Indian Strategic Studies

12 October 2024

Holding the Taliban Accountable Through the Media

Harun Najafizada

In late September, the Taliban regime in Afghanistan started jamming the Afghanistan International TV news channel with newly acquired equipment obtained from Iran. Earlier, in May, they issued a stark ban on communications with the Afghanistan International network, paving the way for the current jamming. They explicitly threatened Afghan citizens against engaging with or even watching our channel.

These draconian measures stem from our steadfast commitment to delivering uncensored news and information to the Afghan populace, who are under the tight grip of the de facto authorities striving to impose their narrative through a heavily censored media landscape, a misappropriated remnant of the international community-backed Republic era in Afghanistan.

In the past, such an authoritarian edict and the desperate attempt to silence the voice of the Afghan people through new waves of jamming attacks on our channel might have signaled the demise of our 24/7 London-based channel, which serves a nation of 40 million people. However, the digital revolution and modern journalism ensure our continued operation, allowing us to cover Afghanistan during these critical times and holding the Taliban rulers accountable.

The Widening Schism across the Taiwan Strait

Introduction

The dispute over Taiwan, a self-governing island that sits 160 km east of China, is a simmering flashpoint that could bring the nuclear armed, economic giants China and the U.S. directly into war. Such a conflict would upend global supply chains and trade.1 One estimate puts the potential cost at a staggering $10 trillion, about 10 per cent of global GDP. The cost of an all-out war between the U.S. and China that involved nuclear weapons is incalculable.

The cross-strait dispute concerns differences over the Republic of China’s (ROC), or Taiwan’s, sovereignty.2 The ROC and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) have functioned as separate political entities since 1949, when the Chinese Nationalists lost to the Communists in the Chinese civil war. The Nationalists, or Kuomintang (KMT), retreated to Taiwan and the Communists established the PRC. But the PRC has since claimed Taiwan as one of its provinces and seeks to bring the island under its sovereign control - what Beijing calls unification. Taipei, for its part, maintains that it is a sovereign state known as the Republic of China and is not a part of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

With CMMC 2.0, Cyber Security Tsunami Ahead for Thousands of Defense Firms

Rebecca Grant

China’s cyber espionage is off the charts, and according to the FBI, Iran has been targeting the aerospace and defense industrial base, too. It’s not just top-secret programs; China, Russia, Iran and others are also going after vulnerable unclassified information and federal contract data. The threat is so severe that the government insists that Controlled Unclassified Information and Federal Contract Information meet higher standards.

That is why thousands of critical businesses face new cybersecurity standards for protecting unclassified information beginning in mid-2025. And many aren’t ready. In one recent survey, 96% of the 300 firms responding said they could not meet full compliance.

The standards known as Cybersecurity Maturity Model Certification 2.0 were first announced in late 2021. Major programs like aircraft carriers and the B-21 bomber depend on thousands of supplier companies. Some suppliers are already wrapped into classified programs. However, there are also numerous firms producing just a few critical parts for the defense sector, often nestled inside thriving commercial businesses.

China’s Balancing Act With the ‘Axis of Upheaval’

François Godement

Everyone remembers former U.S. President George W. Bush’s 2002 designation of an “axis of evil,” at the time comprising Ali Khamenei’s Iran, Saddam Hussein’s Iraq and Kim Jong Il’s North Korea. Today, experts at the the Center for a New American Security refer to an “axis of the upheaval” and former National Security Adviser H.R. McMaster to an “axis of the aggressors” in order to describe the dynamics between China, Russia, North Korea, and Iran.

Europe is also concerned by the ties between the Asian and European strategic theaters. China is in a state of quasi-alliance with Russia, which has invaded Ukraine, as demonstrated by Marcin Kaczmarski, in “strategic cooperation” with Iran, which entertains its own axis of disruption through the Middle East as evidenced by Pierre Pinhas. Meanwhile, Beijing in 2021 renewed a mutual defense treaty with North Korea – the only such formal alliance that China entertains, as Adam Cathcart explains.

The Choice America Now Faces in Iran

Eliot A. Cohen

For the second time in less than half a year, Iran has hurled hundreds of missiles at Israel. Although Iran technically launched more weapons at Israel in April, only 120 of those were ballistic missiles—a smaller salvo than the more than 180 ballistic missiles used this time. The drones and cruise missiles used in April were more easily intercepted and shot down by Israeli, American, and European air defenses, working in cooperation with some of Israel’s Arab partners.

According to early reports, miraculously enough, no Israelis were killed in this latest barrage, although falling debris killed a Palestinian in Jenin, on the West Bank. But some of the missiles seem to have gotten through Israel’s three layers of anti-missile defenses, inflicting an unknown amount of damage. An attack yesterday by two terrorists in Tel Aviv was far more lethal, killing at least seven civilians; its relationship to the Iranian attack is unclear.

The war between Iran and Israel has gone on for a long time, although mostly in the shadows. Iran has armed Hezbollah as a proxy force to attack Israel, and so it has over the years, with roadside bombs, ambushes, and rockets; Iran has also equipped Yemen’s Houthis with long-range weapons to attack the Jewish state, and so they have, as well. Israel has bombed the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps headquarters in Damascus, sabotaged the Iranian nuclear program, and conducted assassinations and raids (including the lifting of an entire Iranian nuclear archive) in Iran itself. A war on the high seas, in which ships on both sides have been sabotaged or attacked, has drawn less coverage but been no less intense.

Iran's Great Ballistic Missile Attack Gamble

Seth J. Frantzman

On October 1, Iran launched 181 ballistic missiles at Israel. Israel was prepared for the escalation, having learned of it earlier in the day from the United States. Israel’s Home Front Command warned the country’s almost ten million people to prepare to go to their local bomb shelters. Shortly after the warning, Iran’s ballistic missiles streaked across the sky, targeting several locations in the Negev and in central Israel. Iran knew it was gambling with this attack, and it has tried to deter an Israeli response by claiming that it will attack with “an even more crushing and stronger response” next time.

Israel has vowed a harsher response to this attack than the previous one in April when Iran launched more than 300 drones and missiles at Israel. Iran has been gambling and testing Israel over the past year. Over the past decade, the Islamic Republic has increased its capabilities to strike at Israel. It has expanded its ballistic missile arsenal and improved its range and precision. It has also invested heavily in kamikaze drones. It has exported both its missile and drone technology to proxies in the region, such as the Houthis in Yemen and Hezbollah in Lebanon. It has also moved drones and ballistic missiles to aligned militias in Iraq. This has had deadly results. Kataib Hezbollah, one of the militias backed by Iran in Iraq, killed three U.S. soldiers in a January drone attack in Jordan.

Iran-Russia Defense Cooperation: Current Realities and Future Horizons

Hanna Notte and Jim Lamson

Introduction

Since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the country’s defense relationship with Iran has deepened and widened considerably. Since the summer of 2022, Tehran’s support has been critical for Moscow’s military campaign. As of May 2024, the Russian armed forces had launched at least 4,000 Iranian-designed Shahed drones against Ukraine1 while also benefiting from Iranian ammunition and support for Russia’s domestic drone production. Russia’s military campaign may benefit from Iranian ballistic missiles, though there is no clear evidence of transfers or their use against Ukraine yet. Finally, Iran has promised to share with Russia insights gained during its own experience in trying to circumvent and overcome the effects of Western sanctions.

In return, Russia has stepped up its provision of sensitive military technology and assistance to Iran: In August 2022, Russia launched the Khayyam (Kanopus-V) imaging satellite for Iran, 2 and it has generally stepped up its cooperation on space. In September 2023, it delivered two Yak-130 trainer aircraft to the Iranian Regular Air Force. According to the CIA, Russian technicians have been detected working on Iran’s space launch vehicle (SLV) program and other aspects of Iran’s missile programs. 3 Commenting on this type of support, U.S. officials have raised the alarm over what they believe is an evolution to “a full-fledged defense partnership.”4 Yet, highly coveted items on Iran’s wish list—such as advanced fighter aircraft (Sukhoi Su-35) or advanced air defense systems (S-400)—have not yet been delivered by Russia. Potential reasons for the withholding of such assistance include a Russian caution not to antagonize its Gulf Arab partners, an inability of the Russian defense industry to produce sufficient quantities of high-end technologies for export because of the effects of sanctions, and a desire to retain some leverage amid its growing dependence on Iran.

The Root of Western Haplessness with Israel

Riccardo Alcaro

As Israel intensifies its bombing of Lebanon and the spectre of a generalised conflict that may involve Iran and the United States hovers ominously over the region, Western governments seem passive viewers of a decade-long drama for which they actually bear great responsibility.

Israel claims to defend itself against enemies determined to destroy it, from Hamas in Palestine to Hezbollah in Lebanon to the Islamic Republic of Iran. These are undoubtedly implacable enemies. However, it is equally true that over the decades Israel has barely missed an opportunity to foment the radicalism of its adversaries, marginalising the more pragmatic voices, and that the United States and Europe have not put up any barriers.

The peace process that never was

In February 1994, a man named Baruch Goldstein fired on a group of Muslim worshippers gathered in prayer at the Cave of the Patriarchs in Hebron, killing 29 Palestinians and wounding 125.[1] Goldstein was a naturalised American-Israeli linked to the most extreme fringes of Zionism, which pushed for the annexation of Palestinian land occupied by Israel after the June 1967 six-day war – East Jerusalem, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip – and the forced removal of its inhabitants.[2]

How might Israel strike back against Iran?

Israel has sworn it will retaliate for Iran's missile barrage on Tuesday, which involved more than 180 ballistic missiles and was largely thwarted by Israel's air defense systems.

Below are some ways Israel, backed by the United States, could strike back.

GO AFTER IRAN'S MILITARY INSTALLATIONS

Some analysts believe Israel is most likely to respond by targeting Iranian military installations, especially those that produce ballistic missiles like the ones used in Tuesday's attacks. It could also take out Iranian air defense systems and missile-launching facilities.

Washington has accused Tehran of supplying short-range ballistic missiles to Russia for use against Ukraine. Both countries deny that allegation.

Analysts said that would be seen as the most in-kind response to Iran's attack.

Eisenhower Center for Space and DefenseSpace & Defense Journal, Spring 2024, v. 15, no. 1

Pushing Boundaries: Feminism, Female Leaders, and the Fate of Feminist Foreign iii Policy

American Sanctions on China’s Space Program: Effective Economic Statecraft?

Protecting the Cosmos: Defining Celestial Bodies in the Outer Space Treaty

Finding a North Star: Lessons in Space Law for the Nuclear Regime

The Unified Command Plan for a New Cold War

Operational Energy Solutions for a 21st Century Battlefield

Capability Gaps in Allied Space Deterrence

Revitalizing America’s Low-Yield Deterrent

Waging Peace on the Final Frontier

Jamestown FoundationChina Brief, September 20, 2024, v. 24, no. 18

Beijing’s Soft Power Push with African Nations

PRC Expands De Facto Jurisdiction in the Taiwan Strait

PRC Partnership Diplomacy in the New Era

PRC Seeking to Boost Ties with Bangladesh After Hasina’s Demise

An Assessment of the Audit of Volkswagen’s Controversial Factory in Xinjiang

‘Grand Strategy’ Misses the Point

Kevin Blachford

As the United States prepares for the November presidential election, political commentators and security analysts are no doubt also preparing for what now seems like the obligatory ritual of providing grandiose plans, roadmaps, blueprints, navigational guides, frameworks, strategy outlines, policy wishlists, and designs for the future of American foreign policy. Of course, this almost ritualized behavior is part of the process by which every new U.S. administration begins its four years in office: by facing numerous calls for the U.S. to adopt a new “grand strategy.” Having a grand strategy is seen as the key to defining the future of American ambitions and the means to securing its national interests. Even before the actual presidential election, there have been several calls for such grand strategies.

Yet the proposed grand strategy revisions are also “wishful” strategies that overplay the unitary nature of the state and largely fail to account for the conflicting interests within U.S. politics. The making of American foreign policy is not led by a clear-sighted president and his strategizing national security advisor, but by a competitive policy marketplace. This ever-expanding marketplace includes the bureaucracy of planning staffs, research institutions, and lobbyists who seek not to secure the national interest, but the prestige and funding to expand organizational growth.

Zelensky and Western leaders aim at exhausting Russia. Is that going to work?

Konstantinos Bogdanos

A war of attrition against Russia has never proved to be a good idea. From Napoleon’s France to Hitler’s Germany, many have attempted it, but no one has succeeded in finally killing the Bear. So why would Zelensky be the one to achieve it?

The president of Ukraine has recently been touring the United States, raising funds for his country’s war effort, but most of all trying to put forward his strategy on how Russia can be defeated.

Zelensky met with President Biden and Vice-President Harris, but also with former President Trump, to sell his “victory plan”. He returned home with an extra $8 billion, but no commitment on the use of US long-range weapons systems against Russia.

Upon return, the Ukrainian leader admitted that the situation on the ground is extremely challenging for his forces. “Reports on each of our frontline sectors, our capabilities, our future capabilities and our specific tasks: the situation is very, very difficult,” he said on a video address.

On the Pokrovsk Front, Ukrainian Forces Struggle To Hold Back the Russian Advance

Joseph Roche

In a dusty sky, the last storks of Donbas fly off to other horizons for the winter. Their supple wings, in the evening light, glide over fields of dried sunflowers and disappear behind massive slag heaps that, from one valley to another, seem to rise out of nowhere.

Philippe, 30, a soldier of Ukraine’s 68th Jaeger Brigade, presses down on the accelerator, his face focused.

After crossing the bridge in Pokrovsk, destroyed a few weeks earlier by Russian forces, he heads south toward Selydove. This is where the fiercest fighting has taken place.

In the opposite direction, dozens of cars and trucks evacuate the last civilians from the city.

Sitting next to Philippe in the front seat, Oleksandr, 31, points to a dark cloud.

"That’s Selydove!" he yells to be heard over the engine noise.

Time to Move Beyond Cannons

L. Lance Boothe

Yet in the US Army, a struggle with math is happening, particularly in the Field Artillery. For a combat arm which demands meeting the five requirements for accurate predicted fire (target location and size, firing unit location, weapon and ammunition information, meteorological data, and computational procedures) as essential to putting steel on target, one would think arithmetic near reverential. Calculus and geometry, simply being able to count to ten, and doing math in increments of 10s, 50s, or 100s applies to just about every one of the “five requirements” in some form or fashion. Yet some artillerymen cannot seem to do the simplest math of all – merely counting munitions and systems.

While “sight-to-crest,” standard and nonstandard factors, “met worksheets” for applying data from ballistic MET (meteorological) messages, the tabular firing table (TFT), graphical firing tables (GFT), “charts and darts,” muzzle velocity records for calculating muzzle velocity variations, and high burst mean point of impact worksheets for solving the gunnery problem (the practical application of the science of ballistics) would be a stimulating discussion, suffice it to say math is involved.[1] And that arithmetic goes a bit beyond balancing your checkbook, which the bank does for you now anyway. Perhaps this is the problem – computing power, which alleviates the individual from doing math. Recalling my days in a fire direction center (FDC) with a battery computer system (BCS), now the Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System (AFATDS), we still laboriously and quickly checked the computer with our TFT, GFT, chart with “whiz-wheel,” range-deflection protractor, and calculations from MET data correction sheets along with a handheld computing device called the back-up computer system (BUCS) – a calculator to check another calculator. Dual independent checks make the gunnery world go ‘round. It is all about the math.

Escalation: A Tool to Be Considered, Not Dismissed

Charles Richard & Robert Peters

In recent years, it has become nearly gospel that “escalation” during an acute crisis or conflict is inherently a bad thing. Indeed, “escalatory” has become a synonym for “bad” or “dangerous” or “undesirable.” As a result, many of our national security professionals and uniformed officers nearly reflexively dismiss taking actions or postures that could be considered “escalatory” or “provocative” in both real-world and simulated crisis or conflict.

These ideas and practice are flawed. Crises and conflicts, especially between great powers, are ultimately issues of stake and resolve, and become competitions in risk taking. In many cases, escalation, or the threat of escalation, is required or desirable to achieve the desired objectives. In fact, deterrence by cost imposition inherently requires the withheld threat of escalation and is not credible without a willingness to do so.

This paper is based upon our years of service within the Defense Department as (respectively) a senior military officer and a civilian. These views are offered with an eye towards re-examining the concept of escalation as a useful tool of statecraft.

Ukraine Military Situation: Russian Military Enters Vuhledar – Analysis

Can Kasapoğlu

1. Battlefield Assessment

As previous editions of this report projected, the Ukrainian town of Vuhledar is on the brink of falling to Russian forces. The Russian military has secured a foothold in the city’s east, and the Kremlin continues to send reinforcements to the area. With the town almost fully encircled, Moscow’s 430th Motor Rifle Regiment and 5th Tank Brigade have also entered the western outskirts of Vuhledar.

Notably, Ukrainian military leaders have relieved the commander of Kyiv’s 72nd Mechanized Brigade, the main formation conducting defensive combat operations to hold Vuhledar, and appointed him to another post. Open-source intelligence suggests that the Ukrainian military is gradually withdrawing from the embattled city, though the Ukrainian high command denies this.

In Ukraine’s east, Pokrovsk and Toretsk remain flashpoints. Toretsk witnessed intense urban warfare this past week, while detachments from Russia’s 90th Tank Division pushed deeper into Pokrovsk. The Russian offensive has now made it as far as Zavitne. Ukraine’s Office of the Prosecutor General stated that the Russian military executed 16 prisoners of war (POWs) in Donetsk Oblast, continuing Russia’s practice of extrajudicial killings.

Emerging and Disruptive Technologies Transform, but Do Not Lift, the Fog of War: Evidence from Russia’s War on Ukraine

Stephen Herzog

Introduction

When we read the call for proposals for the Finnish National Defence University’s 2024 Russia Seminar, we were immediately struck with a question. During Russia’s war on Ukraine, have new emerging technologies helped the fog of war dissipate, or have they made it thicker? Focusing on Russia and emerging and disruptive technologies (EDTs) is essential for understanding today’s strategic context. 1 Russian President Vladimir Putin did, after all, indicate in 2017 his country’s ambition to rule the world through leading developments in artificial intelligence (AI).2 Likewise, in 2018, Putin announced “new exotic weapons” that suggest advances in military applications of AI and the use of autonomous platforms.3 Furthermore, the Kremlin’s investments in nuclear-capable hypersonic missiles were meant to provide capabilities to strike at extreme speeds and overcome existing missile defenses.4 Russia has indeed used several of these EDTs since the beginning of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. But despite Moscow’s interest and investment in disruptive technologies, Russia has not won the war. It continues on, and even Kremlin battlefield successes come with mass casualties among Russian soldiers.

Ideas about new technologies that should theoretically make battlefield outcomes clearer do not just apply to the Russian side. Ukraine has spent considerable resources on whole-of-society efforts to produce small drones that have become ubiquitous in the conflict. This has triggered scores of media and analyst claims about new drone technologies and ways of warfare that revolutionize battlefields, have game-changing effects, and even fundamentally alter the nature of war. However, Kyiv is also remarkably far away from achieving anything resembling meaningful victory in the conflict.

Ukraine War Map: Tracking the Frontlines

This interactive map shows the shifting front lines in the Russo-Ukrainian war. Users can zoom in to conflict zones to view daily changes in troop movements and battlefield dynamics.

Data for this map is taken from the Ukrainian OSINT DeepState project, a live map of Russian and Ukrainian military operations maintained since April 2022.

Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022, escalating a war that had begun eight years earlier when Moscow annexed Crimea and fomented conflict in Ukraine’s eastern Donbas region.

Crisis Group’s research and advocacy efforts aim to help mitigate the war’s human costs and security implications and to identify a path to its sustainable end.

The Tragedy behind Israel’s Ostensible Triumph

Riccardo Alcaro

The killing by Israel of Hassan Nasrallah, the leader of Hezbollah, the Islamist Shia militia that controls South Lebanon, may well go down in history as the harbinger of a seismic change in the balance of power in the Levant and arguably the whole Middle East.

Iran’s ensuing retaliatory missile strike makes war with Israel all but inevitable, though its magnitude remains uncertain. Part of it will be fought with missiles, rockets and drones flying across the sky between the two arch-enemies. Part of it will be fought across the region, possibly wherever Iran’s axis of resistance – the network of pro-Iran armed groups spanning Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Syria and Yemen is based. Most of it will likely be fought in Lebanon, home to Hezbollah, whose demise – or even severe weakening – would result in Iran’s influence in the Levant being curtailed.

While Israel’s onslaught on Hezbollah has tilted the balance of power heavily in its favour, it is too early to make predictions – after all, the Middle East has disrupted expectations time and time again in the past. It is still possible though to make some considerations and discuss a few open questions.

Why Wind and Solar Need Natural Gas: A Realistic Approach to Variability

Robin Gaster

Introduction

The share of U.S. electricity produced by wind and solar (“variable renewable energy” sources, or VRE) is growing very rapidly now. While it’s possible that firm clean power sources (e.g., nuclear, geothermal, or fusion) will expand dramatically, that seems unlikely barring important technological breakthroughs. VRE is expanding quickly, and will likely become dominant in coming decades.

As a result, variability in electricity supply is becoming a formidable challenge. Some variability is short term—the sun doesn’t shine at night. Some is seasonal—solar generates much less power in winter. And some is unpredictable across a longer timescale: Some weeks, months, or years are just much less windy, for example. These problems are not yet acute, but they will quickly become so, depending on the level and speed of VRE adoption.1

The current focus of both industry and government is on short-duration storage, which helps shift energy within the day and also helps solve a number of technical challenges to the grid. But short-duration storage technologies alone won’t work for much longer duration needs.

Zelenskyy’s Victory Plan Attempts to Redefine Victory and Defeat

Vladimir Socor

Inadequate Western military support is compelling Ukraine to accept negotiating with Russia from a posture of weakness. While the battlefield situation seems sustainable for the time being, despite local reverses, Russia’s relentless air strikes on Ukrainian energy supply systems at the onset of winter add an element of urgency to domestic political challenges. In Washington and other capitals, meanwhile, proposals are multiplying for negotiations to “end the war” whereby Russia would retain the Ukrainian territories it has seized. Some of Ukraine’s Western partners hope to see Russia join a peace summit before the end of this year.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy has responded by launching his own plan for a negotiated outcome, dubbed the Victory Plan. It is designed, in part, to preempt outright defeatist proposals from being tabled by other parties. Zelenskyy presented this plan to US President Joe Biden, presidential candidates Vice President Kamala Harris and former President Donald Trump, and the G7+ leaders during his recent visit to the United States (Ukrinform, September 28).

Israel’s Paradox of Defeat

Aluf Benn

Last October 7, Hamas surprised Israel’s famed military and intelligence agencies. Both had known, for years, about the Palestinian armed group’s preparations to invade Israel and kill and kidnap its soldiers and citizens. But they failed to believe that it would dare or succeed to execute such an unprecedented operation. The Israeli military and intelligence services; Israel’s prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu; and the wider Israeli public all believed that their country’s fortified southern border was so impenetrable, and the balance of power so favorable to Israel, that Hamas would never challenge the status quo.

But Hamas did challenge it. In the days and weeks after it launched its devastating attack, a common refrain among Israelis was that “everything has changed.” And for a time, it appeared that everything had: the assault shattered Israelis’ fundamental self-confidence, upending long-held beliefs about the country’s security, politics, and societal norms. The leadership of the Israel Defense Forces lost its prestige almost overnight as details emerged about how it failed to prevent the attack and then arrived too late to save border communities, military outposts, and defenseless attendees at a music festival.

Big Tech manipulating research into its harm to society - Opinion

Timothy Graham

For almost a decade, researchers have been gathering evidence that the social media platform Facebook disproportionately amplifies low-quality content and misinformation.

So it was something of a surprise when in 2023 the journal Science published a study that found Facebook’s algorithms were not major drivers of misinformation during the 2020 United States election.

This study was funded by Facebook’s parent company, Meta. Several Meta employees were also part of the authorship team. It attracted extensive media coverage. It was also celebrated by Meta’s president of global affairs, Nick Clegg, who said it showed the company’s algorithms have “no detectable impact on polarisation, political attitudes or beliefs.”

But the findings have recently been thrown into doubt by a team of researchers led by Chhandak Bagch from the University of Massachusetts Amherst. In an eLetter also published in Science, they argue the results were likely due to Facebook tinkering with the algorithm while the study was being conducted.

Army’s future helicopters could be more autonomous and launch their own drones

Hope Seck

As battlefields become increasingly hostile to conventional combat platforms, the Army is pushing forward with its two-decade effort to develop a new family of helicopters and rotorcraft through its Future Vertical Lift program while incorporating lessons from the war in Ukraine.

The Army recently concluded a major experimental event focused on its Future Vertical Lift program at its Yuma Proving Ground in Arizona. Five unidentified companies were selected to participate out of 36 applicants. The event, known as Experimental Demonstration Gateway Event (EDGE) 24 ultimately included one robot, seven ground technologies, three aerial platforms, and 28 launched-effect surrogates – “launched effects” refers to uncrewed vehicles that can be fired from another platform. Earlier this year, Breaking Defense reported that an Army UH-60 Black Hawk would be used as a test platform for autonomy and launched effects, with flights set to start early next year.

It’s the first EDGE event since the Army canceled its Future Attack Reconnaissance Aircraft (FARA) program earlier this year which hit a dead end after investing $2 billion in research and development. That change, as Army Chief of Staff Randy George explained at the time, was also informed by the war in Ukraine. “Aerial reconnaissance has fundamentally changed” in light of the ability of inexpensive unmanned flying systems to traverse combat zones in depth and inflict damage at minimal risk, he said.

11 October 2024

India Must Match China’s Speedy Moves in Bangladesh’s New Political Landscape

Rakshith Shetty

In early September, Chinese Ambassador to Bangladesh Yao Wen met with Shafiqur Rahman, the chief of the Bangladeshi political party Jamaat-e-Islami (JI), at the party’s central office in Dhaka. According to various reports, Yao termed the JI a “well-organized” and “disciplined” party. JI had been banned by deposed former Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina in August, a decision that the interim government recently overturned.

Yao’s visit was significant because it marked the first time that a foreign diplomat had been to the JI office since 2010. In that context, the meeting was a sign that Beijing is keen to adapt to a rapidly evolving political situation in Bangladesh by maintaining lines of communication across the whole political spectrum. This approach will allow China to pivot swiftly when needed, ensuring that its economic and strategic interests are protected regardless of who comes to power in the months ahead.

By contrast, India is increasingly at risk of getting locked out and losing influence in Bangladesh as a consequence of its perceived association with Hasina. Following Hasina’s departure from Bangladesh and the formation of an interim government headed by the Nobel laureate economist Muhammad Yunus, New Delhi has chosen to wait and watch. But this approach may carry the risk of ceding leverage to China, especially if Beijing continues to engage more proactively with Bangladesh’s emerging political powers.

The Coming Drift in India-Iran Relations

Akhilesh Pillalamarri

Last week, the ongoing war in the Middle East escalated with the death of Hezbollah’s erstwhile leader, Hassan Nasrallah, in a bunker in Lebanon following an Israeli airstrike on September 27. Since then, Israeli planes and missiles have pounded Lebanon, decimating Hezbollah, in addition to causing civilian deaths. Subsequently, Iran, which is closely allied with Hezbollah, fired around 180 missiles at Israel on October 1.

India under Prime Minister Narendra Modi has grown much closer to Israel, driven by strategic, economic, and ideological concerns. In a post on X (formerly Twitter) that could be interpreted as tacit support for Israel, Modi wrote on September 30 that he “spoke to [Israeli] Prime Minister [Netanyahu] about recent developments in West Asia. Terrorism has no place in our world. It is crucial to prevent regional escalation and ensure the safe release of all hostages.”

India has traditionally done a good job of cultivating good relations with sets of countries that are hostile to each other, such as the United States and Russia, and, in the Middle East, with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and Iran. As the minister of external affairs, Dr. S. Jaishankar, has said, India’s foreign policy is “multi-vector,” and characterized by dealing with countries that may be rivals with each other on a “non-exclusive” basis.

Taiwan Thinks China Can’t Invade. They’ve Never Been More Wrong

Brandon J. Weichert

Why Taiwan Might Face a Chinese Invasion Sooner Than You Think

Taiwan’s wishful thinking continues unabated. A recent report conducted by the Taiwanese Defense Ministry asserts that the Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA), while it has made significant strides in its modernization push, is still unable to conquer Taiwan in an amphibious invasion, at least not for another few years. Indeed, this flowery report gels nicely with the long-running contention of the Pentagon that China will not be able to successfully invade Taiwan until at least 2027.

Conveniently, that is the year that the Pentagon believes that its forces will be able to better deter China. But Beijing knows that American military capabilities if trends persist, will be shored up by 2027. And who knows how much more stable and prosperous the United States might be by then.

Compare That to Now

America’s economy is a turgid mess, its political order is crumbling, its social fabric is tearing, and there is a very real fear that the United States might devolve into some sort of civil war, in a limited sense, in the aftermath of whoever wins the 2024 presidential election.

On the international front, the U.S. military is stretched and strained to its breaking

What reports got wrong about China’s ‘sunken nuclear submarine’

J. MICHAEL DAHM and PETER W. SINGER

The purported sinking of a Chinese nuclear submarine at a Wuhan shipyard pier is the latest example of Western reporting on military developments in China that overlooks important details and context, or even takes the wrong lessons from the fragments of stories they tell.

The incident, which took place in June, drew some mention the following month on social media and even in the defense press, but it went viral after a Sept. 26 report in the Wall Street Journal touched off coverage from Fox News to CBS. What apparently lit up the U.S. media landscape were the assertions, attributed to unnamed U.S. defense officials, that the submarine was nuclear-powered. Many of the subsequent reports suggested that the incident revealed safety concerns about a new class of PLA Navy nuclear submarine and a serious setback for China’s military modernization.

These are mischaracterizations. Moreover, the reporting actually buried the lead. The shipyard accident tells us very little about the future of PLA naval modernization, but the submarine itself does.

Understanding Xi Jinping’s ‘reform and opening up’

Charles Parton

Chinese modernisation

Democratic parties announce their manifestos before an election; autocratic parties do so after their (s)election. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) sets out its longer-term goals at party congresses held every five years, and at the main annual plenums. Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CCP, described the Third Plenums of 1978 and 2013 as ‘epochal’ for their role in ‘reform and opening up’, the two main contributors to the People’s Republic of China (PRC)’s rise. Xi implied that this July’s plenum should also be seen as ‘epochal.’ Its measures are to be completed by 2029, and six years later, they will have helped the PRC on its way to achieving the first part of its two-step strategy to build ‘a great modern socialist country in all respects.’

‘Reform and opening up’ have long been the party’s nostrum for success. ‘Reform and opening up are the only way to make our country strong,’ says the 2002 version of the Party constitution. 3 In his ‘Explanation’ of the Third Plenum Resolution, the conclave’s formal document, Xi declared that, ‘...If we are to break new ground in advancing Chinese modernisation on the new journey in the new era, we must continue to rely on reform and opening up.’ 4 The word ‘reform’ duly appears 139 times in the Resolution, ‘opening up’ 27 times

No End in Sight? The West, China, and the Russo-Ukrainian War

Sven Biscop

THE DITHERING WEST

It is shameful that more than two years into the war, the West has still not moved beyond piecemeal decisionmaking about its support for Ukraine. The pattern keeps repeating itself. Every few months, a new weapons system is being considered for transfer to Ukraine. Governments dither for weeks or more, before in the end refraining from delivering the weapons. Or, if they do decide to release them, then in such small quantities that they have no decisive impact. The current debate about long-range missiles is the latest iteration. Meanwhile, the continued supply of replacements and ammunition for previously allocated weapons systems is far from assured. On the contrary, Ukraine can still not count on a regular supply of war matériel.

It is not that the West has been intimated by Russia’s threat of retaliation, not even by the recent announcement of a change in nuclear doctrine (which would allow first use against a non-nuclear state that is supported by a nuclear power). If it had, the West would not have supported Ukraine at all, and the country would no longer exist as an independent state. It is necessary, though, to manage the risk of escalation in any war that directly involves a great power as a combatant. That is why in the Korean War (1950-1953), China’s territory was off limits, even though unlike today in Ukraine, American, European (including Belgian) and other UN troops were directly fighting Chinese troops in North Korea.

China's Theater-Range, Dual-Capable Delivery Systems: Integrated Deterrence and Risk Reduction Approaches to Counter a Growing Threat

Chris Andrews and Justin Anderson

China has engaged in a dramatic buildup of its nuclear forces over the past decade. While much of the attention on China’s new nuclear arsenal has focused on its development and expansion of its strategic nuclear triad, this growth has also included significant numbers of theater-range, dual-capable delivery systems. These forces are not capable of reaching the U.S. mainland but can range U.S. and allied forces and bases across strategically significant swathes of the Indo-Pacific.

This research project assessed the growing threat to the United States and its Indo-Pacific allies posed by these systems. It then considered ways and means to counter and deter this challenge. It also considered possible risk reduction options. The study team organized its work around three main research questions:

1. What is the role of China’s theater-range, dual-capable delivery systems in its strategies and plans for countering U.S. intervention within a future Indo-Pacific security crisis or conflict?

Israel's secret weapon against Iran can be a deadly option

After Iran launched a barrage of missiles at Israel, it warned Iran of consequences with Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu saying that Iran would "pay for the attack". Some analysts said Israel's response would likely be sharper this time, suggesting it could target Iran's nuclear or oil facilities.

The US, meanwhile, is pushing for a measured Israeli response to avoid a broader regional war, but its influence may be limited in shaping Israel's next steps. This latest round of hostilities threatens to expand far beyond the Israel-Palestine struggle, pulling in regional powers like Iran, and sparking fears of a full-scale war across the Middle East.

US President Joe Biden has said that he would not support an attack by Israel on Iranian nuclear sites in retaliation for Tehran's firing of missiles at Israeli cities. "The answer is no," Biden said on Wednesday, when asked if he would support such retaliation after Iran fired missiles at Israel.

What Is Iran Trying to Prove? - Analysis

Vali Nasr

On Oct. 1, for the second time this year, Iran launched a barrage of missiles—nearly 200—toward Israel. This time, the attack involved more advanced missiles and came with little forewarning. The missiles did not do significant damage, but they signaled Iran’s will and ability to attack Israel—and penetrate its defense systems in potentially damaging ways. It is thus a major turning point in both the yearlong war in Gaza as well as the security and stability of the broader Middle East going forward. Why did Iran’s leaders choose to so brazenly confront Israel now—and how is Iran likely to act going forward?

The most proximate reason for this latest attack was retaliation. Iran claimed that it was responding to Israel’s assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in July and the more recent killings of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and Gen. Abbas Nilforoushan of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in Beirut. Beyond exacting retribution, Tehran likely hoped to establish a measure of deterrence against Israeli bullishness after a series of spectacular military and intelligence successes in Lebanon that has gravely damaged Hezbollah.

Can the U.S. Still Prevent an All-Out Middle East War? - Analysis

Michael Hirsh

In the year since Hamas’s Oct. 7 attack, Israel has gone from looking more vulnerable than it has for half a century—when it almost lost the 1973 Arab-Israeli War—to dramatically restoring its strategic edge against Iran and its proxies and, as Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said, changing “the balance of power in the region for years to come” in its favor.

That, in sum, is the conclusion of many military and national security experts following several months of devastating—and mostly unanswered—Israeli attacks. Since the spring, these operations have killed off senior commanders of Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); taken out Hamas’s political leader in the heart of Tehran and its top general in Gaza; and with a stunningly swift series of sophisticated blows both disabled and decapitated Hezbollah.

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