TURKEY: THE DEMAND FOR CONSCIENTIOUS AND ETHICAL POLITICS – ANALYSIS

By Ozdem Sanberk

JTWhttp://www.eurasiareview.com/20062014-turkey-demand-conscientious-ethical-politics-analysis/

Without the popularization of demands for transparent, ethical, and conscientious politics which prioritize humanitarian development, aim to build a balance in the relationship between man and nature, and is capable of protecting the vulnerable segments of society on the basis of power-sharing and participation, paving the way for change in Turkey will be impossible.

Humanity, which is approaching the second decade of the 21st century, is mired in the geopolitical concerns of the past centuries instead of focusing on the ideal of a new world order. Military prowess, spheres of influence, and territorial gains once again occupy the agendas of nation-states. The dynamic of international relations is rapidly shifting from the ideal of a prosperous, just, and liberal world order to the slippery slope of geopolitical rivalries and balance of power politics that marked a large part of 19th and 20th centuries.(*) Suspicion and lack of trust have once again started to prevail over diplomacy.

By contrast, the 21st century was off to a flying start for humanity. The Cold War was over, communism had failed, the Soviet Union dissolved, Germany reunified, and the former Warsaw Pact members started to join NATO and the EU. Ideological warfare between the East and West was settled. The transatlantic world and the world at large, with the exception of the western Balkans and the Caucasus, finally attained stability and began its march toward prosperity. However, against such a backdrop, it was revealed that the military option was still relevant and indeed imperative after the 9/11 attacks and the consequent U.S. invasion of Afghanistan and Iraq. Moreover, Russia’s recent annexation of Crimea as a fait accompli once again blatantly laid bare this reality.

Turkey’s outlook

Turkey entered the 21st century full of hope under the rule of the Justice and Development Party. This political party was attuned to change and was able to carry out significant reforms during its first two terms in power thanks to its strong conservative grassroots. In the meantime, Turkey embarked on an endeavor to realize social and economic development in congruence with the aspirations of the new century for the long-awaited liberal world order, with its humanitarian focus and foundations rooted in a mindset that aims for the expansion of liberties. Based on such a global vision, Turkey took the EU as its guide and started negotiations for full-membership. Ankara pursued a policy of modernization by way of spreading the gains of economic development and individual liberties among those segments of Turkish society which were long deprived of such opportunities.

The collapse of Turkey’s Western option

Turkey’s efforts aimed at EU integration were not supported by the heavy-weights of the Union such as France and Germany. What is more, these two countries pronounced that Turkey was not part of Europe and would therefore never become a full member. They vetoed negotiation chapters, and proposed a privileged partnership instead of full-membership. Such acts basically meant that Turkey was to be locked up in the position of a “buffer state” between Europe and the Middle East and that the gates of Europe were closed to Turkey.[o1] Not only 6 or 12 countries located on the European continent, but the vast majority of them were members of the Union; therefore Turkey was implicitly being left out of any tangible decision-making mechanisms of the West.

Leaning toward the Middle East

Another consequence of Turkey’s exclusion from Europe was its increasing engagement with the Arab World and the Middle East. The ruling party’s conservative background and the Turkish people’s geographical, historical, and emotional attachment with the region accelerated such a process. However, foreign policy is intrinsically related to domestic policy in practice; hence Turkey distanced itself from Western values, and domestic reforms associated with the EU accession process were disrupted as Ankara shifted its foreign policy orientation away from Europe. The agenda for liberal reform was replaced by a roadmap over which the demands and expectations of conservative and religious masses largely prevailed. So long as the Constitution of 1982 remained in force, the “Ankara Criteria” were doomed to an unsatisfactory performance in prioritizing human dignity, social rights, individual liberties, and gender equality. Moreover, values such as respect for minority opinion, transparency, secularism, and justice, which are the essentials of any modern-day administrative system in the West, could not be achieved.

The uncertain atmosphere surrounding Arab revolutions

Another reason why the focus of Turkish foreign policy shifted toward the Middle East was the breakout of the Arab Spring and the subsequent spread of popular revolts to Syria. Turkey initially made a rather accurate strategic diagnosis of the larger picture. It pursued a policy based on trusting in the ability of the wide-spread movement to effect change and transformation in the Middle East. Ankara sided not with dictators, but with the long neglected masses who revolted for their liberty from oppression. However, the radical changes in regional and global political balances that occurred thereafter, and the political quagmire in which the movement eventually arrived, exhausted the validity of such an appropriating policy. The ‘Arab Spring’ deviated from its initial goals especially due to the rise of radical groups affiliated with Al-Qaeda in Syria and Iraq. While Egypt swayed from one dictatorship to another, Iran increased its influence over the region. Turkey could not catch up with the pace of change in a persistent and healthy manner, therefore it had great difficulty in adjusting its policies in accordance with the evolving circumstances.

Security risks

Nevertheless, the bloody stage through which Arab revolutions are passing nowadays in Syria, Egypt, and Libya does not indicate the beginning of the end for such a process of radical change. The changing context in which the Arab world has found itself has reached the point of no return. It was obvious since the beginning that democratic transformation in the Middle East would require a long and painful process, the likes of which will continue to deeply upset balances for years to come, leaving an indelible imprint on Turkey and other states in the region. Therefore, controversies over our Middle East policy will inevitably continue to top our national agenda. If one thing is for certain, it is that the cost of being an influential actor in the Middle East means being obliged to bear the security risks accompanying such a complex task. That is because it is the dictators, rather than people and their elected representatives, who make the final decisions in this region.

Polarization in domestic politics

Turkey currently faces the risk of losing all gains it made during the last 10-15 years in terms of coping with the economic, political, and social necessities of the 21st century, as a result of both challenging external dynamics and domestic polarization coupled with rising tensions among the public. This risk is essentially due to the fact that the Justice and Development Party, their discouragement in the face of the EU’s exclusionist policies notwithstanding, simply brushed aside its former agenda for liberal reforms. However, a more crucial cause for this risk rests in the ruling party’s failure to recognize the fact that political power can only be exercised if it is shared and based on participation in the 21st century. As a matter of fact, neither state administrations nor leaders alone in any country of the world can efficiently manage everything without consulting and sharing power with their citizens in decision-making processes. This is due to the increasingly global character of economic relations, advancements made in IT such as the internet, and the autonomous political power obtained by individuals and groups of individuals separate from their governments as a result of an overall transformation concerning our daily lives and capabilities.(**)

Demand for conscientious politics

Under such circumstances, Turkey’s utmost priority reveals itself as developing an accurate understanding of the world around it, while accommodating the underlying waves of change in order to avoid being driven away to the periphery of the world. The basic condition to achieve this entails putting an end to our domestic quarrels which persistently erode our institutions and deeply paralyze our political life as a whole. Such an imperative became all the more salient after the recent catastrophe which hit Soma, where over 300 Turkish miners lost their lives. Today, Turkey needs to pull itself together quickly, and its people have to act in solidarity. Drafting a new constitution to replace the old one, which was drawn up by the military regime of early 1980s and politically expired long ago, will enable us to catch up with the pace of change which marks the 21st century and will satisfy the needs of an advanced country. Such a scenario is possible only if popular demand presses for transparent, conscientious, and ethical politics that prioritize social rights and humanitarian development, adopt an environment friendly approach, assert the importance of power-sharing and participation, and protect the vulnerable segments of our society. Unfortunately, such a demand is still not common among the masses. Where there is no demand, there is no change. The generation of such a demand interests us all, as its responsibility is placed upon the shoulders of the ruling party, the opposition, civil society, and each and every citizen of Turkey.

Rebels seize former chemical weapons plant; Sistani urges formation of new government

BY LIZ SLY AND LOVEDAY MORRIS 

June 20  

Source Link

President Obama spoke and took questions on the situation in Iraq at the White House on Thursday. He said the U.S. is prepared to send up to 300 military advisers to Iraq but reiterated there would be no U.S. combat troops on the ground. (  / Associated Press)

BAGHDAD — Islamist insurgents continued to bear down on Iraqi forces Friday, seizing a former chemical weapons facility and battling for control of the country’s largest oil refinery, as the spiritual leader of Iraq’s Shiite Muslim majority called for the formation of a new “effective” government with broad support. 

The al-Qaeda-inspired militants from the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), who launched a lightning offensive across northern Iraq last week, seized the former chemical weapons complex, which contains stockpiles of chemical munitions that are not considered usable, a State Department spokeswoman said. The destroyed facility was once part of deposed dictator Saddam Hussein’s arsenal. 

In a sermon read by a representative at Friday prayers in the Shiite holy city of Karbala, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, the top Shiite cleric in Iraq, called on the country’s newly elected parliament to start the process of forming a new government now that the results of April 30 parliamentary elections have been officially certified. The sermon contained thinly veiled criticism of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, who has been widely blamed for the current crisis by failing to accommodate Iraq’s Sunni minority during his eight years in power. 

“It is necessary for the winning political blocs to start a dialogue that yields an effective government that enjoys broad national support, avoids past mistakes and opens new horizons toward a better future for all Iraqis,” the reclusive Sistani said in the sermon delivered by his aide, Ahmed al-Safi. 

President Obama also implicitly criticized Maliki on Thursday, calling on Iraqi leaders to “rise above their differences” and “govern with an inclusive agenda.” But he stopped short of urging Maliki to step down. 

Watch as Islamic militants parade in the northern town of Baiji where they took control of Iraq’s largest oil refinery on Tuesday. They ride in vehicles adorned with the Islamic State's black banners. The video starts with animation depicting the ISIS logo. (  / AP) 

State Department spokeswoman Jen Psaki confirmed that ISIS, a radical Sunni Muslim group formerly known as al-Qaeda in Iraq, “has occupied the Al Muthanna complex,” a former chemical weapons facility about 36 miles northwest of Baghdad. 

“We remain concerned about the seizure of any military site” by the group, she said in a statement. “We do not believe that the complex contains CW [chemical weapons] materials of military value and it would be very difficult, if not impossible, to safely move the materials.” 

According to the CIA, the facility was bombed extensively during the Persian Gulf War in 1991, ending its ability to produce chemical weapons. U.N. weapons inspectors subsequently destroyed equipment and stockpiles there, most of the complex was razed by the Iraqis, and the remainder was extensively looted, the agency said in a 2007 report. 

However, the CIA report said: “Stockpiles of chemical munitions are still stored there. The most dangerous ones have been declared to the UN and are sealed in bunkers. Although declared, the bunkers contents have yet to be confirmed. These areas of the compound pose a hazard to civilians and potential blackmarketers.” Among the chemical agents once produced at the Muthanna complex were mustard gas, sarin and VX, it said. 

“Two wars, sanctions and [U.N. inspection] oversight reduced Iraqi’s premier production facility to a stockpile of old damaged and contaminated chemical munitions (sealed in bunkers), a wasteland full of destroyed chemical munitions, razed structures, and unusable war-ravaged facilities,” the report about the complex concluded. 

Fighting continued between the Sunni militants and Iraqi forces for control of the country’s largest oil refinery at Baiji, 140 miles northwest of Baghdad, the British Broadcasting Corp. reported. It was unclear who was in control of the refinery, Iraq’s largest gasoline processing plant. 

The loss of the refinery would mark yet another blow for Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, the Shiite leader whom the United States is pushing to find a political solution to the Iraq crisis that threatens to engulf the entire Middle East. Maliki’s top priority, however, is U.S. military aid. 

How ISIS is carving out a new country 

Missing from the top table

Missing from the top tableEgypt's turmoil prevents its regional roleS Nihal Singh

Egypt's President Abdel Fattah al-Sissi greets students as he attends the graduation ceremony of Egypt's defence academies in Cairo on June 19 

AS India frets over the fate of its nationals caught up in the Iraq quagmire and regional and world powers seek to safeguard their interests, the traditional heavyweight is missing from the scene. Egypt, the inevitable deal maker and mediator, is too involved in its own problems of transition to spare time for Iraq and the onslaught of the extreme militant group ISIS as it threatens Baghdad.

The former Field Marshal and army chief, Abdel el-Sisi, has assumed the Presidency after nearly three years of turmoil. There was first the dethroning of the long-time ruler Hosni Mubarak, then the assumption of office of the first freely elected President in the country's history, Mohamed Morsi of the Muslim Brotherhood, and most recently Mr Sisi's coronation.

Not surprisingly, most Egyptians are tired of the riots, demonstrations and deaths that have punctuated the fall of Mubarak and are looking forward to a period of quiet so that they can live their lives in peace. There is undoubtedly popular support for Mr Sisi, despite his voluble opponents in the Brotherhood, which has been banned, and the minority of liberals who despair their country going back to the Mubarak era.

However, Egypt's domestic preoccupations have left a political vacuum in the region, beset as it is with the threat of a brutal extremist organisation, ISIS, varying under the names of the Islamist State of Iraq and Syria and the Levant, and the dangers presented by the disintegration of Iraq and Syria. On the sidelines, Israel is conducting a military operation in the occupied West Bank arresting more than 150 Palestinians for the alleged kidnapping of three Israeli teenagers. It is not lost upon the region and the world that Egypt has been the traditional midwife to resolve such problems.

Weighty canine connections

Weighty canine connections Parbina Rashid

I have not read Rujuta Diwekar's “Women and The Weight Loss Tamasha” but I have a fair idea of what the author wants to say. As a lifestyle journalist, I have to edit columns on weight loss, fitness experts’ opinions on sustainable weight loss, dieticians offering platter-full of wonder diets and gyms coming out with innovative steps to lose those loathsome calories.

But nothing had ever enticed me to try out any of those. Not even the alluring walking trail of Sukhna Lake could sustain my interest for more than two days. Too much of hard work! Besides, by Punjabi standards, I am not fat, just pleasantly plump!

However, my recent trip to Guwahati turned out to be the starting point for my weight loss “tamasha”. Travelling from Punjab, I was just on time to catch my afternoon flight. After crossing the security check, I didn't even have to look at my boarding pass to spot the gate that led to my flight.

The queue that had the maximum number of girls wearing shorts was the gate for the Guwahati-bound plane. Naturally thin and willowy, Northeastern girls can carry off shorts as if they were born in it. Instinctively, I looked down at my mid-section. The bulge was visible, even through the loose kurta, but so what? I had my 5 feet 8 inch tall teenaged son to justify that bulge!

As soon as I boarded the plane and made myself comfortable to the soothing tune of Eagle's intoxicating Just Another Tequila Sunrise, I forgot about the weighty issue. Such a refreshing change from our Yo Yo’s disgustingly fattening “Char Bottle Vodka”!

Reclaiming North Waziristan

Reclaiming North WaziristanZahid Hussain

Families fleeing the military offensive against the Pakistani militants in North Waziristan, arrive in Bannu, located in Pakistan's Khyber-Pakhtunkhwa province. Reuters 

THIS will indeed be the most critical battle in Pakistan’s long war against militant insurgency. Ending its prolonged dithering, the government has finally ordered a full-scale military operation in North Waziristan rightly described as the centre of gravity of terrorism. Thousands of ground troops backed by air force jets have moved into action after the announcement of the offensive to reclaim control over the strategically placed territory.

No doubt, the decision to eliminate the terrorist den was imminent after the collapse of peace talks with the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan, but the bloody siege of the international airport in Karachi last week proved to be the proverbial last straw. The Sharif government was left with no choice but to declare an all-out war against those responsible for the brazen assault on the state. The incident shook the country and the demand for action became ever louder.

There was certainly no other option but to face the challenge head on. A lot of time has already been wasted because of indecisiveness on the part of our national leadership. The endless talk about talks delivering peace had exposed the weakness of the state. Despite the decision, however, the prime minister still appears unwilling to take charge and has left it to the military to run the show.

While immensely critical, the latest campaign is much more complex than any other undertaken by the security forces so far in its decade-long war in this treacherous mountainous territory. Despite the fact that the military is now much more experienced in fighting insurgency and battle-hardened, this asymmetric war was never easy. One thing is certain — it is going to be a long haul.

This will not be the first time the Pakistan Army is carrying out an operation in North Waziristan. The earlier expedition, launched in 2004, ended in a peace deal with the tribal militants after two years of fierce fighting. The truce allowed the militants to not only regroup, but also strengthen their positions. It will be even more difficult to dislodge them now.

Foreign fighters

The biggest of the seven tribal agencies North Waziristan is a haven for a lethal mix of foreign and local militants presenting an existential threat to the country. Many of the terrorist attacks in other countries also have roots in the region. The number of foreign fighters in the territory is roughly estimated by the intelligence agencies to be around 8,000. More than half of them — some 4,800 — are reportedly Uzbek. They have not only been involved in the Karachi airport attack, they have also participated in other high-profile attacks eg, Bannu jail, Mehran and Kamra air bases.

Apart from the Uzbeks there are other foreign militant groups such as networks of isolated Chechens, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and Chinese Uighur militants of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. Reportedly, the majority of Arab militants have either been killed by US drone strikes or left the region. Thousands of Punjabi militants also moved to North Waziristan over the years, and established training camps in the restive border region.

Endgame in Afghanistan

The battle for control over this lawless region has assumed much greater gravity with the approach of the endgame in Afghanistan. Al Qaida-linked groups present a worrying, long-term security threat for Pakistan, in fact, for the entire region.

Counter-terror operation

Pakistan announced the start of a full-on military offensive recently to quash an increasingly assertive Taliban insurgency in the tribal ethnic Pashtun region where some of the region's most feared Al-Qaida-linked militants are based. 

Their belongings piled up high on rickety buses, donkey carts and tractors, thousands of refugees poured out of Pakistan's North Waziristan. People are terrified by both state troops and Taliban insurgents fighting for control of the troubled region. 

Foreign hand 

The number of foreign fighters in the territory is roughly estimated by the intelligence agencies to be around 8,000. More than half of them are reportedly Uzbek. 

Foreign fighters have been involved in the Karachi airport attack, they have also participated in other high-profile attacks. 

Apart from the Uzbeks there are other foreign militant groups such as Chechens, the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group and Chinese Uighur militants of the East Turkestan Islamic Movement. 

A major concern for Pakistani security forces pertains to terrorists crossing over to Afghanistan as has happened in the past, and the use of the sanctuaries for cross-border attacks. The Pakistan military has requested the Afghan security forces to seal the border on their side to facilitate the elimination of terrorists who attempt to flee across the border. But that may not work given the tension between the two neighbours.

There is certainly a greater need for cooperation and a joint strategy between Kabul and Islamabad to fight militancy. The security of the two countries has never been so intertwined as now. The militants’ sanctuaries on either side of the border will have serious consequences for the region, particularly, after the withdrawal of foreign troops from Afghanistan.

Securing control

Surely a major objective of the offensive is to secure the control of the lawless territory. But military action alone does not offer a long-term solution to an extremely complex problem. The government needs to take urgent measures to end the alienation and backwardness of the tribal region as well. The ongoing military operation provides a great opportunity to push for the long-delayed integration of the region with the rest of the country in order to end its ambiguous semi-autonomous status.

The military operation in North Waziristan is only one dimension of the wider battle against militancy and violent extremism in the country. The militant groups have strong networks across the country. For a long-term solution, the government needs to develop a coherent and overarching counterterrorism strategy in order to strengthen the capacity of the civilian law-enforcement and intelligence agencies. There is also need for closer coordination among the various intelligence agencies and strict enforcement of rule of law.

What is most positive is the evolution of a wider political consensus on the war against terrorism. Almost all political parties with the exception of some right-wing Islamic groups such as the Jamaat-i-Islami are united in their support of the military campaign. But that unity can only be sustained by developing a strong internal security narrative.

One must learn from past military operations in other tribal regions. A major flaw in the approach was that after clearing the areas, no effort was made to establish a proper administrative system. As a result, the state’s control over those areas remained tentative.

Swat and South Waziristan present glaring examples of battles not fully won. The presence of the military does not provide permanent solutions. Therefore, it is necessary to establish a formal civilian system along with the military operation. Without that, the objectives of the operation will never be fully achieved.

By arrangement with the Dawn

Can America’s Favorite Ex-Con Mayor Win Again?

http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2014/06/22/can-america-s-favorite-ex-con-mayor-win-again.html

Can America’s Favorite Ex-Con Mayor Win Again? 

Buddy Cianci is the poster boy of U.S. political scandals. But that may be ancient history in Providence, where the still-beloved figure may seek one more go of it in City Hall.

In the Museum of American Political Scandals, if it ever gets built, there will be exhibits on Bill Clinton and Eliot Spitzer and Anthony Weiner and Larry “Wide Stance” Craig and Marion Barry. And there should be an entire wing dedicated to The Buddy Cianci Story. 

The addition could be made out in the likeness of one of the old vaudevillian theaters in downtown Providence that Cianci saved from the scrapheap in his 21 years as mayor there—a baroque, ornate thing with painted ceilings and gold-plated columns. 

There should be enough room to showcase his first two-and-a-half terms, a reign that began in 1974, when Cianci, just 33, ran as a Republican in an overwhelmingly Democratic city in the year that the Watergate scandal led to a Democratic tsunami. 

Cianci made ads that look now like ‘70s police procedurals. “Take a good look at the face on your TV screen,” the ads intoned, labeling Cianci “The Anti-Corruption Candidate.” 

His tenure ended when Cianci, who had a reputation as one of Providence’s most active ladies’ men, summoned to his home a friend he thought was having an affair with his ex-wife. (Both denied it.) Over the course of three hours, Cianci poured liquor on the man, threw an ashtray at him, punched him repeatedly, burned him with a lit cigarette, and threatened him with a fireplace log while demanding hundreds of thousands of dollars of payoff. 

“I saw a lunatic, simply stated,” the victim, a contractor from nearby Bristol, told police. Facing a long prison sentence, Cianci pleaded no contest to the charge in order to avoid jail time, and was forced to step down. 

Then there should be an extension to the Cianci wing, for what became known around town as Buddy II. “I am the two-timing mayor of Providence,” Cianci likes to quip, and six years after the Fireplace Log Affair, Cianci was back, winning election as an independent, then winning twice more, the last time unopposed. 

ed about this, about how to manage a city at a time when there is no cavalry coming from the federal government to help, Cianci said simply, “sometimes all it takes is sheer force of personality.” 

As Providence blossomed into a Seattle of the East in the ‘90s, with its brick-building stock getting converted into lofts for the postgrad art-school set, Cianci again reigned as its crown prince, in a whirlwind of parades and ribbon cuttings and school graduations. “I’d attend the opening of an envelope,” he says now. He was out on the town nearly every night, pulling up in his limo, breezing past lines of waiting diners to hold court at the choicest tables, leaving without paying. “The cost of doing business,” one restauranteur told a Cianci biographer. 

That show ended in operatic fashion in 2001, during the unforgettably named Operation Plunderdome, when federal officials were determined to clean up what they saw as rampant corruption at City Hall. Two tax officials went to prison and four city staffers were indicted, as was Cianci. The mayor faced 17 charges of corruption, but only ended up getting convicted of one, a RICO violation, a charge that until then had been mostly used to put mob bosses away. Cianci spent four-and-a-half years in prison. The sentencing judge said, “There appear to be two very different Buddy Ciancis. The first is a skilled and charismatic political figure, probably one of the most talented politicians Rhode Island has ever seen, someone with wit, who thinks quickly on his feet and can enthrall an audience.” The second Cianci, the judge said, “presided over an administration that is rife with corruption at all levels” and “engaged in an egregious breach of public trust by engaging to operate the city that Buddy Cianci was supposed to serve as a criminal enterprise to line his own pockets.” 

Cianci has always maintained his innocence, and after the sentencing told one reporter that if there were two Ciancis, “How come I didn’t get two fucking paychecks?” 

Now 73, out of prison, Buddy Cianci is very much considering doing the unthinkable—adding a new addition to that wing of the museum, and running for mayor of Providence one more time. 

Vincent Buddy Cianci former Mayor of Providence at book signing of his latest book at Barnes & noble in Warwick RI (Jesse Nemerofsky/ZUMAPRESS.com)

But first, he would like to clear up a few things. 

“If I did the kinds of things I was accused, of, I mean, it’s like Mario Puzo wrote the fucking story!” 

All of those scandals of the past, “were blown way out of proportion by the local press. They couldn’t get me at the ballot box. I went to jail because I was convicted of one charge, which was conspiracy to commit RICO, and I was found not guilty of the RICO! So there were 29 charges, and 28 I was found not guilty on right away. The judge [told the jury] that they did not have to know that a crime was committed, just that he was part of an organization where the crime was committed. That he knew or should have known. Now how the fuck you going to beat that? You can’t beat that.” 

To hear Cianci tell it, an administration that was once described a criminal enterprise, and the most corrupt in the history of the state, was undone because one aide, and not a particularly close one, accepted $1,000 in cash from an undercover FBI agent. Later in an interview he revised the crime downward, saying that the aide was distracted by a phone call when the agent left the cash, and tried to wave him off. The press was very liberal, back in those days, “so they find every little thing that is wrong and try to maximize it,” he said. 

The Interventionists Who Cried Wolf

Paul J. Saunders

June 21, 2014 

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-interventionists-who-cried-wolf-10712?page=show

"Americans’ rejection of war—and, indeed, their reluctance to get involved in many international problems—is in fact a direct consequence of the interventionist case for action."

America’s neoconservatives and liberal interventionists are unhappy. It’s easy to understand why—the American public is tired of overseas adventures and is reinforcing the instincts of a domestically focused liberal president who often seems skeptical of not only military action, but the military itself. As a result, President Barack Obama is withdrawing from Afghanistan faster than many prefer, continues to reject military options or even meaningful military assistance to Syria’s rebels and Ukraine’s government, and appears cautious in responding to renewed fighting in Iraq. The irony is that for all of Mr. Obama’s demonstrable foreign policy failings, interventionists in both parties have no one but themselves to blame.

Many have argued that the American public is “war weary” after years of unsatisfying fighting in Afghanistan and Iraq, but there is more to public attitudes than frustration at enduring conflicts with ambiguous goals. Americans’ rejection of war—and, indeed, their reluctance to get involved in many international problems—is in fact a direct consequence of the interventionist case for action.

This has two components. The first is the routine manner in which America’s interventionists have inflated threats, minimized costs, and/or overstated benefits of the use of force. Iraq is the most obvious case—the U.S. war there was supposed to be a “cakewalk” that would oust a Hitler-like Saddam Hussein who was cooperating with al Qaeda and developing weapons of mass destruction. Occupying Iraq and making it a democracy was to transform the entire Middle East for the better, spreading freedom and accelerating the Israeli-Palestinian peace process.

NATIONAL SECURITY EDUCATION: THE VIEW FROM NEWPORT

James Holmes

June 23, 2014

http://warontherocks.com/2014/06/national-security-education-the-view-from-newport/

Last week saw graduation day at the Naval War College here in Newport, and that makes it a fitting time to reflect on the state of professional military education, or PME. George Mason professor Audrey Kurth Cronin opened the debate earlier in the week with a thoughtful column weighing the relative merits of PME and civilian national-security education before coming down on the side of the latter. Which, she asks, “better prepares future leaders of the United States”?

Let me add a few words from a former naval officer (if there are former naval officers) who has graduated from and taught at both PME and civilian institutions.

To start with, Professor Cronin oversimplifies the make-up of the civilian and PME communities a tad. That’s no big deal for the initiated, but a couple of points are worth teasing out for prospective students weighing which path to pursue. For starters, all civilian institutions aren’t created equal. Indeed, there is a deep cultural divide within the international relations (IR) field, of which national and international security programs constitute a subset.

Broadly speaking, there are professional schools of international relations and there are traditional university IR (or sometimes political science) departments. The former are practical-minded schools such as my alma mater, the Fletcher School at Tufts, or the School of International and Public Affairs at Columbia, Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government, or the Sam Nunn School at Georgia Tech. They’re the closest counterparts to PME institutions. These policy-oriented institutions aim to help practitioners execute their duties in professional life.

And then there are university IR departments, where scholars concentrate overwhelmingly on IR theory, try to use (mostly) quantitative methods to determine laws governing international politics, and so forth. Here’s a rough-and-ready way to differentiate between the professional schools and university departments. Professional schools see theory as an implement for future decision-making, university departments as an implement for analyzing what already happened. The one method is prescriptive, the other descriptive.

Theory for professional schools is prescriptive. It’s a toolkit the practitioner uses to analyze tough problems he encounters in the bare-knuckles world of politics and strategy. Theory for university departments is largely descriptive. It’s a tool to appraise the nature of nation states, the structure and dynamics of the international system, and the like. It supplies context.

If we wanted to put a face on professional school IR theory, it might be that of martial sage Carl von Clausewitz. The face of IR departments might be that of Ken Waltz, the grand master of realism. Clausewitz helps statesmen and soldiers wage power politics and war better, while Waltz gazes back across history, posits rules governing how states interact, and attempts to glimpse the future.

Pave the Roads With Solar Panels?

A startup turns to the public for help to turn the ground into a source of power.

In America, immigrants used to say, the streets are paved with gold. But what if roads were paved with. . . electricity? 

That’s the question Scott and Julie Brusaw began asking several years ago. And that’s the idea behind their start-up, Solar Roadways.

The idea is at once simple and completely out of the box. Surfaces exposed to the sun can generate electricity. Typically, solar panels need an open, unshaded area—like rooftops or open fields. In the southwest and California, after all, it’s not uncommon to see parking lots fitted with canopies that generate electricity. 

But what if the parking lot itself could do the generating? Instead of laying down concrete and asphalt on the ground, the Brusaws hit upon the idea of using pavers. But instead of being constructed from granite, marble, or other stone, they’d be made out of a highly durable glass that would house solar cells and circuit boards. In effect, the paving “stones” would be electricity-generating solar panels. It would save a lot of money—roads would essentially pay for their own construction and maintenance by generating energy. And it could help contribute to a new energy future. Solar Roadways says “a nationwide system could produce more clean renewable energy than a country uses as a whole.” 

Scott Brusaw had been noodling with the idea since he was a kid. After serving in the Marines and working in oil exploration, he went to college and became an electrical engineer and inveterate tinkerer. Julie is a licensed counselor and family therapist. The couple founded Solar Roadways several years ago in Sandpoint, Idaho to try to bring this concept to fruition. 

As is often the case, the government stepped in early to encourage the development of a new technology. In 2009, the Federal Highway Administration (FHA) awarded Solar Roadways a contract to construct a prototype. The Brusaws developed their first 12'x12’ panel in February 2010. The world began to notice. In 2010, the company won a $50,000 award as part of General Electric’s Ecomagination Challenge. Next, the FHA followed up with a two-year contract worth $750,000 that would allow the Brusaws to test their theory on a larger surface—a prototype parking lot. In March, Solar Roadways began releasingphotos of the installed prototype. 

Now the company is turning to the public for help. In late April, it started acampaign on crowdsourcing platform Indiegogo, with the intent of raising $1 million by June 20. The funds would be used for production. And the public has responded. With 22 days left, Solar Roadways has already raised $1.64 million, easily surpassing its $1 million goal. 

Al Muthanna Chemical Weapons Complex

https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general-reports-1/iraq_wmd_2004/chap5_annxB.html

Background: Evolution of Iraq’s Chemical Weapons Development Facilities 

Iraq’s pursuit of chemical and biological warfare programs dates back to the early 1960s when members of the armed forces traveled overseas, including to the US and UK, in pursuit of CBW training. From this training, Iraq formed the Chemical Corps. With this foundation and a change in political power from the Ba’thist revolution in 1968, Iraq began a campaign of organized research and development into an infant CBW program. 

Junior Army officers were trained in United States and Russia in chemical warfare during the 1960s. The Iraqi army then formed the Chemical Corps. 

A division of opinion evolved in the chemical corps where the more Senior Officers desired only a defensive CW program while Junior Officers favored both an offensive and defensive program. This rift in leadership opinion continued into the 1970s. 

The Ba’thist revolution forged contacts among Junior Officers of the chemical corps and Senior Officers of the Army enabling Iraq to embark upon an offensive CBW program. 

Iraq’s first attempt to produce a chemical weapon was a series of failures and limited technological advances. 

During the early 1970s the Army developed the concept of “Scientific Centers for Excellence.” The goal of the project was to develop a chemical weapon, however after four years of poorly organized research, the project failed to achieve the development of a chemical weapon. 

The desire to undertake an offensive CW program continued, and a more organized approach to produce a chemical weapon began in 1974 under the military leadership and Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) oversight. In 1975 the Al Hasan institute (the first laboratory devoted to the development of CBW) was formed. Its main laboratory was at Al Rashad in suburban Baghdad. 

The Al Hasan Institute was founded as the nucleus for chemical research dedicated to CW development. 

Al Hasan was funded by the government through the Ministry of Higher Education, not the military. 

The Al Hasan Institute was intimately supported by the IIS. The project was not just a Chemical Corps project. 

Two key military personnel founded the Al Hasan Institute, the first laboratory devoted to the development of CBW. 

Ghassan Ibrahim, a captain in the chemical corps, formed the Al Hasan Institute. 

Faiz ‘Abdallah Al Shahin, an Intelligence Officer, was Ghassan’s assistant. 

The institute established a mentorship and overseas training program to foster better-trained scientists and chemical corps officers. 

Some of the more prominent Iraq chemical weapons experts received their PhDs from the Chemical Warfare Academy in Moscow from 1973 to 1979. 

Dr. ‘Imad Husayn ‘Abdallah Al ‘Ani (Research and Development) 

Dr. Salah-al-Din ‘Abdallah (Weapons Design Expert and Toxicity Research) 

Dr. Hammad Shakir (Weapons Preparation Expert) 

Iraq’s second organized attempt at CBW production ended abruptly in a scandal and the Al Hasan Institute was abolished in 1978. 

The founder of the Al Hasan Institute and a number of staff were imprisoned for fraud and embezzlement. 

The program, though it made substantial advancements in CW research and development, never succeeded in CBW production. The program ultimately failed to meet expectations. 

Project 1/75 evolved from the Al Hasan Institute and began to materialize after 1978. Project 1/75 eventually evolved into Iraq’s third and most successful attempt in developing a viable and productive CBW program. Funding came from a different ministry, leadership was changed, and resources became more remotely located away from Baghdad. 

Project 1/75 was a remnant of the Al Hasan Institute and started as a small facility 40 km SW of Samarra’, Iraq. 

The Ministry of Defense funded the project. 

Lt. Gen. Nizar ‘Abd-al-Salam Al-Attir spearheaded what later became the largest campaign in the pursuit of chemical weapons in Iraq’s history. 

The price of Confucius Institutes

BY EDITORIAL BOARD 

June 2014 

EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES between the United States and China have grown to record numbers. With these programs come scholarly value but also risks.

Confucius Institutes offer an example of this trade-off. These centers, heavily funded and supported by the Chinese government, offer Chinese language and culture classes around the world. But unlike Germany’s Goethe-Institut or the U.K.’s British Council, many are established directly inside U.S. universities. It’s this combination of linkage and Chinese control that carries risk.

Last week, the American Association of University Professors called on almost a hundred U.S. universities to reexamine their ties with Beijing’s signature cultural outpost. “Occasionally university administrations have entered into partnerships that sacrificed the integrity of the university,” the association wrote. “Confucius Institutes function as an arm of the Chinese state and are allowed to ignore academic freedom.”

Chinese officials have said that these institutes are key to expanding the country’s soft power, and constitute “an important part of China’s overseas propaganda setup.” They’ve proliferated quickly, with China aiming to hit“500 large cities across the world by 2020.”

Better soft power than the alternative. But educational exchange should not come at the expense of free speech — especially not with the help of the U.S. academic community.

At North Carolina State University in 2009, the Confucius Institute allegedly objected to the university’s invitation to the Dalai Lama, a Tibetan spiritual leader whom China considers a traitor. The event was canceled. While the official rationale was lack of time and resources, the university provost told Bloomberg, “I don’t want to say we didn’t think about whether there were implications. Of course you do. China is a major trading partner for North Carolina.”

Three years later, institute instructor Sonia Zhao told a human rights tribunal that her employment contract dictated she was “not allowed to join illegal organizations such as Falun Gong,” a spiritual movement that China sees as a threat. She was also “trained in Beijing to dodge sensitive topics in class,” according to the Globe and Mail. Ms. Zhao taught at a Canadian university, but these practices extend to centers at U.S. universities, where China controls many hiring and curriculum choices.

Self-censorship — illustrated by the Nation with a University of Chicago administrator’s acknowledgment that he would not hang a picture of the Dalai Lama in its Confucius Institute — has also been documented.

These concerns have led some universities to reject China’s proposals. Faculty in universities with institutes have signed petitions of protest. Many worry about the secrecy of the undisclosed contracts between China and school administrators. Some elite universities, such as Stanford, negotiated restrictions away, but others have not done so.

China offers hundreds of thousands — in some cases millions — of dollars, in addition to what the London School of Economics’ institute director calls“a ready-made partner.” But academic freedom cannot have a price tag. Universities should publish their agreements to show there is no possibility of Chinese discrimination and suppression. If they can’t or won’t do so, the programs should end.

A Largely Indian Victory in World War II, Mostly Forgotten in India

By GARDINER HARRIS

JUNE 21, 2014
Source Link

REMEMBRANCE AT THE BATTLEFIELDNingthoukhangjam Moirangningthou, still living in a house at the foot of a hill that was the site of some of the fiercest fighting, recalled the battle.CreditGardiner Harris/The New York Times

KOHIMA, India — Soldiers died by the dozens, by the hundreds and then by the thousands in a battle here 70 years ago. Two bloody weeks of fighting came down to just a few yards across an asphalt tennis court.
Night after night, Japanese troops charged across the court’s white lines, only to be killed by almost continuous firing from British and Indian machine guns. The Battle of Kohima and Imphal was the bloodiest of World War II in India, and it cost Japan much of its best army in Burma.

But the battle has been largely forgotten in India as an emblem of the country’s colonial past. The Indian troops who fought and died here were subjects of the British Empire. In this remote, northeastern corner of India, more recent battles with a mix of local insurgencies among tribal groups that have long sought autonomy have made remembrances of former glories a luxury.

Now, as India loosens its security grip on this region and a fragile peace blossoms among the many combatants here, historians are hoping that this year’s anniversary reminds the world of one of the most extraordinary fights of the Second World War. The battle wasvoted last year as the winner of a contest by Britain’s National Army Museum, beating out Waterloo and D-Day as Britain’s greatest battle, though it was overshadowed at the time by the Normandy landings.Photo
A military cemetery in Kohima, India. CreditGardiner Harris/The New York Times

“The Japanese regard the battle of Imphal to be their greatest defeat ever,” said Robert Lyman, author of “Japan’s Last Bid for Victory: The Invasion of India 1944.” “And it gave Indian soldiers a belief in their own martial ability and showed that they could fight as well or better than anyone else.”

The battlefields in what are now the Indian states of Nagaland and Manipur — some just a few miles from the border with Myanmar, which was then Burma — are also well preserved because of the region’s longtime isolation. Trenches, bunkers and airfields remain as they were left 70 years ago — worn by time and monsoons but clearly visible in the jungle.

This mountain city also boasts a graceful, terraced military cemetery on which the lines of the old tennis court are demarcated in white stone.

A closing ceremony for a three-month commemoration is planned for June 28 in Imphal, and representatives from the United States, Australia, Japan, India and other nations have promised to attend.

“The Battle of Imphal and Kohima is not forgotten by the Japanese,” said Yasuhisa Kawamura, deputy chief of mission at the Japanese Embassy in New Delhi, who is planning to attend the ceremony. “Military historians refer to it as one of the fiercest battles in world history.”

Hunting the Hunters

By Kim Wall

Source Link

India’s Pardhis are poor outcasts—and the country’s finest tiger hunters. Some are now helping authorities track down the poachers in their midst. 

A Bengal tiger at the Tadoba Andhari Tiger Reservation in central India. The country is home to more than half the remaining 3,200 wild tigers in the world.

Each Friday, Roads & Kingdoms and Slate publish a new dispatch from around the globe. For more foreign correspondence mixed with food, war, travel, and photography, visit their online magazine or follow @roadskingdoms on Twitter.

BHORAMDEO, India—Rajesh was only 10 years old when he killed his first tiger, and 20 years later, he still remembers it vividly.

He was frightened. The tiger, a paw caught in a foot trap, was furious. The boy’s father said there wasn’t much time. First, Rajesh (a pseudonym) smashed the tiger’s head with a stick, but it remained conscious. Other hunters attacked the animal with thin spears as the boy stabbed through the tiger’s mouth down its throat. Then, piercing its ribs, he aimed for the heart.

That night, they ate as much tiger meat as they could. Cooked in a curry, it was similar to mutton, only softer. 

Rajesh’s tribe, a sub-clan of the Pardhi tribe, hunted as their ancestors had—a dangerous but effective strategy refined and handed down over generations. Shooting drew too much attention, and bullet holes decreased the value of the hide. Poisoning, a cheap and easy method often used by villagers in retaliation for killed cattle, risked ruining the fur. Instead they used homemade spears and traps, forged by nomadic blacksmiths over campfires. The community took great pride in its quiet hunting techniques, for a Bengal tiger is no easy kill. An adult weighs between 240 to 500 pounds and measures 7 to 9 feet head to tail, one of the largest tiger subspecies in the world.

Outside India, the Pardhi community is virtually unknown. But almost all of India’s tigers are poached by its tribesmen: an anachronistic, nomadic people whose primary link to the 21st century is the mobile phones on which they call the middlemen of the international poaching syndicates. Although exotic animal parts have become a multi-billion-dollar global business, the first link of the chain remains desperately poor societal outcasts. Inside India, the Pardhi tribe has long been synonymous with criminality and lawlessness.

*** PAKISTAN’S OFFENSIVE, AMERICA’S WITHDRAWAL

BY STEVE COLL
JUNE 19, 2014
http://www.newyorker.com/online/blogs/comment/2014/06/pakistani-offensive-american-withdrawal.html

For five years or more, the United States has been urging Pakistan to clear North Waziristan, a semi-autonomous tribal agency along the Afghan border, of foreign fighters and Taliban. North Waziristan has been a deep haven for Arab, Central Asian, Punjabi, Taliban, and sectarian militants, and the headquarters of the Haqqani network, an Afghan Taliban faction that has repeatedly bombed and gunned down civilians in Kabul. Insurgents trying to overthrow the Pakistani state have also launched one bloody attack after another from North Waziristan. Most recently, a few weeks ago, a team of Uzbek fighters shocked the country by killing more than two dozen people during a suicide-by-police-style-raid on Karachi’s international airport.

This week, the Pakistani military finally moved. Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif announced the launch of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, named in reference to a sword of the Prophet Muhammad. The Army, in its own announcement, called it a “comprehensive operation against foreign and local terrorists” who “had been disrupting our national life in all its dimensions.” It vowed to “eliminate these terrorists, regardless of their hue and color.”

In the opening days of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, Pakistani F-16s have bombed forested mountains where some of the groups have camps. The Army claimed to have killed about two hundred opposition fighters. The C.I.A. has apparently launched several drone strikes near Miran Shah and in other areas of the agency this week, reviving its secret air war over North Waziristan after a long period of quietude. These strikes were almost certainly commissioned and supported by Pakistan’s military and intelligence services; it would seem unthinkable for the Obama Administration to act unilaterally with drones just when Pakistan was at last doing what it had long urged.

Why now? The Karachi airport attack was a precipitating event, but there have been many such outrages. The deeper answer involves America’s impending withdrawal from Afghanistan, according to the military officers, advisers, and civilian analysts I’ve spoken to here.

I happened to be in Pakistan when Zarb-e-Azb began. The country’s proliferating cable news channels (absent the largest, Geo, which has been suspended temporarily for earlier broadcasting reports that the military found offensive) instantly rolled out colorful BREAKING NEWS and nation-at-war graphics that make Fox News look restrained. Animated tanks, fighter jets, and armed trucks zipped across the bottom of the TV screen at random moments during talk shows. As field reporters delivered standups in split-screen boxes, animated F-16s flew bombing runs, over and over, as if to induce hypnosis. The cartoon planes bombed into smithereens an artist’s rendering of a mud-walled desert compound.

Pakistani Politics and the Afghan Peace Process

Frederic Grare

JUNE 2014 TONY BLAIR FAITH FOUNDATION 

Over the past few years Pakistan has been trying to signal that its foreign policy has changed, yet Pakistan’s strategic objectives in Afghanistan remain largely the same.

While Pakistan is signalling a change in its policy on Afghanistan, its strategic objective of undermining Indian influence remains. This entails strengthening its central control over the Taliban, but also reaching out beyond its traditional allies. 

Situation Report: Pakistan Over the past few years, Pakistan has been trying to signal that its foreign policy has changed and that interference in the political affairs of Afghanistan was a thing of the past. As evidence of this new brand of responsible behavior, Islamabad has reached out to its enemies in the former Northern Alliance (now largely working with the government or in the non-violent opposition), promoted a reconciliation process between the Taliban and the Afghan government, and called for regional discussion of a policy of non-interference in Afghanistan. Pakistan has moreover cooperated in the Afghan elections, allowing Afghan refugees to cross the border to vote and restraining its Afghan proxies from disrupting the poll.

Yet Pakistan's strategic objectives in Afghanistan remain largely unchanged, and there are few reasons to believe that the shift is anything more than a tactical adjustment to meet new regional and international realities. Islamabad's overarching goal is still to promote a relatively friendly government in Afghanistan, while preventing Indian influence from becoming too great. Islamabad is likewise attempting to re-enter the good graces of the United States by assisting in the American withdrawal from Afghanistan, though simultaneously exploiting the situation to weaken the strategic partnership between Washington and New Delhi. Pakistan also wants Afghan refugees to be able to return to their country and so prevent their potential involvement in Pakistani politics. 

But on-the-ground realities in Afghanistan have demanded new policies to achieve these unchanged objectives. Islamabad now acknowledges that the prospect of a Taliban military victory is neither realistic nor desirable in the short term, so it has moved away from using the Taliban as a primary or sole proxy in denying India influence in Afghanistan. 

At the same time, Pakistan has strengthened its control over the Taliban by removing key commanders whenever they showed independence from Islamabad, and promoted a bilateral reconciliation process aimed at forging a power-sharing agreement between the Taliban and the government. This tactic has the additional benefit of helping to grow a perception of the Taliban as a legitimate interlocutor in the international community.