ISIS Goes to Asia Extremism in the Middle East Isn't Only Spreading West

By Joseph Chinyong Liow

September 21, 2014 

Source Link

A man prays in a mosque outside Kuala Lumpur. (Courtesy Reuters)

As the United States sought in recent weeks to assemble an international coalition to combat the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS, also known as the Islamic State), it looked mostly to the Middle East and Europe, regions that it said face a direct threat from the militant Islamist group. But other parts of the world are just as anxious about ISIS -- above all, Southeast Asia. The governments of that region have not publicized their concerns very loudly, but they are acutely aware that ISIS is a menace. Their top concern is that its extremist ideology will prove attractive to the region’s many Muslims, lure some of them to the Middle East to fight as part of the group, and ultimately be imported back to the region when these militants return home.

There is a clear precedent for this scenario. During the 1980s, many young Muslims from Southeast Asia went to Pakistan to support the Afghan mujahideen’s so-called jihad against Soviet occupation. Many of these recruits subsequently stayed in the region, mingling with like-minded Muslims from all around and gaining exposure to al Qaeda’s militant ideology. Many eventually returned to Southeast Asia to form extremist groups of their own, including the notorious al Qaeda­–linked organization Jemaah Islamiyah that was responsible for several high-profile terrorist attacks in the region over the last 15 years. With evidence now surfacing of Southeast Asians among the ranks of ISIS casualties, it’s only natural that governments in the region are feeling a sense of déjà vu.

RADICAL CHIC

Singapore has already revealed that several of its nationals have made their way to the Middle East to battle with ISIS, and the Philippine government has suggested that local ISIS sympathizers are attempting to recruit from among the Bangsamoro populations in the country’s southern islands. But the greatest concern comes from Indonesia and Malaysia. Indonesia, the world’s most populous Muslim country, has already confirmed that more than 50 of its citizens are currently fighting in Syria and Iraq; Malaysia has suggested that between 30 and 40 Malaysians are doing the same. In both cases, the actual numbers could be much higher if we consider those who may have traveled to the conflict zones from other destinations. Indonesian authorities have already noted that several of their nationals have been killed fighting for ISIS in Syria. On May 26, a Malaysian suicide bomber killed himself in an ISIS attack in Iraq. Another Malaysian fighter who died fighting for ISIS in Syria several months later has been celebrated as a martyr by leaders of the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party, the same party that had earlier dismissed him after he departed for Syria. Intriguingly, three Malaysian women were also alleged to have left for Syria to wage a “sexual jihad” (jihad al-nikah), offering their bodies to ISIS fighters to “boost their morale.”

ISIS’ reach in Southeast Asia is based on several factors. First, certain devout Muslims feel a theological affinity for the militant group. They see parallels between ISIS’ mission and prophecies in Islamic holy texts of the eventual creation of a Khilafah Minhaj Nebuwwah (“end-times caliphate”) following the fall of dictators in the Arabian Peninsula; they are also reminded of the apocalyptic struggle that is said to be fated between the forces of Imam Mahdi, an Islamic messiah figure who is supposed to fight under a black flag, and those of the Dajjal, or Antichrist. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this millenarian perspective is growing in Indonesia and Malaysia with radical clerics such as Aman Abdurrahman, who, though in jail, are expanding their reach through the Internet and radical tracts -- including a book titled Strategi Dua Lengan (Two-Armed Strategy) -- increasingly finding their way into Indonesian translation.

Another reason for ISIS’ appeal is its sectarianism. The ISIS challenge is seen in some quarters as an extension of the Sunni-Shiite schism. To wit: The group’s struggle against Bashar al-Assad’s Alawite regime is considered legitimate in fundamentalist Sunni-Salafi circles. In much the same way, ISIS militancy in Iraq is seen as a consequence of Sunni grievance against the Shiite-led government of Nouri al-Maliki. This support needs to be understood in the context of Southeast Asia’s own problems with sectarianism: Shiite Islam is banned in Malaysia and is not widely accepted in Indonesia.

Finally, the question of the recruitment of Southeast Asians into ISIS cannot be divorced from the larger context of the humanitarian crisis in Syria. The universal sympathy for the Syrian people among Southeast Asia’s sizable Muslim populations has undoubtedly prompted a large number of humanitarian missions to depart for the conflict zone. Many members of these missions may well have set off with noble intentions. But once they arrive in territory held by ISIS, it is not difficult to imagine how they would be exposed to ISIS indoctrination and recruitment.

FALSE ANALOGY

What’s Happening to Russia’s Aging Fleet of Spy Satellites

Russia Lives In The 1980s

strategypage.com , September 26, 2014

One September 2nd a Russian spy satellite entered the atmosphere and visibly burned up over the western United States. On the ground people from New Mexico to Montana could see a bright red streak of light move across the sky with smaller red streaks seeming to fall from the main streak. To experienced observers it was clear that this was not a meteorite, which would have burned up much more quickly than a satellite falling out of orbit. The red streak was soon identified as Cosmos 2495, a Russian Kobalt-M spy satellite that had been secretly launched four months earlier. Russia denied that the September 2nd sighting was of a Kobalt-M spy satellite but most available evidence said otherwise. There are hundreds of quite competent and experience amateur satellite watchers who, thanks to the Internet, can quickly share information and this community has an impressive track record in identifying satellites whose owners will not admit even exist.

At this time only three of the 98 spy satellites in orbit are Russian while 31 are American and the rest are from a number of countries (including Israel). The satellite that put on the September 2nd light show was the ninth Kobalt M reconnaissance satellite launched. The eighth one went up in 2012 and the first one was launched in 2002. The second Kobalt M went up in May 2006, in a very dramatic fashion. That was because at the time the only operational Russian spy satellite (a naval reconnaissance bird) had died the previous month. By the end of 2006, Russia managed to launch an electronic recon satellite and another naval recon satellite. At the time Russia had dozens of military satellites in orbit, but they were all for communications or everything but photo and electronic reconnaissance. Russia is still using a lot of birds designed with Soviet (Cold War era) technology. This is changing, as a new generation of satellites, built more to Western standards, is going up. But a lot of the older tech will remain in use for the foreseeable future.

Kobalt M satellites weigh 6.7 tons and contain three re-entry vehicles for returning film. Yes, a quarter century after the United States stopped using this method Russia continues to use film, instead of digital photography, for some of its recon birds. In the United States the last generation of film-using spy satellites, the Keyhole 9 (or KH 9), was used in 1984. The KH 1 through 9 series satellites sent film back in canisters (for high resolution pictures), to be developed.

The Keyhole 9, the first of which went up in 1971, was not only the last of the American film satellite designs but the largest and most capable. Its basic layout was used by the subsequent digital camera birds. The KH 9 could cover large areas at high (for the time) resolution of .6 meters (24 inches). This was more than adequate to spot and count tanks, aircraft, and even small warships. The 19th, and last, KH 9 went up in 1984. The KH-9 was a 13 ton satellite with multiple cameras and 4 or 5 reentry vehicles for returning the film for developing and analysis. The KH-9s were nicknamed Big Bird. The first film camera satellite, KH 1, went up in 1959. Thus for 25 years the film-using satellites supplied coverage of hostile nations.

Israel's New Strategy

By Barry Rubin

From our July/August 2006 Issue

Source Link

Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas (L) and Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon (R) shake hands during their meeting at Sharm el-Sheikh, February 8, 2005. (Aladin Abdel Naby / Courtesy Reuters)

THE END OF OCCUPATION Israeli politics and policy are undergoing a revolutionary transformation -- one of the most important developments in the nation's history. As dramatic as recent events have been, equally important is the emergence of a new strategic paradigm that reverses 30 years of debate and practice and overturns some of Israelis' most basic assumptions.

Why have perceptions, politics, and strategy changed so dramatically? The shift began when Prime Minister Ariel Sharon ordered a complete withdrawal from the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank, including the dismantling of Jewish settlements in those areas. Within a few months, Sharon's Likud Party had revolted against him; Sharon had quit Likud and formed another party, Kadima; the Labor Party had chosen a populist outsider as its leader; the governing coalition had collapsed, necessitating new elections; Sharon had been physically incapacitated by a stroke and replaced by a top deputy, Ehud Olmert; and Olmert had gone on to win in the March 2006 elections. Hamas' victory in the January 2006 Palestinian elections only underscored already existing trends.

The emerging new policy is based on a broad Israeli recognition that holding on to the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is simply not in Israel's interest, despite the fact that the Palestinian leadership has been uninterested in and incapable of making peace and that both Fatah and Hamas will use that land to try to launch attacks on Israel. The territories no longer serve a strategic function for Israel, given the unlikelihood of a conventional attack by Arab state armies, and Israel could better defend its citizens by creating a strong defensive line rather than by dispersing its forces. Moreover, because a comprehensive peace deal is not likely to be reached for many years, the territories are no longer of value as bargaining chips. During the long era before the Palestinians will be organized and moderate enough to make peace, Israel has to set its own strategy based on these realities.

TERRITORY FOR PEACE?

Hot Water in Ukraine

By Balazs Jarabik

September 23, 2014 

Source Link

Residents collect water at a pumping station in the eastern Ukrainian city of Slaviansk, June 17, 2014. (Shamil Zhumatov / Courtesy Reuters)

How the U.S. military's idiotic tribal mentality leaves us vulnerable to cyber catastrophe

By David W. Brown 

September 24, 2014

Source Link

Our leaders could solve this problem. But they won't.

The government needs the country's best and brightest tech minds to work for their country. (iStock)

The future of cyber warfare is limited only by the imaginations of enterprising hackers. In this arena, there is a dangerously level geopolitical playing field and an ill-defined domestic "turf." In the void of the unfulfilled promise of Cybercom, we're left waiting for some U.S. agency to take the lead on cyber warfare. The U.S. military in particular has a chance to "own" cyber. But if reports this week are any indication, America's armed services are going to blow it, and badly.

Here's where we are today: If you want to find the smartest minds in technology, look anywhere but the government and military. This isn't to say that there aren't clever people doing interesting things at dot-gov. But if you're a hot, second-year computer science student at Stanford, are you going to choose the huge paychecks, free gourmet food, wine-and-beer Fridays, and lavish ancillary financial benefits that come with, say, Google? Or will you choose a job in Washington D.C., a city so "with it" that — brace yourself — you might not have to wear a tie to the office?

Imagine you're a health junkie with hacking skills. Would you rather assemble at 5 a.m. to do a two-mile formation run limited by the speed of the slowest member of your Air Force flight or Army platoon and led by a first sergeant whose sole qualification for his position is time-in-service? Or would you prefer to work in a place where there are climbing walls and lap pools in the main office, company kayaks available for check-out, a free, state-of-the-art gym right there on campus, andmountain biking and hiking trails right at company headquarters? 

This is why the government is full of "technologists" so forward-thinking that they didn't think to solder closed the USB ports of computers containing the crown jewels of the intelligence community — which is basically IT 101 — and Silicon Valley is full of technologists who have developed driverless cars, contact lenses that track glucose levels, a fleet of tiny drones that can deliver packages to your front door, and, oh yeah, they have a plan to cure death.

A Decoy Computer Was Set Up Online. See Which Countries Attacked It the Most

By Jordan Roberts

Sep 24, 2014 

Photographer: Jon Feingersh/Getty Images

A systems control room. 

If you build it, they will come. And attack.

Earlier this year, I was brainstorming with Greg Martin, the founder and chief technical officer of ThreatStream, a Google Ventures-backed security startup, about finding a way to show the global nature of attacks against industrial-control systems used in electrical grids, water systems and manufacturing plants. For obvious reasons, attacks against critical infrastructure are among the biggest concerns in cyber-security.

Industrial networks are already under daily assault by hackers, and that threat is only growing as more countries develop advanced cyber-war capabilities. Few have been as thoroughly revealed to the public as the United States' through the disclosures of former National Security Agency contractor Edward Snowden.

Martin and I decided on setting up an online decoy known as a honeypot, which was made to look like an enticing industrial-control computer to hackers. It's designed to attract attacks so they can be traced and studied.

The graphic below shows which countries were the apparent source of the majority of attacks.

The Current State of Cyber-War in the World

September 26, 2014

By Kim Stewart in Security

Photo Credit: virii001 by .hj barraza Licensed under CC BY-SA 2.0

Drama. Drama is the touchstone for reporting. We have to look well around this particular stone in order to catch a realistic impression of the virtual. We have to look around it even to understand what cyber-war is or how it is defined.

When talking about cyber-war, hyperbole and metaphor are the rule rather than the exception. Cyber-this, cyber-that — you may have noticed that the virtual world is inhabited by nouns and verbs taken from the material world, and that images of cyber-things in the news tend to have dramatic pictures of physical things rather than the electrons that make up the cyber-world. Images of coins inhabit stories of purely virtual crypto-currency, such as BitCoin. Perhaps Physics journals, where readers actually are interested in the electrons and the math of the cyber-realm, are the exception to this rule.

But when we read stories of cyber-war, we see pictures of soldiers, firearms and materiel accompanying the story. When we read of the people sitting at desks and computers to figure out how to hack and not be hacked, we call them cyber-warriors and pictures of men in flak jackets and helmets accompany these stories. I wonder what cyber-item will be accompanied by pictures of tanks and bombers.

Aside from the dramatic illustrations and photos, what is cyber-war? In 2010, Richard Clarke, former special advisor to the President on cyber-security defined cyber-warfare as “actions by a nation-state to penetrate another nation’s computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption.” The salient point being that a nation-state must be identified as the offender. If this is true, then we have apparently been already involved in years-long cyber-wars, with attacks both from and to/on China, Russia, the USA, Israel, Georgia, Ukraine, the Koreas, Syria, Iran, Estonia and more. And though countries always deny it, there have been clear indicators, tantamount to proof, that these countries have set their digital attackers on one another’s networks, computers, and data. Damage to said networks, computers, and data has ensued.

Certainly, there have been cyber-attacks on and by states. But is it cyber-war? Dr. Thomas Rid, professor of security studies at King’s College says there is no cyber-war. He tends to define cyber-war in terms of physical infrastructure catastrophes — scenarios where water stops “flowing, the lights go out, trains derail, banks lose our financial records, the roads descend into chaos, elevators fail, and planes fall from the sky.” And he says it’s not going to happen. In fact, he has a 2013 book named, ‘Cyber War Will Not Take Place.’

What Businesses Could Learn From NSA

Thomas H. Davenport 

Wall Street Journal 

September 24, 2014 

I just read the interesting story about Edward Snowden in Wired, and I can’t quite figure out what I think of the man. He seems neither the patriot that James Bamford (not surprising, given his background) portrays him to be, nor the traitor that some argue. The story certainly nourishes the increasing concern that the U.S. spies on its own citizens and national allies. And there is little doubt after reading it that a disgruntled employee (or contractor) can walk out an intelligence agency’s door with a “pocket full of thumb drives.” 

However, there is little doubt that the intelligence sector in the U.S. (including the Central Intelligence Agency, the National Security Agency, parts of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, Homeland Security, and many other agencies) and elsewhere is quite accomplished at several aspects of data management and analytics. It’s also clear that businesses can learn from these organizations in several respects. Below are a few lessons from which business leaders could draw. 

Focus on intelligence about the external environment. Just the notion of gathering and analyzing “intelligence” is something businesses could emulate. Some businesses have competitive or customer intelligence operations, but most firms lack a systematic approach to learning about important aspects of the external environment. In most organizations there is no role that is responsible for making managers aware of intelligence that may affect the business. No one would argue that intelligence isn’t important for a country, but for some reason its importance has not been realized in the business sector. 

Use “sigint” as well as “humint.” The intelligence sector has historically made use of “sigint,” or signals intelligence deriving from electronic communications interception, and “humint,” or human intelligence from human analysts in the field or at headquarters. Recently, sigint has been somewhat more of a focus. However, organizations like the CIA and the FBI still maintain human-staffed listening posts in the field, and all intelligence agencies rely in part on human analysts to make sense of intelligence. Companies should also make use of both electronic and human intelligence sources; the intelligence-gathering and analyzing function will not be fully automated anytime soon. If you want to know about your customers, for example, you should examine their online behaviors, but also talk to them, and to your salespeople about them. 

New Malware System Found in Linux and Unix Ops Systems, Called SHELLSHOCK, Can Take Control of Millions of Computers

Security Experts Expect Shellshock Software Bug to Be Significant

Nicole Perlroth

New York Times

September 25, 2014

A newly discovered bug in the world’s widely used Linux and Unix operating systems could allow hackers to take control of hundreds of millions of machines around the world, according to security experts.

The bug, named Shellshock, is similar to the Heartbleed bug that generated widespread fear last spring because it would allow anyone with knowledge of the vulnerability to exploit a large number of computer servers. The flaw was discovered in Bash, short for Bourne-Again Shell, a command prompt in Unix. Unix is commonly used in corporate computer networks and is the basis of other operating systems, like Linux and Apple’s Macintosh operating system.

It is not yet clear how the bug affects Macintosh machines.

The bug, which was reported late Tuesday night, would allow hackers to write code that could surreptitiously take over a machine, or run their own programs in the background. The National Institute of Standards and Technology has said that the vulnerability is a 10 out of 10, in terms of its severity, impact and exploitability, but low in terms of its complexity, meaning it could be easily used by hackers.

While the Heartbleed bug affected some 500,000 machines, in early estimates, security experts predicted that the Shellshock bug could ultimately be far more significant.

Researchers at Kaspersky, a security firm, noted that hackers could only use Heartbleed to steal data from a server’s memory in hopes of finding something interesting. But the Shellshock vulnerability makes it possible for someone to take over a machine. The Kaspersky researchers said that as soon as the bug was reported Tuesday they detected widespread Internet scanning by so-called “white hat” hackers — most likely security researchers — as well as people believed to be cybercriminals.

The Department of Homeland Security’s Computer Emergency Readiness Team, known as US-CERT, which warns about security vulnerabilities, advised users and technology administrators to refer to their Linux or Unix-based operating systems suppliers for an appropriate patch.

Researchers at Red Hat, a company that distributes a version of Linux, found that the patch initially offered by the agency was incomplete and noted that hackers could still use Shellshock to take over a machine. They were working on a more comprehensive patch. US-CERT referred experienced technicians administrators to a GNU Bash patch, which patches for the flaw.

For users at home, security experts advised them to stay abreast of updates from techonology manufacturers on their websites, particularly for hardware such as routers.

U.S. and Chinese Officias Hold Secret Talks on Computer Hacking Issues in Washington

Bill Gertz

Washington Free Beacon

September 25, 2014

China, United States Hold Secret Cyber Talks: Talks resume as Senate report reveals military hacking against U.S. logistics contractors

Chinese officials held closed-door talks in Washington last week with U.S. cyber security counterparts despite Beijing’s formal cutoff of talks on the subject following the federal indictment of Chinese military hackers.

“We exchanged views with Chinese counterparts on cyber issues in Washington last week,” a State Department official confirmed, adding, “We do not read out the contents of our private diplomatic exchanges.”

The cyber talks were held as the Senate Armed Services Committee revealed in a declassified report last week that Chinese military hackers conducted cyber attacks against at least 20 U.S. Transportation Command contractors as part of plans for cyber attacks aimed at disrupting U.S. military operations in a future conflict. “Cyber intrusions into operationally critical contractors pose a threat to defense operations,” the report concluded.

The committee report, once labeled “Secret/Noforn,” said between June 2012 and May 2013, foreign hackers conducted 50 attacks on Transcom contractor networks, including 20 traced to China.

Chinese military hackers obtained emails, documents, user accounts, passwords, and computer source code from the contractors. A commercial ship used for military transport also was hacked by the Chinese military.

A third case involved a Chinese military “spear-phishing” email campaign against a Transcom contractor airline.

Some 90 percent of U.S. military transport, both air and sea, travels through Transcom contractors.

The Senate report quoted an earlier Defense Science Board warning of the impact of cyber attacks against logistics networks: “U.S. guns, missiles, and bombs may not fire, or may be directed against our own troops,” and “resupply, including food, water, ammunition, and fuel may not arrive when or where needed.”

The State Department official said the cyber talks were held despite China’s suspension of formal talks under a joint U.S.-China Cyber Working Group. “We regularly take opportunities to discuss our concerns and exchange views with Chinese officials about cyber issues in a variety of channels,” the official said.

“We remain committed to expanding our cooperation with the Chinese government on cyber matters where we have common ground and to candidly and constructively address differences,” the officials said.

Geospatial Center drills down on GIS for the Army

Army Geospatial Center Director Joseph Fontanella is responsible for providing geospatial expertise across multiple customer communities and technical disciplines ranging from operations, intelligence and acquisition to research and development, and modeling and simulation. The center he oversees does this by providing topographic, geodetic and geospatial information to the Army and the larger Department of Defense. The center employs both forward-deployed and reach-back elements. As the Army’s Geospatial Information Officer, Fontanella is responsible for collecting and validating geospatial requirements, formulating policy, setting priorities and securing resources in the support of the Army Geospatial Enterprise.

C4ISRNET: What is the mission of the Army Geospatial Center [AGC]?

Fontanella: Our job is to provide timely, accurate [geospatial intelligence] products and services within the framework of functional areas that support the Army Geospatial Enterprise: warfighter support, systems acquisition and program management, enterprise development and acquisition support. We also provide support in ways the national agency can’t, and we have our own collection capability. We’re a source of geospatial expertise to the Defense Department, FBI and others. We also set standards and enforce compliance, but the overriding goal is to enhance the ability of the commander to map his or her battle space.

C4ISRNET: How close are we to a common operating environment?

Fontanella: We’re coordinating with NGA [National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency] and supporting studies that optimize technology investments as they relate to common overlays, formats and ways of depicting 3-D data. We’re trying to build a ground war fighter geospatial data model. The endgame is to ensure that soldiers have the most timely and reliable information that we can bring to them, in a format that’s useful to them. If you look at how GIS [geographic information systems] technology has become more user-friendly over the years — we can take some of the credit for that because we have some ability to shape industry behavior. We’ve been pushing for open standards, and for the elimination of stovepiped systems with proprietary formats. The goal, of course, is to become platform agnostic systemwide.

New iPhone 6 Encryption Bars NSA and FBI From Accessing Customer Data

1. September 27, 2014
   
   Signaling Post-Snowden Era, New iPhone Locks Out N.S.A.
   
   David E. Sanger and Brian X Chen
   
   New York Times , September 27, 2014
   
   WASHINGTON — Devoted customers of Apple products these days worry about whether the new iPhone 6 will bend in their jean pockets. The National Security Agency and the nation’s law enforcement agencies have a different concern: that the smartphone is the first of a post-Snowden generation of equipment that will disrupt their investigative abilities.
   
   The phone encrypts emails, photos and contacts based on a complex mathematical algorithm that uses a code created by, and unique to, the phone’s user — and that Apple says it will not possess.
   
   The result, the company is essentially saying, is that if Apple is sent a court order demanding that the contents of an iPhone 6 be provided to intelligence agencies or law enforcement, it will turn over gibberish, along with a note saying that to decode the phone’s emails, contacts and photos, investigators will have to break the code or get the code from the phone’s owner.
   
   Breaking the code, according to an Apple technical guide, could take “more than 5 1/2 years to try all combinations of a six-character alphanumeric passcode with lowercase letters and numbers.” (Computer security experts question that figure, because Apple does not fully realize how quickly the N.S.A. supercomputers can crack codes.)
   
   Already the new phone has led to an eruption from the director of the F.B.I., James B. Comey. At a news conference on Thursday devoted largely to combating terror threats from the Islamic State, Mr. Comey said, “What concerns me about this is companies marketing something expressly to allow people to hold themselves beyond the law.”
   

Director of National Intelligence Unveils 2014 National Intelligence Strategy by ODNI Public Affairs

Director of National Intelligence James R. Clapper unveiled last week the 2014 National Intelligence Strategy – the blueprint that will drive the priorities for the nation’s 17 intelligence community (IC) components over the next four years. The National Intelligence Strategy (NIS) is one of the most important documents for the IC as it sets forth the strategic environment, sets priorities and objectives, and focuses resources on current and future budgets, acquisitions and operations decisions. Most importantly, the strategy builds on the success achieved with integrating intelligence since the previous NIS, as demonstrated by both high-profile operational achievements and significant enterprise improvements.

“Intelligence integration is a journey, not an end state, and the National Intelligence Strategy is another way to promote the integration of the 17 intelligence community components, which has been my major theme for the past four years. I believe it’s the reason my post and office exists, and it’s what the 9/11 Commission advocated and IRTPA [Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act] legislated,” said Clapper.

The National Intelligence Strategy lays out the strategic environment and identifies pervasive and emerging threats. While key nation states such as China, Russia, North Korea and Iran will continue to challenge U.S. interests, global power is also becoming more diffuse. New alignments and informal networks, outside of traditional power blocs and national governments, will increasingly have significant impact in global affairs. Competition for scarce resources such as food, water and energy is growing in importance as an intelligence issue as that competition exacerbates instability, and the constant advancements and globalization of technology will bring both benefits and challenges. 

“I’ve often said publicly that the United States is facing the most diverse set of threats I’ve seen in my 50 years in the intelligence business. We face significant changes in the global and domestic environment and must be ready to meet the 21st century challenges and to recognize emerging opportunities,” said Clapper.

The strategic environment also includes factors that Clapper said affect IC capabilities and what he referred to as “a perfect storm” that is degrading IC capabilities including: 1) the theft and leak of National Security Agency documents and the associated loss of collection capabilities; 2) the resulting damaged relationships with foreign and corporate stakeholders; 3) the conscious decision to stop collecting on specific targets; and 4) increasingly constrained budget resources.“The result of that perfect storm,” said Clapper, “is that we – as a nation – are taking more risk.” 

The Future of Human Rights in an Urban World

Source Link

This collection of eight essays explores the opportunities and challenges that a rapidly urbanizing world poses for human rights and for the work of human rights advocates in particular.

Authors 

Thijs van Lindert and Doutje Lettinga (eds), The Future of Human Rights in an Urban World. Exploring Opportunities, Threats and Challenges. Contributions from: Esther van den Berg and Barbara Oomen, Benjamin Barber, Parag Khanna, Marie Huchzermeyer, Margaret Kohn, Gregory Smith Simon and Sharon Zukin, Stephen Graham, Rivke Jaffe and Erella Grassiani.

Content

The world is inexorably becoming urban. Already, more than half of the world population lives in cities. By the end of this century this will be 90 percent. Cities have a direct impact on the lives of billions of people. Moreover, megacities like Beijing, New York, Sao Paulo and Delhi expand their political weight at the international stage. Nonetheless, the implications of urbanization for human rights are still unclear. Therefore Amnesty International Netherlands publishes a new volume in its Changing Perspectives on Human Rights series: The Future of Human Rights in an Urban World.

The essays discuss different views on and aspects of human rights in an urbanized world. One of the authors emphasizes the positive role that mayors play in protecting the rights of migrants, which might create opportunities for human rights advocates. Other authors foresee a world marked by the urban divide between rich and poor in which rights to housing, privacy and protest are increasingly restricted. In this new collection of essays, politicians, policymakers and human rights activists will find inspiring and worrying trends, thoughts and visions on human rights and the city.

The Future of Human Rights in an Urban World

2.19 MB 

Challenging Army Force Design

by E.J. Degen and John W. Spencer

September 22, 2014 

As the Army resets after protracted wars in Iraq and Afghanistan it is an appropriate time to challenge existing Army beliefs about force structures and design. Many inside and outside of the beltway have opined on the optimum force structure and design the Army should have for future conitingencies. Most of these arguments are based on “best professional military judgement” as opposed to thorough analysis and expirmentation. The present opinion-based discussion relating to the “McGregor Transformation Model” is a perfect example of this.[1] Fortunately, the Army has recognized a time of change and has begun to look towards the future. For Army planners to consider what the Army of the future should look like, they need to shift to a model based on experimentation and analysis.

The optimum force structures for the full range of military operations (ROMO) in an uncertain future will only be obtained if we challenge the “facts” and “assumptions” used in previous transformation efforts, apply available science to force design, and develop different models and practices for experimentation. There are also gaps in the analysis tools and processes that are needed to support decisions about shaping the future force. All of these concerns, combined with constraints on thinking about force design and force structure, may prevent the Army from preparing the force adequately for the future.

There are thirteen critical facts and assumptions that underpin thinking about Army force design, structure, management, and employment (tactical and operational). All of these should be explicitly recognized and then analyzed to determine if they should continue to guide Army thinking. If the Army does not grapple with these, the Army of the future will likely evolve into a smaller version of what it is today. We will address these in separate discussions of force design, force management, and force employment.

Force Design

Assumption: General purpose forces best allow the Army to react to emerging threats and requirements. The Army’s Brigade Combat Team (BCT) structure is designed for a specific, generally offensive mission, but it can also adapt to any mission along the ROMO. Three BCT types (light, stryker, and armor) are believed to provide the most optimum menu of force capabilities for senior leaders to apply against most military problems. Even with the variety of equipment, training, and organization of these three types of designs, each design is still a generalized model (as opposed to a specialized model). The general purpose force (GPF) is by nature not specialized against a mission, environment, enemy, or problem. This is not optimization, but rather generalization. It is not possible to optimize for general purposes.

Assumption: If you man, equip, and train a unit to conduct combined arms maneuver (CAM) all other missions are of lesser difficulty. As stated above, Army formations are designed for a specific, although general, mission. The scenarios and plans used to design army units center primarily on major combat operations. These operations involve both of the Army’s core competencies of combined arms maneuver (CAM) and wide area security (WAS), but the underlying premise to the army’s organizational designs (to include equipping and training) is that if units can execute the high end of the spectrum of military operations (specifically combined arms maneuver) they can also do and accept risk in all other missions because they are less difficult.

Employing Armor Against the Islamic State: The Inevitable Urban Combined Arms Fight

by Dennis A. Lowe

September 26, 2014

http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/employing-armor-against-the-islamic-state-the-inevitable-urban-combined-arms-fight

Employing Armor Against the Islamic State: The Inevitable Urban Combined Arms Fight

A: Where is the shooting?

B: Everywhere! In every area.

A: What is it, artillery?

B: Artillery, mortars, tanks—everywhere.

A: Where are you?

B: By the flour mill.

A: Are they attacking the flour mill?

B: Yes, and they are attacking us too. The artillery is destroying us. All of Fallujah is in ruins. Not a house left standing. What can stand? The tanks come down every street with artillery falling ahead of them.

- Intercepted jihadist cell phone conversation, November 12th, 2004.[i]

ISIL cannot be destroyed relying solely on airstrikes, guided missiles and special operations. The Russians made a critical mistake thinking artillery and airstrikes could bend the Chechen’s to their will in 1994 and 1999. Military options confined to these capabilities will hinder ISIL in the short term. Ultimately, they will adapt to survive the circumstances imposed by external actors operating without a significant and stable ground presence. As long as ISIL controls territory and shelters among civilian populations in easily fortified urban environments, a combined arms ground force will be required to root them out and establish alternative governance. Essential to a major combined arms effort is the enlightened employment of armor and the mobile, protected firepower it provides.

Lacking the capability to engage a well-trained combined arms force in conventional maneuver warfare, ISIL will seek to level the playing field asymmetrically by choosing to fight in urban environments. Cities mitigate many of the technological and numerical advantages of Western-style conventional forces. Their topographic and human complexity impedes analysis and therefore effective planning. Such constraints make cities difficult to seize without significant collateral damage. Although ISIL will harass forces outside cities through IED’s, ambushes and raids, they will seek victory in the concrete jungle. Unless the world is prepared to adopt an indefinite containment policy against an ISIL pseudo-state in the heart of the Middle East, we will find ourselves waging war in cities against a well prepared foe.

Past urban conflicts provide valuable lessons for a possible fight in ISIL controlled cities. Had U.S. forces used armor in Mogadishu, Somalia in 1993, some of the ground force losses may have been avoided. A crucial component missing in Task Force Ranger were vehicles that could sustain multiple hits from an array of enemy weapon systems and keep moving. This is a recurring need in urban warfare that was neglected to the detriment of the forces involved.

In Chechnya, the failures of Russian armor commanders to effectively employ their forces in Grozny led to disastrous consequences. The hard-won lessons of the Russians serve as an important guide for any force contemplating action in the urban landscape.

The second battle of Fallujah in 2004, however, is an excellent case study in the successful combined arms employment of armor to take and hold urban terrain. Here a range of armored vehicles, centered on the Marine M1A1 Abrams, provided indispensable protection and firepower for the infantry who cleared the city room by room. Moreover the shock effect that this armor brought to bear had both a physically and psychologically crushing impact against the insurgent defenders.

Article on Unit 504 - Israeli Military Intelligence’s HUMINT Organization

Oded Shalom

September 26, 2014

Human intelligence under fire

The events of that day of fighting on the outskirts of Khan Younis still stir emotions among the members of Unit 504. It all went down on the seventh day of the ground operation, in the central portion of the Gaza Strip. Paratroopers who were on a mission to locate tunnels and shafts in the densely packed urban area had commandeered key positions of control in the area the previous evening. In the early afternoon, three Hamas fighters were seen emerging from one of the buildings. The fire power that rained down on them left them no chance; all three were killed.

A shaft leading down into atunnel was found in the building from which they had emerged. The commander of the company of paratroopers decided nevertheless to continue combing the area, but left behind a small force to keep an eye on the opening in case more Hamas militants surfaced. Unit 504’s field operatives explain that deciding not to deal with a tunnel opening right away isn’t something that should be taken for granted.

"After all, it’s a place from which terrorists can emerge and endanger our fighters," says R., a Unit 504 soldier who was operating in the area at the time. "So why leave it intact? The easiest thing to do is to blow it up. But as a field investigator, as someone who is responsible for extracting tactical intelligence from detainees captured during the fighting, I think one step ahead. If three terrorists emerged from the shaft, why shouldn’t more terrorists come out from there? And if others do come out, they don’t necessarily have to be killed in a battle. You can interrogate them and extract information that will help our forces in the fighting to come." 

Thus, while most members of the company of paratroopers continued their searches, a small force remained behind to keep watch on the shaft. The sounds of gunfire and explosions fill the air, and the communications radio carries the noise of the fighting, but the paratroopers don’t take their eyes off the opening. They wait. Half an hour, an hour, two hours go by since the firefight with the three Hamas militants. Well into the third hour, and tensions are running high; the time that has passed does nothing to ease it. And all of a sudden, two figures emerge from the shaft.

At first, only heads appear, and then come torsos. Through the ruins of the structure in which the paratroopers are stationed one can see that the two men have their arms raised after having thrown down their weapons. “There’s a term, ‘a cornered terrorist,’” R. explains, “and this occurs when you have the edge over him in terms of your vantage point and have him in your sights. You’re in a protected area and he isn’t. You can watch his every move too, and know that at any given moment, if he tries anything funny, you can take him down.

"So my first move is to advise the company commander not to open fire on the terrorists, not to kill them. He sees them as a threat, but the field investigator sees them as a source of information. I am then authorized to speak to them. I shout to them, explain to them that they’re surrounded and don’t have a chance against us. I instruct them to come out slowly and stand in an area where they are fully visible; and then I ask them to strip down to just their underwear. The majority of the terrorists who emerged from the shafts were suicide fighters, and that’s how you make sure they aren’t strapped with explosives. So the two are standing there naked, in their underwear only, their arms in the air, and this is where your work begins, the field interrogation."

Notes From the Underground The Long History of Tunnel Warfare

By Arthur Herman

August 26, 2014 

A Palestinian fighter from the Izz el-Deen al-Qassam Brigades, the armed wing of the Hamas movement, is seen inside an underground tunnel in Gaza on August 18, 2014. (Courtesy Reuters)

Perhaps the most surprising development of the recent war between Israel and Gaza was the discovery of the sophisticated network of tunnels that Hamas had quietly developed in the preceding years. The dark, low-tech tunnels running underneath Gaza offered a stark juxtaposition to the modern artillery Israel deployed on the surface. But if the tunnels hinted at an older kind of warfare, that doesn’t mean they should be dismissed as a military curiosity. Compared with the most sophisticated weapons systems in use today, tunnels have withstood the test of time: for centuries, they have allowed military units to approach their enemies undetected and helped weaker combatants turn the battlefield to their advantage. There’s no way to know how long drones or lasers or anti-missile defense systems will last. But as long as there is warfare, tunnels will almost certainly be part of the fight.

FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERNITY

Tunnels and caves, tunnels’ geologic predecessor, have a long history in warfare stretching back to biblical times. For at least 3,000 years, embattled populations have used them to hide from, and strike at, stronger enemies. Ironically, this has been especially so in the region where present-day Israel and Palestine are located. Archaeologists have found more than 450 ancient cave systems in the Holy Land, including many that were dug into mountainsides, which the Jews used to launch guerrilla-style attacks on Roman legionnaires during the Great Jewish Revolt from AD 66 to 70. The Romans faced the same tactic around that time in their fight along the Rhine and Danube frontiers in Europe, against Germanic tribes who would dig hidden trenches connected by tunnels and then spring out of the ground to ambush the Roman soldiers.

America in digital war with IS

- US directly engaging young Arabs with anti-extremist messages

BRIAN KNOWLTON

Volunteers attend a combat training session in Basra. (AFP) Washington, Sept. 27: Along with its surprising military success, the Islamic State group has demonstrated a skill and sophistication with social media previously unseen in extremist groups. And just as the US has begun an aggressive air campaign against the militants, Richard A. Stengel, the under secretary of state for public diplomacy, believes the US has no choice but to counter their propaganda with a forceful online response. “Sending a jazz trio to Budapest is not really what we want to do in 2014,” said Stengel, referring to the soft-edged cultural diplomacy that sent musicians like Dave Brubeck on tours of Eastern-bloc capitals to counter communism during the Cold War. “We have to be tougher, we have to be harder, particularly in the information space, and we have to hit back.” But now, digital operators at the state department are directly engaging young people — and sometimes extremists — on websites popular in Arab countries, publishing a stream of anti-Islamic State messages, and one somewhat shocking video, on Facebook or YouTube or Twitter, using the hashtag #Think Again Turn Away. Critics have questioned whether this effort is large, nimble or credible enough. The US’s image in West Asia — which seemed perched on the verge of hopefulness when President Obama delivered a closely watched speech in Cairo in 2009 — is now at “the bottom of a sliding scale”, said Lina Khatib, director of the Carnegie Middle East Center, in Beirut. Stengel, who joined the Obama administration in February after seven years as managing editor of Time magazine, is focusing his efforts on an approach that reflects Obama’s insistence that countries like Iraq must take responsibility for their own defence. While secretary of state John Kerry was assembling a military coalition against the Islamic State on his most recent trip to West Asia, Stengel met Arab officials to create what he called in an interview “a communications coalition, a messaging coalition, to complement what’s going on the ground”. The Centre for Strategic Counterterrorism Communication is the state department’s spearhead in this fight and potentially defines the kind of pushback it would like to see friendly countries in the region engage in. Formed in 2010 to counter messaging from al Qaida and its affiliated groups, the interagency unit engages in online forums in Arabic, Urdu, Punjabi and Somali. It recently added English, making itself more transparent — and more open to critical scrutiny. Posting on Twitter, Tumblr, YouTube and Facebook, members of the unit question claims made by IS, trumpet the militants’ setbacks and underscore the human cost of the militants’ brutality. Terror groups in Somalia and Nigeria are also targeted.

NEW YORK TIMES NEWS SERVIC

Washington And The World Who’s Afraid of Narendra Modi? Why the Indian prime minister could be good news for Washington.

By ADAM B. LERNER September 26, 2014

Read more: http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/2014/09/whos-afraid-of-narendra-modi-111364.html#ixzz3EaQw9ASK

Before he even landed in New York Friday, Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s celebrity had already touched down on American soil. Among the plans for his weeklong sojourn in New York and Washington, D.C., are a sold-out address to 30,000 people at Madison Square Garden, high-level diplomatic meetings (including with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu) and an official visit to the White House, where Modi will meet for the first time with President Obama. Making his trip a little complicated, Modi will be fasting the entire time for the Indian festival of Navaratri, consuming only liquids during his most high-profile foreign trip yet.

But all of this hubbub conceals the extent to which Modi’s election this spring in many ways caught American foreign policy elites with their pants down—and still appears to have them confused over how to approach the new leader of the world’s largest democracy. Hopes for closer U.S.-India haven’t materialized, and Modi’s first few enigmatic months in office have offered few clues to what kind of partner he can be for Washington. In a Wall Street Journal op-ed this week, Modi wrote vaguely of shared goals such as technological innovation, improved education and combatting terrorism. In an interview with Fareed Zakaria last Sunday, pressed on relations with the United States, Modi proposed no substantial policy initiatives, saying that “both Indians and Americans have coexistence in their natural temperament”—not exactly the rhetoric of a bold new alliance.

So how should the United States think of Narendra Modi? Among the Western pundit class, he has been painted as two divergent caricatures—the bold reformer in a rising economy or the bigoted oppressor holding his country back. Conservatives have celebrated Modi’s rise as the beginning of the end for India’s stagnation. In November, Goldman Sachs released an enthusiastic report, “Modi-fying Our View,” that endorsed Modi as an “agent of change” responsible for spurring double-digit economic growth in the state of Gujarat, where he was then chief minister. “India needs a jolt and Mr Modi looks like the man to provide it,” Gideon Rachman wrote in the Financial Times in April. On his visit to India this summer, Secretary of State John Kerry, too, applauded Modi’s “vision” for economic growth.

Silk Road Diplomacy

The route of the voyages of Zheng He's fleet.
One minor problem in China’s history-based campaign—the history is distorted.
TANSEN SEN
http://www.outlookindia.com/printarticle.aspx?292067

NEW YORK

The romantic concept of a historic Silk Road by which camel caravans wend among the mountains and deserts of Central Asia is back in the news. So is talk on re-establishing the maritime networks by which the Chinese Admiral Zheng He steered his naval armada across the Indian Ocean seven times. China’s leaders promote the ancient trade routes, most recently during the Chinese President Xi Jinping’s visits to countries in Central and South Asia, to emphasize the nation’s historic role as a harbinger of peace and prosperity.

One minor problem in China’s history-based campaign— the history is distorted.

In September 2013, less than a year after assuming the position of general secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China, Xi launched new foreign policy initiative known as the “Silk Road Economic Belt.” In an address at Kazakhstan's Nazarbayev University, calling for cooperation and development of the Eurasian region through this new Silk Road initiative, Xi presented five specific goals: strengthening of economic collaboration, improvement of road connectivity, promotion of trade and investment, facilitation of currency conversion, and bolstering of people-to-people exchanges.

A month later, at the 16th ASEAN-China Summit held in Brunei, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang proposed the building of a 21st century “Maritime Silk Road” to jointly foster maritime cooperation, connectivity, scientific and environmental research, and fishery activities. A few days later, in his address to the Indonesian Parliament Xi confirmed this idea and stated that China would devote funds to “vigorously develop maritime partnership in a joint effort to build the Maritime Silk Road of the 21st century,” stretching from coastal China to the Mediterranean Sea.

In both speeches, Xi underscored China’s historical linkages with the respective regions and suggested that his proposals were intended to reestablish ancient friendly ties in a modern, globalized world. In Kazakhstan, Xi credited the Western Han envoy Zhang Qian with “shouldering the mission of peace and friendship” and opening up the door for east-west communication and establishing the “Silk Road.” In Indonesia, he praised the Ming dynasty Admiral Zheng He for bequeathing “nice stories of friendly exchanges between the Chinese and Indonesian peoples.”

India Shouldn't Get Drawn Into Islamic World Rivalries

By G Parthasarathy

New Indian Express and Sunday Standard, 28 Sep14.


The decision by the Obama administration to challenge the writ of the ruthless and extremist Islamic Sate of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) in Syria and Iraq is fraught with dangers of further destabilisation in the Islamic world. The Obama administration has declared that it will use its air power to attack ISIL in both Iraq and Syria. Its armed forces chief, General Dempsey, has indicated that he would not hesitate to seek presidential approval for sending in ground forces to fight side by side with the Iraqi forces and Iraqi Kurds to eliminate ISIL. The US has constituted a “coalition” of around 50 countries, ranging from Saudi Arabia and the UAE to the UK and Australia, which have pledged to back the Americans with air power and economic support. None of these countries have offered ground forces and some have not even publicly acknowledged their “support”.

What has made this entire effort seem strange is that while Iraq has supported the Shia-dominated Assad regime in neighbouring Syria to fight its opponents, including ISIL, the US has stepped up support for anti-Shia opponents of President Assad, like the “moderate” Sunni “Free Syrian Army”. Paradoxically, while the US seeks to fight ISIL in Syria, it simultaneously destabilises the Syrian government, which controls the best equipped and motivated armed forces in Syria. Moreover, the Americans have deliberately not invited the most powerful regional power, Iran, which is a close ally of the Syrian and Iraqi governments, to join its “coalition”.

There are already rumblings against US policies in the powerful Shia militias that back the Iraqi government. There is also unease in Sunni-dominated Arab Gulf countries to make common cause with a Shia-dominated Iraqi government. While both the US and Israel are hostile towards Iran, neither has a clear strategy for co-opting regional powers like Iran to confront ISIL. Moreover, given its close relations with the Assad regime in Syria and with Iran, Russia will not agree to grant international legitimacy to US actions through approval by the UN Security Council. Military intervention in Libya by the US, UK and France has led to the fragmentation of the country, which is now ruled by regional warlords, some of whom have virulently anti-American agendas. There are growing fears of similar Balkanisation, as the Americans wade into Iraq and Syria,

Oded Yinon, an Israeli intelligence analyst, envisaged the “dissolution of Lebanon”, following its invasion by Israel in 1982, as the forerunner for the dismemberment of Iraq and Syria. He predicted that Syria would fall apart into a Shia-Alawite dominated state along its coastal area and two Sunni-dominated states in the Aleppo area and around Damascus, with the Druzes dominating the Golan. A war-torn Syria is already broadly divided on these lines. Yinon also held that in Iraq “three or more states will exist around the three major cities of Basra, Mosul and Baghdad. Shia areas in the south will separate from the Sunni and Kurdish north”. He concluded: “The entire Arabian Peninsula is a natural candidate for dissolution due to internal and external pressures.”