China’s Evolving Perspectives on Network Warfare: Lessons from the Science of Military Strategy

By: Joe McReynolds

April 16, 2015

Publication: China Brief Volume: 15 Issue: 8

When tracking the development of China’s military capabilities, Western People’s Liberation Army (PLA) watchers encounter frequent challenges in determining which data sources they should draw upon for their analysis. Purely quantitative measurements of the PLA’s nominal force strength, though often valuable, may not provide insights into challenges the PLA faces in the real-world execution of its missions, while writings on Chinese military strategy by any given PLA author may not reflect the PLA’s broader institutional stance or limitations imposed by inadequate material capabilities.

If one analyzes China’s approach to network warfare in particular, these challenges are multiplied. [1] “Cyber weapons” are not publicly viewable and quantifiable in the same sense as submarines or aircraft, and often the PLA will not admit even their existence. And just as in U.S. discussions of “cyber war,” charlatans and self-promoters abound; although it is easy to find writings by PLA officers theorizing loosely and grandiosely about information warfare, they are often speaking only for themselves rather than for their respective military institutions.

Roughly once every 15 years or so, however, the PLA’s influential Academy of Military Sciences (AMS) issues a new edition of The Science of Military Strategy (SMS), a comprehensive, generally authoritative study of the PLA’s evolving strategic thought that escapes much (though not all) of the shortcomings of other PLA original sources. The AMS plays a much more central role in the formation of China’s military strategic thought than its academic counterparts in the United States, and the SMS is its flagship external product. It is the result of dozens of high-level PLA authors working together over a period of years to produce a heavily vetted consensus document.

Rolling Out the New Silk Road: Railroads Undergird Beijing’s Strategy

By: Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga

April 16, 2015 

Publication: China Brief Volume: 15 Issue: 8

The much-heralded arrival of the Yixinou train in Madrid last December, after traveling 8,000 miles from Yiwu, China, encapsulated the rapid expansion of China’s railway network across Eurasia and the key role that railroads are playing in Beijing’s New Silk Road strategy (Xinhua, December 9, 2014).

China’s domestic railway infrastructure development is now often cast in the light of facilitating China’s physical links with countries along the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (MSR) and Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB), also known as the “One Belt, One Road.” When three new railway lines—Lanzhou to Urumqi, Guiyang to Guangzhou and Nanning to Guangzhou—opened in late December, Xinhua said that “the completion of these railroads not only expands China’s railway track another 3,000 kilometers, but also facilitates the main blood vessels of the One Belt, One Road” (Xinhua, December 27). The Lanzhou to Urumqi line is “on the Eurasian bridge hinterland and goes through the core area of the Silk Road Economic Belt that the country is building,” and will support development of China’s western provinces, industrialization as well as connect Xinjiang with Central Asia and Europe.

Chinese Views on the Information “Center of Gravity”: Space, Cyber and Electronic Warfare

By: John Costello

April 16, 2015

Publication: China Brief Volume: 15 Issue: 8

This paper seeks to examine the intersection of Chinese thought on cyber, space and electronic warfare, particularly in the context of command, control, computers, communication, intelligence, reconnaissance and surveillance (C4ISR) complexes and their use in the current military paradigm. Space warfare is still in a fairly nascent phase of use, just as space is still in its early stages of development and use as a major resource for humanity. The use of military long-range communications systems and the proliferation of complex, layered networks separate from the Internet backbone have only complicated the strategic implications of disruption and denial.

The Internet “Embargo”

An Internet defined by geopolitical lines and “cyber borders” serves China’s interests, both domestically and internationally. Establishing geopolitical boundaries is increasingly being viewed by regimes such as China, Russia and Iran as a mitigating step to subvert many of the strengths from the U.S.-dominated global Internet infrastructure. Tightening border security between national intranets and the wider global infrastructure will be a huge factor in these countries’ defensive protection. Chinese domestic policy regarding Internet businesses and censorship has fostered a de facto protectionist e-commerce: Chinese companies are, by law, required to serve at the behest of government sensors and monitoring apparatuses. Western companies have been banned or, unwilling to comply, have been unable to gain a foothold in the market. This has created an almost entirely separate internal cyber environment, within China spurred on by the participation of nearly 650 million Internet users. Chinese e-commerce has developed to the point where it does not fundamentally need foreign participation, and maintains a healthy business environment in a nearly isolated and independent setting. The Internet in China could be called an almost entirely separate commercial ecosystem: an Internet autarchy.

Chinese Military Think Tanks: “Chinese Characteristics” and the “Revolving Door”

By: Silvia Menegazzi

April 16, 2015

Publication: China Brief Volume: 15 Issue: 8

Following Chinese President Xi Jinping’s recent call on October 27, 2014 to build think tanks with “Chinese characteristics,” growing attention has focused on the impact his remarks have had on think tanks in China dealing with foreign policy and economics (seeChina Brief, December 19, 2014; Guangming Daily, December, 25, 2014). The Chinese media has covered the domestic debate over this new approach to think tanks, with Chinese academics and policy analysts discussing the future trends and likely development path of think tanks, whereas, the foreign media has attempted to better understand the policy implications. Yet, few analyses have directly addressed how President Xi’s proposal will impact other think tank sectors, most notably China’s military think tanks. The announced reforms will likely stifle what was an increasingly free environment within PLA academic circles, at least at the public level, limiting the utility for Western officials and academics of interacting with these Chinese think tanks.

A Survey of Chinese Military Think Tanks

Focusing on the wider defense and security sector, there is a diverse array of think tanks that support the Chinese government and military’s thinking and strategy on critical issues. Among the most prominent are: the Academy of Military Sciences (AMS), the Chinese Institute for International Strategic Studies (CIISS), the Center for Peace and Development Studies (CPDS), the Foundation for International Strategic Studies (FISS), the Institute for National Security Studies–National Defense University (INSS/NDU) and the China Defense Science Technology Information Center (CDSTIC). These think tanks usually interact with top leaders through closed meetings and internal reports. Moreover, through their close proximity to the PLA’s core leadership, informal conversations with Chinese Communist Party (CCP) officials and cadres are also common.

PLA Navy Used for First Time in Naval Evacuation from Yemen Conflict

By: Nathan Beauchamp-Mustafaga

April 3, 2015

Publication: China Brief Volume: 15 Issue: 7

On March 29, the Linyi, a People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) missile frigate, evacuated the first 122 Chinese citizens and two foreign experts from Aden, Yemen to Djibouti as the situation in Yemen deteriorated—marking the first time PLAN ships were used to rescue citizens abroad (People’s Daily Online, March 30; Xinhua, March 30). The next day, the Linyi’s sister ship, the Weifang, also rescued another 449 Chinese citizens from Al-Hodayda (Xinhua, March 30). Speaking at the Boao Forum in Hainan on March 29, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said “there are 590 Chinese nationals in Yemen and the Chinese government launched the evacuation plan Thursday evening [March 26], when Saudi Arabia and its allies launched airstrikes in Yemen. The evacuation will help ensure Chinese nationals come back to China safely” (China Daily, March 29).

The crisis in Yemen escalated this January when Houthi rebels took control of the capital, Sana’a, forcing the president to leave the capital in February, and by early March they had taken large parts of the country. In response to the president fleeing to Saudi Arabia via Oman on March 26, Saudi Arabia was able to build a 10 country coalition, with a reported 150,000 troops, seemingly overnight to begin an air campaign against the rebels. Describing the scene in the capital, Xinhua said residents had fled and businesses were closed (Xinhua, March 29). The instability in Yemen represents a challenge to what was a deepening relationship between Beijing and Sana’a, after Defense Minister Muhammad Nasir Ahmad and President Abdu Rabbu Mansur Hadi visited Beijing in September and November 2013, respectively, to “[seek] cooperative relations” (Xinhua, September 23, 2013; CTTV, November 13, 2013; China Brief, July 7, 2006). However, the Chinese government had already begun pulling back on some projects in the country in January (Yemen Post, January 1).

The Generals’ Growing Clout in Diplomacy

By: Willy Lam

April 3, 2015

Publication: China Brief Volume: 15 Issue: 7

A recent foreign policy debate in the Chinese media has thrown into sharp relief the extent of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) generals’ influence on the country’s diplomacy. Wang Zhanyang, a liberal academic at the Central Institute of Socialism, caused a stir when he argued in a late 2014 article in Global Times that “it is impossible for Japan to go down the old road of militarism.” Professor Wang argued that “both the ‘Japan threat’ theory and the ‘China threat’ theory do not tally with reality.” He added that believers in Japan’s re-militarization, including the country’s hawkish military officers, had “strayed into the realm of methodological fallacy” (Global Times, October 9, 2014). Lieutenant-General Wang Hongguang harshly disputed Professor Wang’s point in a Global Times article last November. General Wang, a retired deputy-commander of the strategic Nanjing Military Region, cited efforts by the Shinzo Abe administration to reinterpret the Japanese Constitution and to develop state-of-the-art weapons as demonstrating that “Japan’s 1,000-year-old ambition of conquering China remains unchanged.” General Wang hinted that a new war with Japan was a distinct possibility (Global Times, November 14, 2014).

Supporters of the professor and the general have clashed vociferously in China’s social media. Senior Colonel Xu Sen seemed to back the PLA’s heightened involvement in foreign policy when he argued that “soldiers have every right to make public statements about issues of national defense and national security.” Xu, a veteran researcher at the National Defense University, denied accusations that the generals were “stoking the flames of nationalistic feelings.” “If soldiers don’t talk about war, what else should they talk about?” he asked rhetorically in a commentary in the Global Times (Global Times, August 28, 2014; Chinaiiss.com [Beijing], August 28, 2014). Xu’s remarks provoked the bigger question of whether, apart from raising eyebrows, the generals’ increasingly frequent comments on diplomatic and national-security issues mean that President and Commander-in-Chief Xi Jinping, China’s No. 1 foreign-policy formulator, is giving them a bigger say in this key arena.

What’s in a Story?: Chinese Narratives on Territorial Conflict in the Pacific

By: David Millar

Publication: China Brief Volume: 15 Issue: 7

April 3, 2015

Last week, China finished hosting the 2015 Boao Forum and also participated with Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members in the 13th round of talks on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea. Both were promoted in the Chinese press as symbols of China’s commitment to the region and to an emerging pan-Asian economic and security order, embracing peace while also according China appropriate weight as a “great power” (Xinhua, March 27, March 28). This year’s Boao theme, “Toward a Community of Common Destiny,” seems to perfectly capture Beijing’s vision for a 21st-century Asia closely entwined with China’s economic and political leadership (Tung Fang Jih Pao, March 29).

Yet China’s ongoing territorial conflicts in the East and South China Seas sound a discordant note in this otherwise harmonious symphony. Many in the United States see China’s engagements as part of a carefully-calibrated campaign of military and diplomatic maneuvering, an “incremental assertiveness” meant to divide the United States’ attention and acclimate neighbors toward accepting China’s rising power (The Diplomat, January 8). Yet in China, the dominant narrative insists that any conflict with regional neighbors is rooted in the United States’ interference—and particularly the “Rebalance to Asia,” which encourages confrontation rather than negotiation and suggests a covert intention to thwart China’s rise (China Daily, April 1).

Mullahs against the mouse Iran, unhindered, proceeds with its scheme to dominate the Middle East

By THE WASHINGTON TIMES

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The cat and mouse game playing out in the waters of the Middle East has profound consequences, not only for the United States, but for the rest of the world. It’s part of the clash of civilizations, whether the West likes it or not — the mullahs in Tehran against the Katzenjammer Kids in the White House. It’s not yet clear who’s the cat, and who’s the mouse, but the mullahs think they know.

The mullahs are pushing hard to consolidate a growing control over the region by seizing the initiative, nautical mile by nautical mile, from the U.S. Navy, which succeeded the British Royal Navy as the monarch of the seas after World War II. A few days ago two Iranian merchant ships, carrying arms to their Houthi tribal friends in Yemen, were observed sailing in these troubled waters. The Pentagon immediately dispatched an aircraft carrier, presumably assigned to intercept them. Someone, almost certainly someone at the White House, tipped the news that despite United Nations sanctions against the Yemeni rebels, the Americans would not board the ships to halt the arms cargoes.

Apparently as confused as the rest of us about what American policy might be, the little Iranian flotilla turned tail and headed home. The sight of an American carrier is impressive.

Iran and Saudi Arabia Are on a Collision Course

By Farzin Nadimi

Source Link

May 1, 2015

To prevent recent airline and shipping incidents from escalating into a wider military confrontation with Iran, all sides will need to exercise great caution in the Persian Gulf and the skies over Yemen.

On April 28, Saudi-led coalition aircraft bombed runways at Yemen's al-Rahaba Airport to prevent an Iranian Airbus A310 plane from landing there. The Sana airport is currently controlled by Houthi/Zaidi forces with close ties to Shiite Iran, and the plane belonged to Mahan Air, a company affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps. At the controls was a famously reckless ex-IRGC cargo pilot who had stubbornly ignored orders from Saudi F-15 crews to change course, spurring the runway strikes that rendered the airport inoperable and eventually forced him to turn back.

Iranian officials, especially within the IRGC, are frustrated by the coalition's actions against Houthi/Zaidi militias and by their own inability to provide military assistance to them. Only days before the airport incident, IRGC commander Maj. Gen. Mohammad Ali Jafari had called for a more aggressive stance against coalition operations in Yemen, while Hassan Firouzabadi, the chairman of the General Armed Forces Staff, called for "heavy-handed punishment" of the Saudis. Just last week, a convoy of cargo ships from Iran had attempted to run the Saudi blockade and deliver supplies and possibly arms to Yemeni ports under Zaidi control. The convoy was reportedly escorted by two of the IRGC Navy's Tondar-class missile boats (armed with Ghader anti-ship missiles, whose range is up to 200 miles), but it was called back after the U.S. Navy sent the aircraft carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt and the guided missile cruiser USS Normandy from the Persian Gulf. The standoff was brief and politically courteous, but it also carried a clear message for Iran.

The Faltering Russian Economy Makes a Renewed Ukraine Offensive More Likely

By: Pavel K. Baev

Source Link

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 73

“Boring” is perhaps the prevalent impression of President Vladimir Putin’s televised four-hour-long Q & A session that aired last Thursday (April 16), which was meant to demonstrate his good health and relaxed attitude to the great many problems worrying his loyal subjects. The three key points he stressed were that everything is under control, the economy is set to improve from the low point of the crisis, and there will be no war (Slon.ru, April 17). His command of facts and figures was far from convincing to support the first point, and the everyday reality of falling incomes disproves the second one; thus, the commitment to peace inevitably looks dubious. Triumphalism over the “spectacular” annexation of Crimea was gone, overtaken by a return to “mundane” issues such as degenerating health care and the credit crunch to small businesses, which have fueled domestic discontent. And under the Putinist system, such discontent can only be neutralized by a new patriotic mobilization (Moscow Echo, April 17).

The Russian president has not found any inspirational idea for such a mobilization and even implicitly distanced himself from the rabid conservatism targeting “corrupt” Western values, which is fanned by the official propaganda (Novaya Gazeta, April 16). Reportedly, more than 3,000,000 questions and pleas were recorded for last week’s carefully staged performance. Putin attempted to highlight a few “human stories” but clearly preferred to push the pesky details to subordinates (Gazeta.ru, April 16). Russia’s governors and ministers, however, excel in explaining such problems away. Thus, Nikolai Rogozhkin, the presidential envoy to Siberia, suggested that the devastating forest fires raging in Khakassiya were caused by arson executed by specially trained oppositionists (Newsru.com, April 17). Sabotage is indeed a perfect cover-up for man-made disasters caused by rampant embezzlement. And it is typical in this respect that one issue that has disappeared completely from Putin’s discourse is the fight against corruption (Navalny.com, April 17).

NSA Is Not Resisting Proposed New Restrictions on Its Eavesdropping Activities

Peter Baker and David E. Sanger

May 2, 2015

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WASHINGTON — For years after the attacks of Sept. 11, 2001, even as theNational Security Agency fiercely defended its secret efforts to sweep up domestic telephone data, there were doubters inside the agency who considered the program wildly expensive with few successes to show for it.

So as Congress moves to take the government out of the business of indiscriminate bulk collection of domestic calling data, the agency is hardly resisting. Former intelligence officials, in fact, said Friday that the idea to store the data with telecommunications companies rather than the government was suggested to President Obama in 2013 by Gen. Keith B. Alexander, then the N.S.A. director, who saw the change as a way for the president to respond to criticism without losing programs the N.S.A. deemed more vital.

The limits on bulk collection are the centerpiece of legislation now advancing in the House that would be the first significant response to the spying revelations by Edward J. Snowden, a former N.S.A. contractor. In addition to new restrictions on domestic data sweeps, the plan would require more transparency and introduce ostensibly independent voices into secret intelligence court proceedings.

But as one recently departed senior intelligence official put it on Friday, “This is hardly major change.”

The legislation would still leave an expansive surveillance apparatus capable of tracking vast quantities of data. Some of the most sweeping programs disclosed by Mr. Snowden, particularly those focused on international communications, would remain unaffected. The N.S.A. could continue efforts to break private encryption systems, and information about Americans could still be swept up if originating overseas.

Moscow Likely to Choose Control of Territories Over Their Economic Development

By: Valery Dzutsev

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 80

April 29, 2015

The Russian government is considering building a new water link connecting the Caspian Sea to the ocean via the Azov and Black seas. The new route is supposed to be the shortest and the cheapest way to carry Chinese goods via Central Asia to Europe. Existing oil and gas pipelines from the Caspian Sea to outside markets also have hit the limits of their capacities, and finding new ways for exporting oil and gas is another important aspect of the project. Central Asian countries are regarded as the primary beneficiaries of the new transportation link, with Kazakhstan reportedly being its most ardent supporter. It is believed the new link will also boost the stagnant economies of the North Caucasus, creating new jobs and providing better access to world markets and investment. The Eurasian Development Bank has allotted $2.7 million for early project assessment, and the results of the research was discussed in the Russian Ministry of Transportation, but that discussion was closed to the public (Kavkazskaya Politika, April 17).

The proposed water link, commonly referred to as the “Eurasia canal,” would significantly affect the economic and political situation in the North Caucasus and southern Russia more generally (see EDM, June 25, 2007). Southern Russia has significant agricultural potential and would certainly be of interest to Chinese investors. Access by Chinese investors to the North Caucasus would also substantially improve local economies and decrease their dependence on subsidies from Moscow. As a rule, the Russian government prefers control to development. Unless the government is reassured that there is no threat to its control over the North Caucasus, it is unlikely to proceed with even the most lucrative developmental projects.

Will Turkey Choose the European or Eurasian Energy Union?

By: Orhan Gafarli

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Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 12 Issue: 72

The sixth meeting of the World Forum on Energy Regulation is scheduled to be held on May 25–28, in Istanbul, and is being organized by the office of the prime minister of the Turkish Republic. The competitive and dynamically expanding nature of the energy sector in Eurasia has been boosting Turkey’s regional importance as it prepares to take on the role of a strategically important transit and energy hub country (Hurriyet Daily News, January 28).

December 2014 saw the reemergence of competition between rival pipeline projects in Eurasia—similar to the earlier competition between the Nabucco natural gas pipeline, proposed by a consortium of European companies, and Russia’s South Stream. Currently, Russia’s new proposed pipeline project—Turkish Stream—is challenging the Azerbaijani-initiated Southern Gas Corridor, which will carry Caspian-basin gas to Europe via the South Caucasus, Turkey and then across Southeastern Europe. Turkey is already signed on to the Southern Gas Corridor—the Corridor’s longest pipeline segment, the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP), will cross Turkey from east to west—but it is also being strongly courted by Moscow to host Turkish Stream (see EDM, December 17, 2014; February 20, 2015). This growing significance of Turkey in competing large-scale energy transit projects across Europe and Eurasia has also opened up a discussion domestically regarding which prospective energy union the country should become part of—European or Eurasian.

Russia’s Hybrid War Against Poland

By: Matthew Czekaj

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In early April 2015, the Polish Internal Security Agency’s Governmental Computer Security Incident Response Team (also known as CERT—Computer Emergency Response Team), released its annual report on cyber security in Poland (Cert.gov.pl, April 3). According to the report’s findings, Poland came under a record number of hacker and cyber attacks in 2014—7,498 specific cyber attack “incidents” last year, compared to 5,670 confirmed incidents in 2013, 457 in 2012, and 249 attacks verified by CERT in 2011 (Cert.gov.pl, accessed April 28). In addition to a marked escalation in cases, the threat and level of sophistication of the registered cyber attacks also increased compared to previous years, in many cases pointing to state backing. The report highlights a series of high-profile hacking and distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks against key Polish state and financial websites in mid-August 2014, including the homepage of Poland’s president and the Warsaw stock exchange. Those incidents were promptly claimed by an online group calling itself “Cyber Berkut,” which stated it was acting in retaliation against the Polish government’s support of the post-EuroMaidan Ukrainian authorities.

However, what is novel about the 2014 issue of the CERT report, compared to all previous years, is the fact that, for the first time, it discusses an emerging “new trend” of “information war” directed against Poland via the Internet. As CERT notes, examples of such efforts include the dissemination of foreign “propaganda-disinformation” by bloggers and contributors to online discussion forums or website comments sections. Many such individuals, the report states, are on the payroll of a foreign state; while others may simply be naïve, misinformed or ideologically driven “useful idiots [sic]” whose viewpoints or standing can be exploited. Though the report does not specifically single out the Russian government as being behind this effort, CERT does highlight the veritable “deluge” of pro-Russia “trolling” commentary on the Polish Internet and blogosphere immediately following the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea (Cert.gov.pl, April 3). The Polish news outlet Niezalezna quickly pointed to these findings as examples of Russian hybrid warfare being waged against Poland (Niezalezna.pl, April 14).

Why, and how, Britain might leave the European Union

Apr 29th 2015

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GREECE has long seemed a decent bet to crash out of the euro zone, and perhaps also the European Union. But during the current election campaign in Britain, Britain's exit (or a "Brexit") from the EU has also started to seem a real possibility. David Cameron, the prime minister, has promised an in/out referendum vote on Britain’s EU membership by the end of 2017 if the Conservatives remain in power on May 7th. Several other smaller parties, notably the UK Independence Party (UKIP), are campaigning specifically to leave the EU. Moreover, polls show that any referendum would be an extremely tight one. Why might Britain be leaving the EU, and how would it happen?

Even at the best of times Britain has always been a semi-detached member of the EU. The first post-war Labour governments turned down the opportunity to participate in the negotiations that led to the birth of the forerunner of the EU in the early 1950s. Since then Britain has often been more sceptical of the European project than committed to it; the country has been called “the awkward partner”. Britain eventually joined what was then called the European Communities under a Tory government in 1973, as Europe seemed to be doing so well economically. But the next Labour government quickly held a referendum on membership in 1975. The majority, on that occasion, voted to stay in, but over the past few decades British governments have kept their distance as others within Europe pursued "ever closer union". Britain did not join the single currency, and it is not a member of the Schengen passport-free travel zone. Traditional hostility to the EU has increased in recent years with the arrival of hundreds of thousands of east Europeans (quite legally, under EU rules) to find work, which has caused parties such as UKIP to assert that they are hogging an unfair proportion of the housing, school-places and health services that should go to Britons. 

On Trade: Obama Right, Critics Wrong

Thomas L. Friedman

APRIL 29, 2015 

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BERLIN — I strongly support President Obama’s efforts to conclude big, new trade-opening agreements with our Pacific allies, including Japan and Singapore, and with the whole European Union. But I don’t support them just for economic reasons.

While I’m certain they would benefit America as a whole economically, I’ll leave it to the president to explain why (and how any workers who are harmed can be cushioned). I want to focus on what is not being discussed enough: how these trade agreements with two of the biggest centers of democratic capitalism in the world can enhance our national security as much as our economic security.

Because these deals are not just about who sets the rules. They’re about whether we’ll have a rule-based world at all. We’re at a very plastic moment in global affairs — much like after World War II. China is trying to unilaterally rewrite the rules. Russia is trying to unilaterally break the rules and parts of both the Arab world and Africa have lost all their rules and are disintegrating into states of nature. The globe is increasingly dividing between the World of Order and the World of Disorder.

When you look at it from Europe — I’ve been in Germany and Britain the past week — you see a situation developing to the south of here that is terrifying. It is not only a refugee crisis. It’s a civilizational meltdown: Libya, Yemen, Syria and Iraq — the core of the Arab world — have all collapsed into tribal and sectarian civil wars, amplified by water crises and other environmental stresses.

Army awards $4B Rifleman Radio contract

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Harris Corp. and Thales Defense and Security are the winners of a $4 billion contract to purchase the Army's handheld, manpack and small-form fit (HMS) Rifleman Radio.

Under the agreement, each vendor will produce 50 radios, which then will undergo laboratory tests to determine if threshold requirements have been met, according to an Army release. If the vendor meets qualifications, its radios will move a subsequent operational evaluation phase. If the vendor fails to meet qualifications, the vendor will be off-ramped. Vendors that are found to be qualified through testing will then compete to fill delivery orders on an as-needed basis.

"By working closely with our requirements and contracting teams, these contract awards are a critical step in moving closer toward full rate production of the Rifleman Radio. Using the nondevelopmental item strategy, we are hoping to procure superior radios at lower costs, relying on a competitive, innovative radio marketplace," COL Jim Ross, Army project manager tactical radios, said in a released statement. "These radios are key in closing the information gap on the battlefield."

The indefinite delivery, indefinite quantity contract, awarded under a "radio marketplace" strategy, has five base years and five option years. With each new generation, the Army plans to procure radios with better capabilities, including faster processors, increased power and battery life and decreased weight.

Cyber War and Peace

Javier Solana

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MADRID – Information and communication technologies have become a central part of everyday life for most of the world’s population. They affect even the most underdeveloped and remote areas of the planet and have become a key factor driving development, innovation, and economic growth.

But this is just the beginning of a fundamental transformation. In the coming years, new technologies, such as the “Internet of things,” 3-D printing, and autonomous vehicles will revolutionize businesses operations, regulatory regimes, and even social conventions.

These technologies generate enormous benefits, but they are also risky, owing to the ease of accessing data and using it for criminal purposes. Cyber attacks are already vastly increasing in number, sophistication, magnitude, and impact. As the world becomes more interdependent and hyper-connected, there is growing concern about the vulnerability of the Internet, an infrastructure on which nearly all economic activities – including trade, energy provision, and the entire financial system – have come to depend.

Cyber attacks take place in a medium, cyberspace, where offensive actions have an advantage over defensive ones. Indeed, most of cyberspace’s infrastructure was designed to ensure its interoperability and openness, often at the expense of security, which tends to limit usability.

Former Intelligence Chief: U.S. and Israel Must Increase Collaboration in Cyber Warfare

by Eliyahu Berkowitz

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Cyber warfare is a very real reality. Any military force that uses weapons more advanced than swords and spears relies on computers for most of its most basic functions. Israel is vastly outnumbered so much of its security is based on maintaining a technological edge over its enemies. Tel Aviv University (TAU) Institute of National Security Studies (INSS) director and former Israel Defense Forces (IDF) Chief of Military Intelligence Maj. Gen. (Res.) Amos Yadlin spoke at a conference in Washington, DC, and explained that it is no longer sufficient to build up cyber-defenses. Just as in conventional warfare on a physical battlefield, it is essential to be on the offensive in cyber warfare.

“Building a cyber-wall-of-defense around strategic national assets is not enough,” said Yadlin. “A country’s cyber-defense toolbox must include advanced attack capabilities. This combination is essential for effective cyber-defense.”

Though America and Israel have a long history of cooperation in the military and in intelligence, there has yet to be such an initiative in the area of cyber warfare. The conference was a step towards remedying that.

INSS director of Military and Strategic Affairs and Cyber Security Gabi Siboni also participated in the conference. Siboni said, “Not enough has been done to advance cyber-cooperation between Israel and the US, given the severity of the threats facing both countries. There is a need for a joint mechanism to integrate the technological and intelligence capabilities of Israel and the US.”

Report: To Aid Combat, Russia Wages Cyberwar Against Ukraine

AARTI SHAHANI

Source Link

APRIL 28, 2015 

The rules of War 2.0 (or 3.0) are murky. Experts and pundits say that cyberwarfare is happening. And it makes sense. But it has been very hard to prove.

A new report adds to the body of evidence, charging that the Russian military is waging a sustained cyber campaign against Ukrainian military and law enforcement agencies, and the purpose is to extract a steady stream of classified documents that can aid violence and on-the-ground combat.

A Sustained Campaign Targeting Military

Lookingglass, a security firm based in Arlington, Va., and Baltimore, publishes a report Tuesday documenting a real-life instance of a cyberwar campaign.

CEO Chris Coleman says the attacks are persistent, but not sophisticated. "We're not claiming we found some big exploit in the Windows operating system," he says. "We tracked malware that was in emails, and it shows full-scale coordination."

Lookingglass says a dedicated group of hackers is getting Ukrainian military, counterintelligence, border patrol and local police to open emails with malicious attachments.

Only, they look legit. It's masterful — so far as manipulation goes — because of the "lure documents" that attackers use as bait.

Learning from South Korea’s mobile-retailing boom

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byHeeyoung Hwang, Paul McInerney, and Jun Shin

How much do South Koreans love their smartphones? Well, the country has the highest smartphone penetration in the world: more than two-thirds of South Koreans own one, compared with 47 percent of Americans, 57 percent of Australians, and 52 percent of Britons.1 South Koreans are also big users of their smartphones, with sales of goods purchased using mobile devices jumping more than fourfold since 2012 to about 10 trillion won, or $9.8 billion.

This enthusiastic adoption has put the country at the vanguard of so-called omnichannel commerce, where physical stores and online shopping are complemented by mobile (m-commerce). The majority of South Korea’s consumers already have experience with m-commerce, and on-the-go shoppers spend about as much on each mobile transaction as they do in stores. In addition, consumers who turn primarily to their phones to shop—“mobile first” consumers—tend to spend more than shoppers in other channels. South Korea’s rapid m-commerce growth means not only that local companies are taking their know-how elsewhere—witness SK Planet’s recent purchase of Silicon Valley start-up Shopkick2 —but that the country’s experience holds lessons for players around the world.

Four m-commerce insights

Every year since 2010, South Korea’s mobile-commerce market has more than doubled in value. Today it represents nearly one-third of all web-based sales. Using smartphones to buy products and services has become so commonplace (tablets play an extremely limited role in South Korea) that nearly two of every three people have done so at least once, up from fewer than half in 2012 (exhibit). By comparison, just one in four US and Australian consumers have had a mobile-shopping experience.3

Are the Dangers of Cyberwar Being Hyped for Personal Profit and Political Gain?

Josh Gerstein

April 30, 2015

Two former high-ranking U.S. officials presented different perspectives Wednesday on the current risk of a serious or catastrophic cyberattack against the U.S.

Former National Security Agency Director Keith Alexander said the danger of such attacks is growing. He laid out scenarios where a bad actor might take down the power grid and mount a cyberattack on the financial sector at the same time, causing a high degree of panic, confusion and economic damage.

“The use of cyber, both for criminal activity and for nation-state, has had a significant rise in the last seven, eight years. … We see this only picking up,” Alexander said at a discussion in Washington organized by the Aspen Security Forum. He said he was optimistic that Congress may be on the verge of passing long-debated cybersecurity legislation intended to facilitate information-sharing between industry and government.

“We’ve told them it’s a crisis,” Alexander said of the message he’s delivered to lawmakers. Director of National Intelligence James Clapper has also put cyber atop his annual list of threats to U.S. security.

However, speaking to the same group, former National Counterterrorism Center Director Matt Olsen said that while the greatest risk of a devastating cyberattack remains in the future, more conventional forms of terrorism are a greater danger right now.

Drone strikes are bad; no drone strikes would be worse

By Editorial Board 

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AT A time when Islamic jihadism has become a major threat in at least half a dozen countries, it’s important to acknowledge that the group that has posed the greatest threat to Americans and the U.S. homeland — the original al-Qaeda affiliate in Pakistan — has been devastated. By all accounts, U.S. counterterrorism actions — above all drone strikes — have eliminated several generations of the organization’s leadership and pushed its survivors into far corners of Pakistan and Afghanistan, where they have scant chance to concoct operations like that of Sept. 11, 2001.

This success, veiled by the secrecy of the U.S. operations but nonetheless very real, must be part of any evaluation of the tragic deaths of two hostages, including American Warren Weinstein, in a Jan. 15 drone strike.President Obama rightly apologized for the failure to detect the hostages inside a structure targeted by a drone and promised a review.

One consideration in such a review could be whether drone strikes not targeted at specific individuals — known as “signature strikes” — are still justified in Pakistan. Since Mr. Obama tightened procedures for drone attacks in 2013, their numbers have decreased dramatically; outside monitors have counted only about two dozen in Pakistan in the past year, with civilian casualties in the single digits. Nevertheless, it was a signature strike that killed the two Western hostages, as well as four al-Qaeda militants. Such attacks do not require a finding that the targets pose an imminent threat to the United States, though they must still involve a judgment of “near certainty” that no civilians will be killed.

Why Terrorism Works

By Bruce Hoffman

March 2, 2015

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Does terrorism work? Its targets and victims steadfastly maintain that it does not, while its practitioners and apologists claim that it does. Scholars and analysts are divided. Given the untold death and destruction wrought by terrorists throughout history, the question has an undeniable relevance that has only intensified since the September 11 attacks. Yet a definitive answer unaccountably remains as elusive as a universally accepted definition of terrorism itself.

"Terrorists can never win outright," Prime Minister Ian Smith of Rhodesia declared in 1977. Following the 1983 suicide truck bombing that killed 241 U.S. military service personnel in Lebanon, President Ronald Reagan defiantly proclaimed that "the main thing" is to show that terrorism "doesn’t work," and "to prove that terrorist acts are not going to drive us away." Margaret Thatcher described the attempt by the Provisional Irish Republican Army to kill her at the 1984 Conservative Party Conference as illustrative not only of a failed attack but of a fundamentally futile strategy. And in July 2006, Prime Minister Ehud Olmert of Israel promised that his government "will not give in to blackmail and will not negotiate with terrorists when it comes to the lives of Israel Defense Force soldiers."

Scholars have made similarly sweeping claims. Thomas Schelling, a Nobel laureate in economics, observed in 1991 that despite considerable exertion, terrorists have little to show for their efforts except for fleeting attention and evanescent publicity. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, the historical novelist cum military historian Caleb Carr consolingly averred, "The strategy of terror is a spectacularly failed one." And in a 2006 article unambiguously titled "Why Terrorism Does Not Work," the political scientist Max Abrahms argued that terrorism is a failed tactic. "The notion that terrorism is an effective coercive instrument," he concluded, "is sustained by either single case studies or a few well-known terrorist victories."

Tactical or strategic: all nuclear weapons are political by nature

by Pranay Kotasthane and Rohan Joshi

April 28, 2015

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Why Pakistan’s claims to “full spectrum” deterrence are meaningless in the subcontinental context.

Two disparate triggers in March 2015 turned the world’s attention to Pakistan’s nuclear weapons programme, yet again. The first was a Stimson Center essay Pakistan’s Tactical Nuclear Weapons: Operational Myths and Realities by Jeffrey D McCausland which concluded that the induction of short-range, nuclear-capable delivery vehicles in Pakistan’s arsenal is both dangerous and problematic.

The second trigger was a speech by Gen Khalid Kidwai at the Carnegie conference on Nuclear Policy where he gave a glimpse of Pakistan’s nuclear philosophy — Pakistan moving to what he described as “full-spectrum deterrence,” the desire for a sea-based deterrent and how “having tactical nuclear weapons would make a war less likely”. These occurrences have been interpreted as Pakistan’s attempt at lowering the nuclear threshold by using short-range, battlefield “tactical” nuclear weapons. The fear that these tactical nuclear weapons might be inducted into Pakistan’s armed forces triggered concern among the nuclear non-proliferation observers, multilateral organisations and states.

The Bren is One Awesome Machine Gun

By Paul Huard

May 1, 2015

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In April 1945, an entire brigade of British special forces joined the massive effort to attack the German army until its back was against the Po River.

If successful, the Wehrmacht would have no choice but escape across the river and evacuate Italy — or stay and fight, facing the prospect of heavy losses.

Cpl. Thomas Peck Hunter, a 21-year-old member of 43 Royal Marine Commando, was Bren gunner in charge of his section during Operation Roast. Deployed for combat on April 2 near Lake Comacchio, Hunter and his fellow Royal Marines faced German soldiers behind three fearsome MG-42 machine guns lodged in nearby houses.

The Germans were well-protected and had a clear field of fire for hundreds of yards. Hunter realized that the German machine gun fire would mow down the British troops, who had no cover.

Hunter grabbed his Bren gun and ran 200 yards, dodging both machine-gun fire and mortar rounds. He fired from the hip and reloaded on the run, purposely drawing fire toward him and away from his fellow Royal Marines.

Hunter was shot and killed. But his actions — and his Bren gun — likely saved the lives of his fellow Commandos.

Why physical standards still dog the fight about women in combat units

By Dan Lamothe 

May 1 

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FORT BENNING, Ga. — Retired Army Col. Ralph Puckett watched thoughtfully as a few dozen soldiers prepared for an outdoor breakfast of eggs, home fries and waffles after a six-mile road march. A legendary Army Ranger, he earned two Distinguished Service Crosses, two Silver Stars and five Purple Hearts while serving in Korea and Vietnam, but was reflecting on the military’s future before dawn on a damp morning in April.

Puckett, 88, is revered enough in the Rangers to have a street named after him on this massive base in western Georgia. He’s the sort of old-school soldier that is celebrated for his heroism, and welcome virtually anywhere on base.

He also appears relatively open-minded when it comes to the polarizing idea of women serving in the infantry and other combat units.

“It’s okay with me if they maintain standards,” Puckett said April 19. “I think there are some who can meet the standards, and I want to see it.”

Puckett’s views are common among combat veterans as the military examines how to integrate women into more combat units. A decades-long ban on women serving in direct ground combat assignments was lifted in January 2013, but top Pentagon officials gave the services until later this year to research whether it should submit requests to keep some jobs closed.

The Differences in Military's 'Command Culture'

By Daniel J. Bergen

May 1, 2015

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Jörg Muth’s Command Culture (University of North Texas Press, 2013) is an insightful study that compares the shortfalls and strengths of the U.S. Army officer corps to that of the German Armed Forces. In developing his comparison of the leadership cadre in both services, Muth focuses his attention on the first half of the 20th century (1901 through 1940, specifically), investigating the respective services’ selection and education systems and evaluating their efficacy through the battlefield consequences of World War II. To summarize his project’s intent, Muth writes, “Command culture is in this study is to be understood as how an officer considers himself in command, i.e., does he command as a visible person close to the action or rather through orders by his staff from his command post?”

In very direct language, Muth ties together historical documents, memoirs from past field grade and general officers and personal interviews to paint a picture of of American military education through two schools: the U.S. Military Academy at West Point (USMA), as well as the more intermediate Command and General Staff School (CGSS) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. From the outset of WWI in 1914 through 1940, West Point graduates – though approximately 1.5 percent of total personnel in the U.S. officer corps – held up to 74 percent of the 480 general officer billets. A professionally educated and trained corps by any estimation.

Nitin Pai: How much does India really spend on defence?

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Nitin Pai

Zen practitioners routinely confront puzzling parables, or koans, as part of their practice to attain enlightenment. One koan goes: "There was a woman walking down the street. Was she the elder or the younger sister?" Thinking with our logical minds, the question seems absurd. How can we tell whether the woman is the elder or the younger sister merely based on the information in the koan? But the method of Zen is to abandon logical thought, for it gets in the way of true enlightenment.

But why is a Business Standard column getting into Zen on a Monday morning? Well, because our defence Budget is much like the aforementioned koan. Every year, the government announces a defence Budget (this year, it amounted to Rs 2.47 lakh crore or $40 billion) and people begin to debate whether it is low, high, adequate or inadequate.

Unfortunately, national defence in a liberal democracy cannot be managed through Zen methods: it needs thought, logic, reasoning and analysis in order to persuade the citizens that so much of their collective wealth and income ought to be allocated for their collective security.

Earlier this month, Prime Minister Narendra Modi was in France where he concluded a deal to purchase 36 readymade fighter aircraft, leading to more Zen: was it right to purchase them even when most people agree that we ought to make in India? This is not about procurement procedures, which are merely instruments. This is about the fundamental question: how should we allocate resources between "Buy" and "Make"?