Indonesia, Malaysia and the Fight Against Islamic State Influence

By Stefanie Kam and Robi Sugara

September 11, 2014

With ideology spreading via social media, authorities need to consider a ‘soft’ approach as well as traditional tactics. 

The Indonesian government recently banned the Islamic State (IS), formerly known as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS). The Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI) also released a statement that it was “haram” or forbidden, for Muslims to participate in IS activities. Malaysian Prime Minister Najib Razak also recently issued a strongly worded statement condemning the IS for its actions, which run counter to Islamic faith, culture and to common humanity.

These are all positive steps. But they have been inadequate, given the spread of the ideological beliefs of IS via social media tools to preach and recruit others to join the extremist group.

Rise in Social Media Support

Following IS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi’s message for Muslims worldwide to join the Jihadist cause in Syria and Iraq, new jihadist recruitment videos have surfaced from Southeast Asian terrorists. In July, a picture of firebrand Muslim cleric, Abu Bakar Bashir in his maximum security prison in Nusakambangan, Central Java, with an ISIL flag as its background, was widely circulated on Indonesian social media. Bashir had reportedly instructed his followers to support their “fellow brothers” who were part of the IS group. Another prominent jailed jihadi leader, Aman Abdurrahman, had also conveyed support for IS and had reportedly been translating and distributing IS publications over the Internet.

A video by the IS released in July featuring an Indonesian fighter named Abu Muhammad al-Indonesi showed him delivering an impassioned appeal to fellow Indonesians to “join the ranks.” A number of Indonesian IS fighters are reportedly also using social networking platforms such as Facebook to recruit fighters. A growing number are young individuals who are drawn to the cause. Among them is al-Indonesi, a 19-year-old Indonesian student who studied in Turkey and later joined the IS in Syria. According to Indonesia’s National Agency for Combating Terrorism (BNPT), 34 Indonesians have joined the IS. These numbers do not include Indonesians who have joined other groups in Syria and Iraq in the jihadist cause.

Malaysian authorities meanwhile say that IS sympathizers are attracting a small number of Malaysians from a wide variety of backgrounds through social media, particularly Facebook, and have also managed to raise funds through the same channels. In early August, photos of a dead 52-year-old jihadist Malaysian fighter who was formerly a member of the Kumpulan Mujahiden Malaysia (KMM) were uploaded and circulated via social media and blogs. The man allegedly died while defending the town of Arzeh with several other jihadist fighters. The photo was liked by thousands of online users, with some congratulating him on his “successful transaction.”

Radical Narratives

India-Vietnam Supersonic Missile Talks in 'Advanced Stage'

By Ankit Panda

September 15, 2014

Vietnam may soon import the BrahMos cruise missile from India. 

According to a report in India’s Deccan Herald, citing comments made by a senior Indian diplomat, talks for the sale of the joint Russia-India-developed BrahMos supersonic cruise missile platform to Vietnam are in an “advanced stage.” Vietnam first expressed interest in acquiring in the platform in 2011. The decision to sell these cruise missiles to Vietnam will require approval from both the Indian and Russian governments.

According to The Asian Age, Vietnam was already deemed to be a “friendly country” according to a joint Indo-Russian supervisory council in 2011, allowing formal negotiations to move forward in the first place. In late 2013, Nguyen Phu Trong, the general secretary of the Vietnam Communist Party, proposed formal negotiations during his visit to New Delhi. While the fact that India and Vietnam have been talks over the BrahMos has been known for some time, the latest reports suggest that a deal may come to fruition sooner rather than later.

Indication that New Delhi and Hanoi may be closer to closing a deal on the BrahMos came ahead of Indian President Pranab Mukherjee’s four day trip to Vietnam. Notably, it also comes as New Delhi prepares to receive Chinese President Xi Jinping on his inaugural trip to India. China, a major claimant of territory in the South China Sea, will not welcome the deal as it will improve Vietnam’s deterrence capabilities. As some analysts have noted, India’s interest in strengthening relations with Vietnam is driven both by its stated “Look East” policy and by a desire to check Chinese interests in the South China Sea. New Delhi also benefits directly from Vietnamese overtures. For example, ahead of Indian External Affairs Minister Sushma Swaraj’s trip to Vietnam earlier this month, Hanoi renewed India’s lease of two oil blocks in the South China Sea.

Airstrikes Against ISIS Are Tactics. Here's a Strategy

Daniel L. Davis

09.15.14 

Source Link

A U.S. Army officer with plenty of on-the-ground experience suggests the talking heads think through the consequences of their calls to action.

We’ve heard a lot lately about a “strategy” to take on the barbarous horde of the so-called Islamic State, also known as ISIS and ISIL. At a White House briefing on August 28, President Barack Obama remarked that “we don’t have a strategy yet” and that as “our strategy develops we will consult with Congress.” Last week the President announced that we now have a “comprehensive strategy.” His critics, meanwhile, had been declaring for weeks that they were sure what should be done. Their talking-head “strategy,” expressed on countless cable news and radio talk shows, was “airstrikes,” and virtually nothing else. As it turned out, item one on the president’s four point plan was “a systematic campaign of airstrikes.” Many of those same critics were gratified. 

As a soldier who’s spent a fair amount of time on the ground in conflict zones, I find this popular focus on the power of Hellfire missiles and precision bombing a little disconcerting. What many of the talking heads who’ve filled the airwaves since the savage murders of American journalist James Foley (then Steven Sotloff, and this weekend, British aid worker David Haines) apparently fail to understand is that tactics are not strategy. Without first establishing the latter, they advocate a tactic in the dark that, even if successfully attained, could worsen the situation with perverse consequences. 

One especially memorable commentator to encourage bombing ISIS was the editor of the Weekly Standard, William Kristol. Appearing on the Laura Ingraham radio show on August 26, the conservative critic gave his expert opinion on how to deal with ISIS. “You know, why don't we just [bomb them]?” he advised. “We know where ISIS is. What’s the harm of bombing them at least for a few weeks and seeing what happens? I don’t think there’s much in the way of unanticipated side effects that are going to be bad there.” 

To Beat ISIS, the Arab World Must Promote Political and Religious Reforms

Rula Jebreal

09.15.14 

Source Link

If the U.S. does nothing, the Arab world will continue its slide into sectarian bigotry, political repression, and madness. This will come back to haunt the United States. 

Last week’s counter-terrorism conference in Jeddah can be summed up in two words: lost opportunity. Why? None of the participants were representative of an independent, democratic or critical voice in the Middle East. Rather, the Muslim scholars who participated were voices of their inept governments, who condemn every dissident voice as a terrorist. 

In the backdrop of the conference, President Barack Obama made his case for war against ISIS in Iraq to the American public last week as well. Obama also sent a direct message Muslims around the world that ISIS is not really Islamic and America is not at war with Islam. This message was meant to hit the heart of the Arab Muslim world, but it fell on deaf ears. 

Nonetheless, Secretary of State John Kerry is lobbying Arab allies to play a central role to insure the success of the initiative, since ISIS poses a much greater threat to them than it does to the United States. While this is a more responsible strategy on the part of the United States, the truth is that Arab and Muslim states continue to pursue myopic and delusional policies that produce more extremism, rather than countering it. 

If ISIS is Al Qaida 2.0, What will ISIS 2.0/Al Qaida 3.0 Look Like?

by MV 

September 13, 2014 

Source Link

President Obama spoke to the nation this week and pledged to “degrade” the capabilities of ISIS and “destroy” it. It was a strong speech. It was a Presidential speech. But we wish it had been shorter and more succinct. We wish he had simply said ISIS killed two Americans in barbaric brutal fashion and, when you kill Americans, you will hear from America. That’s all he needed to say. 

Unfortunately, President Obama needlessly catapulted ISIS into a higher plateau and involved other nations, sometimes called “allies”, in this war. Even his best media friend, Jon Stewart, saw the optics and reality. Stewart looked at the array of “allies” and noticed that it looked like another “crusade” of white Christian nations invading Arab Sunni lands. Stewart also noticed that the only Muslim partners in this American-led “crusade” are Shia Iran, the historic religious enemy of Sunni Muslims, and the Shia-Iraqi forces of Baghdad.

The only potential Sunni ally was non-Arab Turkey which is hated for its colonial history of subjugating Arabs. And Turkey has already refused to allow use of its airbases or supply weapons for attacks against ISIS. If this were not enough, European “allies” like Germany have so far refused to participate in air strikes in ISIS-held Syria. So, within two days of his speech, President Obama is left virtually alone in his “war” against ISIS. We wish he had stood alone out of American pride rather than as a result of unreliable allies.

The declaration of “war” against ISIS has, in our opinion, needlessly elevated ISIS into a position of global Sunni Muslim champion against the world’s superpower. That is a marketing coup for ISIS and makes them stronger especially vis-a-vis Muslim religious leaders who support Arab monarchies & military autocrats. 

All President Obama had to do was to promise harsh punishment for barbaric murders of American citizens. This eye-for-an-eye doctrine is simple, accepted in the Middle East, and fulfills the demands of honor. By keeping it so simple, President Obama could have unleashed hell onto Syrian-held ISIS territory and been respected for it in the Arab Sunni world.

1. The Dempsey Reality

Boko Haram Is on the Attack

Will the world intervene?

Militant group Boko Haram now controls 21 out of 72 major towns in northeast Nigeria—and many smaller villages, too.

The Islamic group reigns supreme over an area bigger than some African states, including the northeastern border with Cameroon. Lately, the militant group has captured towns on an almost daily basis, shattering the Nigerian army units weakened by poor equipment and low morale.

Observers and locals alike believe an attack on the regional capital Maiduguri—a city of more than a million people and home to the main army base in the northeast—is imminent.

It’s unlikely that Boko Haram could hold on to a city this large, or that the Islamists event want to. But a mere attack would be a devastating blow to the Nigerian army and would probably trigger a humanitarian catastrophe, as army troops and insurgents duke it out with heavy weapons in a densely populated cityscape.

To be fair, Nigeria’s armed forces aren’t losing every battle.

Recently the military repelled an attack on the town of Mubi. Troops have retaken some other towns, and the Nigerian air force—while not without its problems—is certainly helping. But on the whole, the army seems to be completely out of its depth and unable to stop to Boko Haram’s surge.

The problem is aggravated by the government’s incompetent media strategy.

For years, the Nigerian government has claimed that Boko Haram is on the verge of defeat. It has published outlandishly high body counts while denying any setbacks of its own.

Boko Haram-controlled towns in red. In blue, towns that have been under attack but which are still under government control. Original with sources:https://mapsengine.google.com/map/edit?mid=zFRhTwLcBvyk.kmcXT1OC3zeM

TO DEFEAT ISIS, KEEP IT SIMPLE

J. Michael Barrett

September 15, 2014

An ages-old military dictum known as the “KISS” principle warns wartime planners to “Keep it Simple, Stupid.” Complexity is all too often the enemy of success. When too many uncertainties mix together the unknowable amount of resulting risk always becomes unmanageable. Unfortunately, the Obama administration’s newly announced strategy to deal with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) severely violates this principle.

First, the strategy seems ignorant of Iraq’s troubled history — the lessons of which a generation of American service members has learned at great cost. The administration is desperately hoping to hold together a state whose borders were defined by the West less than a hundred years ago, but which has been marked by internecine strife between three distinct cultural segments — Sunnis, Shi’a, and Kurds — for nearly 1400 years. Indeed, this is yet another instance of the tribalistic “my family against my neighbor, my neighbor against my clan, and my clan against the neighboring clan” cultural view dominant throughout much of the Middle East. The past three decades have continued this pattern in Iraq: Sunnis brutally repressed and starved out the country’s Shi’a during a horrific decade-long war with Iran, a predominantly Shi’a country, and following the 1991 Gulf War there was a series of Shi’a and Kurdish uprisings against Saddam Hussein, the suppression of which included forcible relocation of the mainly Shi’a Marsh Arabs living in the Tigris-Euphrates river basin and the deadly gassing of thousands of Kurds. Is it any wonder then that when Shi’a Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki came to power he demonstrably favored his own sect and that Sunnis and Kurds roundly rejected him? More to the point, is there any real chance the new Shi’a prime minister will be significantly more successful in uniting these disparate, ages-old enemies when centuries of mistrust continue to cloud public and sectarian opinion, and be able to do so amidst an ongoing civil war?

It is a fool’s errand to try to force the state of Iraq to remain intact when that outcome requires political compromises and burying of religious and ethnic hatreds that are all too evident throughout the entire region. The facts on the ground and decades of Western political and military failures support the conclusion that forcing these disparate sects together without also accepting a ruthless dictator brutal enough to force public acquiescence is simply not possible. And, obviously, this policy also means hoping against hope that the complex swirl of sectarian divides, unstable (if not untenable) power-sharing arrangements, and splitting of spoils and oil revenues can be contained while the central government fights the prolonged civil war against ISIS that has taken root within its borders. Yet the administration’s plans hinge on providing support to Iranian-backed Iraqi leaders in taking on the Sunni extremists of ISIS by arming and supporting moderate Sunnis who will be fighting to sustain their subservience to a Shi’a government. Wouldn’t it make more sense to recognize the reality of three distinct territories of what used to be Iraq and thus help Kurds, Sunnis, and Shi’a fight ISIS in the name of their own respective sovereignties? Then all the parties would be defending their own self-interest, and the anti-ISIS battle can be separated from the entangled complexity of objectives that arise when defeating ISIS leads to political outcomes against the fighting forces’ own interests.

ASSESSING THE TERRORIST THREAT 13 YEARS AFTER 9/11: OLD GUARD AL QAEDA, TEAM ISIS & THE UPSTARTS

Clint Watts

September 11, 2014

Since the tenth anniversary of al Qaeda’s attacks on the United States, 9/11 has slowly become an afterthought, an increasingly distant memory of an absolutely awful day. For sure, the National Geographic Channel will dust off its 9/11 specials and run them on a continuous loop while the History Channel serves up Osama bin Laden biopics. For the superstitious, this year’s unlucky 13th anniversary might be of greater concern than past years. They are correct, but for the wrong reasons. At no time since the original 9/11 attacks has there been such a diverse set of terrorist threats that might strike the West, and so much certainty about the intentions of the dozen or more jihadi terrorist groups scattered around the world. For Americans on Sept. 11, 2014, the question is not “Will al Qaeda attack us again?” Instead, it is “Which one of these terrorist groups will attack us?”

Today’s Jihadi Terrorism: From Al Qaeda as the Primary to Al Qaeda as One of Many

The Afghan mujahideen victory over the Soviet Union concluded with the famous march of Lt. Gen. Boris Gromov over the bridge into Uzbekistan on Feb. 15, 1989. A little more than 12 years later, Osama bin Laden’s al Qaeda pulled off its third attack against the United States on Sept. 11, 2001, this time striking the U.S. homeland and forever changing American perceptions of their security. Most Americans have remained trapped in a psychological time warp pinned in place by the awful memories of the 9/11 attacks. Despite most Westerners not moving on from bin Laden’s great success, adherents to jihadi ideology have. Today marks 13 years since al Qaeda reached its pinnacle. Since then, jihadi terrorism has become more diffuse, both ideologically and geographically.

Prior to his death, bin Laden represented the height of jihadi terrorism, admired by his followers and respected by his challengers within the jihadi community. His resume spoke for itself: a fighter in Afghanistan, leader of three successful attacks on U.S. targets; the Embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, an attack on USS Cole and 9/11. What other jihadi leader could boast such merits? More importantly, bin Laden had money and vision. He could put together a plan, staff it and resource it. Al Qaeda’s regional affiliates adored bin Laden. They needed his resources and approval, hence the push by disparate groups to take on the al Qaeda moniker to strengthen their own appeal. Bin Laden kept the lid on a violent stew brewing in the next generation of jihadis fighting in Iraq under the leadership of new men of more brutal action like Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

Bin Laden’s death freed a new generation of seasoned foreign fighters from the Iraqi battlefields and affiliates in Yemen, the Sahel and now Syria to push for Islamic governance – a goal for which al Qaeda has always pursued with trepidation. Each month since bin Laden’s death has seen greater autonomy on the part of al Qaeda’s affiliates. Since 2011, the Syrian civil war has breathed new life into jihadi militancy, providing an unprecedented wave of recruits, a larger number of whom were ten years old or younger on 9/11. This new generation of jihadists has grown up knowing Iraq, Zarqawi and Facebook more than bin Laden, Afghanistan or the mosque. For al Qaeda, now led by Ayman al Zawahiri and pinned down by global counterterrorism efforts, the currents of jihad have become too much to manage, leaving the group as just one voice among many rather than the uncontested leader of the jihadist movement. Today, Americans face three jihadi threats: Old Guard al Qaeda, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS, one of the many acronyms for the so-called Islamic State) and an array of Regional Upstarts

Old Guard Al Qaeda – Still Targeting The U.S. On The Way To Irrelevancy

Paths to War, Then and Now, Haunt Obama

By PETER BAKER
SEPT. 13, 2014

President Obama on Wednesday in Washington. Mr. Obama says he is aware of the “political price” he pays for being deliberate. CreditPool photo by Saul Loeb

WASHINGTON — Just hours before announcing an escalated campaign against Islamic extremists last week, President Obama privately reflected on another time when a president weighed military action in the Middle East — the frenzied weeks leading up to the American invasion of Iraq a decade ago.

“I was not here in the run-up to Iraq in 2003,” he told a group of visitors who met with him in the White House before his televised speech to the nation, according to several people who were in the meeting. “It would have been fascinating to see the momentum and how it builds.”

In his own way, Mr. Obama said, he had seen something similar, a virtual fever rising in Washington, pressuring him to send the armed forces after the Sunni radicals who had swept through Iraq and beheaded American journalists. He had told his staff, he said, not to evaluate their own policy based on external momentum. He would not rush to war. He would be deliberate.

“But I’m aware I pay a political price for that,” he said.

His introspection that afternoon reflected Mr. Obama’s journey from the candidate who wanted to wind down America’s overseas wars to the commander in chief who just resumed and expanded one. For Mr. Obama, that spring of 2003, when President George W. Bush sent troops to topple Saddam Hussein, has framed his own presidency. He has spent nearly six years trying to avoid repeating it.

In forming a plan to destroy the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria using airpower and local forces, but not regular American ground troops, he searched for ways to avoid the mistakes of the past. He felt “haunted,” he told his visitors, by the failure of a Special Forces raid to rescue the American hostages James Foley and Steven J. Sotloff — “we just missed them,” he said — but their subsequent murders were not the real reason he opted for war, although he noted that gruesome videos released by ISIS had helped galvanize public support for action.

The Islamic State Is Losing the Twitter War

Patrick Tucker

September 12, 2014

Earlier this week, the president reiterated the administration’s ultimate objective toward the Islamic State: airstrikes and partner support “to degrade and ultimately destroy the terrorist group.” But one former IS safe haven may have already been reclaimed: the social networking site Twitter.

Patrick Tucker is technology editor for Defense One. He’s also the author of The Naked Future: What Happens in a World That Anticipates Your Every Move? (Current, 2014). Previously, Tucker was deputy editor for The Futurist, where he served for nine years. Tucker's writing on emerging technology.

It’s a recent change. In June, the group’s al-I’tisam page had more than 50,000 followers and the Islamic State’s al-Hayat Media Center operated numerous Twitter accounts with overlapping roles such as quoting Islamic scripture (the Ajnad) and producing multi-media assets (al-Furqan). Local IS groups had Twitter pages and affiliated organizations played a role in coordinating and spreading IScommunications, according to Rita Katz, the one of the founders of SITE Intelligence, a jihadist watchdog group.

“Twitter became an important tool for jihadists because of its ease of use and ability to provide rapid updates to an unlimited number of viewers. Some jihadists became active to the point of ‘live’ tweeting during fighting, reporting about injuries or deaths of fellow fighters and battle outcomes without any censorship,” Katz wrote in a blog post in June.

Perhaps the most important role that Twitter played for IS played was as a forum where potential volunteers could ask IS fighters questions about the process of joining up. It was also a means for IS to control new recruits who had to give up their social media passwords upon becoming part of the group.

Without Twitter, the Islamic State might not have been able to grow to 10,000 fighters last spring (the size of IS is currently estimated at 30,000) but the phenomenon was self-perpetuating. Many of the jihadists who became part of the Islamic State through Twitter went right back to work tweeting on behalf of IS upon their acceptance. Former Taliban recruiter and Canadian intelligence operative Mubin Shaikh recently revealed to the International Business Times that media warrior was one of the three jobs offered to fresh IS fighters.

Follow ISIS on Twitter: A Special Report on the Use of Social Media by Jihadists

By: Rita Katz

The Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham [ISIS], along with its ongoing offensive on Iraqi cities, continues to intensify its use of mobile electronic devices and social media as important weapons of war. Tweets of beheading videos and posts of gruesome images led to Twitter’s suspension of two important ISIS pages, al-I'tisam and al-Hayat, three days after ISIS’s conquest of Mosul. Twitter's action, while symbolizing a step in the right direction, is too little too late.

For years, jihadi groups have recognized the multifaceted role that images, audio messages, and videos play in psychological warfare and in recruitment, and have placed substantial emphasis on media campaigns. Contrary to Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda (AQ), which frequently used news organizations such as al-Jazeera to release their media, ISIS has terrorized Iraq and the world by videotaping beheading videos and distributing them exclusively online ever since its foundation a decade ago by Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

Zarqawi’s internet jihad began in a pre-You Tube and Liveleak era, when posting videos online was difficult and time consuming. Zarqawi's group had to rely on jihadi forums and on trusted members to upload and disseminate videos and media releases. Videos such as the beheading of Nick Berg took hours to upload, and several more hours to download. Soon after the video was posted on the jihadi forum “Ansar al-Islami [Supporters of Islam],” the site crashed due to the volume of downloads. Members had to rely on those who were able to download the video to create new working links for it.

In spite of such difficulties, Zarqawi continued to use the internet as his main media outlet, and within less than a year, from anonymity, he became one of the most inspiring and beloved leaders within the jihadi community.

Why Arab militaries would not bring much firepower to the coalition against ISIL

WRITTEN BYBobby Ghosh

September 13, 2014

A great deal is being made of the fact that the Gulf Arab states with the most to fear from ISIL are loath to contribute their militaries to president Barack Obama’s global coalition against the terrorist group in Iraq and Syria. Although the Gulf countries are nominally members of the coalition, they have pledged only to provide military “assistance,” rather than aircraft to strike against ISIL targets, much less troops to fight the terrorists.

But, how useful would Gulf Arab contributions be? In purely military terms, not very.

For the most part, the Gulf states use their military to protect the ruling elite and menace civilians who dare challenge their authority. Their utility against a lethal force like ISIL is, at best, questionable.

How do Gulf Arab militaries compare with those of other nations? Torank 106 countries by their military strength, the website Global Firepower uses over 50 factors, not including nuclear weapons. By their reckoning, the highest-ranking Gulf Arab military belongs to Saudi Arabia, which is 25th. That’s in part because the quality of the military hardware at its disposal: the best that petrodollars can buy. (For instance, it ranks 13th in the number of attack aircraft and 9th in the number of armored fighting vehicles.)

Even so, Saudi Arabia ranks just one place higher than Syria overall. And, as we’ve seen, Bashar al-Assad’s forces, despite overwhelmingly superior arms, have lost vast swathes of the country to ISIL. It’s far from clear that the Saudis would fare much better.

The other Gulf states rank much farther down the list: the UAE is 42nd, Yemen 45th, Oman 69th, Kuwait 74th, Bahrain 81st and Qatar 82nd.

Facing Reality in Ukraine

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/facing-reality-ukraine-11289?page=show

Breaking down the deeper meaning of the controversy surrounding the Boistö plan. 

Robert Legvold

September 16, 2014

The attack letter on the Boistö bilateral U.S.-Russian Track II initiative setting out a path toward a stable cease-fire in Ukraine is sad, yet, in ways, useful. Sad, because it graphically displays how hard it will be to achieve consensus, even among outsiders who want to be helpful in easing Ukraine out of the current morass. But it is also useful, because it highlights what the real choices are among a series of unhappy alternatives. Participants on both sides are highly respected, experienced individuals and, thus, their clash of views merits more than passing attention.

Set aside the critics’ strange dismissal of the Boistö plan, because Ukrainians were not part of the meeting. Since when have any among the eighty-nine letter signers not participated in some initiative—singular, bilateral or broader—designed to develop ideas for solving a problem where the third party or parties concerned were absent? The Boistö participants, most from universities and think tanks, were simply trying to sketch a path that might be helpful, should the Ukrainian sides and their foreign allies wish to walk it. As the report says, a high-level U.S.-Russian dialogue is needed as “part of a larger discussion that must include Ukrainian as well as European representatives.”

The real issue is whether the path suggested is helpful. The signers say “no” for four reasons:

First, they contend, the initiative treats the two sides “as equals and fails to recognize Russia as the aggressor.” Russia’s role in the Donbas war surely amounts to aggression, but how helpful will making that the premise of an agreement requiring Russian cooperation be to achieving an agreement? To drive home their point, the authors of the letter condemn the initiative’s call for “withdrawal of regular Russian and Ukrainian army units to an agreed distance from conflict zones,” and insist that “Russia must remove all of its forces from Ukraine and stop attacking and invading its neighbor.” Here, however, it would be useful to distinguish between steps key to a cease-fire and what will ultimately be required to end the war in eastern Ukraine. What President Poroshenko and President Putin agreed to as part of the Minsk cease-fire is essentially what the Boistö initiative urges; what the initiative’s critics demand must, indeed, be the ultimate goal.

With China on the Rise, America Must Woo India

Paul J. Leaf

September 15, 2014 

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-the-rise-america-must-woo-india-11275?page=show

"Obama must take bold steps to show Modi that India’s future is best secured by closer ties to the United States and its partners." 

The competition between the United States, Japan and China is heating up. All three countries are aiming to woo India—a country whose uncommitted partnership will help to define Asia’s balance of power. At meetings on September 29 and September 30 between President Barack Obama and Indian prime minister Narendra Modi, Washington must reinvigorate the countries’ recently strained ties, make up ground lost to Beijing in courting New Delhi, and supplement Tokyo’s progress in drawing New Delhi closer.

There are many motivations for wooing India. It has the world’s second largest population and is projected to surpass China’s by 2028. As measured by GDP, India’s economy is the third largest in Asia. New Delhi fields the world’s second largest army, its military budget exceeds $38 billion (up 12 percent over the previous year), it is expected to become the world’s fourth largest defense spender by 2020, and it has been the world’s top arms importer since 2010. India is enhancing its power-projection capabilities, including by developing long-range nuclear missiles and manufacturing indigenous nuclear submarines and aircraft carriers. The country shares a 2,500-mile border with China and sits near critical chokepoints in the Indian Ocean, through which over 80 percent of the world’s seaborne oil passes, along with almost one third of global trade. Given its strength and location, India can shape Asia’s balance of power in favor of or against China, depending on whether it deepens its cooperation with the United States and China’s competitors.

While in many respects, India is a natural U.S. ally, its partnership should not be assumed. These democracies’ overlapping interests include avoiding a hostile Chinese rise, maintaining open sea-lanes to meet their energy needs and combatting terrorism. But New Delhi’s history of nonalignment dampens its willingness to militarily partner with other countries. After all, India seeks favorable relations with all countries to maximize its benefits from each, and Modi came to office promising significant economic development after India’s average annual growth dipped from approximately 9 percent for over seven years to under 5 percent since 2012. Given doubts about U.S. security commitments in Asia and India’s deep economic ties to China (which is New Delhi’s largest trade partner and a growing investment source), these preferences are amplified vis-à-vis anti-China coalitions. Indeed, during the recent summit between Modi and Japanese prime minister Shinzo Abe, the leaders struck economic deals, but failed to finalize pending security agreements. Perhaps Modi sought to encourage Chinese investment in his country and avoid upsetting Chinese president Xi Jinping before his scheduled India visit later this month.

Scot free?

The Statesman

16 Sep 2014

SALMAN HAIDAR

After some 300 years of existence, the United Kingdom is trembling at the edge of what could be its dissolution. In the next few days the Scots will vote in a referendum to decide whether they continue in union with England or whether they cast off and fashion a future for themselves as an independent sovereign country. The move to go their own way has been in the air for some time, and though it started as a rather fringe sentiment, reflecting historic Scottish grumbling about being tied to a larger and stronger entity, in the past few years the issue has become more politically significant and more strongly contested. Regional sentiments have strengthened in Scotland and, to a lesser degree, in other parts of the British Isles, and have compelled a number of constitutional changes that have led to the devolution of more power and authority to regional administrations. The extent of devolution, however, has not fully met the wishes of the Scots, and there has been a steady buildup of sentiment in Scotland in favour of complete separation. 

What had been a somewhat desultory political campaign was greatly energized by the decision that there should be a referendum on the subject, and as the date approaches, there is real uncertainty about the outcome. It is not just the irreconcilable fringe but much the greater part of the population that has been drawn into the debate, with over 4 million having signed up to express their view and make their choice.

An observer in India of these proceedings may well be bemused by the passions driving the referendum. In India's colonial experience, there was not much to distinguish one part of the UK from the other: they were a single entity joined together by their Act of Union, and they were conjoint in the colonization of India, to which they brought the same skills and attitudes, the English perhaps more intent on ruling while the Scots sent engineers and doctors to construct the Raj. The British Indian army was where their parallel legacy was most visible, the English with their punctilio, the Scots with their bagpipes and tartan. There may have been small differences here and there, but no notable divergences. Scotland was part and parcel of the imperial enterprise that coloured a good part of the globe red in acknowledgement of British ascendancy, and while that is over and done with, there are still some tangible spinoffs from their past to benefit and gratify the British Isles and its inhabitants. But all this seems to have been obscured by the campaign to create a little, separate Scotland, entirely distinct from the country of which it is a part today.

What is happening in Scotland has its parallels elsewhere too, especially in Europe, where localized nationalisms are finding new room to flourish and express themselves. Paradoxically, this is taking place at a time when there is also a strong counter-flow against unbridled national sentiment in international affairs, and nowhere is this more to be seen than in the European Union (EU), which embodies supranational and collective decision-making that transcends localized or regionalized demands. Indeed, many decisions that were once the domain of national parliaments are now taken in Brussels at EU headquarters, which sometimes provokes a nationalistic backlash, as is to be seen quite frequently in England where commitment to the EU is notably uncertain and is under frequent challenge. In Scotland, however, the EU evokes much warmer sentiments and is regarded as a buttress rather than a threat to its sovereign rights. For those who are pushing for separation, membership of the EU offers Scotland an assured and stable future after it breaks its union with England, on the assumption that it would continue to be a member of the EU after the split, without any serious disruption. The reality of the EU and what it provides to member-states is an important element in the discussion of the pros and cons of Scottish separation from England.

Withering away of a revolution

by R K Vij 

September 16, 2014

http://indianexpress.com/article/opinion/columns/withering-away-of-a-revolution/99/

The recent surge in the surrender of Maoist cadres, particularly in Dandakaranya, seems to be a reality check for the protagonists of Maoist ideology, who claim that only a protracted armed struggle can bring about social transformation in a class-ridden society. Maoists of all hues — members of military formations or the People’s Liberation Guerilla Army (PLGA), political formations and the Janatana Sarkar (people’s government) — are leaving the so-called “revolutionary” path they had pledged to tread when joining the movement against the feudal and semi-colonial ruling class. The romance of the armed struggle for capturing power is, perhaps, waning.

There are three main reasons for the surrender of Maoist cadres. The first and foremost is the realisation of the futility of the (people’s) war. More than three decades of violence have not produced any convincing results. Whatever existed in the name of development has been vandalised by the Maoists. An ex-president of the Janatana Sarkar in the Indravati (Maad) area, venting his frustration while surrendering, said that he was fed up with the Maoists’ lofty claims and false promises of realising collective party goals, and that the party has little to show in terms of achievements. Another cadre said he had joined the Maoists because he had seen only Naxalites in the jungles of Maad. But when he encountered the real world outside Maad, he decided to join the mainstream. A former member of the Chetna Natya Manch (CNM), of the Dandakaranya Special Zonal Committee (DKSZC), said the party could no longer charm people with its revolutionary songs and dances to make them join up. Despite their serious efforts, more cadres are now leaving than joining. People’s support, the cornerstone of any revolution, has been eroding steadily.

Second, the police’s continuous persuasion has resulted in a change of mind and heart in many cadres, who had been brainwashed by the Maoists. The police have been approaching Maoists’ family members with the government’s surrender and rehabilitation (S&R) schemes. A “back-home” programme initiated by the former Gadchiroli superintendent of police, Suvez Haque, and followed by many others has proven efficacious. This has also helped the police gain the trust of Maoist cadres who have become disgruntled with their decision to tread the path of bloodshed. Often, pamphlets are distributed in local markets and hung in remote areas, so that the message of returning to the mainstream may reach wandering Maoist cadres. One dalam commander on surrender revealed that when such posters were being put up by a villager, he had grabbed one and decided to surrender with his weapon, as it carried a huge reward. The media, due to its pervasiveness, has also played a significant role in spreading awareness of such schemes.

Third, many Maoist cadres are deserting because of personal reasons. After tying the marital knot in forest camps, they are not allowed to enjoy married life. Therefore, many couples are surrendering. The killings of family members by the Maoists, allegations of informing the police about their movements, and discrimination against and exploitation of junior cadres, especially women, have prompted many to surrender. “Despite my protests, they killed my younger brother, only because he had joined the police department,” said a divisional-level Maoist who had himself recruited many dalam members because of his influence. He then facilitated the surrender of each cadre he had inducted.

The Mathematics of Ebola Trigger Stark Warnings: Act Now or Regret It

BY MARYN MCKENNA

09.14.14

http://www.wired.com/2014/09/r0-ebola/ 

The Ebola epidemic in Africa has continued to expand since I last wrote about it, and as of a week ago, has accounted for more than 4,200 cases and 2,200 deaths in five countries: Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, Senegal and Sierra Leone. That is extraordinary: Since the virus was discovered, no Ebola outbreak’s toll has risen above several hundred cases. This now truly is a type of epidemic that the world has never seen before. In light of that, several articles were published recently that are very worth reading. 

The most arresting is a piece published last week in the journal Eurosurveillance, which is the peer-reviewed publication of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (the EU’s Stockholm-based version of the US CDC). The piece is an attempt to assess mathematically how the epidemic is growing, by using case reports to determine the “reproductive number.” (Note for non-epidemiology geeks: The basic reproductive number — usually shorted to R0 or “R-nought” — expresses how many cases of disease are likely to be caused by any one infected person. An R0 of less than 1 means an outbreak will die out; an R0 of more than 1 means an outbreak can be expected to increase. If you saw the movie Contagion, this is what Kate Winslet stood up and wrote on a whiteboard early in the film.) 

The Eurosurveillance paper, by two researchers from the University of Tokyo and Arizona State University, attempts to derive what the reproductive rate has been in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone. (Note for actual epidemiology geeks: The calculation is for the effective reproductive number, pegged to a point in time, hence actually Rt.) They come up with an R of at least 1, and in some cases 2; that is, at certain points, sick persons have caused disease in two others. 

You can see how that could quickly get out of hand, and in fact, that is what the researchers predict. Here is their stop-you-in-your-tracks assessment: 

In a worst-case hypothetical scenario, should the outbreak continue with recent trends, the case burden could gain an additional 77,181 to 277,124 cases by the end of 2014. 

That is a jaw-dropping number.

The epidemic curves of the Ebola epidemic; look especially at the line for Liberia. From Nishiura and Chowell; original here. 

What should we do with information like this? At the end of last week, two public health experts published warnings that we need to act urgently in response. 

First, Dr. Richard E. Besser: He is now the chief health editor of ABC News, but earlier was acting director of the US CDC, including during the 2009-10 pandemic of H1N1 flu; so, someone who understands what it takes to stand up a public-health response to an epidemic. In his piece in the Washington Post, “The world yawns as Ebola takes hold in West Africa,” he says bluntly: “I don’t think the world is getting the message.” 

He goes on: 

U.S. Pins Hope on Syrian Rebels With Loyalties All Over the Map

By BEN HUBBARD, ERIC SCHMITT and MARK MAZZETTI
SEPT. 11, 2014

Source Link

BEIRUT, Lebanon — President Obama’s determination to train Syrian rebels to serve as ground troops against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria leaves the United States dependent on a diverse group riven by infighting, with no shared leadership and with hard-line Islamists as its most effective fighters.

After more than three years of civil war, there are hundreds of militias fighting President Bashar al-Assad — and one another. Among them, even the more secular forces have turned to Islamists for support and weapons over the years, and the remaining moderate rebels often fight alongside extremists like the Nusra Front, Al Qaeda’s affiliate in Syria.

“You are not going to find this neat, clean, secular rebel group that respects human rights and that is waiting and ready because they don’t exist,” said Aron Lund, a Syria analyst who edits the Syria in Crisis blog for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “It is a very dirty war and you have to deal with what is on offer.”

Areas of Dominance 

Syrian government

Opposition

ISIS

TURKEY

Qamishli

Hasakah

Aleppo

Rakka

Latakia

IRAQ

ISIS began a campaign

to take control of the

airbase outside the city on

Aug. 26.

Deir al-Zour

Hama

SYRIA

Homs

LEBANON

SYRIAN DESERT

100 MILES

Beirut

The capital’s center is controlled

by the Syrian government,

but the outskirts are

held by opposition

forces.

Population data from 2004 Census, the most recent available. Cities without circles had less than 100,000 residents.

POPULATION

Damascus

2,000,000

1,000,000

500,000

ISRAEL

200,000

Analysts who track the rebel movement say that the concept of the Free Syrian Army as a unified force with an effective command structure is a myth.

Whatever force the United States can muster, it will face a jihadist army that has surged in size. Todd Ebitz, a spokesman for the Central Intelligence Agency, said Thursday that the agency now believes ISIS has between 20,000 and 31,500 fighters in Iraq and Syria, an increase from a previous assessment of more than 10,000 fighters.

Why America Needs An Army with Tanks

By BG Leopoldo Quintas and CPT Nicholas Simpson, U.S. Army Armor School

September 8, 2014 

http://tacticaldefensemedia.com/blog/2014/09/08/why-america-needs-an-army-with-tanks/

Leaders from the U.S. Army Armor School, Fort Benning, GA, explain why armored vehicles are anything but obsolete.

Recently, critics have argued that the tank is a relic of the Cold War era made obsolete by advanced aircraft and unmanned systems. This argument ignores the unique and necessary capabilities provided by mobile protected firepower. Even in a fiscally constrained environment, the main battle tank continues to play a critical role in maintaining peace and winning conflicts. As an integral member of the combined arms team, the tank serves as a component of the Army’s ability to gain, sustain, and exploit control over land, resources, and people. The tank’s enduring qualities of mobility, protection, and firepower provide versatility and tactical agility in both combined arms maneuver and wide area security environments.

The Army’s main battle tank, M1A2SEP, which has undergone significant technological advances over its lifetime, provides decisive overmatch against a variety of threats, from dismounted infantry to heavy armored vehicles, and serves as a deterrent to would be adversaries. As the U.S. shifts its focus to the Asia-Pacific region, where armies collectively possess some 50,000 armored fighting vehicles, the tank will remain a vital element of America’s power on the world stage.

The Importance of Mobile Protected Firepower 

The tank delivers qualitative tactical capabilities that cannot be underestimated or replaced. As Clint Ancker, the director of the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at Fort Leavenworth, KS, observed, “Since the early days of recorded combat, there are three essential capabilities for land combat—the ability to move around the battlefield to gain a position of advantage (mobility), the ability to deliver a blow sufficient to kill or psychologically demoralize an enemy (shock or firepower), and the ability to defeat such blows by the enemy (protection).” The tank possesses the ability to terminate a long firefight by providing mobile protected firepower against enemy infantry, fortified positions, and armored vehicles. To illustrate this point, the Abrams platform is the most survivable ground combat platform in the Army’s inventory. Its unique ability to employ precise and discriminate lethal effects serves to simultaneously destroy enemy capabilities with limited collateral damage and to destroy the enemy’s will to fight.

The mobile protected firepower provided by the tank proved irreplaceable by other assets from the combined arms and joint team, and as one division commander stated, “No one wants to go downtown without tanks.”

Shia team to bring back Indians recruited by ISIS

Maria Akram

Sep 16, 2014

ISIS jihadists marching through Raqqa in Syria.

NEW DELHI: A delegation of six members from Anjuman-e Haideri (AEH), a Shia committee from Delhi, will go to Iraq to provide help and appeal to Indian Muslims, who have allegedly joined ISIS, to come back. 

The Shia body is in touch with the Indian and Iraq governments and around 6000 volunteers are lined up to go to the war-torn country. 

Shia leader, Maulana Kalbe Jawwad Naqvi, in a news conference on Monday said that Zionists and their cohorts are reportedly engaged in training and financing the ISIS and other terrorist groups. 

"There are reports that the ISIS terrorists injured in Iraq are being ferried by helicopters for treatment in Israel." The delegation will do humanitarian work and doctors, nurses and engineers have been roped in to help. 

When AEH asked people to volunteer, over 2 lakh people signed up. "Not only Muslims, even people from different religions have come forward to volunteer. There are doctors and engineers in the list and these will be sent to Iraq." 

ISIS has attracted jihadists from across the world to join them like the Chechen jihadist above. 

The members of the committee said that anyone who supports ISIS, Boko Haram, al-Qaida isn't a Muslim as no religion allows anyone to kill innocent people. They have also urged the Indian government to take ISIS seriously as it has threatened to attack Kashmir. 

Members of AEH claim to have recently received a letter from Khairullah, deputy minister of foreign affairs, government of Republic of Iraq, thanking the committee and Indian government for volunteering to protect holy shrines in Iraq.