Brigadier Ben Barry (ret.)
July 8, 2015
The British Army that entered Afghanistan in late in 2001 had a quarter century of successes from Northern Ireland, Zimbabwe, the Falkland Islands, Operation Desert Storm, Bosnia, Kosovo, East Timor and Sierra Leone. All these operations were supported by Parliament, the public and the media. There were remarkably few casualties. Many aspects of these operations were demanding, but in all these conflicts the opposition was of lower average quality than British forces, was mostly unwilling to stand and fight and was overmatched by the arms and joint war-fighting capabilities of the UK and its allies.
So war in a broken country against enemies who rejected Western values and were prepared to stand, fight and die was a strategic shock. The army was faced with far greater challenges than it had expected. There were periods of intense fighting. Most soldiers, officers and units performed well, often outstandingly so.
Many International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) nations experienced similar shocks. Those who also provided troops to the US-led Operation Iraqi Freedom were doubly challenged. For the UK this was not only related to the difficulties of sustaining forces in two different operational theatres, but also to the fact that the ever-decreasing popularity of the Iraq War contaminated the public, media and parliamentary popularity of the UK operations in Afghanistan. These factors greatly challenged the British government, its Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the army. All were too slow to adapt. Overall, the British in Afghanistan were not as effective as they could have been.