Do China's New Terrorism Laws Go Too Far?

Julia Famularo

February 13, 2015

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Beijing’s far-reaching counterterrorism campaign continues to expand with serious implications for Tibet.

As part of a broad counterterrorism campaign, the Ministry of Public Security recently announced that it would reward people for alerting the police to extremist activities. Local police in each city or province determine how much money to allocate for the initiative. For example, authorities in Urumqi reward those who “report the illegal production and sale of face-covering gowns and clothing that represent religious extremism,” and other information pertaining to terrorist and extremist activities.

Authorities in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) recently stated thatpolice will provide up to 300,000 yuan ($48,000) for information thwarting the “organization, planning, and implementation or incitement” of violent terrorist and religious extremist activities inside China by organizations and their members based at home and abroad. Public security officials are tracking the flow of everything from extremist ideology to illegal audio and visual materials to weapons moving across digital and physical borders.

The text of the TAR announcement is broad in scope. Foreign observers wonder whether this is simply standardized national counterterrorism language, or whether officials are referring obliquely to specific security concerns. However, an examination of media reports provides insight into Beijing’s mindset and emerging policies, particularly in light of the ongoing debate regarding how to frame, approach, and manage self-immolations. The government has vacillated between conciliatory and hardline responses since suicide reemerged as a tool of political protest in ethnographic Tibet in March 2011.

Many leaders believe that Tibetans are grateful for state “benevolence” and would not attempt to undermine social stability unless manipulated by external actors. On the fourth anniversary of the 2008 Tibetan unrest, former Premier Wen Jiabao stated, “we do not agree with the use of this type of extremist action, which interferes with and [ultimately] destroys social harmony. Young monks are innocent, and we feel deep grief over this type of behavior.” The Party pledged to punish those who instigate violence by inciting acts of religious extremism. A Foreign Ministry spokesperson accused the “Dalai Clique” of instigating Tibetans to self-immolate and glorifying rather than condemning violence: separatism “at the cost of human lives is violence and terrorism in disguise.”

Why 2015 Will Be a Great Year for US-China Relations

By Shannon Tiezzi

February 12, 2015

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It’s official: Chinese President Xi Jinping’s first state visit to the U.S. is scheduled for September. Xinhuareported today that Xi, in a phone conversation with U.S. President Barack Obama, accepted the “invitation to pay a state visit to the United States in September.” Xi is also expected to attend celebrations of the 70th anniversary of the United Nations in New York this September.

Now the race is on for both the U.S. and China to hammer out some deliverables over the course of the next seven months. My colleague Ankit Panda provided some predictions of what topics might be on the agenda, including progress on a bilateral investment treaty (BIT). Other possible topics of discussion: military confidence building measures and agreement on what approach to take at December’s climate change conference to be held in Paris.

While the announcements won’t be made until September, the discussions are already taking place. Two high-ranking U.S. State Department officials are in Beijing this week to begin laying the groundwork for Xi’s visit: new Deputy Secretary of State Antony Blinken and Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Daniel Russel. Blinken stopped in China as part of a larger tour of Northeast Asia, his first trip abroad since assuming his post. Blinken was in Seoul from February 9-10 and will travel to Tokyo on February 12. The purpose of his visit, he announced on Twitter, was “advancing the rebalance” to Asia. Russel, meanwhile, traveled only to China; he’s in Beijing for talks from February 9-12.

Is the Chinese Military Weaker Than We Think?

By Franz-Stefan Gady

February 12, 2015

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Today, the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (USCC) published an assessment on the weaknesses of the China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA). While the report, compiled by the RAND National Security Research Division (NSRD), points out that “the PLA’s capabilities have improved dramatically,” it also notes “potentially serious weaknesses” that could “limit [the PLA's] ability to successfully conduct the information-centric, integrated joint operations Chinese military strategists see as required to fight and win future wars.”

The authors divide Chinese military’s weaknesses into two broad categories: institutional and combat capabilities. Institutional problems arise from rampant corruption, outdated command structures, the quality of personnel, and lack of professionalism. The weakness in combat capabilities is due to “an incomplete military transformation,” which produced logistical weaknesses, insufficient strategic airlift capabilities, limited numbers of special-mission aircraft, and deficiencies in naval air defense and antisubmarine warfare. The paper also lists shortcomings in other domains such as space and cyberspace. In addition, China’s defense industry is also allegedly suffering from widespread corruption and is in the middle of a “transition from central planning to a more market-oriented system.”

Based on the authors’ study of more than 300 Chinese-language articles, numerous books, and other military publications, the report notes that the PLA is aware of its own shortcomings. Many Chinese military writers have in the last few years pointed out that the PLA appears incapable of conducting information-centric, integrated joint operations, which are required to fight and win future ”local wars under informatized conditions.”

Urbanization With Chinese Characteristics

By Shannon Tiezzi

February 12, 2015

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As part of China’s larger-reaching economic reforms, the government hopes to achieve a 60 percent urbanization rate by 2020. On Tuesday, President Xi Jinping expounded on the right way – and the wrong way – to go about achieving this goal during a meeting of an economic work group.

Speaking to the Central Leading Group on Financial and Economic Affairs on February 10, Xi “demanded stable urbanization,” according to Xinhua. Xi’s conception of urbanization involved attracting “suitable people” to live in urban areas. “Suitable people,” apparently, are those who are both “capable of maintaining steady jobs and comfortable in cities.”

It sounds odd to suggest that China has a problem attracting people to make the move from rural areas to the cities. That process has been underway for decades now; according to data from the World Bank, China has gone from a 30 percent urbanization rate in 1994 to 53 percent in 2014. That means nearly a quarter of China’s population – roughly 300 million people – made the move from countryside to city in the past 20 years.

Enticing rural migrants to cities is not a problem for China. In fact, China has had serious difficulties figuring out how to handle the migration that is already happening. The hukou system, which links receipt of social services (from healthcare to education) to a residence permit, has made many rural migrants second-class citizens in their new urban homes. Viewed in this way, Xi’s comments on attracting “suitable people” are telling. The problem lies not in the “attraction” factor of cities, but in making sure the migrants that do arrive in urban areas are “suitable.”

If the Iran Nuke Talks Fail...

Ilan Goldenberg, Robert D. Kaplan

February 13, 2015

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What if the nuclear talks with Iran completely break down at some point, as quite a few people in Congress and the Washington policy community seem to want? We believe the results might be more dangerous for Iran, the United States, and the Middle East than an imperfect deal that keeps Iran a healthy distance from a bomb and gives the United States reasonable confidence that it could catch an Iranian attempt to dash to a weapon, without eliminating Iran's nuclear program.

First of all, the possibility of an Israeli military strike on Iran's nuclear facilities goes up considerably. The Israelis would claim that, having restrained themselves for years while the talks were ongoing, they now had the moral right and strategic imperative to act. It is possible that Israel has been bluffing all along to try to get the United States and international community to act— or that its last realistic window of opportunity to bomb Iran was in 2010-2012 before the deeply buried Fordow nuclear facility became operational rendering an Israeli air strike ineffective.

However, it is also quite possible that lacking a large enough air force for a comprehensive campaign, the Israelis will launch a less ambitious set of strikes, in order to set the Iranian nuclear program back a few years while leaving Iran’s conventional naval and missile capabilities intact.Iran might retaliate proportionally with missile strikes against Israel and using its global network of proxies to launch terrorist attacks against Israeli and possibly American targets.Or Iran could go further, believing that the United States was complicit in the attack and respond conventionally against American naval assets and forces deployed on the Arabian Peninsula, forcing the United States to finish the job through a military campaign lasting weeks against Iran: something that would be worse for Iran than the United States, but that to say the least, we should all want to avoid.

HOW THE ISLAMIC STATE MAKES SURE YOU PAY ATTENTION TO IT

Charlie Winter

February 12, 2015

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The Islamic State (IS) has played us. It’s been playing us for a long time now. Since it captured the Iraqi city of Mosul in June last year, the cogs of its propaganda machine have continually turned, cranking up hysteria across the world and ensuring it never appears far beyond the front pages of our newspapers. Every day, we read that IS militants have committed some new atrocity, be it a massacre, execution or use of child soldiers, and, every day, our cathartic fascination with it keeps its spectre burning brightly at the front of our minds.

This is not some unhappy coincidence. This is the fruit of the IS media machinery’s tireless efforts.

It started long before the fall of Mosul in June 2014, the point at which the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (as it was then known) entered the world’s common lexicon. Before then, while it was a known player in the Syrian War, it had largely been overlooked by the international media.

However, in August, when tens of thousands of Yezidis were surrounded in Sinjar province, the jihadists’ manifold atrocities truly began to bear scrutiny from Western press. This was compounded when James Foley appeared before a camera on a hillock near the seat of the IS pseudo-state, Raqqa. Seeing an unarmed American photojournalist address his government and people before being decapitated by a British jihadist really caught the world’s imagination. Thus was secured IS propagandists’ featured space in the media.

After Foley, it was John Cantlie, another photojournalist. This time, he was playing “Foreign Correspondent” for IS, reporting variously from his cell, Kobane and, more recently, Mosul.

North Korea's Most Dangerous Weapon (Hint: It's Not Nuclear)

Robert E Kelly

February 12, 2015

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The cyber attack on Sony Pictures by North Korea in response to the film The Interview (which opens in Australian cinemas today; see my review) came after a series of North Korean hacks of institutions in South Korea. It appears North Korea is improving its cyber capabilities and widening its target list. The decision to strike the private sector outside of South Korea is a new development with disturbing ramifications.

The Sony hack got global attention because it showed Pyongyang's new willingness to target high-profile, non-Korean, private companies. All this raises major questions about Pyongyang's asymmetric efforts against the South, and now for foreign firms operating in Korea.

There remains some disagreement over whether it was in fact North Korea that hacked Sony. Recently, the Director of the FBI felt compelled to come forward with more evidence in support of the U.S. government's claim, and President Obama has repeatedly spoken with great confidence that North Korea was the perpetrator. Furthermore, it is scarcely disputed that hacks of South Korean institutions, such as the nuclear power industry, banks, and broadcasters, were performed by North Korea.

North Korea's use of the cyber domain to contend with its opponents – South Korea, Japan, the U.S., and now perhaps their firms – is a new development.

For much of the internet age, North Korea has been so far behind South Korea and others technologically that cyber was not an area in which it was expected to thrive. Indeed, it may be that North Korea contracts out its hacking requests to specialist, third-party “hacktivist” groups like the Lizard Squad or Anonymous. Yet Pyongyang has repeatedly surprised observers with its technological leaps. North Korea beat South Korea in drone development, and of course, it has developed nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. It therefore seems likely that cyber is an emerging arena of North Korean activity. Governments, and now business, will be forced to defend themselves.

Is Israel Next in Line for an Energy Revolution?

By David A. Merkel

February 12, 2015

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The fall in oil prices over the last several months carries significance far beyond the low prices American commuters are paying at the pump. Low oil prices serve Western strategic interests by starving some of the most troublesome actors in the world of their major source of revenue - countries such as Iran, the leading state sponsor of terrorism, and Russia, which attacks its neighbors and uses its energy might to blackmail Europe.

One cause of the drop in oil prices is the technological advances that have enabled Western countries such as the United States and Canada to dramatically increase their domestic oil production. Now the global oil supply appears set to get a boost from a new and improbable player in the oil business: Israel.

Former Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir famously lamented that Moses wandered the desert for 40 years before coming to the only place in the Middle East that doesn't have oil. Today, Israel imports 99 percent of the oil needed to satisfy domestic demand. But depending on the results of drilling tests now underway on the Golan Heights, this situation - which leaves Israel vulnerable to supply interruption - may soon change, and perhaps dramatically.

U.S. company Genie Energy has received permits to drill 10 test wells in the Golan Heights. The company's surveys suggest that some parts of Golan may contain enough oil to fill billions of barrels - enough to satisfy Israel's domestic oil needs and even become an oil exporter.

Oil discoveries would complement Israel's already-discovered natural gas fields to make Israel truly energy-independent. But an oil discovery would also strengthen the U.S.-brokered peace treaties between Israel and neighbors Jordan and Egypt, which, like Israel in the past, are poor in natural resources. Amman and Cairo maintain their peace treaties with Israel despite enormous domestic opposition. Energy partnerships are perhaps the single best way to foster closer relations - promoting regional stability and furthering U.S. interests in the region.

Europe's Desperate Hail Mary to Save Ukraine

Nikolas K. Gvosdev

February 13, 2015

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It is never a good sign when differences in interpretation as to what an agreement means arise before the ink is even dry. The cease-fire accord reached in Minsk between the Ukrainian government, the eastern separatists and Russia, under the aegis of the good offices of Chancellor Angela Merkel of Germany and President Francois Hollande of France, could stop the fighting and lay the basis for a political settlement—but it requires that all parties be prepared to implement its provisions. With two previous cease-fires failing amidst mutual recriminations about violations, the newest agreement contains similar problems that could torpedo its implementation.

First and foremost, the cease-fire calls for an exclusion zone where heavy weapons are to be withdrawn. As we’ve seen in the past, it can be quite easy to cheat—to hide weaponry and not to give up optimal firing positions. The first challenge will be what happens to the cease-fire when we see that not all heavy weapons have been removed; will one violation cause the collapse of the cease-fire, or will the emphasis be on a “ninety percent” solution—that is, if most weapons are pulled back, will that be considered sufficient?

The fate of the Ukrainian government pocket at the key railway junction of Debaltseve is also unclear. Will the town remain in Ukrainian hands, even if forces and equipment are withdrawn—as the government prefers? Or will the government surrender control, as the separatists prefer? Given that the cease-fire will not begin until Sunday, the race is on to see who can determine the status of Debaltseve.

The Disturbing Legacy of the Ukraine Crisis

Dmitri Trenin

February 12, 2015

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The new Minsk agreement is mainly a product of Europe’s fear of war and Ukraine’s rapidly deteriorating military, economic and political condition. The Germans and the French were jolted into action by the prospect of the United States arming Kiev, provoking Moscow to rise to a new level of confrontation. Ukraine’s leadership had to choose between the Scylla of making a bad peace and the Charybdis of continuing a losing war. As for the Russians, freezing the conflict along the lines of engagement and making the “people’s republics” safe from enemy fire was the best option available.

Whatever happens next—there is still uncertainty over the prospective cease-fire—is unlikely to produce a settlement to the Donbass conflict, much less for the larger issue of security in Europe. At best, it is likely to be a truce, hopefully a lasting one, but offering little prospect of (re)integration in Ukraine or reconciliation on the continent as a whole. Indeed, the truce will legitimize new divisions—along the cease-fire lines in Donbass and the NATO-Russia quasi–front line in Europe. There will be no new Iron Curtain, to be sure, but communication between Russians and Westerners has already become difficult, with members of the policy communities essentially talking past each other, as the public exchanges during the recent Munich Security Conference have demonstrated.

The truce could be tested by various actors: the rebel republics seeking to gain control over the part of Donbass under Kiev’s control, including the port city of Mariupol; Kievan elites using the war as an excuse not to implement reforms that run counter to the vested interests; political and paramilitary forces in Ukraine losing faith in their weak and ineffectual government and attempting to replace it; Russia trying to use the new turmoil in Ukraine to achieve the triple goal of permanent neutrality, federalization and official Russian-Ukrainian bilingualism; the United States giving Ukraine lethal weapons and Europe failing to give it economic and financial relief. Things could go badly wrong.

A 'Glimmer of Hope' in Ukraine?

BY ASHISH KUMAR SEN

FEBRUARY 12, 2015

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A new deal that would end the fighting between Ukrainian security forces and Russian-backed separatists is being met with skepticism amid an escalation in the conflict in eastern Ukraine.

“This is essentially the same ceasefire that failed before, so I expect the same issues to arise: Kyiv’s control of the border, lack of removal of non-Ukrainian weapons, and military personnel, etc.,” said Frances G. Burwell, Vice President and Director of the Atlantic Council’s Program on Transatlantic Relations.

“But what may be very problematic is the length of time between now and the coming into force of the ceasefire on February 15, during which the separatists will undoubtedly seek to improve their military position,” she added. 

The ceasefire was reached after more than sixteen hours of negotiations between the leaders of Russia, Ukraine, Germany, and France in Belarus’ capital Minsk on February 12. 

German Chancellor Angela Merkel said the deal provided "a glimmer of hope, no more no less."

The Obama administration, which was not part of the talks, expressed cautious optimism about the deal as Russian-backed separatists sought to drive home their military advantage around Debaltseve in eastern Ukraine. 

The US is “particularly concerned about the escalation of fighting today, which is inconsistent with the spirit of the accord,” said White House Press Secretary Josh Earnest. 

Merkel said Russian President Vladimir Putin agreed toward the end of the talks to put pressure on Russian-backed separatists to stop the war.

Russia’s Military Advance in Ukraine Wins It Advantages in New Truce Deal

BY JOHN E. HERBST

FEBRUARY 12, 2015

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With thousands of Ukrainian troops nearly surrounded in Donbas by the freshly armed, Kremlin-directed rebel militias, Ukraine’s President Petro Poroshenko accepted the Minsk II agreement February 12. The new accord is clearly less advantageous to Kyiv than was the Minsk I agreement, which Moscow has openly flouted since its signing last September. This diplomatic victory for Moscow reflects Russia’s advances on the battlefield, which have weakened Ukraine’s position steadily since September, but especially in the last few weeks.

The reason for Ukraine’s setback is simple. In violation of the Minsk I accord, the government of Russian President Vladimir Putin has been funneling arms and fighters into Donbas. This flow picked up substantially since early December. In addition, the Kremlin has used its hundreds of active-duty military officers in Ukraine to establish much stronger command and control over the armed rebels. With these advantages, the Russian proxy forces launched an offensive in early January that has included the near-entrapment of Ukrainian forces at Debaltseve, a strategic town between the region’s main cities, Lugansk and Donetsk.

In this predicament, President Poroshenko made a number of significant concessions. The most important was accepting a delay until the end of this year for Ukraine to regain full control of the Russian-Ukrainian border. Under Minsk I, Ukraine should have been ceded control of its border from day one, a control to be verified by monitoring teams of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Moscow has never permitted that step, which would remove its principal means of placing pressure on Kyiv: the constant re-supply of Russian arms and fighters in the Russian-controlled bastions of Donbas, which enables the Kremlin’s agents to seize more territory. 

A Cynical Ukraine Deal That Just Might Work

By The Editors

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FEB 12, 2015

This morning’s cease-fire agreement for Ukraine is horribly flawed, yet far better than the alternative: Without it, the country would continue losing lives, territory and hope for a more stable and prosperous future -- whether or not the U.S. sends arms.

That said, it's easy to see why Russian President Vladimir Putin was the one who emerged from the all-night negotiations in Minsk wearing a grin. In many ways, the deal rewards Russia and the separatists he supports for breaking the last cease-fire, agreed to in September. Putin's displays of machismo -- he snapped a pencil in two and sat in a taller chair, looking down on his glum counterparts from France, Germany and Ukraine -- were only mildly less obnoxious than his straight-faced call for both sides in the conflict to stop fighting, as if the tanks, artillery, anti-aircraft missiles and drones being used against Ukraine’s military weren’t his. Yet there was truth to his posturing: Putin remains in charge of this war. Only he has both the means and the will to determine whether to expand it or end it.

Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko was negotiating from a far weaker position. But this agreement at least creates a framework for his country to regain control of the Russian frontier, ensuring that Ukraine can remain whole and free.

Thursday's deal is based on the terms of the last one -- which failed to stop the fighting -- and it suffers the same central flaw: It sets a demarcation line on which neither side really agrees. This time, Ukraine will have to pull its heavy weapons back at least 31 miles from the current frontlines, while the pro-Russian separatists will have to withdraw the same distance from the line drawn in September. Given that the rebels have, since then, conquered substantial territory, the new buffer zone will be much larger, and leave more land in rebel hands.

In an act of cynicism that alone risks scuppering the deal, the start of the cease-fire was delayed until midnight Saturday. This guarantees a burst of savage fighting, and gives the rebels the chance to finally take Debaltseve, an important rail junction that Ukrainian forces barely hold.

A New and Unimproved Ceasefire

ADAM CHANDLER

FEB 12 2015,

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An all-night peace summit yielded an agreement to de-escalate the violence in eastern Ukraine even as tanks were spotted crossing into the country from Russia overnight.

 

There are plenty of reasons to be pessimistic about the new Ukrainian ceasefire that was signed in Minsk, Belarus, on Thursday morning after nearly 17 hours of negotiations. The first is the fact that there was already a ceasefire signed in Minsk, Belarus, back in September, which failed to end the violence between Ukrainian forces and pro-Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine.

Here's what things looked like then:

Minsk Talks Offer Cease-Fire, But No Peace

By Ivan Nechepurenko

Feb. 12 2015 21:28

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The 16-hour marathon of overnight talks between the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, Germany and France resulted in an agreement to end fighting in Ukraine, but stopped short of offering a long-lasting and fundamental solution to a conflict that has already claimed at least 5,300 lives since April.

"It was not the best night of my life," President Vladimir Putin told journalists once out of the negotiation room on Thursday morning.

"But it's a good morning because despite all the difficulties of the negotiation process, we have managed to agree on the main issues," he said. 

Under the agreement, a cease-fire is due to go into effect Sunday between pro-Russian rebels and Kiev-controlled forces, followed by the withdrawal of heavy artillery. Both sides will have to withdraw their heavy weapons an equal distance to create a secure zone up to 140 kilometers wide.

For the government forces, the point of measurement is set at the current frontline, while the insurgents will measure the movement of arms from the demarcation line established by the Minsk memorandum signed last September.

The Ukrainian government will only regain full control of its border after a "comprehensive political settlement" that will involve "constitutional reform" implemented by the end of 2015, according to the text of the package of measures for the implementation of the Minsk agreements.

China Can't Solve Russia’s Energy Technology Trap

By Morena Skalamera

February 13, 2015

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While the EU has been historically dependent on Russian oil and gas supplies, this dependence has proved to be a two-way street, with Russia dependent on European goods and technology. This trade has nonetheless remained asymmetrical: Russia imports equipment, consumer goods, and high value-added products (such as luxury garments, cars, and foods), while it exports raw materials. Today Russia’s hydrocarbons are becoming harder to find and more expensive to produce even though the country’s technologically underdeveloped economy relies increasingly on the revenues they ensure. Moreover, despite possessing over 30 percent of global gas supplies and unconventional gas reserves that are estimated to be ten times larger than those in all of Europe, today’s Russia is heavily reliant on Western technology to boost energy extraction and develop these promising resources.

Russia’s economy dependence on hydrocarbons is a bad story that is destined to get worse. For years Vladimir Putin has been reminding Russians that urgent action is needed to modernize and diversify Russia’s economy, develop domestic expertise, and foster energy market reforms. But given that his own system rests on the informal glue of corruption, Russia has – unsurprisingly – largely failed to address the state’s meddling in business, shortcomings in the rule of law, and takeover of the energy business by politically favored interests. Consequently, energy reform never became a viable option. Instead, Russia has been trapped in a vicious circle whereby its capacity to hire foreign specialists and purchase required energy technologies depends heavily on revenues from oil and gas exports, and thus, on oil and gas prices. This unsustainable situation was in place even before the two disastrous – from Russia’s perspective – recent developments: sanctions and the decline in the price of oil. Today, with the Urals crude around $50 a barrel, Russia’s ability to harness Western technology is greatly undermined. Moreover, because of sanctions, Russia faces severe limits on its residual ability to acquire the technologies that the country needs to develop the promising but nonetheless geologically challenging offshore and onshore sites in the Arctic and Eastern Siberia.

Obama's ISIS AUMF: A Convenient (But Necessary) Excuse

James Joyner

February 13, 2015

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When President Obama declared last September that he would "degrade, and ultimately destroy, ISIL through a comprehensive and sustained counterterrorism strategy" without the use of American ground combat troops, most observers were skeptical. Now, five months later, the president is asking Congress to authorize him to dramatically escalate the fight, including the use of ground combat troops, ostensibly in very limited numbers with a very limited mission for a limited period of time. In fact, it’s likely to lead to expanded American involvement.

Wednesday morning the White House released a letter from the president to the Congress declaring, "Although existing statutes provide me with the authority I need to take these actions, I have repeatedly expressed my commitment to working with the Congress to pass a bipartisan authorization for the use of military force (AUMF) against ISIL. Consistent with this commitment, I am submitting a draft AUMF that would authorize the continued use of military force to degrade and defeat ISIL."

The text of the draft "Joint Resolution: To authorize the limited use of the United States Armed Forces against the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant" declares that said authority " does not authorize the use of the United States Armed Forces in enduring offensive ground combat operations" and "shall terminate three years after the date of the enactment of this joint resolution, unless reauthorized." But it does expand the mission to "associated persons or forces," which it defines as "individuals and organizations fighting for, on behalf of, or alongside ISIL or any closely-related successor entity in hostilities against the United States or its coalition partners."

Russia’s Nuclear Forces Begin Their Largest Drill Ever

Zachary Keck

February 12, 2015

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Russia’s Strategic Missile Forces are conducting their largest drills ever, according a state-run media outlets.

On Tuesday, Col. Igor Yegorov, a spokesman for the Strategic Missile Forces, toldInterfax-AVN that the unit began the largest drill in its history on Thursday. According to Yegorov, over 30 missile regiments and both road-mobile and silo-based missile systems are expected to participate in the massive drills.

The exercise it taking place across a vast sway of territory, covering an incredible twelve different regions in the country, from Tver region in western Russia to the Irkutsk region in the east. According to Google Maps, that’s a distance of about 3,998 km (2,484 miles).

Yegorov said the drills will test the Strategic Missile Forces’ preparedness for a wide variety of potential scenarios.

"Strategic missile units are practicing a broad range of missions, including red alert, maneuvering in actual combat and deterrence of sabotage units and precision-guidance attacks of a simulated enemy," Interfax quoted Yegorov as saying.

The spokesman for the unit went on to explain that the first day of the drill was devoted largely to defending deployed road-mobile missiles from sophisticated enemy sabotage attacks. “According to the drill scenario, sabotage groups of the simulated enemy laid mines on combat patrolling routes [of missile units] and applied poisonous chemicals to the area adjacent to their field positions," Yegorov said, Interfax reported.

PATIENT, PRUDENT, STRATEGIC? THE 2015 US NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY – ANALYSIS

By Giovanni Grevi

FEBRUARY 13, 2015

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The publication of a National Security Strategy (NSS) gives American presidents an opportunity to outline to domestic and foreign audiences the broad strategic posture and priorities of the world’s main power. The new United States (US) NSS published in February 2015 puts forward ‘strategic patience’ as the organising principle for dealing with growing challenges, while building on the achievements of the previous six years of the Obama administration.

The vindication of President Obama’s foreign policy record and the reassertion of ‘an undeniable truth – America must lead’ (as Obama puts it in his introduction to the strategy) stand out in the new document.

The NSS features strong elements of continuity with its 2010 predecessor. It affirms the need for American leadership, acknowledges the limits of American power and confirms a preference to wield it in concert with others, where possible. At the same time, it reflects the considerable changes that have occurred in the US and in the global strategic landscape since the 2010 version of the NSS.

PATIENCE

The defining message of the 2010 NSS was that, after two wars in Iraq and Afghanistan and a deep economic downturn, American leadership needed renewal. That would start from rebuilding the base of US power at home, notably restoring economic growth. The 2015 NSS claims mission accomplished on this crucial score. America has recovered its economic strength, the US has become the largest producer of oil and gas in the world and well over 150,000 troops have left Iraq and Afghanistan. In 2015, the US ‘is stronger and better positioned to seize the opportunities’ of the 21st century.

The Lunch Question

By Ian Morris

FEBRUARY 11

https://www.stratfor.com/weekly/lunch-question

At an event in Beijing last November, I had the good fortune to meet the French economist Thomas Piketty, who has sold 1.5 million copies of his book, Capital in the Twenty-First Century,since it was first published in 2013. Pacing up and down in front of a packed auditorium, Piketty explained that because the rate of return on capital is now higher than the growth rate of the global economy, the proportion of the world's wealth that is owned by a small elite will likely keep increasing; in other words, we should expect to see a divergence of wealth as the rich get much richer. As his book says, "capitalism automatically generates arbitrary and unsustainable inequalities that radically undermine the meritocratic values on which democratic societies are based."

No strategic forecaster can afford to ignore this alarming prediction — or the enthusiastic response it got from the audience in Beijing. In the 20th century, the two world wars were the only force powerful enough to reverse the concentration of wealth in the elite and the mounting class conflict; in the 21st century, we seem to be falling back into a comparable world of revolution, political extremism and mass violence.

It was hard to be sure whether the members of the audience were enthusiastic because they thought Piketty was forecasting the collapse of Western democratic economies or because they thought his words applied equally well to their own society. After all, China could almost be the poster child for the process Piketty described. When Mao Zedong died in 1976, post-tax and -transfer income inequality stood at 0.31 on the Gini index. (The Gini coefficient runs from 0, meaning everyone in a country has the same income, to 1, meaning one person earns all the country's income and everyone else earns nothing.) By 2009, China's income inequality score had soared to 0.47, where it stubbornly remains after peaking at 0.51 in 2003. Though Chinese tax returns are too opaque to make reliable calculations regarding wealth inequality, or the uneven distribution of assets as opposed to income, he is almost certainly correct that this figure has risen even faster than the country's income inequality.

The White House Is Creating a New Agency to Fight Cyberattacks

By Franz-Stefan Gady

February 13, 2015

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This week, the White House announced that it will create a new office integrating data on cyber threats from various intelligence organizations (CIA, NSA etc.) and distributing this information to other federal agencies. This new Cyber Threat Intelligence Integration Center will be part of the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, which is in charge of coordinating intelligence across the U.S. federal government.

The new agency, modeled after the National Counterterrorism Center, is supposed to employ 50 people and will have an annual budget of $35 million. The fiscal year 2016 budget request by President Barack Obama asked for $16 billion in overall expenditure for cybersecurity; the Pentagon spends around $5 billion on cyber defense and its cyber arsenal per year.

“The threat is becoming more diverse, more sophisticated and more dangerous, and I worry that malicious attacks… will increasingly become the norm unless we adapt quickly and take a comprehensive approach,”stated Lisa Monaco, the White House’s senior advisor for counterterrorism and homeland security, in a speech this Tuesday outlining the rationale behind the creation of a the new office.

She noted that the Sony hack changed everything: “It was a game changer because it wasn’t about profit. It was about a dictator trying to impose censorship and prevent the exercise of free expression.” As a consequence, the White House decided that it needs to step up its efforts to fight such attacks.

Are We Prepared for 'Hybrid Warfare'?

By Prashanth Parameswaran

February 13, 2015

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Earlier this week, the Institute of International and Security Studies, a leading British think tank, released the 2015 version of The Military Balance – an annual assessment of global military trends and capabilities. The report has long served as a useful weather vane for those who follow defense and security trends closely.

The concept of ‘hybrid warfare’ – broadly, situations where the adversary uses a combination of conventional and irregular warfare – features prominently in the editor’s introduction. That is no surprise, as the term has gained renewed prominence following Russia’s annexation of Crimea and fomenting of instability in Eastern Ukraine. Just last July, the then NATO secretary general Anders Fogh Rasmussen publicly accused Russia of waging hybrid warfare. And in a key indication of how the term has caught on among the chattering classes of late, this year’s Munich Security Conference – an annual gathering of bigwigs which just wrapped up a few days ago – specifically included the concept in one of its panel discussions.

What’s so new about ‘hybrid warfare’? Those who read widely on the evolution of warfare will know that the concept is hardly novel. The term itself at least a decade old and is often traced back to the U.S. Marine Corps, although one can easily find references to similar conceptions in other countries including Russia and China. But the general practice of blending conventional state-on-state conflict with irregular warfare has been around for centuries. Even if one were to avoid the rather quotidian reference to Chinese military strategist Sun Tzu, it has arguably played out recently in the Vietnam War, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and Hezbollah’s attack on Israel in 2006 to cite just a few examples.

THE IMPORTANCE OF SPACE IN MARITIME SECURITY

FEBRUARY 12, 2015
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Honorable Mention – CIMSEC High School Essay Contest

As long as man has walked the Earth and gazed into the stars, he’s asked “what’s out there what’s waiting for me?” Today, our country asks that very same question, although not for what we can find, but how we can use Space and its resources to advance our scientific and military might into, and hopefully beyond the 21st century.

With the dawn of rockets and the nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, Space would soon become a vital asset for the interests of both countries and other major players for the years to come (particularly China). With the sudden rise of China, and the reemergence of the Russia as a major military power, it is absolutely vital that the United States once again pursue Space for economic, political, and commercial purposes, as well as for strategic military purposes which will benefit not only the military, but the United States as a whole; and how our Navy can play a big role in helping us make this happen.

As of the time of this writing, the United States and other Western European Countries are currently embroiled in a geopolitical dispute with Russia over Ukraine and the rights of its territory such as Crimea and Eastern Ukraine. As a result of this, the United States and the European Union declared economic sanctions on Russia which are meant to cripple the Russian economy and force Russia out over its interference in Ukraine. In response to this, the Kremlin has threatened to stop shuttling Astronauts to and from the International Space Station, and cut off supplies to the ISS. In 2007, the Chinese military carried out its first antisatellite missile test when it launched a ground based missile 500 miles to destroy an aging satellite of theirs.

What the Vietnam War Hawks Got Wrong

By Robert Farley

February 13, 2015

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Earlier this week, Francis Sempa offered a curious effort to rehabilitate James Burnham, best known as a columnist for the National Review, and as author ofSuicide of the West. Burnham began his career as a radical Trotskyite, but by the 1950s found himself on the right edge of the American conservative movement.

What’s odd about Sempa’s column is that very few try to resurrect the reputation of Vietnam hawks, the people who argued that the only problems with the war in Indochina are that the United States didn’t squander enough blood and treasure and didn’t slaughter enough Asians. America’s historical memory has struggled to flush such voices from its consciousness, and has largely succeeded. It also bears note that the National Review itselfrarely enjoys being reminded of the sort of sentiments it published during the 1950s and 1960s.

In any case, Sempa believes Burnham deserving of attention and rehabilitation because Burnham “was mostly right about the ‘big’ items.” Which of these “big items” does Sempa cite? Here’s one: “It is a critical battle in the war for Asia, the Western Pacific and the South Seas,” [Burnham] wrote. If the U.S. withdraws from the struggle, “we will have demonstrated our inability as defender. It will become next to certain that the whole vast region, sea and land, will shift into the camp of the enemy.”

It is difficult to convey in words just how wrong this claim ended up being. The United States lost the Vietnam War, and lost it in the worst possible way. The investment of the Soviet Union and the People’s Republic of China in the Vietnam War yielded huge dividends in U.S. engagement and escalation; the United States paid tremendous costs in blood, treasure, and national solidarity. U.S. credibility, always an intangible quality, surely must have taken a massive hit when American helicopters departed from the roof of the embassy in Saigon.

The Human Cost of the Military’s Toxic Burn Pits

by MATTHEW GAULT

Taxpayers wasted millions to replace open-air burning, but the damage was done

Jason Dawson joined the Marines in 2003 and went to Iraq in 2006. He deployed to Al Asad air base in Anbar province where he was part of a crash, fire and rescue team.

When his tour finished, he stayed and became a civilian contractor—a firefighter.

He liked the pay and the work, but he didn’t like the burn pits. Al Asad maintained a large, open-air ditch filled with burning garbage. It’s how the base disposed of all its waste.

“Some mornings I remember waking up … and I could smell the burn pits,” he says.

Dawson stayed in Al Asad for three years, and the whole time he dealt with toxic fumes. Since coming home, he’s developed several mysterious health problems doctors can’t seem to diagnose.

Dawson—who is a personal friend—is not alone. Thousands of returning soldiers and civilians reported various health problems after coming back from Iraq and Afghanistan. Many suspect prolonged exposure to the burn pits are the cause.

What didn’t help is that the military’s efforts to clean up the burn pits were half-hearted at best, and negligent at worst. That’s the conclusion of a new report from the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction.

In the report, the congressionally-mandated watchdog details taxpayer cashwasted trying to close the Pentagon’s burn pits.

But worse than the monetary waste is how SIGAR details the eight years the Defense Department ignored the problem.

In Afghanistan alone, the military spent close to $90 million to provide alternatives to open-air burning of waste. It didn’t go well.

Words for War: Seven Unknown Quotes on War, Part 6

By Lieutenant Colonel Dave Lyle

February 11, 2015

“To be saved from folly you need either kind friends or fierce enemies.”

Diogenes of Sinope (aka Diogenes the Cynic)

How War Works

“In the history of the world, there have been persons in leadership positions who have not thought things through as well as they might have. Nor have they always been able to direct matters even skillfully enough to achieve their short sighted objectives. One of the traditional places where the price for that is paid is in the trenches where the common soldier has to crawl in simple self-preservation. Far less often is the price paid in the distant citadels of power, and even then it is normally paid in bloodless coin, limousines taking the henchmen away to minimum-security detentions or to exile in luxury.”

Algis Budrys, in the introduction to L. Ron Hubbard’s Final Blackout

Garrison life and junior officer angst

“In youth, the author had experienced war, without – to be sure – understanding it, but he had maintained a general impression. Even a modicum of reflection on these experiences during the autumn maneuvers in Potsdam and Berlin was bound to lead at once to the realization that none of this had taken place in the war that we had fought. What caused the author the greatest pain was that these sham battles, long practices in advance, carefully discussed, arranged in every detail, were carried out by the most distinguished men in the service…with total absorption, and a degree of seriousness and energy that bordered on weakness.”

Words for War: Seven Unknown Quotes on War, Part 7

By Von Clausewitz

February 12, 2015

On operational command and civil-military relations:

‘I spend a great deal of time imprisoned in my office, captive to the demands of Canberra. As much as possible I shield the unit commanders in Afghanistan from the deadening touch of Defence bureaucrats and political wrangling, but not always successfully. I tear my hair out in frustration when I am second-guessed, undermined or contradicted by staff officers half a world away; sometimes I get actual help. I have a bit of a blue with my boss, a turf war; we patch it up and get on with it’.

From Exit Wounds by Major General (ret) John Cantwell (Australian Army)

On hope as a course of action

‘It was all very well hoping confidently and optimistically that the grand endeavour would be smiled upon by a benevolent deity, but the battle-hardened old-timers taught us that you shouldn’t mix hope and soldiering’.

From Kandak by Patrick Hennessey

On returning home

‘With my post deployment leave finished, I am back at work… Each day I shake off the previous night’s horrors and present myself for duty. The work is stimulating and I enjoy the comradeship of my fellow instructors, but the sheer normality of life seems wrong. Paperwork is processed and filed, supplies are stacked and counted, soldiers line up to be ticked off a roll before starting work for the day. Supervisors fuss and worry over small details, energy is expended on petty problems. Stern memos are circulated. The very blandness of such activity should be comforting to me, reassuring me that the life I have known goes on, that the compressed period of violence and fear I experienced was an aberration. But it is not. Instead, I feel like I am watching all this from afar, a detached observer. I struggle to stay engaged, to mask my impatience with issues that seem inconsequential, to appear normal’.