locate U.S. carrier groups and other targets, the Beidou satellite constellation, China’s counterpart to GPS, will guide long-range missiles to their targets.

Faced with the threat to important U.S. space assets and the threat from Chinese space assets, what contributions can the Navy make to the Air-Sea Battle fight in space?

The Navy can help mitigate the U.S. dependence on space assets. While current operations are dependent on targeting, navigation, and weather information from space assets, the Navy operated for decades before the first satellite was launched. Relearning how to operate without space assets- navigating and targeting weapons without GPS, for instance- will make U.S. forces more resilient in the face of threats to U.S. space systems. The Navy can also try to reduce its reliance on space systems when acquiring new weapons and platforms. Unmanned aviation, for instance, is a major consumer of satellite communication bandwidth. Finding alternatives to vulnerable satellite communications should be a major part of the Navy’s embrace of unmanned systems for maritime surveillance and carrier operations.

The threat from adversary space surveillance is not a new one. The Soviet Union deployed radar and electronic intelligence satellites to track and guide attacks on U.S. carrier groups as part of its own A2/AD effort. In response, the Navy developed countermeasures and deception tactics to blunt the threat from Soviet satellites. Relearning tactics such as emissions control (EMCON), maneuvering to avoid the orbital path of surveillance satellites, and dispersed formations to confuse tracking and targeting, will improve the chances of U.S. forces surviving Chinese A2/AD systems.

Why Can’t Our Spies in the Sky Find Malaysian Airlines Flight MH370

March 26, 2014

Why Can’t Big Brother Find MH370?

William Saletan

Slate, March 25, 2014

On one side of the Earth, Americans are afraid that the U.S. government is watching everything they say. On the other side of the Earth, millions of people, scouring hundreds of millions of satellite images, have failed to locate the wreckage of Malaysia Airlines Flight 370.

A few days ago, NBC News correspondent Andrea Mitchell asked former President Jimmy Carter about the NSA controversy. Carter replied:

I have felt that my own communications are probably monitored. And when I want to communicate with a foreign leader privately, I type or write a letter myself, put it in the post office, and mail it. … Because I believe if I send an email, it will be monitored.

This fear of being personally spied upon is pervasive. In polls, 35 to 40 percent of Americans have said they’re concerned that the government is “collecting your phone call records” or “monitoring your internet activities.” Majorities have said that the NSA’s programs violate privacy and go too far. Their anxiety, stoked by allegations that the government is “placing millions of people under permanent surveillance,” has forced the Obama administration to agree—in a plan reported last night by the New York Times—to shut down the NSA’s collection of phone call records.

It’s hard to square this fear with the surveillance logjam that’s been crippling the search for MH370. For the last two weeks, satellites associated with Australia, China, France, and the U.S. have captured images hinting at possible locations of the plane’s debris. But in each case, the images haven’t been released until days after they were taken, by which time the debris—whatever it was—could no longer be found.

On March 13, when the search was focused near Malaysia, the Malaysian Insidernoted a four-day gap between the capture and release of images from a Chinese satellite. At that point China said that it had 10 satellites searching for the plane and that they had covered 120,000 square kilometers, “an area almost the size of Greece.” An Australian space analyst explained the delay this way:

Building an Army of 125,000 Spartans, Part II

Source Link

March 24, 2014

By J. Furman Daniel, III

Editor's note: This is a follow-up to the March 6 article, "Building an Army of 125,000 Spartans." 

One of the great things about making a provocative argument is that you get plenty of responses. Two weeks ago, I wrote a think piece about the advantages of creating a small, elite force that could serve either as a rapid response force for small scale operations or as the cadre for a rapidly expanded army in the event of a major power war. Since then, I have received a wide range of responses ranging from full-fledged agreement, to thoughtful engagement with my points, to openly hostile personal attacks on my education and character. My reaction to all of these comments has been the same−I must have struck a nerve!

My piece argued for a radical transformation of the Army, including a steep 75% cut to active-duty personnel to 125,000. To compensate for this downsizing, the Army should adopt a multifaceted-approach to increase the quality, flexibility, and combat power of the force. This approach would entail stricter recruiting and promotion selection standards, significantly higher pay, greater emphasis on education and training, lengthier enlistment terms, longer deployments, a no-tolerance policy for criminal and disciplinary infractions, an increased use of private contractors for non-combat roles, and a rethinking of our reliance on the National Guard and Reserve.

In what follows, I will attempt to briefly address some of the most common responses to my work; clarify some of my points; and reaffirm my claim that given the budgetary restrictions of the time, that a small elite force would be the best choice among a panoply of bad options.

1. I’m Glad I Got a Discussion Going

I firmly believe that U.S. grand strategy is at a crossroads. The choices we make today will have “long-tailed” impacts on the future and the consequences for guessing wrong could be catastrophic. One of the most difficult elements of crafting an effective long-term strategy is to carefully consider a wide range of options. To that end, I am extremely proud that I have gotten people to discuss the merits and faults of my argument. In short, I would strongly prefer to be heard and “wrong” than ignored and “right.” We must make difficult choices on our national defense, and I believe that there is no better way to arrive at the optimal strategy than an informed and rational debate. Mission accomplished.

2. Thinking in These Terms Is Useful, Even if You Ultimately Reject the Argument

When thinking about strategy, it is essential to understand both the risks and rewards of potential options. I have proposed a plan that would carry significant risks (increased reliance on contractors, less redundancy, greater pressure on the men and women in uniform, civil-military dynamics, etc.), but would also provide the potential for significant rewards (cost savings, greater combat proficiency, greater institutional knowledge, continuity, and professionalism, etc.).

Many of my critics have made excellent points in claiming that the risk exceeds the rewards. I believe that the value of thinking in these terms is that it provides both warriors and policy makers with the opportunity to reevaluate what is valuable and what is not about our current force structure. It is perfectly reasonable to conclude that a larger force is preferable to the smaller force that I proposed, but I want my critics to carefully consider why their preferred option is better as well as the risk that their alternative entails.

***** War Amongst the People, Or Just Irregular?

by Marcelo O.L. Serrano

Journal Article | March 25, 2014

War Amongst the People, Or Just Irregular?

Marcelo O.L. Serrano

Abstract

This paper analyses the concept of War Amongst the People proposed by General Rupert Smith in his book “The Utility of Force: the Art of War in the Modern World”. War Amongst the People would be the new paradigm of war, which would have replaced the previous one, the Interstate Industrial War. General Smith’s ideas are analysed in their historical and logical coherence. Firstly, the definition of War Amongst the People as a world characterized by confrontations and conflitcs, no longer by the dichotomy war and peace, is contradicted. History demonstrates that confrontation and conflicts are not a specifity of this paradigm, but a perennial reality. Secondly, the Interstate Industrial War paradigm, the basic idea of the concept of War Amongst the People, is flawed in three aspects: it particularizes what is general, generalizes what is particular and do not suffice to explain all wars it was supposed to serve as model. Lastly, as the core of the work, the six tendencies of War Amongst the People are dissected. Many features, shown as specific of the new paradigm are, in fact, not new. Some intellectual artifices are used as a way to support flawed ideas. The characteristics of War Amongst the People, in reality, do not differ from the very know concept of Irregular War. The paper concludes that war war cannot be understood only through the wars of the great powers and, due to its innumerous and variable contexts, cannot be contained in a paradigm.

Introduction

The background of this paper is the notion that war would have assumed a new nature, distinct from that traditionally known. Its goal is to analyze the concept of War amongst the People, proposed by the General Rupert Smith in his book “the Utility of Force: the Art of War in the Modern World”. Although the General does not speak of new nature, but new paradigm, his thinking is clearly associated with the current of thought that advocates that idea.

“War no longer exists”. This is the opening phrase of General Smith’s book. The War amongst the People (WAP) would be the new paradigm, which would have replaced the previous one, the Interstate Industrial War (IIW). In this new paradigm, the conflicts would not develop itself linearly - peace, crisis, war, resolution, peace - being instead, dictated by the dynamics of permanent confrontation and conflict – no longer by the dichotomy of war and peace.

The idea of WAP is being accepted by increasing number of Brazilian army’s officers whitout due reflexion about its relevance. There should be caution before the trend of seeing in the current and future armed conflicts the emergence of a new nature of war, instead of simply recognizing them as a subjective manifestation of war’s nature, according to Clausewitz’s theorization. War, as a political, economic, military and social phenomenon, has been a constant throughout history. What is so markedly different in present time to the point of characterizing this change?

The Art of Tailoring Competitive Strategies

by Octavian Manea

Journal Article | March 23, 2014

The Art of Tailoring Competitive Strategies

SWJ discussion with Dr. Andrew D. May, Associate Director, Office of the Director, Net Assessment, Department of Defense. The views expressed here are the interviewee's personal opinions and do not reflect the views of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or the Office of Net Assessment.

Octavian Manea

SWJ: When we talk about the history of the Cold War we tend to focus on pivotal personalities like George Kennan or Paul H. Nitze. But how do you see the role of Andrew Marshall and the Office of Net Assessment in shaping the history of the Cold War and the strategic decision-making framework in the competition with the Soviet Union?

Dr. Andrew D. May: At least during its initial period, one of the real contributions of the office was structuring comparative analysis and doing it in a particular way that highlighted opportunities for the officials responsible for managing the US side of the competition with the Soviet Union. It wasn’t only about threats, problems and weaknesses, it was in a very structured way an attempt to draw attention on opportunities we had to improve our position and complicate life for our competitors. That was unusually rare and exceptionally helpful. The office has been especially useful in the last 40 years partly in the analytic products that it produced but also in the generations of officers (who come in 2-3 year rotations) that through exposure to Mr. Marshall and working for someone like him and the kinds of problems he sets for them have come out from the experience better officers and better strategists. The historical record speaks a lot about the success that Mr. Marshall has had in identifying promising officers, setting them on a path for future success that has helped not just them but the DOD and the country.

SWJ: What in the strategic environment of the mid 1970s pushed the US in searching for a new strategic framework in the competition with the Soviet Union?

Dr. Andrew D. May: There were I think two things that were related. In the early part of the 1970s there was a sense among a lot of people, including Mr. Marshall, that the trends in the strategic competition with the Soviet Union were not favorable to the United States. The Soviets were catching up in a lot of areas, particularly in the strategic nuclear arms, which had been a very prominent advantage for the U.S. In many other areas there was a growing sense that we were not faring very well in the competition. And this was a particular problem because our strategy, since the ‘50s, was predicated on the notion that if we could just not lose, we could eventually win. So doing well in the peacetime competition was an essential component of our strategy and watching that position deteriorate was really worrisome to a lot of people. That context created a general sense that we needed to start having a more informed, intelligent, calibrated strategy rather than buying the best of everything which was no longer a viable option. Shortly after that, this movement received an impetus because the US presence in Vietnam drew down and the attention returned to the Central Front and there was a broad realization that we had lost a lot of position relative to the Soviets while we were focused on Vietnam. In the meantime, the Soviets had made a lot of improvements and advances and we really needed to return our attention to that competition. This coupled with the earlier sense pushed things along.

SWJ: A key concept that Andrew Marshall and ONA developed and shaped starting in the mid 1970s is that of competitive strategy. What is a competitive strategy?

Dr. Andrew D. May: A competitive strategy is nothing more than trying to identify your own enduring competitive strengths and looking for opportunities where those match up against particular weaknesses of your competitor and finding ways in which you can exploit those. Ideally you are looking for situations where those strengths and weaknesses are deeply rooted in the fundamental characteristics of the two competitors so that they are not circumstances that your competitor can really realistically change in any rapid way.

Declassify Henderson Brooks' report

The tactics employed in 1962 have no relevance today

Kuldip Nayar

Indian troops show a banner asking Chinese troops to withdraw. A Tribune file photograph

I was a correspondent of The Times, published from London, when Neville Maxwell was its South Asia correspondent. He operated from New Delhi and we often discussed matters concerning India and other countries, particularly China.

That he was anti-India would be an understatement. His hatred towards the country was patent in his dispatches. For example, he wrote after the second general election in 1957 that it was the last poll of the country because democracy was not suited to India's genius.

I have not seen any of his writings to admit that his reading was incorrect. He reminded me at times of British die-hards who exploited India to make their country rich and indulged in unspeakable atrocities to keep us a colony. Both Maxwell and I often compared India's development with China's. Otherwise progressing democracy, he praised China's authoritarian regime. He honestly believed that it was India which attacked China and therefore titled his book as "India's war on China".

The utility of the book was the reproduction of certain portions of the report by Henderson Brooks, appointed by the government to probe reasons for India's debacle in the 1962 war against China. He reportedly blamed New Delhi, particularly Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru, for "shoving" India into a war against China when the former had not provided shoes to the soldiers who were moved from Kashmir to face the Chinese.

I was then the Press Secretary to Home Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and knew his unhappiness over the building up of China's Premier Chou En-Lai by Nehru. The latter introduced him to the world figures and took him to Bandung at the first non-alignment conference. That Nehru was never the same after the defeat and died early because he felt personally betrayed. Although Sardar Patel had warned him through a letter not to trust China which would one day attack India, Nehru was obsessed by a Socialist country and he, to his grief, could not transform India into that mould.

Chinese takeaway: PLA Goes Out

C. Raja Mohan | | March 26, 2014 

The Beijing-bound Boeing 777-200 Flight MH370 of Malaysia Airlines had 227 passengers aboard. (AP) 

Chinese military operations, in waters far from its shores, in search of the ill-fated Malaysian airliner have demonstrated Beijing’s impressive maritime capabilities and the strong political will to use them. India’s hesitant response to the humanitarian emergency, in contrast, has brought into sharp relief the diminution of India’s defence diplomacy under A.K. Antony’s extended tenure in South Block. 

Immediately after the disappearance of the Boeing 777 aircraft, flight MH 370 from Kuala Lumpur to Beijing, on March 8, the Chinese navy embarked on its largest search and rescue mission ever. Beijing deployed four warships and five coast guard vessels along with helicopters and fixed wing surveillance aircraft in the Gulf of Thailand and the South China Sea. Among the warships were two of China’s most advanced amphibious ships (called landing platform docks). The 20,000 tonne vessels, equipped with helicopters and boats, including hovercraft, can carry up to 20 armoured vehicles and 800 troops. 

Once the attention turned to the Indian Ocean, China ordered nine vessels to head to the region. Four vessels led by the LPD Jinggangshan travelled through the Malacca Straits to the Bay of Bengal and five others, led by the LPD Kunlunshan, set sail through Indonesia’s Sunda Straits to the southern Indian Ocean. Once possible debris was sighted west of Australia, the squadron in the Bay of Bengal headed south. A scientific research vessel returning from an expedition to Antarctica was asked to join the Chinese flotilla in the southern Indian Ocean. Imagery from China’s satellites — Beijing has a vast military space programme — confirmed sightings by others and helped limit the search to the southern Indian Ocean. China also deployed two IL-76 transport aircraft of the Chinese air force to Perth in Western Australia to reinforce the search for the remains of MH 370. 

Non-War Ops 

The rapid deployment of multiple military assets by the Chinese armed forces in search of MH 370 underlined the People’s Liberation Army’s new emphasis on what it calls “military operations other than war”. After Chinese leader Hu Jintao called on the armed forces to fulfil their “new historic missions” at the end of 2004, the PLA has focused on organising, equipping, training and deploying its armed forces for a range of operations other than war, including humanitarian assistance, emergency rescue and disaster relief.