Vladimir Rauta

The recently published Routledge Handbook of Proxy Wars invites a reconsideration of the transformation of proxy wars, from ostensible Cold War relics to the reality of war and warfare in the twenty-first century. As one of the editors of the handbook, I offer some reflections on the thinking behind the thinking about proxy wars, as this field has changed over the last decade and matured into what we call proxy war studies. In this short essay, I hope to tease out some key takeaways. Three observations preface this discussion. First, edited together with Assaf Moghadam and Michel Wyss, the handbook owes a tremendous debt of gratitude to the nearly 50 contributors whose work amounts to an intellectual reset of our thinking about proxy wars. Second, while the handbook directly addresses an audience of scholars, practitioners, and students of proxy wars and conflict delegation, it hopes to engage skeptics too. Third, the handbook is tasked with answering questions about the contentious yet undeniable reality of warfare in the twenty-first century. In line with recent data on external support and proxy wars, the handbook does not make claims that the future of war is proxy and that all war is delegated. Rather, it strikes a balance by looking at where proxy wars – and their study – are today and where they might be going. With this in mind, I discuss the nature of the problem the handbook addressed, the relevance of the debate, and what puzzles lie ahead.
Conceptually, we chose the label “proxy war.” This was a deliberate choice grounded in recent work that robustly and rigorously explained what the concept is and is not, its utility, and how it might be developed typologically. We saw no need to pursue novelty through neologisms. As we wrote in the introduction to the handbook, the term is “emotive and evocative, provocative and pejorative, often commended and criticized, renamed and reified, rejected and replaced.” It has been excessively politicized and used for ideologically charged commentary, but this is not unique to proxy war. It is, of course, not without its faults, but what concept of war today is? In fact, one can simply look at “civil war,” one of the most established categories of conflict, for conceptual competition and disagreement. We dispensed with conceptual debates not because they do not matter – they most certainly do and I have written about this at length – but because the charges brought against proxy war were often superficial and driven not by an honest engagement with the notion, but by the desire to introduce a rival term. On this, I am firmly of the opinion that if the adjective “proxy” has limitations, they are shared equally and entirely by “ally,” “partner,” or whatever preposition counterinsurgency and irregular warfare rest on these days.


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