In China, Warning Signs

By David Ignatius - April 11, 2014

http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2014/04/11/in_china_warning_signs_122241.html

WASHINGTON -- China's financial markets seem to be signaling trouble, as a government crackdown on corruption and loose credit begins to bite and jittery local investors scramble for safety.

China remains an opaque country, and even the most knowledgeable experts say they aren't sure how to read the tea leaves. But the warning signs are growing that after decades of economic expansion and exploding wealth, China is moving toward the scary side of the perpetual seesaw between greed and fear that drives financial markets.

An early warning that China might be facing a liquidity squeeze came from Patrick Chovanec, chief strategist of Silvercrest Asset Management, at a conference I attended in Shanghai in February. In a subsequent report, he explained that "a steady stream of defaults has raised awareness of China's mounting bad debt problems" and that "China's existing growth model has reached its sell-by date."

Signs of trouble abound: A report last week by the China Index Academy noted that real estate sales during the first quarter of this year in China's four biggest cities were more than 40 percent below the levels of a year ago. To sell property and raise cash, developers are said to be cutting prices sharply in some smaller cities.

According to Anne Stevenson-Yang, a Beijing economist who blogs for the Financial Times, 40 percent price cuts have been offered by developers in Changzhou and Qinhuangdao, and developers in Ningbo, Wuxi and Suzhou have offered discounts of up to 40 percent.

The slowdown in China's super-hot property market appears to be part of a broader pattern of difficulty. In mid-March, a big developer in Zhejiang province defaulted on $600 million in loans, according to The Wall Street Journal; a few days later, a commercial bank in Jiangsu province was hit with a run by skittish depositors. Investors' nerves were frayed partly because China had suffered its first modern bond default in early March, when a solar energy company in Shanghai failed to make scheduled payments.

China Might Actually Seize Japan's Southern Islands

It's not as crazy as you think-- and here's how the United States and Japan can prevent it from happening. 

BY James Holmes 

APRIL 8, 2014 

In a speech in Tokyo on April 6, U.S. Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel made a not-so-subtle reference to China's aggressive behavior in the disputed Senkaku Islands, warning that countries cannot "redefine boundaries and violate territorial integrity and sovereignty of nations by force, coercion or intimidation," whether that be "small islands in the Pacific or large nations in Europe." Two days later, Hagel's Chinese counterpart, Defense Minister Chang Wanquan fired back: China, he said, has "indisputable sovereignty over the Diaoyu" -- as the Chinese call the islands -- while noting that the "Chinese military can assemble as soon as summoned, fight any battle and win." 

Beijing's position on the islands is clear. But are the Senkakus dessert, or are they an appetizer? If Chinese troops were to seize the Senkakus, might they also wrest the nearby Ryukyu Islands from Japan? It's not so far-fetched: Japanese strategists fret about how to forestall a doomsday scenario in the Ryukyus, the southwestern island chain that arcs from Japan's home islands southwest toward Taiwan. 

Americans should worry as well. The southern tip of the Ryukyu Islands sits only about 80 miles east of the Senkakus. Unlike the uninhabited Senkakus, the Ryukyus host not only roughly 1.5 million Japanese residents, but also the U.S. Marine and Air Force bases that anchor the U.S. presence in the East China Sea. Occupying the Ryukyus would fracture the U.S. strategic position in East Asia -- separating U.S. forces based in Japan (to the north) from those at Bahrain, the other permanent U.S. hub in Asia, far to the west. At a bare minimum, U.S. ships and aircraft would have to detour around Chinese-held islands, waters, and skies -- incurring the additional time and costs longer voyages entail. 

Exclusive: Key General Splits With Obama Over Ukraine

Eli Lake

04.11.14 

http://www.thedailybeast.com/

The commander of NATO is insisting that the West do more to protect Ukraine from a possible Russian invasion. But the Obama administration has other plans. 

Late last month, as the world was still reeling from Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the Supreme Allied Commander of NATO was warning Congress that Moscow was preparing to make another move. 

During classified briefings on March 26 and March 27, Gen. Philip Breedlove painted for members of the House Armed Services Committee a bleak picture of Russia’s actions—and warned that the United States was not taking steps it could to help Ukraine better defend itself. On several points—from estimates of Moscow’s troops to intelligence-sharing with Russia’s likely adversaries—Breedlove’s briefing directly contradicted the message coming from other branches of the Obama administration. 

Breedlove, a four star Air Force general, was careful not to tell members of Congress anything that directly undermined the authority of the Commander-in-Chief during his March briefings. But lawmakers and Congressional staff members who attended these sessions say it was clear that Breedlove felt he was stifled to respond adequately to the crisis in Ukraine. 

The quiet protests from one of Obama’s most important generals at the moment reveal an important policy rift inside the administration. While President Obama, the joint chiefs of staff and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel have hesitated to provide too much assistance to the interim government in Ukraine, Breedlove has wanted to do more. 

In a statement for The Daily Beast, Breedlove acknowledged that he met with members of both parties in Congress in the last week in March. “I provided my estimation of Russian capabilities and that estimation was well-received by the Members. As these sessions were classified, I can only get into generalities.” Breedlove added that he discussed a number of issues including the U.S. consideration of non-lethal aid to Ukraine. “I was clear that our efforts were aimed at reassuring our NATO Allies and European partners of our commitment and resolve,” he said. 

SOUTH CHINA SEA COOPERATION: WE SHOULD NOT WAIT FOR ANOTHER DISASTER – ANALYSIS

APRIL 11, 2014

SIS 

Source Link

By RSIS

Cooperation between the littoral states in the search for Malaysia Airlines flight 370 in the South China Sea has prompted calls for more joint activities amongst them. The South China Sea Workshop Process started in 1989 identified many such opportunities. It may be time to revisit them.

By Hasjim Djalal and Ian Townsend-Gault

IN THE aftermath of the initial search for Malaysia Airlines flight 370 in the South China Sea, commentators have drawn attention to the need for ASEAN countries to work closely together to respond to such emergencies. They have also touched on the fact that territorial and jurisdictional disputes did not prevent the littoral states from engaging in a broad range of cooperation. This raises the question: Is this not a strong basis for regional cooperation in the South China Sea?

Reviving the South China Sea Workshop Process

The answer, of course is an emphatic yes. We have been making this argument since 1989, when we took the first steps to initiate what was to become the South China Sea Workshop Process. The central premise of the initiative was to have maritime cooperation over as broad a range of areas as possible to defuse the essentially divisive claims and counterclaims to sovereignty over the disputed islands.

While any form of cooperation was thought desirable as an end in itself, the 60 plus meetings in the decade that followed the First Workshop in 1990 tended to look at areas where cooperation was an absolute requirement to achieve a given objective.

With the passage of time, the extent of the work carried out under the aegis of the Workshop Process has perhaps been forgotten. Perhaps the time has come to revive the process. So what can be done? One immediate step perhaps is to re-examine some of the themes for cooperation identified by the leading experts of the South China Sea region and see how far they have developed over time.

The real question isn't naval presence but how to best empower U.S. partners in Asia

BY Thomas E. Ricks 

APRIL 9, 2014 

By Captain Paul Lushenko, U.S. Army 

Best Defense guest respondent 

Dear Doug, 

No one questions the U.S. Navy's utility. The issue at stake, however, is how to achieve the best balance between the services to (1) provide for regional security and order while (2) meeting America's security obligations to its allies and partners, especially Australia, Japan, and South Korea. While the Navy, as both a ‘way' and ‘means,' as you point out, can help achieve both ‘ends,' your analysis is parsimonious to the point of obfuscating, particularly the diplomatic or messaging dividends of deploying land-based forces across the region. 

In a region beleaguered by a mélange of threats and vulnerabilities, epitomized by North Korea's increasingly brazen machinations and natural disasters respectively, the Navy can't do it all or by itself. Here, think of the U.S. Army's equally important response to Japan's 3/11 or its live-environment training exercises on the Korean Peninsula that do much to reassure regional-states -- again, especially allies -- of America's staying power. 

Among other things, the dispatch of land-based forces is designed to placate allies and partners as well as deter potential challengers, namely the Chinese party-state on account of its reputed revisionism. All of these actors increasingly question the viability of America's so-called ‘pivot' or rebalance towards the Indo-Pacific. Such uncertainty is based not only on sequestration and its attendant spending caps, but the recent denigration of U.S. soft power given the country's failures in Iraq and Afghanistan and its frustrated management of global security challenges including Syria's implacable civil war and Russia's annexation of Crimea. If you don't believe me, perhaps you'll appreciate this recent article published by the New York Times, titled "U.S. Response to Crimea Worries Japan's Leaders." 

Moreover, because the Navy is not necessarily omnipresent -- unlike you, I disagree that the Navy can be everywhere at once on the basis of simple math, logistics, and manning -- land-based forces provide a tangible and stable deterrent. Do you think North Korea or China's provocations would be lessened if the Pentagon removed land-based forces on the peninsula and in Okinawa, respectively? Do you think Russia might also abrogate its competing claims to the Kuril Islands vis-à-vis Japan as well? 

The Red Line and the Rat Line

Seymour M. Hersh on Obama, Erdoğan and the Syrian rebels 

In 2011 Barack Obama led an allied military intervention in Libya without consulting the US Congress. Last August, after the sarin attack on the Damascus suburb of Ghouta, he was ready to launch an allied air strike, this time to punish the Syrian government for allegedly crossing the ‘red line’ he had set in 2012 on the use of chemical weapons.​＊ Then with less than two days to go before the planned strike, he announced that he would seek congressional approval for the intervention. The strike was postponed as Congress prepared for hearings, and subsequently cancelled when Obama accepted Assad’s offer to relinquish his chemical arsenal in a deal brokered by Russia. Why did Obama delay and then relent on Syria when he was not shy about rushing into Libya? The answer lies in a clash between those in the administration who were committed to enforcing the red line, and military leaders who thought that going to war was both unjustified and potentially disastrous.

Obama’s change of mind had its origins at Porton Down, the defence laboratory in Wiltshire. British intelligence had obtained a sample of the sarin used in the 21 August attack and analysis demonstrated that the gas used didn’t match the batches known to exist in the Syrian army’s chemical weapons arsenal. The message that the case against Syria wouldn’t hold up was quickly relayed to the US joint chiefs of staff. The British report heightened doubts inside the Pentagon; the joint chiefs were already preparing to warn Obama that his plans for a far-reaching bomb and missile attack on Syria’s infrastructure could lead to a wider war in the Middle East. As a consequence the American officers delivered a last-minute caution to the president, which, in their view, eventually led to his cancelling the attack.

For months there had been acute concern among senior military leaders and the intelligence community about the role in the war of Syria’s neighbours, especially Turkey. Prime Minister Recep Erdoğan was known to be supporting the al-Nusra Front, a jihadist faction among the rebel opposition, as well as other Islamist rebel groups. ‘We knew there were some in the Turkish government,’ a former senior US intelligence official, who has access to current intelligence, told me, ‘who believed they could get Assad’s nuts in a vice by dabbling with a sarin attack inside Syria – and forcing Obama to make good on his red line threat.’

Syria: Come With Me If You Want To Live

http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/syria/articles/20140411.aspx

April 11, 2014: Three years of war have killed nearly 150,000 Syrians (about 80 percent men, the rest women and children), wounded over 600,000, drove over three million Syrian refugees into Lebanon, Turkey, Jordan and elsewhere plus more than twice as many Syrian refugees within Syria. About half the Syrian population has been driven from their homes by the fighting at one time or another since 2011. The actual war-related deaths are rapidly increasing. This includes losses from disease, exposure, starvation and war related crime (murder, not just getting caught in a firefight). Include all that and the deaths grow by as much as 20,000. 

The war has trashed the economy. Since 2011 the Syrian GDP has gone from $60 billion to $34 billion and is still shrinking. The $8 billion a year tourism industry is gone for the moment, as is $3 billion a year in oil revenue. The rebels have captured the oil fields but ISIL has not been able to gain control over all the oil fields and facilities. Al Nusra and local tribes have opposed ISIL here, which means that a lot of pol is not being pumped or shipped. 

In fought over areas up to half (on average) the homes and businesses have been damaged and 10-20 percent destroyed. Much of the economy is no longer working, either because of facilities being destroyed or the workers have fled. It is believed that it will take over a decade to rebuild the economy, and perhaps as long as three decades. Imports and exports are crippled because of the fighting. Unemployment is about 50 percent and what remains of a functioning economy is largely in government controlled areas. 

The government and its suppliers Russia and Iran see eventual government victory although it may take years. The Assads have announced that the main fighting will end this year, followed by “counter-terrorist” operations for as long as it takes. The government has made it clear that it can play rough. In addition to the use of chemical weapons, the government is also accused to running brutal prison camps and regularly executing or torturing prisoners who do not provide information on rebel activities. This has produced calls for war crimes investigations against the Assads. This has not deterred the Assads, who are still in “fighting for survival” mode. 

U.S. needs to plan for the day after an Iran deal

By David H. Petraeus and Vance Serchuk, Published: April 10

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/us-needs-to-plan-for-the-day-after-an-iran-deal/2014/04/09/056ff992-bf4b-11e3-b195-dd0c1174052c_story.html

David H. Petraeus is a former director of the CIA and a former commander of U.S. Central Command. Vance Serchuk is an adjunct senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security. 

Advocates of the effort to reach a negotiated settlement with Iran over its illicit nuclear activities have emphasized the benefits an agreement could bring by peacefully and verifiably barring Tehran from developing nuclear weapons. Skeptics, meanwhile, have warned of the risks of a “bad deal,” under which Iran’s capabilities are not sufficiently rolled back. 

Largely absent from the debate, however, has been a fuller consideration of the strategic implications a nuclear agreement could have on the U.S. position in the Middle East. 

Such an assessment must begin by considering the consequences of lifting the majority of sanctions on Iran — and of Iran resuming normal trade with the world’s major economies. This prospect is what provides our strongest leverage to persuade the Iranian government to abandon key elements of its nuclear program. 

But lifting sanctions would also lead to the economic empowerment of a government that is the leading state sponsor of terrorism. Indeed, even under crippling sanctions, Iran has managed to provide robust support to extremist proxies as part of its broader geopolitical agenda across the Middle East and beyond — activities antithetical to U.S. interests and to those of our closest allies. 

It is possible that a nuclear deal would pave the way to a broader detente in Iran’s relations with the United States and its neighbors. It is, however, more plausible that removing sanctions would strengthen Tehran’s ability to project malign influence in its near-abroad, including Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, the Arabian peninsula and the Palestinian territories. 

Rather than marking the end of our long struggle with Iran, therefore, a successful nuclear deal could result in the United States and our partners in the Middle East facing a better-resourced and, in some respects, more dangerous adversary. 

This does not mean we should abandon diplomacy with Tehran. Preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons ought to be our foremost priority, and a diplomatic agreement that truly bolts the door against that danger is worth potential downsides. Moreover, the alternative to successful diplomacy — military action — carries its own set of costs and risks to regional stability and the global economy. And military action holds less promise for decisively ending the nuclear threat than does a good negotiated accord. 

But we need to recognize there are genuine trade-offs involved in even the best possible nuclear deal — and start laying the groundwork for mitigating them. To that end, five actions should be considered. 

First, it is imperative to make clear there can be no true reconciliation between Iran and the United States, regardless of the outcome of the nuclear talks, without a comprehensive change in Iran’s destabilizing regional behavior. Such a message — delivered publicly, unambiguously and consistently — would help eliminate the corrosive, and inaccurate, perception that Washington is so eager to disengage from the Middle East that it would accept Iranian hegemony there. 

The Realist Prism: West’s Tactical Blunders on Ukraine Go Unquestioned

Source Link

By Nikolas Gvosdev

on April 11, 2014, 

Petro Symonenko, the Communist Party deputy who was attackedearlier this week as he addressed the Rada, Ukraine’s parliament, raised some uncomfortable points that Western policymakers need to consider about their response to the crisis in Ukraine. Symonenko aroused the ire of deputies from the nationalist Svoboda party by noting that some of those protesting the government of now-deposed President Viktor Yanukovych, including Svoboda activists, had used what might be termed improper methods—including storming buildings and breaking into armories—that are now being utilized by those who in turn do not recognize the authority of the interim government. By driving Yanukovych out of office, they created the conditions both for other aggrieved parties in Ukraine—namely, Russian-speakers in the south and east—to adopt similar tactics to advance their interests, and for Moscow to intervene in Ukrainian affairs and detach Crimea from Ukraine’s control.

It is easy, at first glance, to dismiss Symonenko. The Communists, after all, were close allies of Yanukovych, have opposed Ukraine’s membership in Euro-Atlantic organizations and have advocated for closer relations with Russia. And Symonenko’s accusation—that the manner in which Yanukovych was overthrown is what triggered the crisis—goes against the preferred narrative, which sees Yanukovych as a budding dictator who received his just political rewards and Russian President Vladimir Putin as the unprovoked aggressor against Ukraine. Yet while some Ukrainian politicians answered Symonenko’s words with their fists, Western statesmen might want to use his charges to re-evaluate their own positions—and their complicity in Ukraine’s plight.

The first question they should ask is why Brussels and Washington ignored clear warningsemanating from Russia prior to the beginning of the protest movement against Yanukovych last November. The Kremlin made it consistently clear that, while it would not object to Ukraine having somewhat closer economic ties to Europe, it would vigorously oppose any effort to bring Ukraine in as a full member of the Euro-Atlantic community. And while the level of Ukraine’s membership in Putin’s proposed Eurasian Union was still apparently negotiable, the Russian government signaled that, at minimum, it expected Ukraine to have some degree of association with any Eurasian economic entity. 

News of a Russian arms buildup next to Ukraine is part of the propaganda war

To project strength, Nato requires a convincing enemy and a retreating Russia does not do the job 

Mary Dejevsky

theguardian.com,

11 April 2014

Nato secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen walks past a guard of honour at the Czech government headquarters in Prague yesterday. Photograph: David W Cerny/Reuters

Any report about Ukraine these torrid days needs to come with a political health warning, even if that report originates from what might be called "our own" side. This includes the latest revelation from Nato aboutRussian troop deployments on the borders of eastern Ukraine.

Over the past six months, but especially since the collapse of Viktor Yanukovych's government in February and his circuitous flight from Kiev, there has been as much of a propaganda war as – potentially – a real war between Russia and the west. Two distinct, and for the most part mutually exclusive, versions of the truth have been put about, and have found receptive audiences on either side.

Russia saw Yanukovych's departure as the result of an illegal coup, orchestrated by dangerous rightwing nationalist elements. It discerned intervention by western, particularly US interests, in the formation of the interim government, and believed that these outside parties were driving events, the underlying purpose being to claim Ukraine for the west and do Russia down.

Western politicians and most of the media have taken a totally different view. Yanukovych was removed as the result of a genuine popular revolution. Russia annexed Crimea out of pique at what had happened, and in pursuit of Vladimir Putin's longstanding ambition to resurrect something like the Soviet Union. Next up would be eastern Ukraine, with its largely Russian-speaking and eastern-orientated population, and then – Moldova, perhaps even the Baltic states and Poland.

The latest Nato report has to be seen against this background. Its images purport to show Russian troops and hardware massing on the borders of eastern Ukraine. But there is one detail worth noting. Nato gives a date range for these pictures which makes them, essentially, historical. It is not at all clear that this situation pertains today.

Several more points could be made. The first is that several journalists have recently traversed the length of the eastern sector of the Russian-Ukrainian border, on the Russian side, and found nothing that would not correspond to the previously conducted exercises being wound down. They reported that the atmosphere seemed to be relatively relaxed; not the level of alert that might be expected of an army about to be aggressively deployed.

The second is that the US secretary of state, John Kerry, stated after his talks with Russia's foreign minister, Sergei Lavrov, that Russia had withdrawn a battalion from the area near the border with Ukraine. In other words, the trend was for de-escalation – to use western diplomats' term of the moment – rather than the opposite.

None of this, of course, means that Russia could not, or perhaps would not, move into eastern Ukraine if serious disorder broke out there and urgent calls came from Russian "compatriots" for help. And it is not beyond the bounds of possibility that such calls might be deliberately manufactured by Moscow. There is also such a thing as contingency planning.

The seductive allure of wars we’re not winning

By Andrew J. Bacevich, Published: April 11 

http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-seductive-allure-of-wars-were-not-winning/2014/04/11/4e5b9d70-c011-11e3-bcec-b71ee10e9bc3_story.html

Andrew J. Bacevich is a military historian at Boston University and the author of “Breach of Trust: How Americans Failed Their Soldiers and Their Country.” 

For better or worse, ours is today a warlike nation that depends on volunteers to fill the ranks of its armed forces. Young men and women have a variety of motives for signing up. No doubt some do so for high-minded, even idealistic reasons. For many, however, more pragmatic considerations figure: a job with salary and benefits, a chance to escape from a humdrum or dispiriting existence. In all likelihood, few volunteers know what they are getting into, particularly in wartime. Fully disclosing what service in a distant war zone might entail is not a high priority for recruiters trying to fill their monthly quota of warm and willing bodies. 

Even so, the new Washington Post poll of Iraq and Afghanistan veterans shows that, looking back, most of today’s veterans find no cause to regret their decision to join. Nearly nine out of 10 would do so again. Indeed, a majority of those who participated in the Iraq and Afghanistan wars profess to “miss” something they experienced there. 

What they miss is not the chance to kill jihadists, pursuant to spreading democracy and the American way of life, but comradeship experienced in the midst of trying circumstances. In that regard, of course, today’s veterans do not differ greatly from prior generations. However mystifying to those who have never spent any appreciable time in uniform, the bonds formed between soldiers in the course of wartime service — and even on occasion in service other than in wartime — have an immediacy and intimacy seldom found in other walks of life. 

For decades now, Hollywood has milked this band-of-brothers narrative for all of its considerable entertainment value. More recently, in a curious sort of implicit homage to military life, an endless succession of television series has depicted relationships formed in precinct houses, fire stations, hospitals and law firms as equivalent in intensity to those forged on the battlefield. 

U.S. Offer Hampers U.N. Missions

BY Mark P. Lagon, Ladan Rafii

APRIL 9, 2014 

The ongoing debate on U.S. immigration reform tends to focus on domestic aspects of this legislation still pending with Congress, but there is another issue worth looking at that has global impact. 

A little known provision in the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 USC § 1101(a)(27)(I)) authorizes the U.S. government to grant permanent residency to retired staff members of international organizations who, while working for multilateral institutions such as the U.N., live in the U.S. for 15 years. 

Those engaged in the immigration debate rightly focus on the costs and benefits to the U.S. of immigration reform, but they are likely unaware of the detrimental impact this particular provision has on the work of the U.N. and other international organizations based here. Opening borders and welcoming others to stay in the U.S. may be beneficial in many ways, but it can hurt these institutions whose budgets are largely funded by American taxpayers. 

By offering legal permanent residency to international bureaucrats, the U.S. is encouraging them to avoid being sent overseas on field missions -- where they would share with their colleagues the challenges and benefits of being posted in a variety of locations, including hardship postings. These organizations are deprived of staff rotations and turnover, and those not already posted to the U.S. are unlikely to find many openings here. The result is a stagnant working environment, rather than a dynamic and vibrant workforce that could be more effective in tackling today's global challenges. 

For the past few years, this is precisely what U.N. Secretary General Ban Ki-moon and others seeking to reform the system have been striving to achieve. In August 2012, the secretary general presented his report on staff mobility as part of his human resources management reform proposal. 

The report states his goal as "to improve the ability of the Organization to deliver its mandates, helping to ensure that the right people are in the right position at the right time, and allowing the Organization and staff to benefit systematically from the opportunities that mobility affords." 

Armed and Dangerous?

UAVs and U.S. Security

by Lynn E. Davis, Michael J. McNerney, James S. Chow, Thomas Hamilton, Sarah Harting, Daniel Byman

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Armed drones are making the headlines, especially in their role in targeted killings. In this report, RAND researchers stepped back and asked whether these weapons are transformative. The answer is no, though they offer significant capabilities to their users, especially in counterterrorism operations as has been the case for the United States. Will they proliferate? Yes, but upon a closer look at the types of systems, only a few rich countries will be in a position to develop the higher technology and longer range systems. U.S. adversaries and others will likely find weapons such as aircraft and air defenses more cost and militarily effective. Their proliferation will not create the kinds of global dangers that call for new arms control efforts, but the risks to regional stability cannot be dismissed entirely, as is the case of any conventional weapon. How the United States will use these weapons today and into the future will be important in shaping a broader set of international norms that discourage their misuse by others.

Key Findings

Longer-Range Armed Drones Are Unlikely to Spread Broadly 

The complexity and expense of long-range armed unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are quite different from short-range systems, which make them difficult to develop and even to operate. 

Many countries are developing and acquiring drones. Short-range drones are going to spread, because they have attractive civilian uses. Only a few rich and technologically advanced countries will be in a position to develop the higher-technology and longer-range armed systems. 

Cyberwarfare Goes Wireless

Cyberwarfare is changing rapidly and the U.S. military has to change with it. 

Source Link

The field of cyberoperations is expanding, and the U.S. military must adapt. 

By Isaac R. Porche III

April 4, 2014

Recent reports indicate that Russian forces used hacking to intercept a U.S. surveillance drone flying over the Crimea region of Ukraine in March. Allegedly, hackers were able to sever the connection between the drone and its operator using “complex radio-electronic technology.”

Additional coverage indicates a wide range of cyberactivities under way during the standoff, from primitive vandalism of Russian websites by Ukrainian hackers to more sophisticated operations, such as the possible Russian use of “Snake” malware to stealthily siphon information from various networks.

For American audiences and policymakers alike, reports like these provide chilling reminders that cyberspace is emerging as a 21st-century global battlefield. They also point to a critical need for the U.S. military to redefine “information warfare” for a wireless world to defend against such threats This is one reason for the recent U.S. budget increases for cybercapabilities.

Among the most significant challenges now facing the U.S. military is the increasingly blurred boundary between wired and wireless technologies.

In the military and commercial worlds, “cyberoperations” long referred to attacking and defending networks and connected devices. Nefarious hacking is typically thought of as an intrusion into remote computers through wired channels. But cyberoperators have gone “wireless.” Radio and other frequencies that span the electromagnetic spectrum are the new contested domain. Sometimes this contest involves keeping these wireless channels up and running. At other times, it involves seeking to shut them down through jamming.

The past decade has seen a proliferation of wireless technologies, such as those used to fly U.S. drones and those allegedly used to intercept one of them over Crimea. Stories of insurgents using smartphones to detonate improvised explosive devices have gone from the Hollywood script to the newspaper.

America’s military and intelligence communities are grappling with these issues at all levels, but it’s particularly important for the Army given the large size and expansive reach of Army networks, which are the largest among all the service and which extend down to the tactical edge. The Army is responding to these developments in numerous ways.

Rapid Acquisition of Army Command and Control Systems

by Shara Williams, Jeffrey A. Drezner, Megan McKernan, Douglas Shontz, Jerry M. Sollinger

Related Topics: 

Military Acquisition and Procurement, 

Military Command and Control, 

Military Technology, 

United States Army

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How can the DoD better perform rapid acquisition within the current framework of policies and procedures? 

Based on analysis of selected recent successful rapid acquisition efforts, what issues and challenges have been posed by rapid acquisition of C2 systems? 

What are the factors that have enabled successful rapid acquisition of C2 systems? 

Abstract

The Global War on Terrorism (subsequently Overseas Contingency Operation), Operation Enduring Freedom, and Operation Iraqi Freedom all presented urgent technological challenges for the U.S. military. These challenges, particularly countering the use of improvised explosive devices, forced the Department of Defense (DoD) to acquire materiel solutions at unprecedented speeds. With a particular focus on command and control (C2) systems, this study examines how the Army can better manage the acquisition of systems using rapid, nontraditional means (i.e., outside the formal processes defined by DoD Instructions 5000.02). The research identifies issues, challenges, and problems associated with nontraditional rapid acquisition processes and recommends ways DoD can more rapidly develop, procure, and field effective C2 systems within the framework of current policies and processes. The research assesses past and current experience in the rapid acquisition of C2 systems through nontraditional means, including detailed case studies of three such systems.

Redefining Information Warfare Boundaries for an Army in a Wireless World

by Isaac R. Porche III, Christopher Paul, Michael York, Chad C. Serena, Jerry M. Sollinger, Elliot Axelband,Endy M. Daehner, Bruce J. Held

Related Topics: 

Information Operations, 

Military Communication Systems, 

Military Doctrine, 

Military Information Technology Systems, 

United States Army

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Research Questions 

In what kinds of electronic and cyber operations does the Army currently engage? Where are the boundaries between them? 

How are recent and ongoing changes in the information world, especially the explosion in different modes of communication, affecting the Army's information operations? 

How should the Army adapt, organizationally and operationally, to best respond to these changes? 

Abstract

In the U.S. Army as elsewhere, transmission of digitized packets on Internet-protocol and space-based networks is rapidly supplanting the use of old technology (e.g., dedicated analog channels) when it comes to information sharing and media broadcasting. As the Army moves forward with these changes, it will be important to identify the implications and potential boundaries of cyberspace operations. An examination of network operations, information operations, and the more focused areas of electronic warfare, signals intelligence, electromagnetic spectrum operations, public affairs, and psychological operations in the U.S. military found significant overlap that could inform the development of future Army doctrine in these areas. In clarifying the prevailing boundaries between these areas of interest, it is possible to predict the progression of these boundaries in the near future. The investigation also entailed developing new definitions that better capture this overlap for such concepts as information warfare. This is important because the Army is now studying ways to apply its cyber power and is reconsidering doctrinally defined areas that are integral to operations in cyberspace. It will also be critical for the Army to approach information operations with a plan to organize and, if possible, consolidate its operations in two realms: the psychological, which is focused on message content and people, and the technological, which is focused on content delivery and machines.

FoW (24): The seven key ingredients of highly adaptive (and effective) militaries

BY Thomas E. Ricks 

Thomas E. Ricks covered the U.S. military for the Washington Post from 2000 through 2008.

APRIL 11, 2014 

By Col. Keith Nightingale, U.S. Army (Ret.) 

Best Defense future of war entry 

The there are two great truths about the future of war. 

The first is that it will consist of identifying and killing the enemy and either prevailing or not. We can surmise all sorts of new bells and whistles and technologies yet unknown, but, ultimately, it comes down to killing people. It doesn't always have to happen, but you always have to prepare to make it happen, and have the other guy know that. 

The other great truth is that whatever we think today regarding the form, type, and location of our next conflict, will be wrong. Our history demonstrates this with great clarity. 

Well then, how do we appropriately organize for the next conflict if both these things are true? There are a number of historical verities that should serve as guides for both our resourcing and our management. In no particular order, but with the whole in mind, here are some key points to consider that have proven historically very valuable in times of war. The historic degree of support for any one or all within the service structures usually indicated the strengths and shortfalls of our prior leadership vision, preparation, and battlefield successes or failures at the time. 

TECHNOLOGY. This should be heavily invested so our military is on the leading, not trailing edge of warfare and its tools. It is a given that bad people and bad nations look to new and unknown elements to provide a leading edge. It was only because of FDR's instincts that we got a nuclear program ahead of the Germans. Conversely, had they made earlier investments in jets and long-range submarines, we may never have had a chance to use our newfound technology. Research & Development is often shorted for budgetary reasons and is largely unseen and unappreciated until the other guy's R&D work is demonstrated on the battlefield against our people. Think IED and cyberwarfare. 

INTELLIGENCE. There can never be enough in enough different ways. Enough is never enough in this area. This is especially true now with so many bright people, bright ways, and asymmetric environments. Crucial to all this is HUMINT -- often a dirty word because it involves risk and judgment -- but usually the only really truly confirming data point a field commander has. The Iran rescue attempt would probably have had a far different outcome had quality HUMINT been available. 

Measuring Naval Power: Bigger Ain’t Always Better

JAMES HOLMES

Aggregate tonnage alone doesn’t win naval battles in the modern era, and suggesting otherwise is dangerous. 

By James R. Holmes

April 12, 2014

Some ideas are undead. Even false ones are hard to kill. Exhibit A: the conceit that the U.S. Navy is bigger, or stronger, or something, than the next X navies combined. The Naval Diplomat was dismayed not long ago to hear a seasoned scholar of maritime affairs retail a version of this line. She, he, or it contended that the navy is “more powerful” than the next sixteen navies.

Implication: the U.S. Navy could fight an alliance among its sixteen strongest potential opponents with a 50-50 chance of victory — or better. Whoa!

And wrong. Egregiously so. This factoid is nothing more than a tonnage figure. It means the U.S. Navy outweighs the next sixteen (or thirteen, the usual figure bandied about during the 2012 election campaign) navies. That’s all. Framed in those terms, the American advantage doesn’t sound so overpowering, does it? Still less is tonnage a sound basis for decisions about how many and what types of ships you lay down, or what combat systems you build into them.

Now, bulk isn’t entirely meaningless. Indeed, it’s a must for a navy like America’s that journeys and does battle across intercontinental distances. Bigger hulls house more fuel, stores, and ammunition. More storage capacity for bullets, beans, and black oil (as U.S. Navy sailors of a certain, ahem, vintage like to say) means more rounds out the barrel, the ability to undertake longer voyages, and greater time on station once in theater. None of these are minor things.

A navy that displaces more, then, may be stronger than a slimmer opponent. But not necessarily. If tonnage were all that mattered — as our factoid maintains — then the Maersk Line, with its heavyweight container ships, would be the world’s strongest navy. The freighter Emma Maersk, after all, displaces a burly 165,000 metric tons, to the supercarrier USS Ronald Reagan‘s welterweight 103,000. Is the unarmed merchantman stronger than the nuclear-powered flattop because it displaces over half-again as much?

Hardly. You have to look past brute tonnage numbers and other simple metrics to take a navy’s true measure. Though necessary when cruising far from home, size is insufficient.

Israel Does Not Tolerate Poor Performance

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20140411.aspx


April 11, 2014

Israel recently revealed the results of an investigation into a February 3rd friendly fire incident that left a young officer dead. This took place on the Gaza border when the victim was shot by another Israeli soldier who was confused about who was where. As a result of this the army decided to dismiss three soldiers from their jobs because of poor performance. The soldier who fired the fatal shot was dismissed from combat service. His company commander, who had planned and supervised the operation also lost his job and can never hold a combat command in the future. The battalion commander lost his job but can receive combat commands in the future.

Israel expects a lot from its combat troops, especially unit commanders. In Israeli society it’s a pretty severe punishment to be expelled from combat service, and especially to be barred from commanding combat troops. The incident happened because the combat commander did not adequately brief the troops who were sent on a mission to patrol the Gaza border fence to prevent the Islamic terrorists on the other side from placing bombs. These bombs are then remotely detonated when an Israeli patrol comes by. The fence is monitored electronically but troops are sent along the fence periodically to double check. During this incident, which occurred at night, the company commander used a poorly thought out patrol plan and did not adequately train all his troops how to tell friend from foe in the darkness. Thus the Israeli officer was mistaken for a Palestinian terrorist and shot dead.

(W)ARCHIVES: YOU’RE FIRED!

Mark Stout

http://warontherocks.com/2014/04/warchives-youre-fired/

April 11, 2014

On April 11, 1951 the Defense Department’s communication system sent a rare “Flash” precedence message streaking from Washington to South Korea. The message was classified Top Secret, but its substance would soon become very public.

President Harry Truman had fired General Douglas MacArthur, the World War II hero and commander of United Nations forces in Korea.

Truman was fed up with two years of what he viewed as insubordination and the ignoring of orders by MacArthur. For instance, in June 1950 MacArthur was authorized to bomb targets in Korea south of the 38thparallel. MacArthur had ordered bombing of targets north of the parallel. Only afterwards did he seek the authority to do so. The bombings themselves were of no major import, but it was a bad sign and further such incidents ensued. However, the straw that broke the camel’s back was when MacArthur started publicly debating the President over America’s defense policy and corresponding out of channels with a member of Congress on this subject.

By late March, 1951 Truman had already decided to fire the General. However, MacArthur was such a major figure that before pulling the trigger the President engaged in several days of consultation with Secretary of Defense George C. Marshall; General Omar Bradley, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and through him the Joint Chiefs; Secretary of State Dean Acheson; and “Wise Man” Ambassador Averell Harriman. All of these men agreed that MacArthur must go. Indeed, Harriman and Marshall said that MacArthur should have been fired two years earlier.

Unfortunately, Clausewitzian friction affected the firing. The original plan was to send a cable through State Department channels to the U.S. Ambassador in South Korea, who was expected to be receiving Secretary of the Army Frank Pace. Pace was then to deliver the word to MacArthur. In the event, Pace was visiting the front when he was expected to be with the Ambassador and the State Department’s communication system suffered a power failure that slowed receipt of the message. By this time, word had reached the White House that the press knew what was afoot. The news would be in the next morning’s papers.

The result was the Flash message through Defense channels and a near simultaneous early morning White House briefing for the press. In the end, one of MacArthur’s aides heard the news on the radio and informed Mrs. MacArthur, who told her husband. The message itself became irrelevant.

Developing Army Leaders

Lessons for Teaching Critical Thinking in Distributed, Resident, and Mixed-Delivery Venues

by Susan G. Straus, Michael G. Shanley, James C. Crowley, Douglas Yeung, Sarah H. Bana, Kristin J. Leuschner

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Abstract

The U.S. Army uses the Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) as a key component of its system for developing critical thinking skills and abilities in its officer corps. The Common Core is the first phase of CGSOC. The Common Core is taught in three venues: a resident course taught at Fort Leavenworth and at satellite campuses; Advanced Distributed Learning (ADL), a web-based, self-paced course that uses interactive multimedia instruction; and The Army School System (TASS), primarily for Reserve Component officers, which combines resident and interactive multimedia instruction and is taught by the U.S. Army Reserve Command's 97th Brigade and its three subordinate battalions. CGSOC consists of nine blocks of instruction taught as stand-alone modules in the resident course (14–16 weeks long) and organized into three phases in TASS and ADL (designed to be taken over a period of up to 18 months). In response to the interests of Army leadership, this study sought to answer the following questions about the Common Core, focusing on the 2009–2010 academic year: Based on current methods of evaluation, how effective is the Common Core, and to what extent are there differences among distributed, resident, and mixed-delivery venues? Based on current measures, how can course delivery be improved? How well do current methods of evaluation gauge course success and point to needed improvements? To answer these questions, the authors analyzed available data from Command and General Staff School, including responses to student surveys, grades on assignments, and student characteristics. In addition, the authors conducted a quasi-experimental study to assess consistency in grading among faculty members.

‘Militants using global SIM cards’

Published: April 13, 2014

Sandeep Joshi

The HinduIronically, despite the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India recommending a four-pronged action plan for improving telecom services in Assam, neither the DoT nor the USOF has managed to implement any plan on the ground.

Poor telecom connectivity hindering security operations: Assam government

Alarmed at growing use of international SIM cards by insurgents in the north-east and poor mobile connectivity affecting the maintenance of law and order, the Assam government has asked the Department of Telecommunications (DoT) to install more mobile towers in the State, particularly along the international borders and in remote areas.

The Assam government has raised with the DoT the issue of slow pace of expansion of mobile tower infrastructure in the State and sought strengthening of mobile network in “sensitive areas” on priority.

In a letter to Telecom Secretary M.F. Farooqui, Assam Chief Secretary Jitesh Khosla has explained how poor telecom connectivity was hindering security forces in carrying out operations against insurgent groups and manning international borders.

“Due to its geographical location and history of insurgency and extremism, Assam faces many challenges to maintenance of law and order and many threats from forces inimical to national security. It shares a long international border with Bangladesh and Bhutan and faces several serious ethno/communal sub-nationalist conflicts and militancy. Besides, there are equally contentious inter-State border disputes which need constant monitoring. In this background, an effective communication system is sine qua non for effective security monitoring of the State,” says the letter, a copy of which is in the possession of The Hindu.

Pointing out that mobile communication network in Assam is far from satisfactory, particularly in forest and hilly areas, and on inter-State and international borders, the letter says: “Due to several communication shadow areas, some miscreants even use mobile SIM cards of foreign countries. This hinders proper reporting of incidents, effective surveillance and coordinated response by the security forces.”

“Given such a backdrop, it is desirable that the projects for installation of base transmission stations [BTS] in the communication shadow areas of Assam, particularly in Karbi-Anglong, Dima-Hasao, Goalpara, BTAD [Bodo Territorial Autonomous District] areas and along the Assam-Arunachal border and the Assam-Nagaland border be taken up on priority basis,” it adds.