Erdoğan’s Neo-Ottoman Vision Meets Xi’s Silk Road Dream in the Middle East

22 January 2016
As Christina Lin sees it, Recep Erdoğan’s desire to protect Turkey’s energy interests in its near-abroad may disrupt the Middle East segment of China’s One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Initiative. To avoid this burgeoning problem, Ankara will have to tread cautiously and operate within a conciliatory “multiple modernities” framework.
By Christina Lin for Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung (ISPSW)
This article was originally published by the Institut für Strategie- Politik- Sicherheits- und Wirtschaftsberatung in January 2016.
Abstract
The ancient Silk Roads crossed Eurasia to link trade between China and its Greco-Roman trading partners until the Ottoman Empire cut it off in the 1400s. With the newly revived One Belt, One Road (OBOR) Initiative under Chinese President Xi Jinping, will it meet the same fate as Turkey’s President Erdoğan asserts his Neo-Ottoman ambitions in the greater Middle East?
China hopes it won’t. On December 17, DHL Global Forwarding, a leading provider of air, sea and road freight services in Europe and Asia, inaugurated its China-Turkey intermodal corridor as part of the One Belt, One Road initiative.1
The Lianyungang-Istanbul corridor takes around 14 days to transit Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, and Georgia as well as the Caspian and Black Seas, with the option for immediate freight forwarding by truck to any Turkish city.
The rail corridor is expected to generate US $2.5 trillion in annual trade within the next ten years, and was recently expanded to connect Taiwan with Europe via China, thereby linking the Pacific Ocean with the Atlantic Ocean through the Eurasian continent.2
Steve Huang, CEO of DHL Global Forwarding China, said: “Turkey already counts China as its second-largest source of imports, and the EU as its largest export market… new corridors like the Lianyungang-Istanbul link will only further boost Turkey’s strategic importance and associated economic development as a conduit for trade between China and Europe.”
However, challenges remain. Foremost is how China and Turkey can cooperate in the Middle East segment of China’s OBOR, especially as Turkey is also taking a more robust military posture to protect its energy interests.

Turkey’s expanding military footprint in its oil & gas rich near abroad
After winning the November election, Erdoğan has taken a more aggressive posture to realize his dream of reviving the Ottoman Empire both domestically by pushing for a presidential system and internationally by deploying Turkish troops abroad.
Qatar: In December, Turkey announced it is establishing a new military base in natural gas-rich Qatar, with an initial 3,000 troops being stationed at the base, including air and naval units, military trainers and special operations forces.
In an interview with Reuters, Turkey’s ambassador to Qatar Ahmet Demirok said, “Today we are not building a new alliance but rather rediscovering historic and brotherly ties,” referring to the Muslim Ottoman Empire which stretched from eastern Europe to the Arab Gulf.3
Iraq: At the same time, Hurriyet Daily announced Turkey would also set up a permanent military base in Iraq when Ankara sent around 200 soldiers and 20-25 tanks to Bashiqa (near oil-rich Mosul), following a deal with the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) on 4 November.4 After Iraq protested against Turkey’s invasion at the UN, Ankara responded by moving its troops around, some deeper inside Kurdistan, while it is not yet clear where other troops would move to.

U.S. Relies Heavily on Saudi Money to Support Syrian Rebels

http://mobile.nytimes.com/2016/01/24/world/middleeast/us-relies-heavily-on-saudi-money-to-support-syrian-rebels.html?smid=tw-share&referer=https://t.co/SzubZujqFE&_r=0
By MARK MAZZETTI and MATT APUZZO, January 23, 2016
WASHINGTON — When President Obama secretly authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to begin arming Syria’s embattled rebels in 2013, the spy agency knew it would have a willing partner to help pay for the covert operation. It was the same partner the C.I.A. has relied on for decades for money and discretion in far-off conflicts: the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.
Since then, the C.I.A. and its Saudi counterpart have maintained an unusual arrangement for the rebel-training mission, which the Americans have code-named Timber Sycamore. Under the deal, current and former administration officials said, the Saudis contribute both weapons and large sums of money, and the C.I.A takes the lead in training the rebels on AK-47 assault rifles and tank-destroying missiles.
The support for the Syrian rebels is only the latest chapter in the decadeslong relationship between the spy services of Saudi Arabia and the United States, an alliance that has endured through the Iran-contra scandal, support for the mujahedeen against the Soviets in Afghanistan and proxy fights in Africa. Sometimes, as in Syria, the two countries have worked in concert. In others, Saudi Arabia has simply written checks underwriting American covert activities.

The joint arming and training program, which other Middle East nations contribute money to, continues as America’s relations with Saudi Arabia — and the kingdom’s place in the region — are in flux. The old ties of cheap oil and geopolitics that have long bound the countries together have loosened as America’s dependence on foreign oil declines and the Obama administration tiptoes toward a diplomatic rapprochement with Iran.
And yet the alliance persists, kept afloat on a sea of Saudi money and a recognition of mutual self-interest. In addition to Saudi Arabia’s vast oil reserves and role as the spiritual anchor of the Sunni Muslim world, the long intelligence relationship helps explain why the United States has been reluctant to openly criticize Saudi Arabia for its human rights abuses, its treatment of women and its support for the extreme strain of Islam, Wahhabism, that has inspired many of the very terrorist groups the United States is fighting. The Obama administration did not publicly condemn Saudi Arabia’s public beheading this month of a dissident Shiite cleric, Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr, who had challenged the royal family.
Although the Saudis have been public about their help arming rebel groups in Syria, the extent of their partnership with the C.I.A.’s covert action campaign and their direct financial support had not been disclosed. Details were pieced together in interviews with a half-dozen current and former American officials and sources from several Persian Gulf countries. Most spoke on the condition of anonymity because they were not authorized to discuss the program.

From the moment the C.I.A. operation was started, Saudi money supported it.
“They understand that they have to have us, and we understand that we have to have them,” said Mike Rogers, the former Republican congressman from Michigan who was chairman of the House Intelligence Committee when the C.I.A. operation began. Mr. Rogers declined to discuss details of the classified program.
American officials have not disclosed the amount of the Saudi contribution, which is by far the largest from another nation to the program to arm the rebels against President Bashar al-Assad’s military. But estimates have put the total cost of the arming and training effort at several billion dollars.
The White House has embraced the covert financing from Saudi Arabia — and from Qatar, Jordan and Turkey — at a time when Mr. Obama has pushed gulf nations to take a greater security role in the region.
Spokesmen for both the C.I.A. and the Saudi Embassy in Washington declined to comment.

The Man Obama Asked To Defeat The Islamic State

politico.com

Meet Robert Malley, the president’s ISIL ‘czar.’
By Michael Crowley, 01/18/16
Read more: http://www.politico.com/ story/2016/01/robert-malley- syria-bashar-assad-isil- 217503#ixzz3xcqVD43U
A few years before Syria’s civil war broke out, a Middle East researcher named Robert Malley paid at least two visits to Syrian President Bashar Assad to hear his views on the region.
Today, as President Barack Obama’s top adviser on Middle East issues, it’s Malley’s job to push Assad from power and help restore peace to a country where Malley himself has family roots.
Story Continued Below
That hugely influential – and challenging – role is a kind of redemption for the 52-year-old Malley, whose last encounter with Obama ended painfully. Obama’s 2008 presidential campaign severed its ties with Malley after reports that he’d met with members of the Palestinian militant group Hamas. Ardent Israel supporters piled on with charges that Malley, a former member of Bill Clinton’s Middle East team, harbored anti-Israel views. Top foreign policy hands denounced the “vicious” attacks, but the damage was done; the Obama campaign said that Malley never had a formal campaign role and never would.
Today, Malley holds one of the most important jobs in Obama’s White House, with a hand in everything from the Iran nuclear deal to the fight against the Islamic State, also known as ISIS or ISIL. In late November, Obama granted Malley a second title as his senior adviser for the counter-ISIL campaign – in effect an ISIS “czar” coordinating U.S. efforts against the terror group after complaints about an unclear chain of command.
Friends say Malley’s return from exile is no surprise, given Malley’s expertise and key beliefs he shares with Obama, including pragmatism and a willingness to seek common ground with enemies. “Rob brings a fundamentally realpolitik perspective to his job, and that’s well suited to the president’s worldview,” says one former colleague. “He’s capable of holding his nose.”
In that spirit, Malley has counseled Obama that, however despicable Assad may be, the U.S. has more urgent goals than fulfilling Obama’s vow that Assad be removed from power. Malley does not favor an outright partnership with Assad against the Islamic State, according to sources familiar with his thinking. But, as the former colleague put it: “He’s more inclined than some others to be flexible on the question of Assad’s durability.”
Since Malley took over the national security council’s Middle East job in March, the Obama administration has shown more tolerance for letting Assad hang on for several months, possibly into mid-2017. Obama is trying to broker a political settlement to the Syrian conflict but insists it must pave the way for Assad’s exit.
Other Obama administration officials, including Secretary of State John Kerry – who also met with Assad before the 2011 Syrian uprising began – are more impatient for the Syrian leader’s departure.

How Russia Sees the World

http://nationalinterest.org/feature/how-russia-sees-the-world-14988

There's a middle course between nationalist isolation and globalist impulses.

Vladimir Lukin, January 22, 2016

Russian public and political discussions have recently been revolving around two important issues. On the one hand, Russians have been desperately trying to find some transcendental national peculiarity in their past, present and future, seeing their uniqueness in virtually everything, from the first days of Russian statehood to the tectonic shifts and controversial changes of the twentieth and early twenty-first centuries. In other words, Russians are different and essentially much better than the rest of the world. Or maybe they are not better—but that’s for the better as well.

This self-perception (or its cynical imitation) is the backbone of the “national idea” everyone has been diligently seeking but not finding. It is common knowledge that practically all national entities tend to emphasize their uniqueness. At times, this perception becomes more acute, such as when such metaphysical self-admiration is employed as a distraction from more serious and mundane problems. After all, euphoria brought on by feeling unique is a sure sign of inner trouble.

But pompously advertising one’s uniqueness has nothing to do with feelings of exceptionalism. In fact, the absence of such advertisement would be unusual. Practically every country considers itself different from others in some essential way. I once asked a colleague in Luxembourg how he thought his country differed from its neighbors, including Germany. He pondered for a moment, and then said: “It’s dirtier there.” I still cannot understand whether this assessment was based more on perception or reality; to Russians, both are quite clean. So this judgment seems not only ridiculous in this context but in fact quite dangerous.

On the other hand, against this “national idea,” we all have experienced terrible spells of one-dimensional globalist concepts. Such concepts mercilessly erase distinctions that do not fit into the absolute mainstream while purporting to be an ultimate and irreversible triumph. When such ideas possess the masses, they become a material force that destroys everything in its way, including the masses possessed by these ideas.

New Russian Gas Politics or Adapting to a Changing Gas Trading Dynamics in Central Asia?

http://eurasian-research.org/en/research/comments/energy/new-russian-gas-politics-or-adapting-changing-gas-trading-dynamics-central

22.01.2016 | 

Inherited gas pipeline infrastructure, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, turned Russia into a monopolist on moving Central Asian energy resources to external markets in the 1990s and the first decade of 2000s. Possessing almost complete control over the transportation of the Central Asian gas abroad Russian authorities were in a position to dictate the terms of trading arrangements, particularly with its major supplier–Turkmenistan. Over the course of the past few years, gas export–import relationships between Turkmenistan and Russia has been rather unstable showing negative dynamics. Representatives of Gazprom, Russia's state-controlled energy conglomerate, announced that the company stops purchasing Turkmen gas starting from January 2016. This announcement was immediately followed by another statement highlighting Gazprom’s plans to increase gas purchases from Uzbekistan in 2016. Some experts labeled these two interlinked statements as another move by the Russian authorities to force their Turkmen counterparts to change the terms of the gas trade that no longer suites Russia’s interests. I would argue, however, that this whole situation signifies Russian authorities’ attempt to adapt to a changing gas trading dynamics in Central Asia in which they no longer possess an upper hand.

Central Asian gas pipeline system was designed to operate in connection with the Russian gas pipeline networks in which Turkmenistan contributed the largest share of supplies. Having consumed 8 billion m3 Turkmenistan exported 86 billion m3 of gas to Russia and other former Soviet Republics in 1990.[i] Five lines of the Central Asia Center gas pipeline with the initial capacity to transport up to 90 billion m3of gas, which was later reduced to less than 50 billion m3, and Bukhara–Ural gas pipeline capable of transporting up to 8 billion m3 of gas up until recently were the largest networks to move gas out of the region.[ii] Despite some ups and downs in the Russia–Turkmenistan gas trade in the 1990s, Russian authorities envisioned the boost of demand for the Turkmen gas in the future and signed a 25-year contract in 2003 to increase the volume of gas supplies to 80 billion m3 annually.[iii] However, supplies of Turkmen gas to and through Russian never reached the targeted level.

Russia needed Central Asian resources to keep up with the growing demand for gas in Europe. When the stability of the Russian gas supplies to the European customers was compromised, due to Russia–Ukraine gas crises in 2008–2009, the volume of trade started declining. Russia imported 42.6 billion m3 of Turkmen gas in 2007, but the volume of gas supplies dropped four times in 2009 and accounted for only 11.8 billion m3. Russia received 11.2 billion m3 in 2011, 10.95 billion m3 in 2013,[iv] 10 billion m3 in 2014 and less than 5 billion m3 in 2015.[v] A complete supply cut of the Turkmen gas export, however, was instigated by the disagreements between two parties over the terms of contract and delays in payment. In response to the request by Gazprom to reconsider the terms of gas contracts, according to which Russia was obliged to pay the average European price for the Turkmen gas plus cover the transit fees, Turkmen representatives first blamed it for turning into an “insolvent partner,” but later claimed that that Gazprom was not delivering full payment for the received gas.[vi] In its turn, Gazprom filed a case in international arbitration court in Stockholm demanding a revision of prices. As a result, Turkmengaz has received a notification on January 4, 2016 that Gazprom Export stops purchasing gas from Turkmenistan. Following the notification Gazprom representatives made an announcement on increasing the volume of gas trade between Russia and Uzbekistan indirectly point out to the possibility to replace Turkmen gas with Uzbek supplies.

Putin Calls on Germany to Mend Fences by Recognizing Russian ‘National’ Interests

Publication: Eurasia Daily Monitor Volume: 13 Issue: 9

January 14, 2016 By: Pavel Felgenhauer

It has become a cliché to write off President Vladimir Putin’s anti-Western pitches as only intended for internal consumption—uttered to rally the population around the Kremlin and dampen possible social discontent in times of economic and financial strain. However, in a recent interview for the German weekly Bild, clearly aimed at a Western audience, Putin once more accused the West of treachery for enlarging the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Moreover, he again declared the annexation of Crimea to be absolutely legitimate (Kremlin.ru, January 11).

The interview was given last week in Sochi and published this week by Bild in German and English and by the Kremlin in Russian. During the interview, Putin spoke Russian, then switched to German and back again. Due to apparent redacting, there are discrepancies between the different versions of the text. For example, Putin asserted that relations between Russians and Germans were still good, despite the German mass media spreading anti-Russian propaganda under orders from Washington. The German journalists were dismayed: “Do you mean Bild? This is news to us.” Whereas, in the official Russian-language version of the interview, the German dismay was utterly redacted: Putin insists that Germany (like other Europeans) are proxies of the United States that have surrendered their independence, while the Bild journalists are silent, apparently accepting this purportedly obvious, though unpleasant fact (Kremlin.ru, Bild, January 11).

Putin seems to believe his own rhetoric and also apparently hopes that the European nations can be enlightened and induced to rebel against US domination. During the Bild interview, Putin produced a Russian-language memo, dated 1990, which detailed talks in Moscow between Soviet and German officials about the prospects of German unification. According to Putin, “wise man” Egon Bahr proposed that a new alliance must be formed, “separate of NATO,” that would include the Central European countries, the US and the Soviet Union. Bahr, a German Social Democratic Party (SPD) politician and the creator of the “Ostpolitik” policy in the 1970s, died last August, aged 93. But instead of pursuing the Bahr plan, Putin complained, NATO expanded in Europe, which was a grave mistake and a manifestation of Western post–Cold War triumphalism. “Leading NATO member-nations should have refused to accept new member states into the Alliance,” insisted Putin, “You are not obliged to accept applications” (Kremlin.ru, January 11).

The vision of a neutralized Europe, with the US and Russia as equal partners, with Moscow holding onto a recognized sphere of influence along with veto power on strategic decisions, and with NATO pared down or fully disbanded, could perhaps have been achieved if Moscow pressed harder. But the opportunity was lost, and Putin still laments that. According to Putin, Russia’s main mistake “in the last 25 years” was the failure “to state our national interests from the very beginning; if we did, maybe today the world would be more balanced” (Kremlin.ru, January 11).

THE BREXIT EQUATION: EU MINUS UK = ?

http://www.cer.org.uk/publications/archive/bulletin-article/2016/brexit-equation-eu-minus-uk

Ian Bond, 22 January 2016

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Brexit would change the EU as well as the UK. What kind of partner would a diminished EU be for Britain and the rest of the world?

Most discussions of the UK’s possible exit from the EU focus on what Britain would be like afterwards: whether it could trade more freely with the world, escape EU regulations and reduce immigration. Equally important, however, is what the EU would be like afterwards; and how in turn this might affect post-Brexit relations between the UK and the EU.

Former EU legal adviser Jean-Claude Piris set out seven possible models for this relationship in his recent policy brief for the CER, 'If the UK votes to leave: The seven alternatives to EU membership'. He concentrated mainly on the UK’s urgent need to have continued access to the single market.

If Britain left the EU it would have to negotiate a trade agreement with a group that had just lost one of its more economically liberal members. The gap between the laissez-faire British and the dirigiste continentals is smaller than the British imagine, as John Springford showed in ‘Will the eurozone gang up on Britain?’ But the biggest question is whether the EU would be willing to give the UK the market access it currently enjoys – and whether, over time, the market might become more closed to non-EU countries. The UK has consistently pushed for an open EU – especially in financial services, since the City of London is a global financial centre, not just a European one. Without the UK, would any other member-state resist ECB pressure to confine euro clearing to the eurozone, for example?

The centre of gravity in the EU would shift in areas other than the single market, however, including justice and home affairs (JHA), and foreign and defence policy. Though the UK is often caricatured as Europe’s perpetual nay-sayer, the reality is more nuanced. In some areas the UK has indeed been the main obstacle to European co-operation, but in others it has actively promoted it. The EU minus Britain would not automatically become the federal state that eurosceptics fear, but it might not reflect UK preferences as closely as it now does.

In the Justice and Home Affairs area, the UK’s opt-in means that it is already less than a full partner. It has, however, opted in case-by-case to important JHA measures including Europol and the European Arrest Warrant (EAW). The UK has actively employed the EAW, submitting more than a thousand requests to other member-states from 2010-14. Once outside the EU, the UK would have to negotiate a bilateral extradition agreement with the Union, or individual bilateral agreements with each of the EU’s 27 member-states. If the UK were also to reject the European Convention on Human Rights, however, as a result of the government’s proposed ‘British Bill of Rights’, would all EU member-states be able to extradite suspects to the UK? And would the European Parliament (minus UK MEPs) ratify an EU-UK agreement, or reject it on human rights grounds?

The Beard Shavers of Tajikistan

http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/the-beard-shavers-of-tajikistan/

By Catherine Putz, January 22, 2016

Keep it Kempt: Police in Tajikistan’s Khatlon have been busy fighting foreign influences and earlier this week they held a press conference to update the masses on their progress. Last year, amid allegations that officers were detaining men with beards and forcibly shaving them, authorities instructed police not to do so. RFE/RL’s Tajik service reported on the recent presser in which the police said they closed 162 shops selling hijabs and “convinced 1,773 women and girls to shun the alien headwear.” Police also arrested 89 hijab-wearing prostitutes and “brought to order” 12,818 men who “had overly long and unkempt beards.”

The obsession with clothing and well-kempt beards comes straight from the top. President Emomali Rahmon said last year during his Mother’s Day speech that black clothing was not traditionally Tajik. He pointed to “strangers” using clothing to push extremism in the country.

Tajikistan isn’t alone in beard-fear, though it’s perhaps the most serious about it. In October 2015 a passerby called the police on a group of bearded hipsters in Sweden, mistaking them for ISIS supporters.

Perspectives on Central Asia: The January issue of the Eurasian Dialogue’s Perspectives on Central Asia has three fascinating articles.

First, Diana Ukhina writes about an art exhibit in Bishkek displaying the works of Olga Manuilova and other female Soviet artists. She examines the ways art influenced and reflected the women’s emancipation movement during the Soviet era and how, with the resurgence of “traditional” patriarchal values, “We find ourselves in a situation where instead of moving forward, it is necessary to defend the freedoms that the previous generations already struggled for.”

The second piece, by Daniyar Kussainov, offers insight on how Kazakhstan needs to reform the process by which religious materials are censored. “The current model of religious censorship in Kazakhstan has not been effective in preventing jihadist recruitment,” he writes. His suggested reforms include measures aimed at increasing efficiency and legitimacy — for example, by focusing on materials identified by a court and being more transparent about selecting experts. He also notes that there needs to be a better method for religious communities to appeal decisions. Ultimately, Kussianov comments that “State authorities are being naive in believing that methods such as religious censorship are effective in controlling religious extremism.”

The last article, by Aitolkyn Kourmanova, makes the case for greater regional cooperation among private sector entities. Central Asia is one of the least interconnected regions in the world, a fact that stymies economic development. Kourmanova notes that “Central Asia has several competitive advantages to offer in hosting links in global production chains, including land, water and energy resources.” Protectionism on the part of regional governments has stood in the way of capitalizing on potential cross-border synergies.

Former Special Operator to Lead State Department's Counter-ISIS Messaging Center

http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/blog/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?ID=2064
By Stew Magnuson
A former Navy SEAL and current Defense Department official is being called on to revamp the federal government's effort to counter ISIS and other groups' recruitment propaganda.
"The defining characteristics of [special operations forces] -- agility, precision and the effective use of intelligence -- are exactly what is needed to address this challenge," said Michael Lumpkin, in his final speech as assistant secretary of defense for special operations/low intensity conflict. President Obama has tapped him to lead the new Global Engagement Center at the Department of State.
His task is to rethink the government's effort to counter violent extremist propaganda.
"It is a critical part of our overall approach to counter violent extremism and one that quite frankly needs better direction and more resources," he said at the National Defense Industrial Association's Special Operations/Low Intensity Conflict conference in Washington, D.C.
"The center will focus on empowering and enabling partners, both governmental and nongovernmental, to speak out agains these groups to provide an alternative to Daesh's nihilistic vision," he said, referring to another name for ISIS. "The reality is that the U.S government is not always the most effective messenger to contest this propaganda." The most credible messengers come from within the region, he added.
The center's goal is to dismantle the groups' efforts worldwide by targeting recruitment, he added.

Industry can help with tools to counter the extremists online, he said. Attacks in Paris, San Bernardino,California, Istanbul and Jakarta show that this is a global fight, he said. "Working with the defense industry and the tech industry in Silicon Valley, we can use new tools to I detect and measure radicalization," he said. Such technology can also be used to measure how the center's and the violent groups' messaging is resonating, he added.
"With better information we can more effectively counter the narrative espoused by these violent extremist organizations," he said.
He added that there is a serious shortage of credible content that can be used to counter radical messaging. Working with defense and tech industries along with international partners, "we can do better," he said.
Lumpkin is a self-professed "knuckle dragger" who is "not a social media guy."
The center will take a "whole of government approach." He plans to use special operations forces military information support teams, formerly known as psychological operations, in his new job.

** It’s Time to Establish Ethics-Related Metrics

January 12th, 2016
By Col. Charles D. Allen, U.S. Army retired
In July 2006, DoD initiated the “Check It” campaign as part of its internal management controls program and co-opted the military aphorism “what gets checked gets done.” To check that something is being done correctly requires measurement and metrics.
During the past decade, DoD has sought to measure the effectiveness of its counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan and Iraq. It also sought to measure the effect of fiscal year 2013 sequestration using varied metrics for readiness, modernization and force structure of the armed services. DoD is still struggling to find appropriate metrics to assess the efficacy of the Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program.
The difficulties in measuring these areas of strategic concern do not bode well for DoD as it strives to check the character of its leaders and ethics within the profession of arms to ensure that we are “getting it right.”

The White House and Congress have paid a great deal of attention to the ethical missteps and misbehavior of DoD leaders in the early years of the 21st century. In response, the secretary of defense in 2014 appointed a senior advisor for military professionalism to focus its efforts for military ethics, character and leadership development. In a report in September 2015, however, the Government Accountability Office found that DoD “has not fully implemented two key tools for identifying and assessing ethics and professionalism issues, and it has not developed performance metrics to measure its progress in addressing ethics-related issues.” In the years since the renewed focus, ethical issues have continued in operational and institutional settings throughout the Army as well as in other services.

Too Many Failings
News accounts of officer, enlisted and civilian personnel misconduct are, unfortunately, not infrequent and are generally met with cynicism. The perceived lack of accountability for senior leaders is aptly captured by author Tom Ricks’ quip, “different spanks for different ranks.” While the 2011 Army Profession Campaign and study sought to revive trust in the Army as an institution, there are still too many incidents of ethical failings within the ranks.
In early 2015, my U.S. Army War College colleagues, research professor of military strategy Leonard Wong and professor of behavioral sciences Stephen J. Gerras, revealed in “Lying to Ourselves: Dishonesty in the Army Profession” a pervasive culture of false reporting resulting from overwhelming and burdensome requirements, and the accepted norm of telling higher headquarters what they want to hear. 

 Wong and Gerras are known to be provocative in asking tough questions and publishing research findings that are uncomfortable for military members. Ultimately, they challenge the self-image and professional identity of Army officers as well as the Army profession itself. Self-image and identity contribute to the frame of reference developed through career imprinting from the first unit assignment.
Monica C. Higgins, a professor in education leadership at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, offers that career imprinting is a “form of learning that encompasses the professional impression left on individuals by an organization.” Given that career imprinting influences individual leader choices and behavior in an organizational context, then it would also affect the ethical climate of a unit set by its leaders.

Beyond the Build: How the Component Command Support the U.S. Cyber Command Vision

By U.S. Cyber Command Combined Action Group | January 01, 2016
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Networked technology is transforming society. That transformation has come with significant change to war and the military art. Until recently, cyber considerations rarely extended beyond the computers and cables that supported kinetic warfighting functions. The natural domains—land, sea, air, and space—dominated the planning and conduct of operations, while the risks entailed in using cyberspace for military purposes went largely unrecognized. Today, cyberspace ranks as its own warfighting domain—one that intersects the four natural domains.
U.S. Navy’s fourth Mobile User Objective System communications satellite will bring advanced, new global communications capabilities to mobile military forces (Courtesy United Launch Alliance/U.S. Navy)
Cyberspace operations demand unprecedented degrees of collaboration, which the U.S. Government must approach holistically—leveraging resources and expertise from industry, academia, and state/local governments, as well as allied and coalition partners. U.S. Cyber Command (USCYBERCOM) works as a subordinate, unified command under U.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) to conduct the full scope of cyberspace operations. These have three distinct mission areas: to secure, operate, and defend the Department of Defense Information Network (DODIN); to provide combatant command support; and to defend the nation against strategic cyber attack. USCYBERCOM is building the cyberspace operations force of tomorrow, and looking beyond that build to how the command will operate with mission partners in this dynamic and contested space.
USCYBERCOM and its components act to help the joint force operate globally with speed, flexibility, and persistence. USCYBERCOM headquarters focuses on defining and achieving strategic objectives and has delegated operational-level cyber mission areas to three types of headquarters. The first of these is the Cyber National Mission Force (CNMF), which defends the United States and its interests against strategic cyber attacks. The second type of headquarters comprises four distinct joint force headquarters (JFHQs) in addition to Coast Guard Cyber Command (CGCYBER) to support the geographic and functional combatant commands across the globe. The standup of a JFHQ-Cyber by each of the USCYBERCOM Service cyber components—Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), Fleet Cyber Command (FLTCYBER), Marine Corps Cyberspace Command (MARFORCYBER), and Air Forces Cyber (AFCYBER)—constitutes a vital first step to integrating cyberspace operations to deliver effects in support of combatant commanders. The third type of JFHQs and newest of USCYBERCOM’s operational commands, JFHQ-DODIN, provides unity of command and unity of effort to secure, operate, and defend the DODIN.

Cyber Capabilities Key to Future Dominance

http://www.armymagazine.org/2016/01/12/cyber-capabilities-key-to-future-dominance/
January 12th, 2016
By Lt. Gen. Edward C. Cardon
One of the stunning trends since 2001 is the tactical dominance of the American military, especially ground combat units. This success was not gained by accident or chance; it resulted from hard training and the ability of units to harness combat power down to the tactical edge. The historically unprecedented tactical prowess of our ground forces is enabled by a network, with systems and data, connected globally in ways that deliver power to the edge.
This level of connectivity, however, has created expectations within our formations that may no longer be realistic as cyberspace is increasingly contested. This is why mission assurance is so critical. Small ground units connected in ways to harness the power of the U.S. military have a much higher probability of mission success, and in many ways provide an overmatch that is second to none. At the same time, cyber itself, either alone or through its use to change the physical world or human understanding, has evolved to the point that it can lead to lethal kinetic effects, given the increasing connectivity in the world. Our adversaries also recognize this potential and will surely employ these capabilities to challenge our formations the same way.
Unlike the land, sea, air and space domains, cyberspace is continuously evolving and adapting along with each entrepreneur, inventor and actor that uses it. There is an ever-changing convergence and divergence of people, technologies and processes characterized by disruptive technologies and applications. Time is an important component. Software can change at the speed of code; hardware at the speed of chips; and the people change this domain at the speed of human thought, creativity and learning. This distinctiveness translates to a domain that is uniquely contested and competitive; and one that is passive and active, hyperanimated and inanimate, all at the same time. Soldiers participate in a cyber exercise at Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Wash. (Credit: U.S. Army/Capt. Meredith Mathis)
The growth of cyber capabilities has been exponential and is not limited to the U.S. military. We have peer competitors, and the struggle is for both competitive advantage and dominance. To help bring clarity to the U.S. military’s approach to cyberspace, U.S. Cyber Command recently published its vision, titled “Beyond the Build: Delivering Outcomes through Cyberspace.” Most importantly, this vision recognizes that cyber will change both military science and military art, requiring changes in joint and service doctrine, capabilities and operations.
The Army and its headquarters with primary responsibility for cyberspace operations, U.S. Army Cyber Command (ARCYBER), are organized to support this vision by focusing on priorities to strengthen both joint and Army cyber capabilities to support operations, including capabilities to enable ground forces to continue their dominance in the land domain.

Pentagon Delays Cybersecurity Requirement for 10,000 Contractors

bloomberg.com

Jan. 20, 2016
The Pentagon has delayed for almost two years a requirement that as many as 10,000 companies show that they have systems to protect sensitive but unclassified information from cyber-attacks before signing new defense contracts.
“We got feedback from industry that they did not think they could fully comply Day One” with the demand that contractors document a fully operating access-authentication system down to the subcontractor level, Claire Grady, director of defense procurement and acquisition policy, said in an interview. “We want people headed in the right direction,” but “we probably overestimated what the state of the industry was.”
Congress mandated new cybersecurity rules as part of the Pentagon’s budget authorization in 2013 after repeated warnings from officials about hacking threats and successful incursions at companies including Lockheed Martin Corp., the biggest U.S. defense contractor.
An interim version of the rule, in effect since August, requires defense companies that get new contracts to report penetrations of their networks within 72 hours of discovery if those systems hold critical defense information. They also must report intrusions if the hacking degrades the contractor’s capability to provide critical support to the military or has the potential to do so.
 

Getting Cooperation
“The goal is to get people to report as quickly as possible” without fear of penalty, Grady said.
While that provision remains in effect, the requirement for contractors to document that they and their suppliers have systems to protect sensitive information was delayed until Dec. 31, 2017.
Hundreds of companies have indicated they are already in full compliance with guidance from the National Institute of Standards and Technology on safeguarding unclassified but controlled information, said Grady, who called it “basic cyber hygiene.”
“But not everyone is at the same place, so we want to make sure we were moving people toward where they need to be and not creating impediments,” Grady said.
Chinese-backed hackers have infiltrated the computer networks of airline, shipping and information technology companies responsible for transporting personnel and weapons for the U.S. military, according to a 2014 Senate Armed Services Committee review.
 

Attack on Lockheed
The Pentagon also said foreign hackers stole 24,000 U.S. military files from a defense contractor it hasn’t identified in a single incident in March 2011. In May 2011, Lockheed Martin suffered what it called a “tenacious” attack on its computer networks, though the company said no employee, program or customer data was lost.
Against this backdrop, the Pentagon in August put into effect the interim rule on rapidly reporting network penetrations, citing “the urgent need to protect covered defense information and gain awareness of the full scope of cyber incidents being committed against defense contractors.”
One of the challenges that led to extending other provisions of the regulation is meeting the standards institute’s rule requiring multifactor authentication for network access, Grady’s spokesman, Air Force Major Eric Badger, said in an e-mail.

TOP SECRET Messaging: Hacking The Digital Age — App Erases Your Digital Trail

January 21, 2016 ·
www.fortunascorner.com
The World Economic Forum is having its yearly gathering in Davos, Switzerland this week, and the CNBC Squawk Box crew is hosting their daily morning show from there all this week. By having the show live in Davos, the CNBC crew is able to interview the titans of finance, industry, academia, and others. One interview I found interesting was with Ms. Nico Sell, Wickr Co-Founder and she also helps run DEFCON, the largest hacker gathering in the world that takes place every year in Las Vegas.
According to Wikipedia, Wickr was founded in 2012 by a group of privacy and security experts, and Ms. Sell served as the company’s CEO until May 2015, when she became Co-Chairman of Wickr and, CEO of the Wickr Foundation, — a newly launched non-profit dedicated to providing free and secure messaging services to groups including children, political dissidents, human rights activists, and journalists.

Wikipedia adds that, “initially unveiled on iOS and later on Android, Wickr allows users to set an expiration time [ranging from a few seconds, to six days] for their encrypted communications. Last December, Wickr released a desktop version of its secure communications, which coincided with introducing the ability to sync messages across multiple devices, including mobile phones, tablets, and computers. All communications on Wickr are encrypted locally on each device, with a new key generated for each new message — meaning that NO ONE EXCEPT WICKR USERS HAVE THE KEYS TO DECIPHER THE CONTENT. In addition to encrypting user data and conversations, Wickr strips metadata from all the content transmitted through the network.”
In essence, as Jeremy Kirk recently wrote in PC World, “Wickr lets people exchange files and messages, without leaving a digital trail that could later be examined by law enforcement, cyber spies,” and others. The encryption keys, are also encrypted, and only used once before being discarded,” Mr,. Kirk wrote. “Wickr doesn’t have access to any of the encryption keys used for securing the data. Even a person’s user name is stored by Wickr as a cryptographic cypher,” he added. “We don’t know who you are,” said Robert Statica, an Information Technology Professor at the New Jersey Institute of Technology, wh co-founded Wickr with Ms. Sell, Christopher Howell, and Kara Coppa.
Once the time period [set by the sender/receiver] expires, Wickr fatally corrupts the contents of the encrypted message. “This is important,” Mr. Kirk writes, “since computers and other devices don’t immediately erase data that has been tagged as garbage. Using special computer forensics software, the data can often be recovered,” but — that technique does not work with those who employ Wickr’s app. “The only real way to see something sent to a Wickr user would be to steal the user’s [cell] phone. Even then, five wrong attempts at the password — will cause Wickr to erase itself,” he added.

The Fourth Level of War

By Michael R. Matheny | January 01, 2016
http://ndupress.ndu.edu/Media/ News/NewsArticleView/tabid/ 7849/Article/643103/the- fourth-level-of-war.aspx
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Dr. Michael R. Matheny is a Professor of Military Strategy and Operations at the U.S. Army War College.
Civilization began because the beginning of civilization is a military advantage.”1 This observation by Walter Bagehot is not far off the mark. Warfare certainly matured along with civilization as a violent expression of political will and intent. We currently view the art of warfare in three levels-tactical, operational, and strategic-but it was not always so. In the beginning, there were strategy and tactics. Strategy outlined how and to what purpose war might be used to achieve political objectives. Tactics directed how the violence was actually applied on the battlefield. For most of military history, tactical art was able to achieve strategic objectives as tribes, forces, and armies marshaled on the battlefield to destroy the enemy’s ability to resist their master’s political will. Although much debated, operational art was born at the end of the 19th century when the size of armies, made possible by the development of the nation-state, rendered tactics unable to bring about political results. Civilization has moved on. From a doctrinal, theoretical, and practical point of view, it is now time to consider a fourth level of war-the theater-strategic level of war.

Doctrine
There is little written about theater strategy in U.S. doctrine. Joint Publication 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, includes only a single paragraph on what would seem an important subject. U.S. doctrine acknowledges the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war. However, doctrine also includes a theater-strategic level in an overlapping area that suggests this level bridges the operational and strategic levels.2 Yet the operational level is defined as linking “strategy and tactics by establishing operational objectives needed to achieve the military end states and strategic objectives.”3 So what is the theater-strategic level of war? What is theater strategy? The problem in placing theater strategy in some useful context is that we already have so many kinds of strategy and no real consensus on what they are.
On the menu of strategies, we can find grand, national, national security, national military, just plain military, and theater strategies. All of these are harnessed to serve policy, but each varies in its objectives and means. There is a wide range of definitions of strategy, most of which illustrate an attribute rather than its essential nature. They range from the general: Art Lykke’s famous “strategy equals ends plus ways plus means”; to Lawrence Freedman’s more poetic “a story told in the future tense”; to Colin Gray’s more specific “the use or threat of military power for political purposes.”4 The Department of Defense (DOD) asserts that strategy is “a prudent idea or set of ideas for employing the instruments of national power in a synchronized and integrated fashion to achieve theater, national, and multinational objectives.”5This suggests that strategy involves the whole weight of the U.S. Government in the pursuit of national policy. Does theater strategy likewise involve all elements of national power?

Violent Nonstate Actors with Missile Technologies: Threats Beyond the Battlefield

By Mark E. Vinson and John Caldwell | January 01, 2016
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During the summer of 2014, three overlapping crises involving violent nonstate actors (VNSAs) with missile technologies captured the world’s attention.1 First, for 50 days in July and August, Israel engaged in a major conflict with Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad, and other VNSAs that fired more than 4,500 rockets and mortars from the Gaza Strip at Israel.2
The second crisis occurred on July 17, 2014, when Malaysian Airlines flight MH-17, a civilian airliner carrying 298 people, was shot down at cruising altitude by an advanced surface-to-air missile (SAM) while transiting territory controlled by Ukrainian separatist rebels.3 U.S. intelligence officials believe the airliner was shot down by pro-Russian rebels using an advanced Russian SA-11 missile system.4
Marines fire tube-launched, optically tracked, wire command-link guided-missile system from M-41 Saber weapon system during sustainment training at Udairi Range, Kuwait, July 10, 2012 (U.S. Marine Corps/Michael Petersheim)
The third crisis seemed to erupt in the spring and summer of 2014, when the self-proclaimed Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) seized territory and captured advanced weapons as it attacked across large stretches of Iraq and Syria. Among the weapons ISIL reportedly captured and used were shoulder-launched SAMs, also known as man-portable air defense systems (MANPADS).5 ISIL claims to have used MANPADS to shoot down an Iraqi military helicopter.6 ISIL’s possession of MANPADS threatens low-flying coalition aircraft as well as aircraft at Baghdad International Airport.7
As indicated by these crises, the availability of advanced missile technologies—particularly precision-guided missiles—to VNSAs can be a game changer in their warfighting capabilities against nation-states if they use the weapons to offset their air superiority disadvantages with stand-off attack capabilities. This may be attributed in part to a general absence of enforceable control of the proliferation of missile technologies to nonstate actors. Counterproliferation is a term most commonly associated with the international conventions for the control of weapons of mass destruction, specifically nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. However, without the control of international laws or the legitimacy and accountability constraints of state governments, VNSAs have gained access to an array of missile technologies that grant state-like capabilities to threaten significant death and destruction.

The Enduring IED Problem: Why We Need Doctrine

By Marc Trachemontagne | January 01, 2016
Commander Marc Tranchemontagne, USN (Ret.), is an Associate with R3 Strategic Support Group. He served more than 21 years as a Special Operations Officer and Master Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technician.
I sometimes hear people express the hope that the IED threat will diminish as Western forces
pull out of Afghanistan. Unfortunately, nothing could be further from the truth—the IED has now entered
the standard repertoire of irregular forces in urban areas across the planet, and there are no signs
this threat is shrinking; on the contrary, it seems to be growing.
—David Kilcullen, Out of the Mountains
As the Services and joint force update their doctrine after nearly a decade and a half of counter–improvised explosive device (IED) operations in the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, now is a good time to consider what we have learned about operating in IED-rich environments. At the start of Operation Enduring Freedom in 2001, we lacked counter-IED doctrine—as well as counterinsurgency and counterterrorism doctrine—and had to figure things out on the fly. It was a steep learning curve with a high cost in lives lost and equipment destroyed, and the United States spent billions to counter a weapon that costs only a few dollars to make.
In addition to counter-IED doctrine and assorted handbooks, manuals, and lexicons, we created rapid acquisition authorities, notably the Joint IED Defeat Organization, now a combat support agency; new countermeasures such as counter-radio-controlled IED electronic warfare (CREW) systems; a new intelligence process (weapons technical intelligence [WTI]); counter-IED task forces and other ad hoc units such as the Joint CREW Composite Squadron, Task Force ODIN, weapons intelligence teams, and deployable counter-IED laboratories; law enforcement, interagency, and international partnerships; universal counter-IED training and specialized courses in homemade explosives (HME), post-blast investigation, and IED electronics; counter-IED working groups and other new staff elements; new families of armored vehicles; and many innovative tools to meet the IED threat.1 Some initiatives have been incorporated into doctrine or have become programs of record, some have been shelved, and others remain ad hoc. As a joint force, it is important to institutionalize what we have learned from hard experience in IED-rich environments.
IEDs affect how we fight, that is, how we plan for and execute joint operations. Operating in an IED-rich environment creates additional challenges for U.S. forces, just as operating in a chemical warfare environment would. Operation Iraqi Freedom may represent the worst case for an IED-rich environment, with numerous experienced, technology-savvy, externally supported violent extremist organizations (VEO) with overlapping and competing sectarian, nationalist, and international agendas in a developed theater. Future operating environments, however, may match its complexity and lethality. Today’s bomb makers will take their experience and expertise to other battlefields. Even in a conventional war, our adversaries are likely to turn to unconventional warfare tactics, using a mix of special forces, paramilitary units, militias, and surrogates to counter our military superiority. IEDs will figure in their order of battle.

From the First Gulf War to Islamic State: How America Was Seduced by the “Easy War”

http://warontherocks.com/2016/01/from-the-first-gulf-war-to-islamic-state-how-america-was-seduced-by-the-easy-war/
Sebastian J. Bae, January 22, 2016
As the premier military power since the Cold War, the United States, like hegemonic powers of the past, is held captive by the dangerous myth of the “easy war.” While terms like “network-centric warfare” wouldn’t formally enter the U.S. defense establishment lexicon until later in the 1990s, the central notion on which such concepts are based — that precision technology could be leveraged to quickly overpower an adversary — were validated by the stunning U.S. success in the First Gulf War. In a matter of 100 hours, with overwhelming and coordinated force and relying heavily on airstrikes, the largely painless dispatching of Saddam Hussein’s forces, the world’s fifth largest army, served as an affirmation to many of the invincibility of American military might. Compared to the bitter losses in Korea and Vietnam, the First Gulf War established an unequivocal military victory, reaffirming the value and dominance of the American methodology of warfare. Or at least that’s how the story is told.

As a result, the First Gulf War entrenched the notion that technology would provide near-omniscience on the battlefield, paving the road to an uncomplicated victory. Almost overnight, in the minds of strategists and policymakers, wars had become brief, casual affairs.
Operation Allied Force, the NATO air war during the Kosovo conflict, only furthered the easy war mythology, particularly the concept of neat, effective victory through airpower alone. The 78-day campaign, at the price tag of $3 billion, expended over 28,000 high-explosive munitions in an enormous display of airpower. Minus a few high-profile cases of collateral damage, like the accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy (although the Chinese insisted the United States deliberately targeted the embassy), less than 500 noncombatants died in the course of Operation Allied Force. This marked “a new low in American wartime experience when compared to both Vietnam and Desert Storm.” Following the capitulation of Slobodan Milosevic to NATO demands, Operation Allied Force was hailed as an unprecedented success, elevating airpower to match its land and maritime counterparts. Serge Schmemann of the New York Times claimed Kosovo provided “a refutation of the common wisdom that airpower alone could never make a despot back down.” Airpower had evolved the myth of the easy war to a martial enterprise devoid of the risks and complications of ground forces. Thus, the myth continued, brushing criticisms aside.

After 9/11, the mythology of the easy war unsurprisingly carried over to the nascent months of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. Donald Rumsfeld, then secretary of defense, confidently declared in 2002 that the Iraq War would last “five days or five weeks or five months, but it certainly isn’t going to last any longer than that.” The legacy of the First Gulf War and Kosovo produced rapid marches to respective capitals, highlighting the spectacular use of airpower. The Shock and Awe Doctrine was expected to produce another bloodless victory. However, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq quickly devolved into a quagmire of nation-building and counterinsurgency. Contrary to overly optimistic expectations, a decade of occupation, and roughly $1.5 trillion have failed to produce any semblance of security or governance in either Afghanistan or Iraq. The notion that toppling a regime and implementing massive socio-political transformations would be a simple endeavor seems whimsical at best, and delusional in hindsight.

The Bad Lessons of Desert Storm

06/08/2015, William F. Owen

http://mida.org.il/2015/08/06/the-bad-lessons-of-desert-storm/מאת

The rapid collapse of Iraqi forces in Operation Desert Storm made many fall in love with the idea of a quick, bloodless war with the aid of the power of planes and technology • Israel learned the folly of this thinking in the Second Lebanon War • On the 25th anniversary of the First Gulf War, an article on learning the wrong lessons from military history

It is obvious to most that war and warfare are harsh and cruel teachers. What is less obvious is that they also teach bad lessons to otherwise smart men. They trick people with illusions and tricks, and many governments and armies fall prey to those illusions.
This was the case with the First Gulf War, as we have come to know it, or Operation Desert Storm: the campaign to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. What the public saw was quick decisive war, which delivered all the promises that mattered most, was the product of superior western technology.
All of that is undeniably true. It was a short decisive war, and technology was important. The problem was that a partial version of the truth was used to create a convenient story, one which even some in the Israeli Defence Forces came to believe. So strong was that belief, that by 2006 and the Second Lebanon War, serious men thought technology and air power would deliver success, because that was what they chose to learn from 1991.
Israelis are sceptics and critics by nature. Most do not believe easily. Evidence is important. The IDFs ability to learn lessons from 1948, 1967, 1973, and all the other wars before and since is probably un-matched anywhere else in the world. Have they always learned the right lessons? No. Not always. Have they learned them better than others? Yes, mostly.

Most armies are not as incompetent as Saddam's
Magical thinking also characterized the other side in the Gulf War: Saddam Hussein’s consistently faulty instinct told him that the world would not react to his invasion of Kuwait. When he found out he was wrong, he took an army that had only fought against fanatical but un-skilled Iranians and tried to fight against a mostly American and British force optimised to fight an existential battle against the Soviet Union. Worse than that—and that’s pretty bad—he fought in way that gave his opponent every possible advantage.
Compared to all other terrain, the desert offers an army the least chance of concealment from the air. Saddam Hussein parked his Army in the desert and let Allied air power, and some artillery, kill it. A hundred-hour ground operation then essentially drove over it. The hundred-hour ground war showed just how incompetent the Iraqi Army really was, especially actions like the Battle of 73 Easting where a US Armoured unit destroyed well over 100 Iraqi tanks and IFVs for the cost of just one dead.
If you really believed that all future enemies of the west were going to be as catastrophically stupid as Saddam Hussein, and his army so incompetently lead, then the future looked very rosy indeed. Did the Allied armies know it would be that easy? No, they didn’t. They expected a very tough fight, which is why they bombed the Iraqi Army and its entire defence force for just over a month.

Pathankot, before and beyond

http://www.telegraphindia.com/1160123/jsp/opinion/story_65310.jsp#.VqMY_VIpq38
Abhijit Bhattacharyya
Authentic information, rather than 'agenda interpretation', makes analysis credible, meaningful and useful for a nation to understand, decide and act. Hence let us get the basics right and then examine the fundamentals. The sole motto of Pakistan, post-1971 defeat and disaster at the hands of the armed forces of India, is revenge through religious jihad by the jihadists. Shuja Nawaz, the author of the magnum opus on the Pakistani Army, Crossed Swords, has observed that the number 786, which represents the numerological equivalent of the opening sentence of the Quran, is also the "identification number for the General Head Quarters of the new Pakistani Army".
The writing on the wall was too transparent to be ignored by India. The defeat, followed by surrender - resulting in the loss of the eastern wing of the Islamic state of Pakistan at the hands of un-Islamic India in December 1971 - made the Army-ISI duo of Pakistan take a vow of revenge. It was assessed, and appreciated, that no revenge can be successfully carried out through conventional warfare, owing to the superiority of India's man power and material inventory. The assessment and planning concluded a perpetual war of attrition through indirect, irregular and unconventional methods and tactics. The fighting machine of India had to be destroyed without fighting. And the people of the enemy country, must be won over through various means of " Taqiya Kalam", implying deceit, cunning, lies and the "charm offensive" and through the enemy's gullible, divided and vast civil society, a portion of which inevitably resorts to 'could-not-care-less' and 'as-long-as-I-am-not-affected' attitudes, and with the army-ISI recruited, financed, trained and deployed terror pool of unemployed and radicalized young people.
After the 1971 war, Pakistan's military ruling class, the army, made a final assessment that it would be futile to take on the war machine. Instead, it could resort to an indirect approach by permanently targeting Delhi's two principal border states, Punjab and Rajasthan, which is the largest quality reservoir of fighting men filling combat ranks of at least five of the 23 infantry regiments of the Indian army: Rajputana Rifles, Rajput Regiment, Sikh Regiment, Sikh Light Infantry and the Punjab Regiment. In this venture, the Pakistani army-ISI duo's job became easier, as it so often happened in the past, as few notoriously unscrupulous and corrupt Indians in public life have been conniving, conspiring and colluding with foreign invaders even today. Thus it certainly would not be incorrect to suggest that for the spread of the drug trade, particularly to the districts of Punjab and Rajasthan (located close to Pakistan), which are traditional soldier-recruitment (catchment) areas, some Indians have a deep nexus with Pakistan's nefarious activities, thereby posing a direct threat to the safety and security, and the unity and integrity of India.