Putin Threatens Nuclear War Over Ukraine

Gordon G. Chang

08.31.14 

Raising the spectre of nuclear war over Ukraine, Russia’s Vladimir Putin is playing a new, and dangerous, game. 

On Friday, as Russian Federation tanks and troops poured across the border into eastern Ukraine, Vladimir Putin talked about his country’s most destructive weaponry. “I want to remind you that Russia is one of the most powerful nuclear nations,” he said. “This is a reality, not just words.” Russia, he told listeners, is “strengthening our nuclear deterrence forces.” 

That same day, Putin used a term for eastern Ukraine meaning “New Russia.” So when he refers to repelling “any aggression against Russia” and speaks of “nuclear deterrence,” as he did on Friday, the Russian president is really warning us he will use nukes to protect his grab of Ukrainian territory. 

For more than a generation, nuclear weapons were considered defensive only. In a few short sentences on Friday, however, Putin made these devices offensive in nature, just another tool to be employed by an aggressor. And to highlight his threat, on Aug. 14 at Yalta, the Crimean city he had seized this year, Putin mentioned “surprising the West with our new developments in offensive nuclear weapons about which we do not talk yet.” 

Also in Yalta, where the Duma was meeting, the Russian leader spoke about renouncing the 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty between the U.S. and Russia. The treaty outlaws ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 300 and 3,400 miles and is a foundation of the post-Cold War peace. 

“I want to remind you that Russia is one of the most powerful nuclear nations. This is a reality, not just words. 

It is one thing to talk about withdrawing from the pact—Putin has been doing that since 2007—it is another to violate it, which Putin has apparently been doing since 2008, when Russia began testing cruise missiles again. And when the State Department’s Rose Gottemoeller raised the concern in May of last year, Russian officials tried to shut down the dialogue. According to The New York Times, they “said that they had looked into the matter and consider the issue to be closed.” 

“Administration officials said the upheaval in Ukraine pushed the issue to the back burner,” the paper reported of the INF violation. Putin, with his comments Friday, just moved it to the front of the stove. 

And not just in the European kitchen. If Putin manages to intimidate the West with his not-so-veiled promises to incinerate Ukraine’s defenders, other aggressors may think they too can employ his threatening tactics. For instance, both North Korea and China have recently talked about unleashing Armageddon. 

Perhaps we can ignore the ranting of the Kim regime, but Chinese nuclear threats are particularly worrisome. China’s flag officers have, for two decades, been issuing belligerent warnings about Beijing’s willingness to use nukes to seize Japan’s outlying islands or Taiwan, but the threats took on an especially belligerent tone last October. 

With no apparent provocation, the main outlets of Chinese state media—People’s Daily, China Central Television, and PLA Daily, among others—ran identical articles that month about how Chinese submarines launching ballistic missiles tipped with nuclear warheads could kill tens of millions of Americans in Seattle, San Francisco, Los Angeles, San Diego, Boston, New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, Portland in Maine, and the Navy towns of Annapolis and Norfolk. Those Chinese reports also talked about radiation deaths in Chicago. 

On Thursday, a nuclear exchange was, at least for most people, inconceivable. Yet now that a reckless Putin has raised the stakes on Friday by making nukes just another appliance of aggression, an incident of mass slaughter looks dangerously real and perilously close.

The scene in eastern Ukraine: A pressing rebel front, demoralized Ukrainian troops

By Tim Lister, CNN

September 1, 2014

http://edition.cnn.com/2014/08/31/world/europe/ukraine-scene/index.html?hpt=hp_c3

With rebel forces on offensive in eastern Ukraine, evidence of a military presence is scarce 

Ukrainian troops encountered by CNN appear demoralized 

CNN crew asked to stop filming in one rebel-held town south of Donetsk 

Donetsk, Ukraine (CNN) -- A few miles south of the town of Starobeshevo in eastern Ukraine, a group of men in uniform is slumped under a tree.

They are dejected and exhausted, their eyes red with fatigue.

They do not want to be filmed but tell us of the horror they endured a day earlier. As medics with the Ukrainian army, they had transported the bodies of some 70 soldiers away from a combat zone and many more who were seriously wounded.

They scarcely raise their heads when a Ukrainian air force jet streaks across the sky, releasing its payload on a rebel-held area to the east. It's the only action by the air force that we've witnessed against a rebel force that's suddenly gone on the offensive across a wide area of eastern Ukraine.

Ukrainians brace for rebel attack

'Point of no return' in Ukraine?

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko warned Saturday that the crisis with Russia has worsened in recent days and is inching closer to a "full-scale war."

Border guard bases and checkpoints deserted

Everyone Who Wants To Destroy ISIS Needs To Know One Hard Truth

MICHAEL B KELLEY,MIKE NUDELMAN

AUG 21, 2014

Source Link

U.S. President Barack Obama delivers a statement from Martha's Vineyard, Massachusetts, during his vacation August 20, 2014.

Defense Contractor Stocks Are SurgingWhy Defense Stocks Soared Through The Sequester

Just about everyone agrees that the world would be a better place without the brutal terrorist group known as ISIS or Islamic State or ISIL.

On Wednesday, Barack Obamacompared the group to a "cancer" whose spread must be contained and that the group "has no place in the 21st century." And Secretary of State John Kerrytweeted that "ISIL must be destroyed/will be crushed."

But there is one thing everyone must realize in the anti-ISIS crusade: Given the momentum that ISIS has built over the past two years in Syria and Iraq, it will be very difficult to dislodge them from the region. To actually do it will require a full-scale war.

The Troubled Past of Foreign Relations with the Kurds

27 AUGUST 2014

http://kingsofwar.org.uk/ 

Eugenio Lilli, PhD Candidate, Defence Studies Department, King’s College London and Chair of the KCL US foreign policy research group. Twitter @EugenioLilli

A few weeks ago, fighters of the Islamic State (IS), formerly known as ISIS, seized control of significant swaths of territory in northern Iraq. Ostensibly to stop the IS offensive toward the Kurdish regional capital of Erbil and to provide indispensable humanitarian relief to thousands of displaced civilians, the international community soon mobilized.

US President Barack Obama ordered targeted airstrikes against IS forces and humanitarian air drops in northern Iraq. The US administration also began to send hundreds of military advisors and weapons to help the Kurdish peshmerga in their effort to fight the Islamists back.

French President Francois Hollande and British Prime Minister David Cameron said their countries were also ready to supply arms and other forms of aid to Iraq’s Kurds. Similarly, in a meeting in Brussels, the foreign ministries of EU countries agreed to arm the Kurdish forces.

There have been speculations that the current international support for Iraqi Kurds could translate in the near future into international support for a Kurdish breakaway from Iraq and the formation of an independent Kurdish homeland.

What does the 20th century history of Kurdish relations with foreign powers tell us about such a possibility?

After the end of World War I, the victorious Allied powers met to dismember the vast territories of a defeated Ottoman Empire. The 1920 Treaty of Sèvres proposed the creation of an autonomous homeland for the Kurdish people. Noticeably, this proposed Kurdistan would not include the Kurdish communities of Iran, French-controlled Syria, and British-controlled Iraq but would grant the Kurds control of an area on what is now Turkish territory. The Allies also made quite clear that they would not provide military or financial assistance to the fledging Kurdish state. As a consequence, it did not take long before Kemal Ataturk’s Turkish nationalist forces, who strongly opposed the recognition of autonomy to ethnic or cultural minorities within Turkey, violently dashed Kurdish hopes for an autonomous homeland.

In 1946, when Soviet troops were still occupying northern Iran, the Soviet Union encouraged Iran’s Kurds to form an autonomous state entity. In doing so, Soviet leaders were reaffirming the longstanding Czarist Russia’s objective of exerting influence on Iranian territory. The resulting Kurdish Mahabad Republic was short-lived though. Under increasing US and British pressure, in fact, the Soviet Union was eventually compelled to withdraw its troops from Iran. Abandoned by their foreign patron, the Kurds were left defenseless against the subsequent offensive mounted by Iranian government forces.

During 1974-75, Iran, with US and Israeli blessing, supported a Kurdish uprising against Iraq’s central government. Iranian leaders were only too willing to seize any opportunity of weakening their rivals in Baghdad. However, in a sudden about-face, Iran concluded a treaty with Iraq, known as the Algiers Agreement, where Teheran pledged to cease assisting the Kurds’ rebellion in Iraq. The agreement resulted in the quick end of the uprising and the forced relocation of more than 250,000 Kurds from northern Iraq to other areas of the country. 

In the 1980s, the United States and the Soviet Union played Iran and Iraq against each other as part of their cold-war struggle for global dominance. Iraq’s Kurds rose up again in a renewed effort to gain independence. The Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein responded by using chemical weapons against Kurdish rebels. In one particularly infamous case, the use of poison gas by Iraqi armed forces led to the death of at least 5,000 civilians in the Kurdish city of Halabja. Confronted with such a blatant violation of international law, the international community stayed silent.

Again, during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the United States instigated Iraqi Kurds to take arms against the regime of Saddam Hussein. However, by the end of February of that year, US President George H.W. Bush abruptly halted Operation Desert Storm thus providing the opportunity to the Iraqi military to regroup and crash the Kurdish upheaval in the north. Fearing a repetition of the terrible events of the 1980s, two million Kurds escaped toward the Turkish and Iranian borders; at least 20,000 of them died in trying to do so.

Even today, while the international community has declared its willingness to provide military and humanitarian assistance to Iraq’s Kurds in their fight against the Islamic State, important international actors, including the United States, are contributing to a problem that is weakening the Kurds at their most vulnerable moment: the Kurds, in fact, are running out of money. The Iraqi central government is required to share oil revenues with the Kurdish regional government in Erbil, but Kurdish authorities have stated that authorities in Baghdad have failed to do so recently. At the same time, the US administration and others have stopped Kurds’ attempts to sell oil of their own. Tellingly, a tanker carrying about $100 million worth of Kurdish oil is currently sitting off the coast of Texas in the Gulf of Mexico unable to unload its valuable cargo. For the Kurds, reaching economic self-sufficiency would undoubtedly represent an essential step toward achieving political independence.

This all but complete historical overview clearly shows that the relations between the Kurds and foreign powers have been characterized by a pattern of cynical exploitation and cold abandonment. If I were a Kurd, I would be extremely skeptical about the possibility that the current international mobilization will translate into genuine future support for the creation of an independent Kurdish homeland.

How Obama Should Counter the Islamic State

Daniel R. DePetris

August 29, 2014 

Source Link

The Obama administration should look at these recommendations, if they aren’t already pursuing them.

When asked by a reporter during an August 21 news conference whether the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (now simply referred to as the Islamic State) is an imminent threat to the national security of the United States, Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel spoke in the very clear and blunt thelanguage that he was once known for when he was a senator representing the great state of Nebraska.

“[A]s to the comment about an imminent threat, I think the evidence is pretty clear. When we look at what they did to Mr. Foley, what they threatened to do to all Americans and Europeans, what they are doing now, the—I don't know any other way to describe it other than barbaric. They have no standard of decency, of responsible human behavior, and I think the record's pretty clear on that. So, yes, they are an imminent threat to every interest we have, whether it's in Iraq or anywhere else.”

That’s a pretty strong indictment on the Islamic State and the horrendously bankrupt ideology that it represents. But it also happens to be a far more dire assessment than the White House has indicated in its own remarks.

This, of course, is not to suggest that President Barack Obama or his advisers in the National Security Council don’t take the threat of the Islamic State seriously. This is certainly not the case; if it were, the president would not have authorized a selected campaign of U.S. airstrikes on ISIL targets in northern Iraq. Rather, the stark difference in language that the White House and the Pentagon have used to describe the Islamic State suggests that the whole-of-government counterterrorism strategy that Washington is trying to create is still very much in the sausage-making process.

What should that whole-of-government counterterrorism strategy look like? Former U.S. Ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad put forth a series of proposals based on his extensive diplomatic experience in an August 22 article for The National Interest. Think-tankers, columnists, ex-officials, and politicians all have their own opinions, with more aggressive action against ISIL bases in Syria often leading the pack of ideas. Many of the recommendations that have been put on the table, however, tend to be military-centric. The U.S. military certainly has a vital role to play in any anti-ISIL campaign, but as the Obama administration has rightly observed on a number of occasions, there needs to be something beyond the military realm to full grasp the horrific scourge that the Islamic State represents. Politics, economics, and the difficult work of regional and international diplomacy must all be incorporated into any policy if the long-term objective is to track, contain, and eventually degrade the military prowess and capability of the Islamic State. Fortunately, the White House is advocating for precisely that.

At the risk of being called naïve, inexperienced to the intricacies of Arab politics, or an armchair strategizer bloviating from the safety of his own coach, here are a few bullet points that the Obama administration, the U.S. military, the U.S. Foreign Service, and the Treasury Department should at the very least consider during their deliberations. I assume that officials across the U.S. Government are already contemplating some—if not all—of these policy proposals, and would in no way be surprised to learn that the administration is already in the middle of rolling them out to the public. But in any case, here they are:

Iraq, Obama and the Future of War Powers

Robert Golan-Vilella

August 27, 2014 

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/iraq-obama-the-future-war-powers-11153?page=show

Why Congress should vote on any continued—or expanded—military offensive against the Islamic State.

Editor’s note: The following is a postscript to the article “A Tale of Two AUMFs,” which appears in the September/October 2014 issue of The National Interest.

In early August, the United States began conducting a renewed set of military operations in Iraq. In response to the advances of the Islamic State, Washington started launching air strikes against the group, which have continued over the past several weeks.

The rationale for this action, as President Obama described it, was twofold: first, to “prevent a potential act of genocide” against the Yazidis, and second, to protect American personnel deployed in Iraq, particularly in Erbil. The domestic-law justification for these measures was the president’s power as commander in chief under Article II of the Constitution.

However, last week the Washington Post’s Karen DeYoung reported that the Obama administration was weighing a “range of options” to provide the legal basis for an expanded military campaign against the Islamic State. DeYoung wrote that the administration was grappling “with whether and how to try to militarily defeat the Islamic State” rather than simply blunt its advance. A senior administration official told the Post that one of the options that the White House was considering would be to seek congressional approval for an authorization to use force against the Islamic State.

If the White House judges that the threat presented by the Islamic State is sufficiently great, and that a sustained military assault against the group is both necessary and wise, then asking Congress for a new Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) is the best way to proceed. None of the three alternatives are good ones. The 2001 AUMF, understood to allow force against Al Qaeda and its “associated forces,” would be inappropriate primarily because of the dramatic and well-known split between the Islamic State and Al Qaeda’s central leadership earlier this year. (For more on this subject, see this post by Ryan Goodman at Just Security, which has a roundup of pieces that illustrates what he calls the “remarkable consensus of opinion . . . that ISIS is not covered by the 2001 AUMF.”)

Fareed Zakaria: A second Sunni Awakening?

By Fareed Zakaria Opinion writer 

August 28

Source Link

Tribal fighters carrying their weapons pose for photographs during an intensive security deployment to fight against militants of the Islamic State. (Stringer/Iraq/Reuters)

ISTANBUL 

What are the strengths of the Islamic State? I posed this question to two deeply knowledgeable observers — a European diplomat and an American former official — and the picture they painted is worrying, although not hopeless. Defeating the group would require a large and sustained strategic effort from the Obama administration, but it could be done without significant numbers of U.S. ground troops. 

The European diplomat, stationed in the Middle East, travels in and out of Syria and has access to regime and opposition forces. (Both sources agreed to speak only if their identities were not revealed.) He agrees with the consensus that the Islamic State has gained considerable economic and military strength in recent months. He estimates that it is making $1 million a day each in Syria and Iraq by selling oil and gas, although U.S. experts believe this number is too high in Iraq. 

The Islamic State’s military strategy is brutal but also smart. The group’s annual reports — it has issued them since 2012 — detail its military methods and successes to try to impress its backers. The videos posted online of executions are barbaric but also strategic. They are designed to sow terror in the minds of opponents who, when facing Islamic State fighters on the battlefield, now reportedly flee rather than fight. 

But the most dangerous aspect of the Islamic State, this diplomat believes, is its ideological appeal. It has recruited marginalized, disaffected Sunni youths in Syria and Iraq who believe they are being ruled by apostate regimes. This appeal to Sunni pride has worked largely because of the sectarian policies of the Baghdad and Damascus governments. But the Islamic State has also grown because of the larger collapse of moderate, secular and even Islamist institutions and groups — such as the Muslim Brotherhood — throughout the Middle East. 

How to handle this challenge? The American, a former senior administration figure, counsels against pessimism. The Islamic State “is not nearly as strong as al-Qaeda in Iraq was in its heyday,” he noted, playing down recent reports that the militant forces contain within themfearsome elements of Saddam Hussein’s disbanded army. “We fought that army. It was not very impressive,” he noted. The Islamic State could be defeated, he said, but it would take a comprehensive and sustained strategy, much like the one that undergirded the surge in Iraq. 

You Can't Understand ISIS If You Don't Know the History of Wahhabism in Saudi Arabia

http://www.huffingtonpost.com/alastair-crooke/isis-wahhabism-saudi-arabia_b_5717157.html 

BEIRUT -- The dramatic arrival of Da'ish (ISIS) on the stage of Iraq has shocked many in the West. Many have been perplexed -- and horrified -- by its violence and its evident magnetism for Sunni youth. But more than this, they find Saudi Arabia's ambivalence in the face of this manifestation both troubling and inexplicable, wondering, "Don't the Saudis understand that ISIS threatens them, too?"

It appears -- even now -- that Saudi Arabia's ruling elite is divided. Some applaud that ISIS is fighting Iranian Shiite "fire" with Sunni "fire"; that a new Sunni state is taking shape at the very heart of what they regard as a historical Sunni patrimony; and they are drawn by Da'ish's strict Salafist ideology.

Other Saudis are more fearful, and recall the history of the revolt against Abd-al Aziz by the Wahhabist Ikhwan (Disclaimer: this Ikhwan has nothing to do with the Muslim Brotherhood Ikhwan -- please note, all further references hereafter are to the Wahhabist Ikhwan, and not to the Muslim Brotherhood Ikhwan), but which nearly imploded Wahhabism and the al-Saud in the late 1920s.

Many Saudis are deeply disturbed by the radical doctrines of Da'ish (ISIS) -- and are beginning to question some aspects of Saudi Arabia's direction and discourse.

THE SAUDI DUALITY

Saudi Arabia's internal discord and tensions over ISIS can only be understood by grasping the inherent (and persisting) duality that lies at the core of the Kingdom's doctrinal makeup and its historical origins.

One dominant strand to the Saudi identity pertains directly to Muhammad ibn ʿAbd al-Wahhab (the founder of Wahhabism), and the use to which his radical, exclusionist puritanism was put by Ibn Saud. (The latter was then no more than a minor leader -- amongst many -- of continually sparring and raiding Bedouin tribes in the baking and desperately poor deserts of the Nejd.)

The second strand to this perplexing duality, relates precisely to King Abd-al Aziz's subsequent shift towards statehood in the 1920s: his curbing of Ikhwani violence (in order to have diplomatic standing as a nation-state with Britain and America); his institutionalization of the original Wahhabist impulse -- and the subsequent seizing of the opportunely surging petrodollar spigot in the 1970s, to channel the volatile Ikhwani current away from home towards export -- by diffusing a cultural revolution, rather than violent revolution throughout the Muslim world.

But this "cultural revolution" was no docile reformism. It was a revolution based on Abd al-Wahhab's Jacobin-like hatred for the putrescence and deviationism that he perceived all about him -- hence his call to purge Islam of all its heresies and idolatries.

MUSLIM IMPOSTORS

The American author and journalist, Steven Coll, has written how this austere and censorious disciple of the 14th century scholar Ibn Taymiyyah, Abd al-Wahhab, despised "the decorous, arty, tobacco smoking, hashish imbibing, drum pounding Egyptian and Ottoman nobility who travelled across Arabia to pray at Mecca."

In Abd al-Wahhab's view, these were not Muslims; they were imposters masquerading as Muslims. Nor, indeed, did he find the behavior of local Bedouin Arabs much better. They aggravated Abd al-Wahhab by their honoring of saints, by their erecting of tombstones, and their "superstition" (e.g. revering graves or places that were deemed particularly imbued with the divine).

All this behavior, Abd al-Wahhab denounced as bida -- forbidden by God.

Pro-Russian Rebels Push South From Donetsk Toward Black Sea Port Town

Ted Phillips

09.02.14

The strategic coastal city of Mariupol is bracing for attack as pro-Russian rebels move south—and brag that Kiev is next.

NOVOTROITSKE, Ukraine — The front line moved south from Donetsk on Monday as pro-Russian separatists pushed toward Mariupol, a strategic coastal city on the Sea of Azov.

Shortly after 5 p.m., two covered military trucks heading south pulled up to a gas station along the main highway to Donetsk at the village of Novotroitske, 45 miles north of Mariupol. Four heavily armed men and one woman in camouflage jumped out and set up a roadblock, aiming automatic weapons at vehicles, forcing them to stop.

Mariupol has been bracing for an attack since pro-Russian separatists seized Novoazovsk to the east on the Russian border last week. 

The roadblock was an example of how quickly the reality on the ground is changing. Even locals aren’t always sure who is in control along the front line.

“First I was in Sloviansk, then I’ll go to Mariupol and after that I’ll go to Kiev,” said one of the gunmen at the roadblock. He was a Donetsk People’s Republic (DNR) soldier in Novotroitske, who identified himself as “Vologda,” which he said was the city in Russia where he’s from.

“First I was in Sloviansk, then I’ll go to Mariupol and after that I’ll go to Kiev.”

Vologda said he joined the fight for an “independent Donbass,” referring to the contested region where separatists and the Ukrainian army have fought for months.

“We are against oligarchs and against fascists,” he said.

Vologda’s presence was a stark example of how Russia is operating in its stealth invasion, or “incursion,” as NATO likes to call it. There is no blitzkrieg. Instead, it’s a piecemeal Russian and rebel offensive against an increasingly beleaguered Ukrainian military and its NATO supporters. And it’s widening. Russia has continued to deny involvement in Ukraine despite mounting evidence. Last week separatist leader Alexander Zakharchenko claimed that Russian soldiers were volunteers on vacation.

The Ukrainian army had been steadily advancing on the battlefield in recent weeks, but the opening of a third front in the southeast has put them on the defensive. Separatists encircled Ukrainian troops in Ilovaisk who reportedly suffered heavy casualties while withdrawing and the separatists have pushed to retake territory they had lost.

Two of the male soldiers on the road to Mariupol wore the black, red, and blue insignia of the separatists, and the woman wore a patch resembling a U.S. Confederate flag without the stars as well as separatist insignia. Vologda said the other two soldiers were also Russians. A fourth soldier was too far away for his insignia to be seen.

Leadership: RMA Gone Wild

http://www.strategypage.com/htmw/htlead/articles/20140825.aspx

August 25, 2014

In the last two decades of the 20th century the "Revolution in Military Affairs" (RMA) has glimmered in the distance, always just out of reach. To many pundits and military analysts all the new technology of the last few decades was seen as capable of causing a fundamental change in how wars are fought. Then came the end of the Cold War, the disappearance of the enormous Soviet army and a new military landscape. This meant there would be no clash of huge mechanized armies in Europe, or anywhere else. The 1991 Gulf War showed that many of the American military technologies worked quite well. U.S. troops could not see more of the battlefield, communicate better, fight faster and roll over the Russian equipped and trained Iraqi army in record time.

But the RMA that developed over the next decade had less to do with technology and more to do with the nature of future wars. With "The Big One" (in Europe against the Soviet Union) now out of the picture, new kinds of wars became more common.

That’s because there have been three major changes since the Cold War days. First, there is a lot of neat new technology that allows for quicker, less bloody conflicts via the use of better sensors and precision weapons that actually work. Second, the current and future wars are smaller than what NATO and the Soviet Union were planning for nearly half a century. These 21st century wars also involved a lot more civilians getting in the way in addition to lots of politics, diplomacy and other complications. Then there is the growing media angle. Mass media has been around for over a century, but it has grown enormously in presence and volume in the last two decades. News is now a 24 hour a day operation and reporters are everywhere. Moreover, the Internet makes is easy for anyone with a camera, or a way with words, to join the media stream and get their story out. All of this has changed the battlefield atmosphere enormously since the Cold War.

The New War involves smaller forces fighting more complicated (by political, diplomatic and media issues) battles. While better sensors and communications gear give troops a better view of the battlefield, the greater presence of civilians and media actually make it a more complicated place. As a result, RMA is going places its first boosters never imagined. And no one knows exactly where the destination is.

Military analysts and planners in the major countries (especially the United States and China) agree that brute force is still important in a major war, and new technology makes the troops of major powers far more effective than in the past. But most of the wars since 1991 have involved irregular forces or nuclear armed nations confronting each other indirectly so as to not trigger a mutually destructive nuclear war. Thus intelligence, special operations forces and precision weapons become the primary tools that nations use regularly. This in itself is not revolutionary as “great powers” have for thousands of years used special operations troops, diplomacy, subterfuge and all manner of deceptions and feints to get their way. Noted military analysts from Shen Tzu to Machiavelli, Clausewitz and a dazzling array of late 20th and early 21st century pundits have recognized that “operations other than war” (OOTW) are the way to go if you can pull it off. It still is and it’s not RMA. 

How Real Is the Iranian Cyber Threat?

Tom Brewster

August 29, 2014

Persian paranoia: America’s fear of Iranian cyber power

When Israel stepped up Operation Protective Edge in Gaza in July, a crew of hackers going under the name of the Izz ad-Din al-Qassam Cyber Fighters readied their attack tools to show support for their Palestinian brothers.

They attempted to flood a core piece of Israel’s internet infrastructure, the Domain Name System that acts as the web’s phone book for the country. They also tried to take down websites for the national stock exchange and Mossad, the intelligence and special operations body.

Thanks to Israel’s capable cyber defence systems, the attacks caused little trouble, though security firm iSight Partners says the websites were briefly out of action.

Their attacks previously knocked out the websites of top US banks, under the moniker Operation Ababil, but the Cyber Fighters’ gaze has shifted to events closer to home in recent months.

What makes them especially fascinating to the West, however, is that they are almost certainly sponsored by the Iranian government, according to various sources with knowledge of the matter, speaking with the promise of anonymity to the Guardian.

The group, which has compromised large numbers of websites by exploiting vulnerabilities in tools like WordPress, pooling their resources to launch their Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) strikes, is just one of many actors that form part of Iran’s growing cyber capability, according to US firms.

Indeed, there is a rising anxiety amongst US public and private sector mandarins surrounding Iran’s apparent digital prowess, as evinced by research the Guardian was briefed on ahead of its September release.

‘THE GROUPS ARE ALLOWED TO OPERATE ON FINANCIAL CRIMES…’

Rather than large, singular groups of digital spies, Iran has quietly built up a secret, disparate army of “mercenaries”, each separate from one another but with similar aims, according to the authors of the report, which will be published soon by Silicon Valley security company Norse.

Months of research into Iranian networks uncovered at least 16,000 systems controlled by Iran outside of its borders, 2,000 of which were infected machines of businesses in the US, Israel and other nations of interest, claims Norse chief technology officer and co-founder Tommy Stiansen.

Many of the Internet Protocol addresses (IPs) of those machines are hosting .ir websites - domains that are being used as platforms for attacks. In many cases, visitors to those sites are subsequently infected with malware - software designed specifically for surveillance and to siphon off valuable data from target organisations, according to the firm.

These Iranian mercenaries were ostensibly hacking foreign businesses both for their own gain and for the benefit of their country, says Stiansen. “Cybercrime is tied to the same people doing cyber warfare in Iran,” he adds. “The groups are allowed to operate on financial crimes as well as state sponsored crimes… They don’t have a military machine for their cyber warfare programme.”

The IDF is Ready for the Cloud Challenge

Ami Rojkes Dombe 

14/4/2014

http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=512&ArticleID=2866

The pressure currently exerted by the Israeli government on the IDF to cut the costs of defending the State of Israel has become evident, and at the IDF C4I Division they are eyeing the solutions offered by the civilian market. A "small and smart military"

Brig. Gen. Danny Bren, commander of the Lotem unit 

"Those who adapt – survive," said Brig. Gen. Danny Bren, commander of the Lotem unit at the IDF C4I Branch at the recent international C5I conference produced by IsraelDefense in cooperation with the Association for the Commemoration of the Fallen Soldiers of the IDF Signal Corps, IDF C4I Branch and Ben-Gurion University. "The cyber dimension has led the world into a new cold war. It affects states, militaries and human society as a whole. Our ability to adapt to the new reality stands on three legs – technology, talent and the human capital." 

Brig. Gen. Bren presented as an example the capture of the Iranian arms ship Klos-C last week. According to him, the advance intelligence collection for this operation was based on cutting-edge C4I capabilities, including satellite communication and other means. Additionally, the combined arms cooperation between the IAF, the IDF Navy and the IDF Corps of Intelligence was made possible by to state-of-the-art C4I resources being implemented in the IDF. 

"This is the New Era. For each target, we need to provide the technology that will support the operational processes. Technology is shaping the operational concepts of the IDF," said BG Bren. "The ability to identify a target through surveillance, to be able to create a dialog through video and voice between the helicopter and the warfighter, to obtain a designation for the target on all of the display screens in a synchronized manner, to match suitable precision guided munitions and to close the sensor-to-shooter cycle – that is the future. This is the full utilization of interoperability on the new battlefield." 

IDF Adopts Cloud Computing 

Brig. Gen. Bren addressed several technological aspects that would affect the IDF in the coming years. One of them is the switch to open source code. "In the past, we preferred to develop our own codes. We realized it was a time-consuming process. If the code is out there anyway – why not use it? Admittedly, there are problems. One of them is information security. You must know that you do not allow your enemy into your home. The second problem is licensing. We have created an inter-service open source code community in the IDF named 'Yohanan'. Admittedly, it is not cheaper as far as licensing is concerned, as even open source codes cost money, but the fact that the IDF currently cultivate a community of developers and cooperate with the international community helps complete projects faster," explained BG Bren. 

Mobility is yet another aspect the IDF want and have to develop. "Everything must be readily available. The civilian market presents opportunities and they must be taken advantage of. Commercial technologies should be ruggedized where necessary, and put to use. We want cloud computing too. It is a concept – not a technology. If I wanted to purchase processing power in the civilian market today, I would pay by credit card and that would be it. If you want to establish a similar environment in the military, that will be measured by weeks. In the military, the procurement processes are time consuming and do not allow you to pay for resources according to need. On the outside, you can set a maximum price for a certain resource and obtain it according to the supply on offer. Possibly during the night or during timeframes where there is less demand for the cloud service – we must take advantage of these capabilities." 

Brig. Gen. Bren tossed into the air an interesting question: "Does every resource have to be included in the IDF's infrastructure systems?" He referred to services that are not operational, such as electronic mail, for example. "Why do the IDF have to operate electronic mail or the non-operational telephone network? We want to issue a tender for cloud computing services before the end of this year. You will be surprised how creative we will be. The time for a change has come. We do not have the resources to go on in the same way as before," said BG Bren. 

Change Complete Systems at the Push of a Button

Or Heller 

http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=512&ArticleID=2899

The IDF decided to assimilate the issue of cyber in all IDF layouts, including the combat layout. "We are currently everywhere within the IDF," says the head of the Cyber Instruction & Assimilation Section, Major A.

In the IDF they have been speaking, for quite a while now, about military operations in the cyber dimension, but so far these operations have remained within the domain of the more technological divisions, such as the Militry Intelligence Directorate, placed in charge of offensive cyber, and the C4I Branch, placed in charge of defensive cyber. 

Now, for the first time, the IDF decided to assimilate the issue of cyber in all IDF layouts, including the combat layout. For example, Project Tzayad (Digital Land Army), in the context of which field commanders are issued handheld computers through which they are supposed to conduct the next war. The Tzayad computers by Elbit may be used to call in air strikes, to see where other IDF elements and enemy elements are located, to communicate directly with UAVs, Merkava tanks or Apache attack helicopters. 

Now imagine an IDF maneuvering division, operating deep inside enemy territory in the context of the third Lebanon war, when in an instant, all divisional systems collapse. The battalion commander will not know where his brigade commander or where his company commanders are located. Even worse, he will not know where the next Hezbollah antitank detachment is deployed and worse still – he might fire at another IDF element. 

Such a collapse could be the result of a cyber attack. 

Based on the understanding that cyber is not a matter to be confined only to the technological layouts and that it should be assimilated throughout the IDF, Major A. was appointed to a new position: head of the Cyber Instruction & Assimilation Section at the Cyber Defense Department. He started out in the Military Intelligence Directorate and then transferred to the C4I Branch, and has been serving in his current position for the past three years. 

In an interview with IsraelDefense, Major A told us: "I entered the world of cyber about three years ago. This was a fairly new subject for the IDF and in general – a new world. Up to that day we had been referring to four dimensions with which we were familiar: air, sea, land and space. We realized there was another dimension that had to be protected – the cyber dimension. Unlike the other four dimensions, this dimension is man-made and it dominates all of the other four dimensions. You can encounter the cyber dimension anywhere. The force multiplier is the damage multiplier. You will be more accurate in building your target bank and in executing whatever you want to execute. At the same time, you will be more vulnerable, and consequently you would be required to defend more effectively. Today, any six year old kid has an iPad or a smartphone and the more C3-oriented you are, the more vulnerable you will become." 

What is your mandate regarding the introduction of the cyber field into the entire IDF? 

"I am responsible for the training and instruction activities throughout the IDF. We understand that the organizations trying to damage the IDF through the web double and even triple their capabilities each year. The Axis of Evil attempts to threaten the IDF in every realm, and particularly in the realm of cyber. Anything that is C3-oriented is more accurate but it is also more vulnerable. We are ready to build our forces to face that threat, either through training and exercises vis-à-vis any scenario, or through dedicated instruction such as our cyber defender course. There are instruction activities for all the other elements of the IDF: from new recruits at the basic training bases to brigade commanders, battalion commanders and division commanders. The objective of the instruction activity is different for each level. In our cyber defender course, we train highly specialized and highly focused professionals. Through our instruction activities for senior officers we create a common language between the cyber defenders assigned to them and their daily operations." 

How do you cause a field commander who's completely detached from the field of cyber, like the commander of the Golani brigade, to be attentive to the cyber dimension in his unit? 

"It is important for us, beyond those instruction activities, to spread the word about cyber through the top echelons of the IDF. Additionally, it is clear to us that the cyber attack threat is not necessarily imposed on the most senior entity within any organization. Today, everything in the IDF is C3-oriented: the computer used by the secretary in a senior commander's office is connected to the web, so I have to explain to that senior commander that the threat pertains to all of us and we must see to it that the enemy will not be able to reach the objectives he wants to reach." 

Where is the most vulnerable point of the field forces in the realm of cyber today? 

The Defense Sector will switch to Cloud Computing, Nevertheless

Ami Rojkes Dombe 

http://www.israeldefense.com/?CategoryID=512&ArticleID=2916

Contrary to the voices that oppose the transition of the IDF to cloud computing, in the USA they are proving that it is possible, and even desirable, to switch to cloud computing. In a special interview to IsraelDefense, Robert Eastman, VP at Lockheed Martin, says it is a worldwide trend

Can the IDF afford to switch to a cloud computing model in the era of cyber? This is one of the questions that have been bothering senior officials in the Israeli defense establishment recently. If in the past the IDF operated in a decentralized manner that provided each service branch with technological independence, the current economic reality has compelled the military to become more efficient and the various branches to combine their technological capabilities. Concepts like sharing and transparency are entering the defense jargon, to the chagrin of the opponents, and change – under the surface – the technological and organizational culture. 

As recently as early last March, the commander of the Lotem unit at the IDF C4I Branch, Brig. Gen. Danny Bren, said at the international C5 conference that the "Networked IDF" program for combining communication networks had been approved. BG Bren said further that in the context of the relocation to the south, to Beer Sheva, the IDF will cut down the number of server farms in their possession. It is reasonable to assume that the same trend is taking place in other security agencies such as ISA and Mossad, who need (or will need) to demonstrate efficiency improvement in the field of IT in the near future. 

"Amazonization" of the IDF 

At the same time, along with the statements made by senior military officers, quite a few questions remain unanswered regarding the ability of the IDF to switch to a cloud computing model. If we examine the world around Israel, we will see that the aspiration to get there may exist, but in effect, the defense culture cannot contain such concepts as “sharing” and “openness”. One of the most significant moves in this context took place last July in the USA when DISA, the Defense Information Systems Agency of the US Department of Defense allocated a budget of US 450 million to ten projects in the field of cloud computing for the defense services of the USA. 

In this context, DISA announced a certification program designated FedRAMP that every contractor supplying cloud computing services to DOD must pass before the end of this year. Additionally, once certified, contractors are required to undergo a specific certification process at DISA in order to implement their cloud computing services at DOD. At the same time, even if a similar certification program is implemented at IMOD, it will still be hard to imagine operational processes of the IDF relying on the servers of Amazon or any other supplier of cloud computing services anywhere in the world, who maintains decentralized server farms somewhere in North America, Europe or Asia. 

Proof of the problematic nature of DISA's new certification program may be found in the fact that this certification process does not include a demand for compliance with the FISMA federal law enforced by the US government. According to this statute, every federal agency is responsible for securing its own information, and that includes the personal accountability of the head of each agency. According to FISMA, information security means protecting information and information systems against unauthorized access, use, disclosure, disruption, alteration or destruction of the information, all for the purpose of ensuring the integrity, confidentiality and availability of the information. Why has DISA failed to include the demand for compliance with FISMA in their certification program for suppliers of cloud computers? Good question. 

And since we mentioned Amazon, it is the world's first civilian cloud computing service provider which is FedRAMP certified and has been contracted to establish a cloud for the CIA. The contract signed last October (following a legal battle against IBM) for US$ 600 million will enable Amazon to establish a cloud for the Central Intelligence Agency of the USA. Although not much is known about the architecture of the cloud, senior officials at Amazon were able to tell various websites that it will rely on Amazon infrastructure and that the nature of the services will be similar to the company's AWS solution. Nevertheless, it is not yet clear how the CIA will be able to maintain the data channel between itself and Amazon hermetically secured. 

Another company dealing extensively with the implementation of cloud computing models for clients from the government and defense sectors in the USA and Europe is Lockheed Martin. This company, too, is FedRAMP certified. "Classified information cannot pass to the cloud, it is not a sufficiently safe environment for it," says Robert (Bob) Eastman, VP in charge of Lockheed Martin's global solution program, which is a part of the company's defense and intelligence product and service line, in an interview he granted to IsraelDefense Magazine. Eastman is the person responsible for the agreement signed with the Bynet Data Communications company of Israel (through a joint venture named LB Negev) for building the server farm for the IDF in the context of the relocation to Beer Sheva (Project 5/9). 

Conduct of Operations in Limited Scale Conflicts

by Maj. Gen. (res.) David Ivry

August 31, 2014

BESA Center Perspectives Paper No. 268

Executive Summary: Observing “Operation Protective Edge” against Hamas in Gaza lead to the conclusion that a revision of Israel’s conceptual strategic compass is needed, particularly regarding the concepts of ‘deterrence’ and ‘decisive victory’.

Limited-scale, asymmetrical conflicts have become the norm. All-out wars between stateS where both parties invest all of their national resources in an attempt to achieve a decisive victory have become less relevant.

Theories of warfare or conduct-of-operations doctrines that have been studied over the course of decades are no longer relevant to the new military situation. David Ben-Gurion’s conceptual trinity of ‘deterrence’, ‘early warning’ and ‘decisive victory’ is no longer fully valid. These concepts should no longer be used as the only or main criterion when evaluating military and political moves made in the context of the new situation.

While ‘deterrence’ remains relevant to preventing total war, we may lose the ability to deter violence in specific situations, such as launching rockets at Israel by terrorist organizations.

As far as ‘early warning’ is concerned, an intelligence setup may be prepared for a total war with a list of warning indicators compiled to indicate an intention by the other side to initiate a confrontation. However, these precautions and indicators may not be relevant in the event of suicide bomber terrorists.

The ‘decisive victory’ concept, in accordance with Clausewitzian thinking, posits that the losing side can be compelled to negotiate terms of its surrender. For this reason a modicum of governance is to be allowed to the losing side to assure the implementation of the terms of surrender. But in the context of limited-scale conflicts, partial military victories are attainable even if no decisive victory is achieved.

Negotiations may be arranged under international or superpower sponsorship for the purpose of reaching ceasefire agreements. Or a situation may emerge where it will be in the best interests of both parties to hold their fire with each party claiming certain political accomplishments, without the fundamental conflict coming to an end and without decisive victory.

In the 2006 Lebanon War, military victory was unclear and no decisive victory was achieved. Yet the severe blow inflicted on the Dahiyeh suburb of Beirut and the destruction of Hezbollah’s long-range missiles were significant achievements. However, during the last day before the ceasefire came into effect, Hezbollah launched some 250 rockets into Israeli territory. Hezbollah declared this as a victory and subsequently acquired a dominant role in the politics of Lebanon. This political role contributed to the subsequent calm along the Israel-Lebanon border.

Strictly business

Mohan Guruswamy

Sep 02, 2014
http://www.asianage.com/columnists/strictly-business-123

The US is too broke to provide us with capital… India needs partners who can put their money where their mouths are. Only China and Japan can provide the partnerships India needs.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi is now in Japan, having what is evidently a good visit. His Japanese counterpart, Shinzo Abe, has left no stone unturned to make Mr Modi feel most welcome. Later this month, Chinese President Xi Jinping will call on Mr Modi and make a determined effort to take Sino-India relations to a new level. After an economic and political drift lasting a few years, it would seem that India is once again being seen as the economic opportunity not to be missed and the political friend to have.

In recent months there has been a determined effort by Japan and its friends in India to bring these two Asian giants closer, to close ranks against the third and increasingly assertive giant. There is, however, a big difference. While China and Japan can afford to be fierce Kabuki warriors, their conflict is still mostly theatre. A deep sea separates them and the US’ great military presence ensures that Japan’s security is assured.
India, on the other hand, has over a quarter of a million heavily armed troops and a huge and modern Air Force deployed against an equally powerful China’s People’s Liberation Army. At many places, the forces are eyeball to eyeball. War is a hair-trigger away and this is no Kabuki play. The big question for India is whether it wants any part in this drama?
The scars that blight Japan and China’s relations are old and deep, and even the fact that the two are close economic partners has not erased them. India will do well to skirt away from this conflict and focus on serving its own interest.

It took a climactic ending of World War II to force change upon Japan and make it a near pacifist country almost entirely dependent on the US for its security. It was the US that brought China out of its isolation to create a new flank against the Soviet Union. It was the US’ economic engagement with China that turned it into an economic power.
But as China’s assertiveness rises and the US has to gradually withdraw from its self-assumed role as the world’s policeman with global interests, Japan is beginning to bear the brunt of this assertiveness. Japan is hence seeking new friends and emphasising common interests as India alone in Asia has the heft and size to balance Chinese power.