Can Asia prevent its own Crimea?

http://csis.org/publication/can-asia-prevent-its-own-crimea-1

By Bonnie S. Glaser, Ely Ratner 

MAR 26, 2014 

With the world watching Ukraine with wary eyes, the U.S. Navy’s lead admiral in the Pacific suggested Asia could face a similar crisis if the continent’s other major power continues on its current path.

Since 2009, China has stepped up what Philippine officials have called a “creeping invasion” in the South China Sea. Although less dramatic than Russia’s annexation of Crimea, Beijing has been bullying its neighbors to assert and advance an expansive set of territorial and maritime claims encompassed by its “nine-dash line,” which skirts the coastlines of Vietnam, Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei and the Philippines and gobbles up islands, rocks and resources in the process.

Seeking to make new facts on the ground (or, more literally, on the water), Beijing has permitted and encouraged its paramilitary law enforcement ships and navy to engage in persistent harassment and intimidation of non-Chinese fisherman, military vessels and energy companies seeking to go about their business in the South China Sea. Earlier this month, Chinese coast guard vessels reportedly interfered with the delivery of supplies to Filipino marines stationed on Second Thomas Shoal, a submerged reef near Reed Bank that is believed to be rich in oil and gas. If such incidents are allowed to continue, armed conflict could be around the corner.

But what distinguishes the contest over sovereignty in the Asia-Pacific from events unfolding more than 5,000 miles away in Eastern Europe is that hope remains for a peaceful solution that eschews coercion and force in exchange for international law and diplomacy.

Outmatched by China’s rapidly growing military, and dispirited by 17 years of failed bilateral diplomacy to settle its disputes with Beijing, the Philippines decided in January 2013 that its only recourse was to submit its claims to compulsory arbitration under the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, which governs international rules and rights on the world’s seas. This came on the heels of China’s illegal seizure and occupation (continued to this day) of the contested Scarborough Shoal off of the Philippines’ west coast.

Despite Beijing’s unrelenting efforts to pressure Manila to drop the case, the Philippines plans to file its final “memorial” at the end of March, which will detail its case that many of China’s claims, including the notorious “nine-dash line,” have no standing in international or customary law. Legal experts predict a ruling could come down as early as mid- or late 2015.

In the meantime, countries in the Asia-Pacific – and the international community – have an opportunity to decide what kind of world they want to live in: one governed by rules and institutions; the other by brute force.

Robert Kaplan: The center of military power in the world is moving to Asia

Global Viewpoint

In an interview, Robert Kaplan says: 'The United States can preserve the peace [in the Asia Pacific] by seeking not domination, but a favorable balance of power with China. It must at some level allow China its rightful place in the Western Pacific.'

By Nathan Gardels, Commentary contributor, Robert Kaplan, Commentary contributor / March 27, 2014

Chinese President Xi Jinping, waves to reporters as he leaves a meeting with France's Prime Minister Jean Marc Ayrault in Paris, March 27.

Robert Kaplan is the author of “Asia’s Cauldron: The South China Sea and the End of a Stable Pacific.” He spoke with WorldPost and Global Viewpoint editor Nathan Gardels on March 25.

NATHAN GARDELS: “China’s efforts to enhance its influence as a rising power in an assertive way will backfire and result in an unintended encirclement of China by her neighbors. The irony is that this ‘security dilemma’ was exactly what happened in Europe when Kaiser Wilhelm II, confident of rising power of Germany, began to practice a muscular diplomacy in 1890.”

This is a quote from former South Korean foreign minister Yoon Young-kwan in a recent WorldPost article. Like many others, including Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, he suggests that the situation inEast Asia in 2014 is analagous to 1914 in Europe.

Do you see it that way? In what ways yes, in what ways no?

ROBERT KAPLAN: The better comparison is not with the Kaiser’s Germany or World War I, but with American policy in the 19th and early 20th century for the Greater Caribbean.

China sees the South China and East China seas as blue water extensions of its continental land mass, just as a younger America saw the Greater Caribbean that way. Domination of the Greater Caribbean gave the United States strategic control of the Western Hemisphere, allowing it to affect the balance of power in the Eastern Hemisphere throughout the 20th century.

China believes it is its right to be the preponderant power in its adjacent seas, thus unlocking the door to the wider Pacific and Indian Ocean for the Chinese navy.

World War I was a history- and culture-transforming event because of its interminable length and massive body count. Asia by contrast is a maritime sphere that could have short intense wars over blue sea with no civilian casualties.

GARDELS: What are the dimensions of the arms race in East Asia? What is its fundamental motivation?

KAPLAN: China is on its way to having one of history’s great navies. The other states are responding in kind. These are not 20th century land armies that are being built, but postmodern navies, air forces, missile systems, and cyber-warfare capacities.

The center of military power in the world is moving to Asia. The reason: Sustained capitalist expansion leads to military acquisitions. As states consolidate their institutions at home and do more trade and business abroad, they seek militaries in order to defend their new interests. Asian states like China, Japan, and Vietnam are no longer internally focused, but projecting power out – and thus their territorial claims clash and overlap. So we have a great military build-up.

GARDELS: What can be done to prevent East Asia from going the way of Europe in the 20th century where rival nationalisms led to war? Can China and the US share power to stabilize the Pacific?

KAPLAN: The United States must not let China Finlandize its neighbors in the Asia-Pacific. But neither can the United States allow Japanese, Filipino, or Vietnamese nationalism to force the United States into a military conflict with China. The United States can preserve the peace by seeking not domination, but a favorable balance of power with China. It must at some level allow China its rightful place in the Western Pacific. 

© 2014 The WorldPost/Global Viewpoint Network, distributed by Tribune Content Agency, LLC. Hosted online by The Christian Science Monitor.

The Next Round in Gaza

Read full report (pdf)

Middle East Report N°14925 Mar 2014

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The ceasefire between Israel and Gaza has eroded during the past several months and recently threatened to come to an abrupt end. The day after three members of Islamic Jihad were killed by Israel in a border clash on 11 March 2014, the group, apparently in coordination with Hamas, launched the largest salvo of rockets toward Israel since the last major escalation (known in Israel as Operation Pillar of Defence), in November 2012. In a little over a day’s mediation, Egypt restored quiet. But with Hamas’s fortunes declining and Gaza suffering its worst isolation and economic constriction in years, it is likely a matter of time until a flare-up escalates to major conflagration – unless the sides reach an understanding to extend a fragile quiet. Given Hamas’s isolation and worsening relations with Cairo, it is hard to imagine full implementation of the ceasefire Egypt brokered to end the 2012 fighting. But a rump deal, comprised of that ceasefire’s core elements, still could lessen the chance that Hamas and Israel will be dragged into a conflict neither currently desires, while helping both to secure advantages beyond the Gaza-Israel theatre.

Periodic escalations between Israel and Gaza militants are the rule, not the exception. Their shared border has witnessed regular, low-scale violence punctuated by short, intense escalations, typically when one or both sides feel the implicit rules of engagement have been undercut. Hamas and Israel have been headed toward such a clash since 3 July 2013, when Egyptian President Mohamed Morsi was deposed, and Cairo, as part of its campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafi-jihadis in Sinai, initiated a push to further isolate Gaza by closing the tunnels under its border with Egypt. Among Hamas’s limited tools for dealing with its downward spiral is directly participating in a military escalation in the hope that a new crisis would bring about at least temporary alleviation of the closure; call the world’s attention to the resultant economic distress; increase sympathy for the territory in Egypt and elsewhere; and embarrass Egypt’s leaders about their role in immiserating Gaza.

For the time being, Hamas has rejected this option, as it cannot afford a new round of hostilities. It is politically isolated and in severe economic distress. It can neither count on Egypt’s sympathies nor easily rearm during or after a future crisis. Hamas is hamstrung by the burdens of governance and by the fact that it would bear the brunt of any Israeli offensive. As a result, it chose a softer and less risky alternative this month: giving greater leeway to other factions that wish to attack Israel.

Islamic Jihad, with its massive retaliation for the killing of its militants, saw an opportunity to push to the forefront of the national struggle. In contrast with Hamas, it demonstrated continuing fidelity to the principle of resistance, and, by negotiating a ceasefire directly with Egypt, emerged from Hamas’s shadow, positioning itself as a regional player. Hamas too saw an advantage in the escalation: sending a message that Gaza would not remain passive in the face of isolation and misery.

The Turkey–Iran–Saudi Arabia Co-Evolution

In the recent strategic simulation The Turkey–Iran–Saudi Arabia Co-Evolution — in which Wikistrat’s analysts explored competing pathways for Turkey, Iran and Saudi Arabia vis-à-vis each other — Senior Analyst R. Jordan Prescott suggested that Israel and Saudi Arabia might sign a non-aggression pact to balance against their common enemy, Iran. He expands on that proposal here.

State Department Photo

In October, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia stunned international observers by turning down the opportunity to sit on the United Nations Security Council. According to the Saudi Foreign Ministry, the rejection reflected frustration with the United Nations’ ineffectiveness in “preserving world peace”. Diplomats speculated that the move actually reflected Saudi frustration with the West, especially the United States, regarding its policies toward Egypt and Syria. Now, in the wake of the recently concluded nuclear agreement with Iran, Saudi Arabia is reportedly exploring alternatives to its alliance with the United States. While experts acknowledge Saudi frustration is genuine, they assert the kingdom has few viable options. Nevertheless, Saudi Arabia could contravene all geopolitical calculations if it is prepared to engage a nemesis that also happens to be the region’s sole credible counterweight to Iran.

Mounting Unease

The alliance between the United States and Saudi Arabia dates back to 1944 and has weathered many crises, from the 1973 OPEC oil embargo to the participation of nineteen Saudi nationals in the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.

However, in the aftermath of American military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq as well as foreign policy decisions over the past twenty-four months, the Saudi leadership has become very apprehensive as to the alliance’s durability.

CONTAINING RUSSIA AND RESTORING AMERICAN POWER

Robert Killebrew

March 27, 2014 

Source Link

Russia’s actions in Crimea and Ukraine are ringing alarm bells in Europe and United States. For the first time since World War II, European national boundaries are being changed by force, and, in an eerie echo of 1938, by an authoritarian leader who claims the right of intervention on behalf of ethnic kin in other countries.

Is this a temporary setback in relations that can be smoothed over by diplomacy? Or is this the beginning of Cold War II, a reprise of the old days that will be with us as long as Russia continues its bellicosity?

While the returns are still coming in, it’s increasingly clear that Russian President Vladimir Putin intends to set Russia on a long-term course to restore Russian greatness and its influence over the states that used to fall within the Soviet empire. His speech of March 19 deserves careful reading. Although the former Soviet Union based its legitimacy and its right to empire on an ideology, Putin’s new Russia is based on his view of former Soviet glory, strident Russian nationalism and opposition to the West. Whether that view will survive him – whether there will be a similarly motivated line of succession as there was from Stalin to Malenkov to Khrushchev and so forth – is unknown. But Putin is a serious man, and his intentions should be taken seriously.

By now it should be clear that the “American moment” at the end of the Cold War – or, more precisely, of Cold War I – is over, and our security policies must be realigned. During the decade that coincided with the presidency of William Jefferson Clinton and the incompetent incumbency of Boris Yeltsin, the post-Cold War era appeared to be the age of democracy, led by a prosperous and militarily untouchable United States. Those days are long gone. From an explosion of post-Cold War optimism, the number of democratic states in the world is declining from its high water mark in the 1990s, and authoritarianism of the “one man, one vote, one time” type is spreading.

The Certainty of Donald Rumsfeld (Part 3)

By ERROL MORRIS

MARCH 27, 2014

This is the third installment of a four-part series.

3. A FAILURE OF IMAGINATION

Wikipedia

Rumsfeld’s life is bookended by two major historical events, two surprise attacks — the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941 when he was 9 years old and 60 years later, the attack on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon. Rumsfeld wrote in Known and Unknown:

I had dictated a note to myself [July 23, 2001] that I intended to offer when I was next testifying before Congress. “I do not want to be sitting before this panel in a modern day version of a Pearl Harbor post-mortem as to who didn’t do what, when, where and why,” I wrote. “None of us would want to have to be back here going through that agony.”[1]

But he was back testifying before Congress several months after that memo was written — not for a post-mortem assessment of what had happened, but to plead for more money from Congress following the 9/11 attacks.

I sometimes remarked that the only thing surprising is that we continue to be surprised when a surprise occurs. In 1962, Harvard economist Thomas Schelling wrote a foreword to a book on Pearl Harbor that captured this idea perfectly. “We were so busy thinking through some ‘obvious’ Japanese moves that we neglected to hedge against the choice that they actually made,” [Schelling] wrote. “There is a tendency in our planning to confuse the unfamiliar with the improbable.” I was so taken with his piece that I sent a copy to President Bush during our first month in office as well as to many members of Congress.[2]

HASC CHAIR MCKEON: U.S. CAN’T PROJECT POWER WITH DIPLOMACY ALONE

March 25, 2014 

by Fortuna's Corner

For Immediate Release: March 25, 2014 Contact: HASC Communications (202)-225-2539

Chairman McKeon Op-Ed: U.S. can’t project power with diplomacy alone

“America is losing the very strength that keeps the peace and reassures its allies when they stand up to bullies”.

U.S. Can’t Project Power with Diplomacy Alone

By Chairman Buck McKeon

March 21, 2014

The Washington Examiner

A certain worldview in the White House overlooks reality: The nation doesn’t need a strong military because there are no significant threats to it, and the president can handle any crisis through diplomacy.

How has that been working? The president resets the United States’ relationship with Russia, and Vladimir Putin invades Ukraine. White House proposals to resolve the crisis have been flatly rejected by Moscow. Instead, Moscow is amassing troops on the border of eastern Ukraine. The president scraps U.S. missile defense systems in Poland and the Czech Republic and cuts U.S nuclear forces, while Moscow proceeds to violate a nuclear arms treaty.

America’s European allies are worried, and its Asian allies are nervous. China recently declared an air defense zone over Japanese territory and may very well seek to expand its claims to other maritime territory. It harasses U.S. allies in the Philippines, Vietnam and others in the South China Sea. North Korea continues to test nuclear weapons and deploy long-range missiles, including a new ICBM aimed at American cities.

The president strikes a deal with Iran that doesn’t require it to stop enriching uranium. This neither cuts Iran’s ballistic missiles nor curbs its supply of arms to terrorists. Meanwhile, three years after the president’s cut-and-run from Iraq, al Qaeda has retaken Fallujah and Ramadi and has spread to new corners of the globe — no less determined to kill Americans.

While the president’s diplomatic strategy and rosy threat picture haven’t panned out, his drastic cuts to the military have. Since President Obama took office, more than $1 trillion has been cut from defense. Defense is not a priority in this White House.

The president’s budget cuts the U.S. Army to pre-World War II levels. The Marines are cut so low that it has to throw its entire force “all in” for one conflict, leaving other parts of the world vulnerable. The president’s budget also cuts force structure. It cuts an aircraft carrier. It sends hundreds of perfectly good aircraft to the boneyard in Arizona. It cuts U.S. missile defense, submarine forces, amphibs, cruisers and ground combat vehicles.

Nuclear loopholes pose worrying dilemma

Global Times | 2014-3-24

By Xie Chao 

World leaders are gathering in The Hague to address nuclear security issues. China has been playing an active role in nuclear dialogue and cooperation. But there is an absence of effective Sino-India nuclear dialogue. India has never figured in China's threat assessment in any serious fashion.

Sino-Indian strategic stability is sustained by two cornerstones, China's possession of a more advanced nuclear arsenal, and the adoption of a no-first-use (NFU) doctrine by both countries. But if we look deeper into this, these foundations seem less staple.

As a declaratory policy, the credibility of NFU commitment is a two-way process, dependent on both how a country makes the statement and how others interpret it.

China was the first to propose and pledge an NFU policy and has consistently held a position which states that "China remains firmly committed to the policy of no first use of nuclear weapons at any time and under any circumstances. It unconditionally undertakes not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon states or nuclear-weapon-free zones."

However, India's ambiguous nuclear status complicates this issue. India's self-exile from the Non-Proliferation Treaty regime makes it, technically, not a nuclear weapon state and its de facto possession of nuclear weapons makes it not a non-nuclear weapon state either. Hence, India falls in a technical loophole in the context of China's full NFU commitment.

India's NFU policy is under constant debate and interpretation. India first announced its NFU policy after its nuclear tests in 1998, designed to alleviate international pressure after the blast, but no specific content was added.

Its Draft Nuclear Doctrine in 1999 stated that "India will not resort to the use or the threat of use of nuclear weapons against states which do not possess nuclear weapons, or are not aligned with nuclear weapons powers." This stirred up great controversy and failed to get final approval by the government.

In 2003, the Indian Nuclear Doctrine was released, stating an NFU posture but added that "in the event of a major attack against India, or Indian forces anywhere, by biological or chemical weapons, India will retain the option of retaliating with nuclear weapons." This indicates that India would retaliate with nuclear weapons if attacked by non-nuclear weapons of mass destruction.

On October 21, 2010, India's National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon signaled a significant shift from "no first use" to "no first use against non-nuclear weapon states," and despite the speculation it generated, the Indian government chose not to walk back this comment. In April 2013, Shyam Saran, convener of the National Security Advisory Board, affirmed that Pakistani development of tactical battlefield nuclear weapon would nullify Indian NFU doctrine. Hence, the efficacy of India's NFU commitment has been significantly downgraded.

As for the other cornerstone of China's nuclear superiority, India's recent progress has significantly narrowed any gap.

India is now the fourth country in the world to have a workable nuclear triad. In September 2013, India tested its inter-continental ballistic missile the Agni-5, with a range of 5,000 kilometers covering the whole of China and reaching Europe and it further claims to possess the capability of producing a weapon system with a range of 10,000 kilometers in 2015.

According to the 2012 SIPRI Yearbook, the Indian nuclear arsenal comprises 80 to 100 warheads and it keeps expanding its storage of weapon-grade plutonium.

So if China was enjoying and still enjoys a certain nuclear superiority over India, this relative gap is definitely being narrowed.

Enhanced strategic stability needs more than an NFU and shrinking nuclear gap. Both countries are aiming at a greater role in global politics, and neither can afford a strong but hostile nuclear neighbor.

Confidence-building measures can be strengthened, and more effective dialogue mechanisms are required to address nuclear accidents and strategic misperceptions between the two countries. Increasing efforts on bilateral nuclear dialogue and cooperation will thus lead to sustained strategic stability.

The author is a PhD candidate in the Department of International Relations, Tsinghua University, and currently visiting at the Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford. opinion@globaltimes.com.cn

DEFENSE DEPARTMENT DEPLOYS SECURE CLOUD SERVICE

March 26, 2014 

On Wednesday, March 26, 2014 8:35 AM, “Kurtz, James H” wrote:

Defense Department Deploys Secure Cloud Service

MilCloud provides military with on-demand infrastructure and network management tools through web-based interface.

Solar-Powered Wearable Tech Lightens Marines’ Loads

The Department of Defense (DOD) is rolling out a new cloud computing service as part of its ongoing efforts to trim IT costs and provide more streamlined services to its military and civilian users. The service, called MilCloud, provides an integrated suite of capabilities, including the ability for users to configure infrastructure resources and manage applications on a self-service basis.

Developed by the Defense Information Systems Agency, the DOD agency responsible for managing the military’s communications infrastructure, MilCloud represents the latest effort by DOD to reduce IT costs. But DISA officials also claim the service will provide agencies with more flexibility and control over how they manage their computing environments.

The cloud service also helps DISA improve IT security safeguards by standardizing how classified and unclassified data are processed and stored.

“MilCloud allows us to… integrate various applications at the CDC [core data center] level,” DISA’s chief of staff, brigadier general Frederick Henry, said last week at an annual event for government and industry executives that do business with the military.

Henry said MilCloud can deliver cloud services and support DOD applications for about the same cost as providers such as Amazon, “but in a more secure fashion.”

MilCloud forms the foundation of the Joint Information Environment’s core datacenter service and represents one part of a broader effort to connect all of the military services’ networks into a single, secure information-sharing space. DISA officials say that MilCloud’s infrastructure incorporates strict security protocols that keep data secure in the DOD’s core datacenters.

DISA chief of staff

Frederick A. Henry

MilCloud can also support DOD organizations and military personnel anywhere on the planet, using a variety of authorized desktop and handheld devices. Its features include:

•On-demand self-service — Users can place orders via web-based self-service tools, configure infrastructure resources, and manage mission applications running on those resources without manual intervention from DISA support staff.

•Broad network access — All MilCloud products and services are connected to the Department of Defense Information Networks (DODIN) and meet DOD security guidelines and protocols.

•Resource pooling — MilCloud resources are pooled, permitting multiple users to access services for more efficient and flexible use of resources.

Five Reasons Cold War II Isn't Happening

Published on The National Interest (http://nationalinterest.org)

Source URL (retrieved on Mar 28, 2014): http://nationalinterest.org/commentary/five-reasons-cold-war-ii-isnt-happening-10143

March 28, 2014

James Jay Carafano

At a press conference in the Hague, President Obama [3]dismissed [3] the suggestion that Mitt Romney had been right in 2012 to peg Moscow as America’s top strategic challenge. "The truth of the matter is that America's got a whole lot of challenges,” Mr. Obama said. “Russia is a regional power that is threatening some of its immediate neighbors, not out of strength but out of weakness."

The pooh-poohing of Moscow certainly understates the severity of the challenge posed by a restive Russia. No world leader should be sanguine when having disagreements with other countries that own nuclear weapons. But, that said, the nature and scope of that challenge does not support the “Cold War is back” rhetoric now current among many pundits. Today’s Russia is not yesterday’s Soviet Union. This Russia represents a problem all its own.

In sparring with reporters, the president suggested that Russia’s seizure of Crimea was actually proof of Moscow’s weakness—an attempt to mask the significant strategic vulnerabilities facing a new Russian ‘empire.’ It’s an interesting take on events, but not terribly reassuring. After all, the 1914 Austria-Hungarian invasion of Serbia was rooted in trying to cover-up the empire’s strategic vulnerabilities. In 1941, Japan bombed Pearl Harbor out weakness. That same year, Germany invaded Russia to end once and for all the insecurity of its Eastern flank.

History is littered with examples of powers trying to paper over problems by striking out. That doesn’t make the wars they ultimately provoke any less horrifying or destructive.

A reckless Russia on the outskirts of the transatlantic alliance is trouble. Armed squabbling on NATO’s borders has the potential to spiral into a regional conflict. That ought to be recognized on any president’s list of top strategic concerns.

Further, as Mr. Obama continues to gut the U.S. military [4], conflict in one part of the world that requires America’s attention can create space for competitors elsewhere to make mischief while Washington’s back is turned.

The Old Russian Battleship That Helps Explain Crimea

The battlewagon ‘Sevastopol’ and the enduring politics of Russian shipbuilding

Robert Farley in War is Boring

https://medium.com/war-is-boring/bd8148430c17

Until the invasion of Crimea, Russia expected to take into service in 2016 RFS Sevastopol, a 21,000-ton-displacement, French-built amphibious assault ship. The choice of name was odd, given that—until recently—the city of Sevastopol lay outside the borders of Russia.

France may cancel the deal in light of Moscow’s aggression. But the soon-perhaps-not-to-be Sevastopol was not the first ship named for the great Russian naval base on the Crimean peninsula.

In fact, Russian naval history is an intricate web of politics, geography and foreign influence. Moscow has long struggled with the problems of maintaining four distinct, unsupportable fleets—and of an unreliable shipbuilding industry.

The Kremlin’s purchase of the assault ships RFS Vladivostok and RFSSevastopol—and the construction of two additional ships under license in Russia—mirrors, in some ways, long-term Russian practice with respect to naval technology.

In May 1905, Japanese Adm. Heihachiro Togo destroyed the Russian Baltic fleet at Tsushima, putting a grim coda on a long, difficult journey around the Cape of Good Hope. Only Ottoman intransigence prevented Tsar Nicholas II from sending the five battleships of the Black Sea Fleet to the same fiery fate.

However, the commissioning of the British warship HMS Dreadnought in early 1906 proved a blessing in disguise, rendering even the surviving Russian battleships obsolete.

Prior to 1905, the Russian Imperial Navy had alternated between domestic and foreign battleship construction, purchasing vessels from both France and the United States.

Now, needing entirely new Baltic and Pacific fleets, and needing to replace the obsolete Black Sea Fleet, Russia commissioned an international design contest, with the most competitive designs coming from the United Kingdom, Germany and France.

Russian domestic politics scotched an early proposal to go with a British design, and the final proposal came from a Russian builder, with engines and significant technical assistance provided by the British.

The resulting Gangut class most closely resembled the Italian battleshipDante Alighieri. Russia began construction of one class of four dreadnoughts in the Baltic, and another class of three slightly-modified vessels in the Black Sea.

Brassey’s art via Wikimedia Commons

Shipwrights laid down the 24,000-ton-displacement Sevastopol in 1909. Moscow named the ship after the Crimean War siege of Sevastopol, rather than after the city itself. Inefficiency and corruption delayed the battlewagon’s completion until December 1914.

Big Data, Synthetic Biology and Space Planes Are the Weapons of the Future

Patrick Tucker

March 26, 2014

CONGRESS

TECHNOLOGY

What are the military’s cutting-edge capabilities of the next decade? According to the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, it’s big data, synthetic biology and space planes.

“We can see the information revolution unfolding across operations,” DARPA Director Arati Prabhakar told the House Armed Services Committee at a hearing on the FY2015 budget on Wednesday. She emphasized that it was very important to create “new tools to help us get a handle on the explosion of data.”

AUTHOR

Patrick Tucker is technology editor for Defense One. He’s also the author of The Naked Future: What Happens in a World That Anticipates Your Every Move? (Current, 2014). Previously, Tucker was deputy editor for The Futurist, where he served for nine years. Tucker's writing on emerging technology ... Full Bio

Amid the budget crisis in Washington, as the Defense Department is “doing more with less” after more than a decade of war, DARPA is one of the few agencies that’s seeing an increase in parts of its budget.

DARPA’s budget (PDF) reveals a growing focus not on new data sources but on developing entirely new and far-fetched methods for processing it.

The agency is requesting $13 million in FY 2015 for a program to build a so-called “models of the brain,” an increase of about $2 million from this year’s budget. The program will “establish a functional mathematical basis on which to build future advances in cognitive neuroscience, computing capability, and signal processing across the DOD. An important focus of this program will be determining how information is stored and recalled in the brain and other DOD-relevant signals and developing predictive, quantitative models of learning, memory, and measurement.”

DARPA’s Big Mechanism program will create “new approaches to automated computational intelligence applicable to diverse domains such as biology, cyber, economics, social science, and intelligence.” It saw its spending increased to triple inFY2015 to $15 million. There’s also more money for quantum computing research—up to $31 million from $23 million.

The agency is looking beyond bits to bugs, of the biological variety. One of the key new programs highlighted in the budget is the ACE program in Advanced Capabilities in Engineering Biology. The program seeks to create “new chemicals and materials, sensing capabilities, therapeutics, and numerous other applications,” will receive $8 million in funding to develop novel biological materials.

Infinity Journal Special Edition: “The Strategy Bridge”

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Consensus on talks with Taliban

Political parties in Pakistan, however, protect their own turf

D. Suba Chandran

EVER since the current round of negotiations with the Taliban in Pakistan began, there have been numerous committees, limited military strikes and continuing violence by militants. A cursory look at the problematique reveals two major fault lines. The first is between the multiple actors who are directly and indirectly party to the negotiations and its outcome — political parties, the military, the Taliban and civil society. Second, there is also a fault line within each of the above actors on the endgame.

Maulana Sami-ul-Haq, a negotiator for the Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), addresses the media after a meeting of the negotiation committee in Islamabad on March 22, 2014. AFP

There have been numerous “all-party conferences” and debates within and outside Parliament. Though there seems to be a consensus in negotiating with the Taliban in Pakistan, there are subtle differences within the political parties in terms of the endgame. The ruling PML-N and the Punjabi leadership seems to be primarily interested in ensuring that violence does not spread into Punjab. It appears they prefer to live with an element of Taliban presence and influence in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) and Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP), provided they do not attempt to infiltrate into Islamabad and the rest of Punjab.

The regional political parties, especially in KP, including the Awami National Party and Imran Khan's PTI, also seem to be pursuing a same goal, but to a limited extent. It appears that the political parties in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa are also willing to live with a Taliban presence and influence in FATA, and selected settled regions in KP such as Swat, as long as the TTP and its ideology gets quarantined within these tribal belts.

The MQM and the PPP also seem to be more interested in protecting Sindh, especially the port city and economic capital of Pakistan, Karachi. Today, there are more Pashtuns living in Karachi than in Peshawar, Kabul and Kandhahar. The Taliban has an influence over the Pashtuns in Karachi, which undermines the MQM, the ANP and the PPP. Since the PML-N has a smaller political constituency in Sindh, the Punjabi leadership may not be averse to an element of Taliban presence in Karachi as long as it does not affect economic growth and the economic corridor to Lahore and Islamabad.

Given the nature and size, the Baloch parties have less or no say in what they want vis-à-vis the Taliban, though the latter's presence in Balochistan has increased sectarian violence and undermined Baloch nationalism. For the rest of Pakistan, perhaps the undermining of Baloch nationalism under the heat of a violent sectarian discourse suits their larger, but narrow interests.

CAN PAKISTAN SHIFT FOCUS FROM INDIA?

Saturday, 29 March 2014 |

Swarn Kumar Anand |  

Saturday Special this week focusses on the changing trend in Pakistan’s foreign policy with Islamabad’s greater thrust on China (Main), removing sticking points in its relations with Iran (The Other Voice), and whether Pakistan will stop using terror as a foreign policy (Perspective) 

In the run up to the Lok Sabha elections in India, issues like cross-border terrorism and “AK 49” being “an agent of Pakistan” have stirred debates not only in India but in our western neighbour too. Pakistan’s foreign office on March 27 expressed dismay over “Pakistan” being a poll issue in India. Pakistan foreign office spokesperson Tasnim Aslam said: “Unlike Pakistan, where India is not an issue; in India, Pakistan has become a poll issue unfortunately.”

Pakistan’s official statement — though a blatant lie as India has always occupied the mind space of state and non-state actors in Pakistan — is intriguing as it is yet to be established whether the new regime led by Nawaz Sharif really wants to attenuate animosity towards India or the assertion was aimed at the US which is pushing Pakistan to improve ties with India.

Whatever be the reason, the fact remains that India is still being targeted by non-state actors aided and abetted by Pakistan’s ISI. The spate of arrests of Indian Mujahideen commanders, three of whom are Pakistani nationals, within a week indicates the ulterior motive of Pakistan. But more alarming is the debutant intrusion of Taliban attackers via Nepal border.

Old habits die hard

There is nothing extraordinary in Pakistan’s sinister design to weaken India as it is widely known that Islamabad’s foreign policy revolves around New Delhi. In fact, during the last parliamentary elections in Pakistan, India was one of the prime focus and almost all Islamist groups had offered their support to political parties in lieu of intensifying covert war on India.

Even though Nawaz Sharif has been considered as one of the most moderate politicians as far as animosity towards India is concerned, considering the past record of mutual hatred between him and the powerful Army, it is premature to expect there can be a sea change in the course of their foreign policy, particularly against the wishes of the Pakistan Army.

As a matter of fact, even though all clandestine anti-India activities in Pakistan are backed by its Army, India had found the last military regime in Pakistan more soothing owing to a simple reason that while in government, they were accountable to the US for every misdeed. But the coercive approach of the military only built up anger among Islamists for later use.

India-Japan Vietnam Strategic Trilateral- An Asian Security Imperative

Paper No. 5674 Dated 28-Mar-2014

By Dr Subhash Kapila

India-Japan-Vietnam strategic trilateral emerges in 2014 as an indigenous Asian security imperative against the contextual background of United States and Russia despite their Strategic Pivots to Asia getting distracted by global and regional events.

United States sustained focus on its Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific is seemingly becoming diluted by domestic political constraints and revised foreign policy outlooks. US Congressional imposition of budgetary cuts is ending in reduced force deployments on the ground. With change of US Secretary of State American focus is shifting to the Middle East. US hedging strategies and risk aversion in its China policies are confusing Asian powers perspectives on US real intentions.

Russia is being distracted from its declared Strategic Pivot to Asia Pacific by the United States embarking to destabilise Russia’s Western peripheries as it recently got manifested in an American inspired regime change in Ukraine through a civilian coup. The aim of the United States is to keep Russia’s strategic focus away from the Asia Pacific.

In such a contextual strategic backdrop Asian security focus has to perforce look inwards to develop an indigenous Asian security trilateral to cater for Asian security and stability and the management of Asian conflicts flash-points.

Ideally Asian security demands an Asian Strategic Quadrilateral comprising India, Japan, Vietnam and China. But then the problem is that China in terms of Asian security and stability is a major part of the problem rather than being a part of the solution. Asian security and stability today stands endangered by China-initiated conflictual flash-points.

The imperative that therefore emerges is an Asian Strategic Trilateral comprising India, Japan and Vietnam. Common strategic concerns and strategic convergences amongst India, Japan and Vietnam have resulted in the forging of bilateral Strategic Partnerships amongst these three nations. China is the only Asian power to view the emergence of such a Strategic Triangle with misgivings and read it as a China-centric hostile move.

Notably, neither United States nor Russia as global powers are likely to view such a strategic development with any degree of concern. India, Japan and Vietnam have a record of being stable and benign powers with no record of instigating conflicts against their neighbours.

India, Japan and Vietnam are strategically pivotal nations and powerful ones at that, relatively. What requires to be done in this direction by these three nations is to synergise their respective bilateral Strategic Partnerships into a Strategic Trilateral.

As stressed by me in an earlier Paper, the aim of such a Strategic Trilateral is not to form a China-containment military bloc. The common effort required from all these three nations is to create formal mechanisms to coordinate their diplomatic efforts and initiatives to ensure a unified approach to meet any challenges to Asia Pacific security from any quarter. It would also entail intelligence sharing and assisting each other in capacity building of their respective maritime security postures. They should also work together to sensitise the global community for all countries to respect and honour international conventions especially in the maritime domains.

The Hague Nuclear Security Summit: Evaluating Major Achievements

28 March 2014

PR Chari

That the third nuclear security summit meeting could be held as scheduled in the Hague on 24-25 March, attended by 53 nations, must be deemed a minor miracle, considering the rapidly deteriorating American-Russian relationship over the crisis in Crimea. It revealed that both countries appreciate the reality that the incipient threat of nuclear terrorism transcends their bilateral tensions and rivalries and requires a concerted effort by them to strengthen global nuclear security. 

Taking account of the achievements in earlier Summit meetings viz. Washington (2010) and Seoul (2012), what was expected in the Hague summit? The danger of nuclear terrorism had been recognized in Washington, and the world leaders present had agreed to cooperate in protecting their dangerous nuclear materials by jointly and severally improving nuclear security practices. In Seoul, the participants agreed further to secure their radiological sources that can be fashioned into ‘dirty bombs’ capable of causing panic and disruption. A notable success achieved over the intervening years is that the number of countries possessing weapons usable nuclear materials has decreased from 32 to 25. Some 12 other nations have reduced their inventories and improved their security arrangements. In a significant step to improve the atmospherics before the Hague Summit, Japan has agreed to let the United States take charge of its inventory of some 700 pounds of weapons-grade plutonium and a large quantity of enriched uranium. Canada, too, announced that it had returned some highly enriched uranium in its possession to the US. Belgium and Italy also announced they had shipped out HEU and plutonium to the United States for down-blending into less proliferation-sensitive materials.

Against this encouraging backdrop what were the priorities set before the Hague Summit? Key participants like the United States, Netherlands, and South Korea wished to press for reduction in the usage of highly enriched uranium and plutonium in nuclear reactors. Besides they wished the IAEA to undertake more frequent reviews; ensure the registration and protection of radioactive materials; enhance the role of industry in nuclear security matters; and increase transparency on steps taken by states to secure their nuclear facilities and materials. Another major objective was to phase out existing plutonium separation facilities and place a moratorium on new facilities; apart from gaining more adherents to implement IAEA guidelines for protecting nuclear materials. 

The Abandoned Refugees of North Waziristan

Pakistan refugees to acknowledge a growing crisis emerging from its tribal belt. 

By Taha Siddiqui

March 27, 2014

As the government of Pakistan and the Pakistani Taliban continue to discuss conditions for a peace dialogue, thousands of refugees have fled the tribal belt that sits alongside the Pakistan-Afghan border, especially the North Waziristan area where the terrorist organization commonly known as Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) is based. The refugees have made their way to safer areas in the settled areas of the Khyber Pakthunkhwa province.

The mass exodus happened when the Pakistani army carried out airstrikes in the region last December on suspected militant hideouts.

The refugee crisis has yet to be acknowledged by the government of Pakistan, because it has not formally announced any operation in the North Waziristan region, even though there have been a wave of airstrikes by the country’s armed forces in areas occupied by the TTP and other foreign terrorists.

Most of these terrorists have been hiding in Pakistan’s lawless tribal belt since they escaped from neighboring Afghanistan in the aftermath of the U.S.-led attack following 9/11.

The military’s media wing has been claiming that it has killed scores of militants in these strikes, the first of which took place four months ago. However, since journalists from outside are not allowed to visit the North Waziristan area, there is no independent verification of these claims.

Refugees who have fled the area have another story to tell. “The bombardments happened near our homes in the market area and the army was not precise in these airstrikes so many civilian homes were targeted too,” says Javed Iqbal, a 31-year-old who comes from North Waziristan’s Mir Ali area and is currently living in Bannu city, next to the Waziristan’s tribal region.

Mr. Iqbal who fled in the middle of the night with more than forty members of his family after the December air strikes had to pay exorbitant sums to transporters in his hometown to shift them to a safer area.

Even now, he and his family have received no help from official authorities. “No one is registering us or giving us any aid. Our children are not going to school anymore. There are no medical facilities being offered to us either. We are left entirely on our own,” he adds.

Pakistan President Visits Afghanistan

Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain visited Kabul for the first time since coming into office. 

By Ankit Panda

March 28, 2014

On Thursday, Pakistani President Mamnoon Hussain visited Kabul for one day upon the invitation of the Afghan government, marking his first visit to Afghanistan since taking office in September 2013. Hussain’s visit, which comes on the occasion of the Persian new year, Nowruz, will attempt to strengthen Pakistan’s relationship with Afghanistan. Hussain was accompanied by Pervaiz Rashid, the Pakistani Minister for Information, Broadcasting and National Heritage.

According to a statement released by the Pakistani Foreign Ministry, ”The President’s visit is part of the efforts to strengthen bilateral relations with Afghanistan in all dimensions and support efforts for durable peace, stability and prosperity in the region.” The Afghan government also invited other leaders from around the region to participate in the Nowruz celebrations. ”On the sidelines, the President will be interacting with the other participating leaders, during which bilateral matters and regional issues of peace and security and trade and economic cooperation are expected to figure,” the Foreign Ministry statement added.

The visit comes in the wake of Afghan government accusations that Pakistan’s intelligence agency, the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI), may have abetted the perpetrators of the deadly terror attack on the Serena Hotel in Kabul last week. Pakistan’s support of the Taliban government from 1996 to 2001 as well as its strategic interests in maintaining Afghanistan as a weak buffer state have caused Afghan policymakers to regard it with suspicion. Particularly as the United States draws down and prepares to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan at the end of this year, Afghanistan remains concerned that a resurgent Taliban could find clandestine support from Pakistan.

Afghanistan’s President Hamid Karzai is on his way out soon after the elections scheduled to take place next month. In his last few months, however, Karzai has accomplished quite a bit with regard to Afghanistan’s foreign policy with its neighbors. After infamously refusing to sign the Bilateral Security Agreement with the United States, which would have allowed a small U.S. troop presence post-2014 for limited counter-terrorism and training operations, Karzai has reached out to India, Iran, and Central Asian states for security and economic cooperation.

CONFRONTING CHINA’S WATER INSECURITY – ANALYSIS

MARCH 28, 2014

Source Link

By RSIS

With the emergence of water insecurity as a major threat to China’s economic growth and social stability, preventive measures should start with reforms to the country’s food security.

By Zhang Hongzhou

AMONG THE numerous challenges China faces in its quest to become a great power, the biggest perhaps is mounting water insecurity. China has 20 percent of the world’s population but only seven percent of the world’s fresh water. To make matters worse, the country’s scarce water resources are unevenly distributed between the south and north of the country.

With rapid industrialisation and urbanisation, the demand for fresh water is increasing at a very fast rate. It is forecast that by 2030, China’s water demand will surpass 800 billion cubic metres. However, China’s supply is severely undermined by worsening water scarcity and pollution.

Worsening water scarcity and pollution

Due to over-exploration and inefficient consumption, China’s water resources are declining as more rivers disappear and aquifer water levels drop. According to a 2013 report published by the Chinese authorities, the number of rivers in China has decreased from at least 50,000 over a period of 20 years to almost 23,000 rivers in 2011. This means that in the past two decades, China has lost more than 28,000 of its rivers.

Besides, the country’s wetlands have shrunk nearly nine percent to make way for massive agricultural production and infrastructure projects since 2003. This is equivalent to an area of 340,000 km2 of wetland, an area larger than the Netherlands. As wetlands store a large amount of freshwater resources, receding wetlands means that less water will be available in future.

Also, China’s agricultural production and industries are shifting from the southern regions to the central, western, and northern regions where water resources are even scarcer. Unsustainable extraction of underground water has led to the dramatic fall of water levels of aquifers in these regions, in particular, the North China Plain. This region has one of the world’s most overexploited groundwater resources – the North China Plain aquifer system. Due to the expansion of the irrigation systems and intensive farming practice, a significant proportion of the shallow aquifer has dropped by more than 20 metres in the past decades, and with some areas experiencing declines of over 40 metres.