The Palestinian Plan—Overwhelm Israeli Defenses

Jassem Al Salami on Jul 16

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Rocket and drone attacks can swamp anti-missile batteries

On July 7, Palestinian militia group Islamic Jihad launched some 35 small rockets nearly simultaneously at southern Israel—the latest escalation of this summer’s tit-for-tat violence.

The Iron Dome missile battery near Ashkelon could intercept only three of the rockets. Twenty of the projectiles hit populated areas, injuring one person in the city of Sderot.

This was the militants’ master plan—to saturate the Iron Dome with tens or hundreds of cheap munitions. But the Palestinians never assumed the tactic immediately would work. And they knew the Israeli air force would retaliate against the rocketeers.

The Palestinians had back-up plans.

On July 8, the Israeli air force attacked 50 sites in Gaza, largely targeting rocket launchers. The air strikes temporarily suppressed the Palestinians’ short-range ballistic attacks on southern Israel.

And that’s when the militants put their other plans in motion.

An Israeli Apache helicopter fires a Hellfire missile. Israeli Defense Forces photo

For starters, they switched to targets deeper inside Israel—targets they knew were outside the Iron Dome’s defensive umbrella. They aimed R-160 rockets at Haifa, in northern Israel along the coast.

The R-160 is a modified version of the infamous Fadjr-5 missile with an added booster. The R-160 carries a 450-pound warhead, just like the Fadjr-5, but it can travel 170 kilometers, more than double the range of the Fadjr-5.

But the extra range comes at a cost. The R-160 is wildly inaccurate. All the rockets the Palestinians fired at Haifa fell into unpopulated areas or the sea.

The militants’ next move was to deploy suicide teams in Israel. Not suicidebombers—rather attackers who never expected to survive their assaults. The first special operations teams deployed from the sea on July 9.

The Palestinian Plan—Overwhelm Israeli Defenses

Rocket and drone attacks can swamp anti-missile batteries 

On July 7, Palestinian militia group Islamic Jihad launched some 35 small rockets nearly simultaneously at southern Israel—the latest escalation of this summer’s tit-for-tat violence.

The Iron Dome missile battery near Ashkelon could intercept only three of the rockets. Twenty of the projectiles hit populated areas, injuring one person in the city of Sderot.

This was the militants’ master plan—to saturate the Iron Dome with tens or hundreds of cheap munitions. But the Palestinians never assumed the tactic immediately would work. And they knew the Israeli air force would retaliate against the rocketeers.

The Palestinians had back-up plans.

On July 8, the Israeli air force attacked 50 sites in Gaza, largely targeting rocket launchers. The air strikes temporarily suppressed the Palestinians’ short-range ballistic attacks on southern Israel.

And that’s when the militants put their other plans in motion.

An Israeli Apache helicopter fires a Hellfire missile. Israeli Defense Forces photo

For starters, they switched to targets deeper inside Israel—targets they knew were outside the Iron Dome’s defensive umbrella. They aimed R-160 rockets at Haifa, in northern Israel along the coast.

The R-160 is a modified version of the infamous Fadjr-5 missile with an added booster. The R-160 carries a 450-pound warhead, just like the Fadjr-5, but it can travel 170 kilometers, more than double the range of the Fadjr-5.

But the extra range comes at a cost. The R-160 is wildly inaccurate. All the rockets the Palestinians fired at Haifa fell into unpopulated areas or the sea.

The militants’ next move was to deploy suicide teams in Israel. Not suicidebombers—rather attackers who never expected to survive their assaults. The first special operations teams deployed from the sea on July 9.

Israel vs. Hamas, Round Three: What Comes Next?

Daniel R. DePetris

July 16, 2014 

For the third time in less than six years, violence directed towards Israeli civilians from Palestinian militant groups in Gaza has forced the Israel Defense Force to plan and execute a coordinated and large-scale operation in the coastal enclave. The latest operation, initiated in the early morning hours of July 8 and codenamed Operation Protective Edge, is nearly identical to the IDF’s Operation Pillar of Defense in November 2012. However, the intensity of Israel’s current campaign over the first three days—and the countermeasures Hamas has taken—are far more persistent than the eight-day air campaign over Gaza twenty months earlier.

Over the first seventy-two hours of Protective Edge, the Israeli air force has struckapproximately 1,752 sites that the army has labeled “terror targets.” On July 10 alone, the IDF successfully hit 210 targets either affiliated with the Hamas movement or connected to any number of smaller Palestinian militant factions—such as the Islamic Jihad group—in the strip. The length and scope of Israel’s targeting list, including command-and-control nodes, underground tunnels, rocket launching sites, individual militant commanders, and the homes of senior Hamas or Islamic Jihad members is a robust illustration of how extensive the government’s offensive is. 

Despite the sheer animosity that Israel and Hamas have for one another’s existence, both sides appear to understand that a further escalation of the situation along the Israel-Gaza border could result in a far more unpredictable and uncontrollable situation. Having experienced a high number of condemnations from the international community over its January 2009 ground offensive in Gaza, the IDF neither desires to mimic the past military plans, nor does it wish to send Israeli combat soldiers into a densely populated and hostile environment. Hamas, regardless of its public statements and propaganda, is ill prepared for a massive Israeli ground operation in its stronghold, having seen its smuggling tunnels sealed off from the new Egyptian Government of President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. Israel’s vastly superior military capacity assures that Hamas will lose a significant portion of its military prowess and capability in the event of a ground incursion. Each party is most likely searching for a way out of the current conflict, with the reinstatement of a ceasefire terminating the rocket fire and airstrikes the most obvious solution.

In the absence of a game-changing event such as a rocket or airstrike that claims dozens of lives simultaneously, a cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hamas is still the most plausible option at this point in the conflict. Although Hamas firmly rejected Egypt’s ceasefire proposal, calling it a “joke” not worth the paper it was written on, the group will have an incredibly difficult time withstanding an expanded Israeli military campaign for weeks on end.

A cessation of hostilities, depending on the terms being offered, is still in the interest of both Israel and Hamas; both want calm, and have no interest in a full blown war that lasts for weeks or months on end. It’s a pattern that observers of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict have known all too well since 2009: a period of intense rocket fire and airstrikes eventually produces an arrangement that produces a relative degree of deterrence for both sides. Unfortunately, it is also a likelihood that any calm produced by a cessation of hostilities will be capitalized by Palestinian militant groups in Gaza--all of which will try to recuperate from their losses and prepare for the next round of fighting.

Without a long-term ground offensive and re-occupation of Gaza that the IDF is unwilling to unleash, the Israel-Hamas standoff will continue in the same way that it began: cyclically, where quiet along the border is at times interrupted with unpredictable and deadly violence, before quiet is restored again.

MH17: What we know so far

Ryan Evans

July 17, 2014

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Events are fast-moving, but it is important to be clear about what we, in the public domain, know so far about MH17 and the surrounding circumstances. This post will be updated throughout the day (LAST UPDATED 4:26 PM EST). Please alert us to new information as well as any errors. 

MH17, a Malaysia Airlines passenger plane, crashed in eastern Ukraine with 295 souls aboard. It was flying from Amsterdam to Kuala Lumpur (see the Malaysia Airlines tweet announcing lost contact with the aircraft here). 

Preliminary reports indicate that among the dead were 23 Americans, as many as 10 Britons, and 71 Dutch citizens. 

It was flying at 33,000 feet and fell off radar between Donestk, a rebel contested city, and the Russian border. 

Right before reports of the crash were announced, separatist leader Igor Girkin claimed “we just downed a plane, an AN-26…We have issued warnings not to fly in our airspace.” The AN-26 is a turboprop military and civilian transport plane. This claim was made on a social media site and was removed once reports on MH17 came out. Girkin is a Russian citizen from Moscow and the Ukrainian government alleges he is a Russian intelligence asset. 

A pro-Russian, pro-separatist website based in Crimea reported that separatists claimed to have a Buk self-propelled surface-to-air missile system. An an adviser to Ukraine’s Interior Minister claims that Flight MH17 was brought down by a Buk missile system. Watch this video of the Buk missile system in action (with an odd soundtrack). See the specs on the Buk here. 

Today (17 July), an Associated Press reporter claimed to have seen a Buk missile system in Snizhne, a rebel held town in Ukraine’s east.Snizhne is very close to the area where MH17 crashed. 

This morning (17 July), Pentagon Spokesman Colonel Steve Warren said, “We are concerned about the build-up we see along the Russia-Ukraine border. Overall, the increase in Russian presence along the Ukrainian border is concerning.” 

Last night (16 July) White House officials held a conference call with reporters during which officials claimed that Russia continues to supply Ukrainian seapratists with weapons, including heavy weapons. 

When You Mess With Civilian Airliners, You Mess With the World

Robert Beckhusen

17 Jul 2014

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MH17 shootdown takes the war beyond Ukraine 

On July 17, someone shot down Malaysia Airlines Flight MH17 over eastern Ukraine, killing 298 people.

Ukraine blames Russia. Russia blames Ukraine. No one is sure yet exactlywhat happened. But the available facts point to pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine as being responsible.

It’s the latest tragedy in a conflict the international community can no longer contain with sanctions and rhetoric.

Minutes after the crash of MH17, a popular Russian social media page bearing the name of the seperatists’ military commander bragged aboutdowning an aircraft near the village of Torez. The post was later deleted and the site now claims to have received the information from forums and notofficial channels.

“It does seem pretty conclusive that Strelkov did comment about shooting down a plane,” Mark Galeotti, a Russia expert at New York University, told War is Boring via email. “That fits with my working assumption, which is that this was an insurgent missile—provided by the Russians—launched at what they thought was a Ukrainian government aircraft.”

The rebels do have the weapons to take down an airliner like MH17. We know because they told us. On June 29, the press office of the separatists reported they had taken control of a 9K37 Buk anti-air missile system.

The Buk is a medium-range, surface-to-air missile system developed by the Soviet Union in the 1970s. It’s a popular export—both Ukraine and the rebels are using the missiles.

This is the context of an escalating air war in eastern Ukraine. On June 17, Kiev claimed a Russian jet shot down a Ukrainian fighter plane. On Monday, a separatist missile downed a Ukrainian An-26 transport plane. Earlier in the month, separatists downed an An-30. On June 13, the rebels shot down an Il-76 transport.

The rebels are working hard to control the airspace above eastern Ukraine, but these were low-flying planes and the Buk missile can travel to as high as 72,000 feet. MH17 flew at 33,000 feet, well within the Buk’s range.

YouTube videos go up and come down. Some claim to show the crash while others show the Buk missile system moving through areas near Torez.

Kiev just released a transcript of conversations they claim is between the rebels and their Russian military handlers, and between two rebel commanders. The conversation—captured by Ukrainian intelligence—details the downing of MH17 and the rebels’ horror that it’s a civilian plane. 

Escalation

The world has become accustomed to a certain amount of violence in eastern Ukraine—provided it stays in eastern Ukraine.

Five Ways the Soviet Union Could Have Won the Cold War

Tom Nichols

July 16, 2014 

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Or at the very least, could the USSR have survived until today and remained a viable competitor with the United States?

In 1969, a Soviet dissident named Andrei Amalrik wrote an essay called “Will the Soviet Union Survive Until 1984?” It predicted the demise of the Soviet system, most likely in a conflict with China. Amalrik, as it turned out, was wrong about a war with China, but he was only off about the end of the USSR by a few years. No one took Amalrik very seriously at the time; I was assigned his book, like most young graduate students in Soviet affairs, primarily to critique it. Today, people with almost no memory of the period accept the Soviet collapse as just another inevitable historical moment.

But did it have to happen? Could the Soviet Union have won the Cold War? Or at the least, could the Soviet Union have survived until today, and remained a viable competitor to the United States while celebrating the 100th anniversary of the Russian Revolution in 2017, or the centennial of the founding of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics in 2022?

Counterfactual history, the game of “what if,” is an intellectually hazardous exercise. No one can really explain what didn’t actually happen. And in any case, why bother? Maybe the Persians could have beaten the ancient Greeks; maybe Columbus could have taken a wrong turn and been lost at sea; maybe the first atomic bomb could have been a dud and convinced everyone to go back to the drawing board. But the Persians did lose, Columbus did make it across the Atlantic, and the Trinity test did light the sky with nuclear fire. It would take a lifetime to imagine the alternatives, none of which are real.

The reason we even think about these alternate possibilities, however, is to prevent us from making the mistake of believing in inevitability. The inability to see alternatives leads to lazy strategic thinking, which is why so many programs—including the department I once chaired at the Naval War College, Strategy and Policy—use counterfactual history. Otherwise, we risk failures of strategic imagination. I will never forget, for example, the military student I had many years ago who insisted that the American victory in the War of Independence was inevitable. What would it even look like, he sputtered, if North America had stayed British?

There was a long silence in the room until one of his classmates quietly suggested the alternative with two words: “Like Canada?”

Especially for many of my younger students, the victory of the American-led coalition of democracies now seems like a natural end to a struggle that really wasn’t all that dangerous, and whose outcome was foreordained. But to the people who fought the Cold War, there were many days where it all seemed to be a lot more tenuous. There were many moments where this planetary conflict—as I called it in a 2003 book, the fight to “win the world”—with the Soviet Union seemed a near-run thing. With that in mind, let’s consider five historical periods where different choices could have led, if not to global victory, at least to survival and a fighting chance for the since-departed Land of the Soviets.

U.S. Has Given Nigerians Intelligence on Missing Girls, But Nigerian Army Apparently Has Not Used It Because of Fear of Boko Haram

strategypage.com

July 16, 2014

Intelligence: Nigeria Gets A Boost

Since May 2014 the U.S. has been providing training and intelligence support for Nigeria as part of an effort to find hundreds of women and girls kidnapped by Islamic terrorist group Boko Haram since April. The girls are believed to be held in some hilly forests in northeast Nigeria. By June American UAVs and manned aircraft completed their initial survey of the three northern states where Boko Haram is most active and shared that data with Nigeria and other nations providing aerial reconnaissance help. The problem now is for Nigerian ground forces to make use of the data collected. This the Nigerians are reluctant to do because the Boko Haram fighters use booby traps, ambushes and ruthless resistance to defend their rural bases. It’s a bloody business going after Boko Haram where they live. Not a lot of Nigerian army or police commanders are eager to take this on. There is also fear of failure, especially when it comes to rescuing all the women being held hostage and getting them out alive. It also appears that the hostages are held in several locations, which further complicates the rescue effort.

The U.S. used manned and unmanned (UAV) aircraft and spy satellites for the task. Most of the search aircraft used day and night video cameras as well as heat sensors. There was also at least one electronic surveillance aircraft (an MC-12), which may have proved decisive in finding the girls. The MC-12 and the aerial reconnaissance builds a baseline of data which special American analysis software then compares to all subsequent photo or electronic data collected over the same area and quickly spots and differences, which can then be examined in greater detail. This form of pattern analysis also uses data mining and predictive analysis to tease more useful information out of the masses of information you have and continue to collect. The initial survey was accomplished in a few weeks with less than ten aircraft and UAVs along with a few hundred American personnel. Many more analysts worked on the project from distant bases, some in the United States.

The MC-12 is a Beechcraft King Air twin engine commercial aircraft outfitted for electronic warfare and reconnaissance against irregular forces. So far the MC-12 has been used against numerous Islamic terrorist organizations including the Taliban, various Palestinian and Iraqi terrorist groups, several al Qaeda factions as well as Boko Haram, al Shabaab and several different Malian groups in Africa. The MC-12 is crammed with vidcams, electronic sensors, jammers, and radios. This version of the MC-12 was called Ceasar (Communications Electronic Attack with Surveillance And Reconnaissance) and could spend hours circling an area, keeping troops on the ground aware of enemy walkie-talkie and cell phone use, including location of these devices and translations of what is being discussed. The enemy is often vaguely aware of what the MC-12 can do but have no better way to communicate. Thus the few Ceasar equipped aircraft sent to Afghanistan proved very useful for the American and British troops that used them.

Military use of the King Air arose in the United States (where Beechcraft is located) began in the early 1970s when the U.S. Army adopted the King Air as the RC-12 and then used it for a wide variety of intelligence missions ever since. In 2008 the first American MC-12 squadron was deployed to Iraq, where the twin engine aircraft was found to be durable and reliable. In its first six months there those dozen aircraft flew over a thousand sorties. That’s about four sorties per week per aircraft. Most of the 43 MC-12s ordered have been sent to Afghanistan, where they have been worked hard and held up well to the heavy use. In 2010 the U.S. Air Force sent its first MC-12 to Afghanistan and it proved successful. This despite the fact that it could only stay in action for seven hours (plus one to get to the target area) per sortie, which was half as long as a UAVs. But more UAV capabilities (vidcams overhead for hours at a time) were needed in Afghanistan, and it didn’t matter if the pilots are in the air or on the ground.

The King Airs were faster than UAVs enabling them to get where they were needed more quickly. More importantly the King Air carried more sensors than a UAV, which enabled it to be outfitted as a Ceasar aircraft. Moreover, having the equipment operators on board, along with a pilot and co-pilot available to just use their eyes on the target area, did make a difference over relying on operators elsewhere in Afghanistan, or somewhere else on the planet. That personal touch still makes a difference

Less Than Zero– Hyping the Cyber War

Bea Edwards

July 15, 2014

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The following piece first appeared in the Huffington Post. 

This week's issue of Time magazine features an arresting cover: "World War Zero" screams the headline in huge red block letters. An ominous silhouette of a man in a hoody looking into a background of electronic ones and zeroes darkens the center of the frame. "The global battle to steal your secrets is turning hackers into arms dealers," the sub-heading warns.

Before we all strap on our body armor to go fight World War Zero and hacker arms dealers, though, we should consider the deft turn of phrase used by Time. The key word in the war declaration turns out to be 'your,' as in 'your secrets.' The magazine cover suggests that the secrets in question are personal data from all of us, which hacker arms dealers are conniving to steal and then sell to evil aliens. But if those are the secrets we're talking about, then here in the Homeland, we're not sure any longer who they actually belong to. If Facebook is to be believed, then Facebook owns our personal information. We 'shared' it with the corporation and we therefore forfeited our rights to it. Similarly, if you've got a Verizon iPhone, you had 30 days after you bought it to opt out of a data sharing program that gives location, age and gender data to advertisers, along with information about the sports teams you like, the restaurants you frequent, and whatever else you happen to record on your phone. If you missed that 30-day window, then your data belong to Verizon. And if that isn't enough, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) Court, taking its cue from a 35-year-old Supreme Court ruling, determined that Fourth Amendment protections from unreasonable search and seizure don't apply to your phone call logs (metadata) because when you subscribe to a phone service, you surrender your data to the telecom. So Verizon, AT&T, Sprint and Cricket own your secrets. Following this line of argument, you can't claim that the government has no right to your information because you already gave it away to a private corporation. In other words, it's no longer yours.

So it seems, our secrets have already been taken. First by Facebook and Verizon, and then by the National Security Agency (NSA) and the FISA court. Nonetheless, we're apparently plunging into World War Zero to protect our pre-seized secrets from someone else, with whom, according to Time, we're already locked in battle:

This conflict only occasionally becomes visible to the naked eye - in May, for example, when the U.S. indicted five members of the Chinese army for stealing data from American companies, including Westinghouse and Alcoa.

Oh wait. This has taken a surprising turn: the Time story isn't really about our secrets. It's about corporate secrets and intellectual property, which makes a little more sense. The author of the piece, Lev Grossman, then quotes the duplicitous and thoroughly self-serving Keith Alexander, former head of the NSA and U.S. Cyber Command, as proof that we have to go defend these secrets. According to Grossman, Alexander called "China's ongoing electronic theft of American intellectual property, 'the greatest transfer of wealth in history.'" Note the qualifier on intellectual property: 'American.' Note also, the hysteria, unsubstantiated by any fact at all.

Alexander, of course, has his own reasons for hyping illicit cyber transfers. He now runs his own cyber-security firm, which peddles to private industry the techniques he learned while collecting a paycheck from the public. According to Bloomberg, he charges clients hundreds of thousands of dollars a month for access to his expertise.

The Pentagon’s Cyberwarfare Dictionary Reveals Hack Lingo, Tactics

Military figuring out how to talk about—and conduct—network attacks 

Every profession has its own language. And when there’s a language, there must be a dictionary.

So with the U.S. military aggressively embracing cyberwarfare—whatever that means—why shouldn’t the Pentagon also create its own cyberwarfare dictionary? The Website Public Intelligence, which likes to unveil hidden documents, has posted U.S. Strategic Command’s Cyber Warfare Lexicon.

Published in 2009, the Lexicon seems to reflect a U.S. military struggling to define precisely how cyberweapons differ from traditional weapons.

Indeed, the Lexicon borrows much of the language of kinetic—that is, physical—weapons, such as “direct” and “indirect effects” when cyberweapons hit their target … and “duds” and “misfires” when they don’t.

To illustrate the difference between conventional and virtual arms, theLexicon compares a Mark 84 unguided bomb to a cyberweapon. The bomb will detonate with a predictable explosive force regardless of whether it explodes in the jungle or desert.

But when a cyberweapon deploys in an unsuitable environment—the wrong network, data link or computer operating system—then “the weapon is unlikely to ‘detonate,’ or if it does, it will not generate the desired effect,” the Lexicon notes. “Even worse, there may be consequences, such as the weapon revealing itself to the adversary.”

Interestingly, the Cyber Warfare Lexicon includes some examples of targeting orders for cyberweapons.

• Degrade throughput on all channels of a microwave communications tower at specified GPS address by 75 percent beginning at 0630 for three hours.

• Disrupt Internet service at a named cybercafe from 2130 until 2145 for the next three days.

• Destroy the 80-gigabyte hard drive at IP address 207.10.132.15 tonight after 2300, but before 0430.

The Elements of US Maritime Strategy

By James R. Holmes

July 17, 2014

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An all-encompassing U.S. maritime strategy must include all the armed forces—not just the navy, coast guard and marines. 

So does America have a maritime strategy? It’s only fair to ask. A few years ago our Chinese friends were fretting over whether they had one, or needed one, and how to formulate one. Though the Naval Diplomat is a shy and retiring sort, loath to voice opinions, I held forth on the subject over at the Jamestown Foundation’s China Brief. My verdict: yes, China does have a maritime strategy. An unwritten one, evidently, but an impressive one.

Impressive because it alloys all elements of sea power into a single, sharp political weapon. The strategy’s executors include not just the navy but the coast guard but land-based forces too. Its executors are seamen, airmen, and soldiers … and diplomats, international lawyers, fishermen, journalists, you name it. China’s broad-based understanding of maritime strategy begets concentration of energy and effort at sea. And that begets a tough competitor.

Does the United States have anything similarly all-encompassing? No. That’s why this is a historical excursion worth taking. Sea-service leaders have been mulling over “refreshing” the U.S. Maritime Strategy for the past couple of years. Its appearance is — we think — nigh. As they finish revising the document, drafters should take a page from Beijing’s book.

Inscribed on that page are some big insights. For one, policy is king. No strategy should neglect diplomacy. That’s what imparts purpose to enterprises on the briny main. Armed forces exist to empower political leaders in negotiations, whether they’re hobnobbing with pinstriped ‘furriners in peacetime or prosecuting power politics while the bombs burst in air. Too tight a focus on tactics, operations, and widgets obscures these larger strategic and political ends. The refreshed U.S. Maritime Strategy should take a similarly sweeping view.

For another, leaving sister armed services out of a maritime strategy verges on neglect. Why leave air and land power on the shelf if they can advance national purposes at sea? Doing so flouts the Clausewitzian principle of making yourself as strong as possible at the decisive place and time. Furthermore, there are side benefits to a comprehensive outlook. Restricting America’s strategy to the traditional sea services, for instance, primes U.S. commanders to mirror-image. That means projecting our way of thinking onto antagonists — and assuming they think about sea power in the same narrow-gauge way we do.

The Five Most Deadly Chemical Weapons of War

Dina Esfandiary

July 17, 2014

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"Chemical weapons require a relatively low investment, can cause severe psychological and physical effects and are agents of disruption."

The three year crisis in Syria has led to a resurgence of interest in chemical weapons. Often referred to as the “poor man’s bomb,” chemical weapons require a relatively low investment, can cause severe psychological and physical effects and are agents of disruption.

Modern chemical weapons were introduced during World War I in an effort to reduce the deadlock of trench warfare. But they are subject to topography and weather patterns. As munitions have become more precise, their tactical advantage is being eroded. Today, they horrify more than they contribute to victories on the ground. Their indiscriminate nature and unpredictability, coupled with the sometimes-gruesome effects they have make them effective weapons of fear.

Below are five of the worst chemical weapons:

Most toxic: VX

VX belongs to organophosphorus compounds and is classified as a nerve agent because it affects the transmission of nerve impulses in the nervous system. It is odorless and tasteless in its pure form, and appears as a brownish oily liquid.

Developed in the UK in the early 1950s, VX is particularly potent because it’s a persistent agent: Once it’s released into the atmosphere it’s slow to evaporate. Under regular weather conditions, VX can persist for days on surfaces, while it can last for months in very cold conditions. “VX vapor is heavier than air,” which means that when released, “it will sink to low-lying areas and create a greater exposure hazard there.” Such characteristics make VX potentially useful as an area-denial weapon.

VX is also a fast-acting agent. Symptoms can appear only seconds after exposure. They include salivation, constriction of the pupils and tightness in the chest. As with other nerve agents, VX works by affecting the enzyme (acetylcholinesterase) that acts as the body’s ‘off switch’ for glands and muscles. With the enzyme blocked, molecules constantly stimulate the muscles. As the muscles spasm, they tire. Death is caused by asphyxiation or heart failure. While it is possible to recover from exposure, tiny amounts of the agent can be lethal.

Most recently used: Sarin

In September 2013, the UN confirmed that a chemical weapons attack involving specially designed rockets that spread sarin over rebel-held suburbs of the Syrian capital took place the month before. UN Secretary General, Ban Ki-Moonstated that this was the “most significant confirmed use of chemical weapons against civilians since Saddam Hussein used them in Halabja in 1988.”

Sarin (also known as GB) is a volatile but toxic nerve agent. A single drop the size of the head of a pin is enough to kill an adult human rapidly. It is a colorless and odorless liquid at room temperature, but evaporates rapidly when heated. After release, sarin will spread into the environment rapidly and present an immediate but short-lived threat. Similar to VX, “symptoms include headaches, salivation and secretion of tears, followed by gradual paralysis of the muscles” and possible death.

Is the Navy Writing Strategy?

B.J. Armstrong

July 17, 2014 

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The U.S. Navy has been working on a new strategy document. CDR Bryan McGrath has discussed it and the 2007 Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower here at War on the Rocks. In the 21st century, everyone and everything appears to have something they call a strategy, from Silicon Valley start-ups to your home-owners association. But while they call their ideas, plans, and statements “strategies,” they usually don’t deserve the label.

A few weeks ago, the Naval War College held its annual strategy conference, the Current Strategy Forum. This year’s event focused on the Navy’s forthcoming strategy and looked to ask the kinds of questions that would help Navy strategists do their work. Over the past several decades, there have been a number of official Navy documents that have been considered strategies, from the 1990s when papers like “From the Sea” and “Forward … From the Sea” were issued, to the current one, which the Navy staff is endeavoring to update. Some bore the strategy label, others did not.

Many navalists chart the Navy’s strategic course through these documents back to the 1980s. Military analysts of all stripes likely remember the call for a “600 Ship Navy” during the Reagan administration. The fleet size wasn’t just a talking point. It came alongside a document developed by the Navy staff under the leadership of then Chief of Naval Operations James Watkins and Secretary of the Navy John Lehman. AirLand Battle and the NATO plans for the Fulda Gap cast maritime forces in the role of supply chain, necessary for hauling material across the pond, as in World War I and World War II, but not really central to the fight. The Navy and Marine Corps saw things differently. The 1986 “Maritime Strategy” proposed an approach to war with the Soviet Union that included major naval operations around the Eurasian land mass. These would serve to help defend vital American allies while also siphoning Russian combat power away from the plains of Eastern Europe, stretching the Soviets into a multi-front war.

At the Naval War College, retired Captain Robby Harris asked Dr. Geoffrey Till an important question: “Some would argue that the high water point of maritime strategy, naval strategy, was John Lehman and Jim Watkins’ Maritime Strategy of the 1980s. Do you agree, why or why not?” Till’s answer was interesting (and worth watching), but I don’t think it got at the heart of the question. Some members of the audience thought the question seemed to be saying, “Look, we’ve done this pretty well before, we just need to do the same thing.” Then again, as Harris said, it might not even be a valid comparison.

That comparison is built upon a very significant problem. We are not engaged in a Cold War with anyone. We are not moments away from the outbreak of a global shooting war in quite the way we were when facing the Soviets. The Maritime Strategy of 1986 was designed to face that Soviet threat (as Till’s answer illuminated). It had very clear “ends” in the axiomatic approach to strategy described as “ends-ways-means.”

This Laser-Guided Bullet Is a Sniper’s Bloody Dream

Michael Peck

Jul 17

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But who knows how well it will work in combat

The Pentagon’s fringe-science Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has just released a video of its Extreme Accuracy Tasked Ordnance, or EXACTO, in action.

In plain English, that’s a laser-guided bullet.

The video depicts a target … and another aim point a couple feet to the right. The EXACTO bullet arcs toward the second aim point.

Just before it hits, it curves left to strike the first target.

EXACTO is the solution to a problem. American snipers in Iraq and Afghanistan struggled to hit moving targets in high wind and dust. The idea is that a guided bullet will help sharpshooters to hit their marks faster and more accurately, whatever the conditions.

In September 2010, DARPA awarded California-based Teledyne Technologies a $25-million contract to develop the technology.

The DARPA announcement of the test provided few details. It described EXACTO as a “maneuverable bullet and a real-time guidance system to track and deliver the projectile to the target, allowing the bullet to change path during flight to compensate for any unexpected factors that may drive it off course.”

We can glean a few more details of EXACTO from the original DARPAsolicitation from 2008. EXACTO consists of a .50-caliber sniper rifle, a guidance system to send targeting information to the projectile and a bullet that can change its trajectory in mid-flight.

Exact specifications are classified—range, maximum crosswinds and how slow a target must be moving. However, DARPA did reveal that it’s looking for a bullet that has the same energy and momentum as current M33 .50-caliber rounds at all ranges greater than 300 meters.

DARPA would also prefer the EXACTO system weigh no more than 46 pounds, or the same as the current M107 sniper rifle with a scope and tripod. EXACTO’s power supply should last for a 14-hour mission, and should be compatible with existing sniper rifles such as the M82A1 and M107.

The agency wants “secure and tamper-proof design to prevent misuse and exploitation of any portion of the system if obtained by an adversary.”

*** THE FUTURE OF WARFARE: SMALL, MANY, SMART VS. FEW & EXQUISITE?

T.X. Hammes

July 16, 2014

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In the 1970s, faced with the USSR’s overwhelming superiority in numbers, the Department of Defense decided to compensate by focusing on high technology platforms. This led to the highly successful F-15, F-16, F-18, Abrams tanks, and Bradley fighting vehicles. Since then, the United States has continued to pursue cutting edge technology that has resulted in the highly capable F-22 and, when the testing and software development is complete, perhaps a highly capable F-35. Unfortunately, cost has accelerated faster than capabilities. And thus numbers have declined precipitously. The U.S. Air Force initially planned to buy 750 F-22s, but the high cost led Secretary of Defense Robert Gates to cap the program at 187. Nor has the Air Force been alone in pursuing top end systems. The Navy attempted an entirely new concept with “Streetfighter.” Meant to be a low-cost, highly capable ship to replace the Navy’s frigates and minesweepers for operations in brown water, it evolved into the Littoral Combat Ship. High cost and poor performance led the Navy to cut their planned purchase from 55 to 32 with potentially more cuts in the future. Similarly, the Zumwalt class destroyer program was initially planned for 32 ships, but rising costs mean only three will be built. The result has been a pattern of fielding exquisite platforms in diminishing numbers at great cost.

While it was the right decision to pursue high end systems in the 1970s, dramatic improvements in the fields of robotics, artificial intelligence, additive manufacturing, biology, and nano-materials are changing the cost/effectiveness calculation in favor of the “many and simple” against the “few and complex.” The convergence of these technologies and the steady decrease in costs even as capabilities increase is rapidly expanding the destructive power, range, and precision of weapons that soon will be both widely available and relatively cheap. As Frank Hoffmanhas noted, we are putting ourselves on the wrong side of a self-imposed cost curve.

To illustrate how small, many, and smart are emerging as major shifts in warfare, this article will start by examining why it is now possible to create small, smart, and cheap platforms that have sufficient range and combat capability to fulfill the very challenging role of power projection. It will then examine the implications for U.S. defense.

Small

The last decade has made the global public familiar with expensive high end drones. Yet, perhaps the most interesting developments have taken place at the low cost end of the spectrum. In 1998, an industry/university consortium flew a composite drone from Newfoundland to Scotland on two gallons of fuel.By 2003, a hobbyist launched a GPS-guided model airplane/drone that flew autonomously from Newfoundland to precisely the right landing point in Ireland. Built of balsa and plywood with a tiny gasoline engine that burned less than one gallon of fuel in the 26 hour flight, it was cheap enough that the hobbyist built 23 to ensure he could be the first hobbyist to fly across the Atlantic. He made it with the third launch. In the intervening 12 years, governments, hobbyists, and businesses have steadily increased the range and capability of these platforms. Hobbyists and businesses have made use of the rapid technological convergence to decrease the cost of long-range, autonomous systems at least an order of magnitude. Today they are routinely flying smart systems with intercontinental range — they lack only a payload to be a precision weapons system. Their composite construction and very low energy usage mean they will be very difficult to detect.

An Army Wife Charts Her Struggles In 'No Man's War'

by Angela Ricketts

July 15, 2014 

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Irreverent Confessions of an Infantry Wife

People often expect military wives to be strong and stoic. But in her new memoir,No Man's War: Irreverent Confessions of an Infantry Wife, Angela Ricketts writes about the difficulties she faced during her husband's deployments — including the stresses it put on their marriage and on raising their three children.

She also writes about the toll of always bracing herself for the next goodbye.

"After the first really wretched, wretched deployment, each one after that you become a little more removed — a little more numb to the feelings," Ricketts tellsFresh Air's Terry Gross. "That kind of blackens your soul. We joke about that. Army wives say, 'Channel the black soul, honey.' "

Ricketts' husband was deployed eight times — four of them to Iraq or Afghanistan. He was a lieutenant during his first deployment to Somalia in 1992. Then he became a battalion commander. Now, he's a colonel in homeland defense, and they live in Colorado Springs, Colo.

Ricketts, who has a master's degree in social psychology and human relations, grew up in an Army family.

"We are a culture that does lend itself to perpetuating Army brats who either become Army spouses or soldiers themselves," she says. "So as much as ... I wanted to be rebellious and I wanted to do something different, as I got into college ... and saw what life outside the little Army bubble was like, the more I realized that I really enjoyed Army life and wanted to be an Army wife."

Ricketts' book explores the culture at home on the military bases, the responsibilities of being an officer's wife, and the relationships she formed with other infantry wives.

Interview Highlights

On the six years of their 22-year marriage her husband was deployed

He went to Somalia right after we got married, and that's actually where he got his combat patch. And I measured every deployment after that against Somalia, because that was really intense and really scary.

Angela Ricketts, whose husband deployed eight times over 22 years, says she had to get over resentment around parenting their three kids alone while he was gone.

Courtesy of Counterpoint Press

And we didn't have the technology that we do now with emails and immediate news. I had Christiane Amanpour, who I just hung onto her every word on CNN back then — that was all I knew. And [I had] the few letters that I got from [my husband]. So, to me, that was truly a deployment.

GETTING UNMANNED NAVAL AVIATION RIGHT

Shawn Brimley and Bryan McGrath

July 16, 2014 

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The issue of when and how the U.S. Armed Forces fully integrate unmanned and increasingly autonomous surveillance and strike platforms into their inventory is one of the most important issues facing the Department of Defense. The Navy’s unmanned carrier-launched airborne surveillance and strike (UCLASS) program offers a test case to judge how serious the services are about ensuring carrier-based long-range strike missions in a contested environment. We are concerned that the Navy’s path to UCLASS aims too low, missing an opportunity to secure the future relevance of the carrier force, America’s primary forward-deployed, power-projection capability.

There are essentially two competing options for the unmanned system: a semi-stealthy aircraft with sufficient endurance to provide intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) and light strike in largely permissive environments; or a more capable aircraft with air-to-air refueling capability designed to operate in contested airspace for surveillance and strike missions.

Open source reporting indicates that the request for proposals is biased toward the first option: an unmanned ISR aircraft capability. This is a questionable decision given the ability of other Navy platforms to perform this mission, including the P-8 Poseidon, the MQ-4C Triton, the MQ-8C Fire Scout, and the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye. This flies in the face of authoritative guidance, including the 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance, which directed the DoD to “invest as required to ensure its ability to operate in anti-access and area denial (A2/AD) environments.” Secretary of the Navy Ray Mabus also weighed in, writing at War on the Rocks in January of 2014 that “the end state (for UCLASS) is an autonomous aircraft capable of precision strike in a contested environment … It will be a warfighting machine.”

Why does the United States need such a platform? The answer to that question lies in the developing threat environment. The U.S. military enjoys a critical competitive advantage: the ability to project power thousands of miles from American shores. For much of the post-Cold War era, this capability has gone relatively unchallenged. Those days are ending as many nations have realized that the best way to counter the United States is to deny it the time and space to marshal forces and project power. China has effectively woven this approach into its military strategies, fielding a number of capabilities designed to keep U.S. naval and aerospace forces from projecting power by denying them operational sanctuary. All elements of China’s A2/AD network are cause for concern, but it is its long-range anti-ship ballistic missiles that most complicate naval airborne power projection.

UCLASS and The Future of Naval Power Projection

J. Randy Forbes

July 15, 2014

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"Unfortunately, the current direction this program is taking will leave our Naval forces with a platform that I fear will not address the emerging anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) challenges to U.S. power projection..."

While the carrier provides the Nation with a sovereign, mobile airfield that can be positioned at the time and place of the Commander-in-Chief’s choosing, the true combat power of this naval asset resides in the composition of its Air Wing. A carrier like the USS Eisenhower can have a service life that stretches from the Cuban Missile Crisis to the War on Terror, but it’s enduring utility is enabled not just by its hull-life, but by the continued modernization of aviation assets found on its flight deck. Given the scope of China’s counter-intervention modernization effort and Iran’s own anti-access/area-denial investments, I believe the future air wing must comprise a mix of manned and unmanned aircraft that provide extended-range operations, persistence, stealth, payload, and electronic warfare. Central to this mix is the Navy’s unmanned carrier-launched airborne surveillance and strike (UCLASS) system.

The fundamental question we face going forward is not about the utility of unmanned aviation to the future Air Wing, but the type of unmanned platform that the UCLASS program will deliver and the specific capabilities this vital asset will provide the Combatant Commander. Given the likely operational environment of the 2020s and beyond - including in both the Western Pacific Ocean and Persian Gulf - I believe strongly that the Nation needs to procure a Unmanned Combat Air Vehicles (UCAV) platform that can operate as a long-range surveillance and strike asset in the contested and denied A2/AD environments of the future. To achieve this, such a system should have broadband, all-aspect stealth, be capable of automated aerial refueling, and have integrated surveillance and strike functionality. Unfortunately, the current direction this program is taking will leave our Naval forces with a platform that I fear will not address the emerging anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) challenges to U.S. power projection that originally motivated creation of the Navy Unmanned Combat Air System (N-UCAS) program during the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), and which were reaffirmed in both the 2010 QDR and 2012 Defense Strategic Guidance.

Getting this program correct today and not returning later to address the critical operational challenges facing the carrier in the coming decade is one of the most fundamental decisions the United States can do to secure its enduring advantage in power-projection. Given this important oversight question, on Wednesday afternoon the Seapower and Projection Forces subcommittee, which I Chair, will conduct a hearing with both Navy and independent witnesses to explore this topic in-depth.

Al-Qaeda plans final jihad for India: Intel report points to terror recruitment drive targeting nation's Muslims

By Abhishek Bhalla

Published: 16 July 2014 |

Al-Qaeda is at the gates, and there are enough jihadis within already.

Intelligence agencies say the terror network is making inroads into India, sowing the seeds of a "final war" across the country. Information gathered on al-Qaeda's India plans points to a mobilisation of its resources for jihad.

The ideological goal of the group, as detailed in the report, is chilling: Ghazwa-e-Hind, or the final battle in India.


Tribal militias from Pakistan (in photo) are prime candidates for the Ghazwa-e-Hind

Ghazwa-e-Hind refers to an indoctrinated view of a final apocalyptic war in which India will be conquered by a jihadi army. All soldiers of this army are guaranteed a place in heaven.
This term is freely used in jihadi circles and on the web, but is considered bizarre by others.
Sources say the security establishment has been on the trail of launch-pads being set up within the country, and is also in touch with its counterparts in West Asia in order to crack the growing network.

An intelligence report on India being used a hunting ground for global jihad reveals al-Qaeda's diabolic roadmap.
To begin with, the terror group that was created and led by Arab fighters now has recruits from Kashmir-centric groups.



"Not only Kashmiri groups but Taliban and al-Qaeda affiliates have stakes in the larger scheme of Ghazwa-e-Hind where India is regarded as next battleground in the 'End of Times' battle. This ideology is likely to be used to drive Taliban and al-Qaeda affiliates into Kashmir," says an intelligence report.
The al-Qaeda nexus with Kashmir-centric groups indicates it has a readymade jihadi framework in India.
There is other proof too of al-Qaeda using its nexus with Indian groups to spread its ideology.
An online English publication of al-Qaeda called Azan which is not available to the general public but is circulated through changing e-mails and encryption tools is being downloaded by Kashmiri groups.
Sources say this only underlines the trend of terror groups within India getting attracted to the al-Qaeda and global jihad ideology.

Agencies fear that the Azan tactic of spreading the terror group's ideology could spawn anonymous and isolated modules that will be difficult to detect but potent enough to carry out big attacks.
Intelligence reports also state that groups like Tehreek-e-Taliban have declared they will open 'offices' in Kashmir.
It has been revealed that a Taliban flag was hoisted at a point overlooking Srinagar last year, and the walls of Hari Parbat fort were painted with slogans like 'Welcome Taliban.'

Sources say there is an urgent need for the home ministry and intelligence agencies to understand the threat.
"Indicators need to be monitored to prevent the situation from worsening," said one official.
Al-Qaeda's propaganda arm, Al Sahab, released a video recently, titled 'Why is there no storm in your ocean?' The report states that the video and transcripts were posted on several jihadi forums.

The videos have speeches asking youths from Delhi, Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Gujarat and South India to join the global jihad. Incidentally, these are the areas where young men were recruited by the Indian Mujahideen (IM), India's homegrown terror group that has become synonymous with bomb blasts in public places.

With the IM facing a major setback because of a series of arrests, including that of its top leader Yasin Bhatkal, sources say Indians fighting in Iraq for terror group Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) are part of larger scheme.
Many more recruits are getting attracted to the global jihad that can later be used to wage war against India.

There are also distinct inputs on al-Qaeda running a separate terror module in India as the homegrown terror outfit IM is making efforts to go global and establish strong links with groups like al-Qaeda, Taliban and Hizbut Tahrir.
There is also evidence of al-Qaeda keeping a close watch on activities in India. The charge-sheet filed by the National Investigation Agency (NIA) against Bhatkal says that organisations al-Qaeda and the Taliban are helping IM.

It also mentioned that the investigation revealed that some IM members are fighting on the Afghanistan-Pakistan Border.
NIA has said in the charge-sheet that Riyaz Bhatkal, a top IM commander based in Pakistan, travelled to tribal belts on the Af-Pak border to establish contact with al-Qaeda.

"After the meeting, which was very fruitful, Al Qaeda gave specific tasks to the IM for execution and agreed to train their cadres in terrorist activities," the charge-sheet says.

Pakistan Taliban have a keen interest in J&K

By Mail Today Bureau in New Delhi

The withdrawal of US forces from Afghanistan has already fuelled concerns in the Indian security establishment about its implications on Jammu and Kashmir.
The volatile Afghanistan-Pakistan border is expected to explode into further chaos with jihadists expanding their reach to conflict spots such as J&K.

The intelligence agencies have assessed that around 800 militants, mostly foreigners, are ready to cross over the Line of Control (LoC) to spread terror in J&K.


The Army says infiltration attempts have become bolder

With the coming Assembly election in the state, the militant activity is likely to increase. The LoC itself had remained volatile during much of last year, when frequent ceasefire violations were reported.
Even this year, the situation has not improved, though the two countries have initiated steps to normalise the ties.
Sources said the Pakistan Taliban have a keen interest in J&K.
Further, the Pakistan army has not subsided its efforts to push through militants across the LoC.
All the ceasefire violations are linked to the infiltration bids, said officials.
More than two dozen militant camps are still said to be active in Pakistan- occupied Kashmir.

The army has noticed that infiltration attempts have become bolder and the terrorists showed high level of training and carry sophisticated communication equipment to stay in touch with their handlers.
The recent encounters with militants have indicated that their combat techniques have improved drastically.
Most of the camps are located around Muzaffarabad in Kashmir. Another cluster is located in Kotli facing Poonch and Rajouri.

Read more: http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-2694949/Al-Qaeda-plans-final-jihad-India-Intel-report-points-terror-recruitment-drive-targeting-nations-