Between Identity and Territory: The Ethno-Political Conflict in Rakhine State

Mia Mahmudur Rahim

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The conflict in Myanmar’s Rakhine State—historically known as Arakan—is one of the most protracted and complex ethno-political crises in Southeast Asia. At its core lies a struggle between the predominantly Buddhist Rakhine (Arakanese) population and the stateless Muslim Rohingya minority, whose contested identity and historical presence in the region have sparked decades of tension, violence, and displacement. The Rakhine people, themselves a marginalized ethnic group within Myanmar, have long harbored grievances against the central government for political and economic neglect. This has fostered a strong regional nationalism, which views the Rohingya not only as religious outsiders but also as demographic and political threats. The Rohingya, on the other hand, claim deep historical roots in the region, yet have been systematically denied citizenship under Myanmar’s 1982 Citizenship Law, rendering them one of the world’s largest stateless populations.

The conflict escalated dramatically in 2017 when Myanmar’s military launched a brutal crackdown in response to attacks by the Arakan Rohingya Salvation Army (ARSA). The operation led to mass atrocities, including killings, sexual violence, and the displacement of over 700,000 Rohingya to Bangladesh—actions widely condemned as ethnic cleansing and possibly genocide. While the international community has focused on the humanitarian crisis, the deeper ethno-political dynamics remain unresolved. The Rakhine nationalist movement, represented by groups like the Arakan Army, seeks greater autonomy or even independence, complicating the narrative that frames the Rohingya solely as victims. This dual marginalization—of both Rakhine and Rohingya—has created a volatile environment where identity, territory, and political power collide.

Efforts at reconciliation and repatriation have largely stalled. Myanmar’s military junta, which seized power in 2021, has shown little interest in addressing the root causes of the conflict. Meanwhile, the Rohingya remain in limbo, caught between statelessness and exile, while the Rakhine continue to push for self-determination.

China’s Expanding Influence in Bangladesh: Strategic Debt and Naval Ambitions

Charles Davis 

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Bangladesh appears to be yet another example of China’s economic coups. Leveraging debt may allow China to expand its naval presence into the Bay of Bengal and add another strategic port to China’s Blue Water Naval goals. It is also likely to elevate tensions with India.

Bangladesh’s Growing Reliance on China

In August 2022, Mustafa Kamal, then the finance minister for Bangladesh, warned developing countries about the risk of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) loans. He expressed deep concern over poor lending practices and overwhelming indebtedness. At the time of his interview, Bangladesh owed China USD 4 billion, which equated to roughly 6 percent of its foreign dept. Bangladesh’s dept to China has surged to USD 7 billion, nearly doubling in three years.

In January 2024, Bangladesh replaced Kamal with Abul Hassan Mahmood Ali. Abul Hassan has a long, and developed, relationship with China. Abul Hassan served as the Chief of Mission at the Embassy of Bangladesh in Beijing from 1983 to 1986 and led the way to China’s investment in the Barapukuria coal mine project. Bangladesh’s interim government, led by Muhammad Yunus, has signaled a deepening alignment with Beijing.

Yunus met with President Xi Jinping on March 28, 2025 in an effort to reinforce its relationship with Communist China and likely to solidify an additional USD 5 billion soft loan from China, which would raise the dept to USD 12 billion.

Yunus is hopeful China will increase investments in Bangladesh to revive its economy, which is in disrepair due to both political and economic crises. He encouraged collaboration in infrastructure, renewable energy, and trade, highlighting Bangladesh’s potential as a manufacturing hub. Most importantly, he reminded Xi that his country’s strategic position provided opportunities for China to expand its influence and solidify presence in an area that is strategically important to the United States.

China’s Local Governments: Can they pull the weight of the country’s economy?

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China’s economy has been undergoing a structural slowdown after witnessing four decades of near double-digit growth rates. For the third time in a row, China has set an annual growth target of around 5 per cent for 2025. And to a great extent, whether it achieves the target will be contingent on the performance of its local governments, which are responsible for around 88 per cent of the national expenditure.

However, their fiscal situation continues to worsen. Not only has their general budgetary revenue as a percentage of GDP dropped, revenue from sale of land use rights has also sharply declined. To further compound their misery, local government debt, including hidden debt, has soared to over 50 percent of GDP.

With the central leadership’s crackdown on illegal debt, coupled with falling revenues, the fiscal space for the local governments has drastically reduced. However, their expenditure mandates continue to expand, thereby creating a structural fiscal imbalance. This has, in turn, severely limited the local governments’ ability to keep the economy running. Read the Issue Brief (PDF)

Nvidia: The AI chip giant caught between US and China

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With the meteoric rise of Nvidia, chief executive Jensen Huang has been nicknamed a tech "rock star" and the 'Taylor Swift of tech'

Computer chip giant Nvidia has once again found itself at the centre of US-China tensions over trade and technology.

On Thursday Nvidia's chief executive Jensen Huang flew to Beijing to meet senior Chinese officials, just after the US imposed new export controls on its chips.

The California-based company will require licenses to export its H20 AI chip to China, a move which the US Commerce Department said was designed to safeguard "national and economic security". Nvidia said federal officials had told them the requirement will be in force for the "indefinite future".

But why is the company so pivotal in the race for AI supremacy between the US and China?

What is Nvidia?

Nvidia designs advanced chips, or semiconductors, that are used in generative artificial intelligence. Generative AI can produce new content from a user's prompt, like ChatGPT.

In recent years, a surge in global demand for AI chips led Nvidia to become one of the world's most valuable companies. In November, Nvidia briefly unseated Apple as the largest company in the world by market capitalisation.

Because its chips are seen as so essential to advancements in generative AI, successive US administrations have scrutinised Nvidia's relationship with China.

Washington hopes the new export controls will slow China's development of advanced AI chips - especially their use by the Chinese military - and secure an advantage in AI competition with Beijing.

The New Cold War with China

Daniel R. Green

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The threat to the United States from the People’s Republic of China (PRC) is multifaceted, long-term, and aggressive. Whether it’s from military modernization to economic coercion, cyber warfare to space competition, the PRC’s national security challenge is global, and it targets U.S. interests, values, security, and standing in the world.

While much of the focus of U.S. policymakers has been on the military threat from China, the communist country has also implemented a multi-pronged approach to weaken the United States economically, politically, culturally, and diplomatically. It is enlisting a whole-of-government strategy blending civil and military approaches with tactics short of war to expand its influence and improve its geopolitical position.

Their determined plan uses economics, media, education, politics, culture, diplomacy, and information, among many other approaches, in a highly integrated and orchestrated fashion. Its actions take place within the U.S. domestically, they seek to undermine the U.S. regionally and globally, while sowing doubt in the minds of U.S. allies.

In short, in many respects, the U.S. is involved in a Cold War with China, and it urgently needs to do more to stop their aggressive actions.

A central component of the Cold War with China are the efforts of its government to influence American public opinion and culture. The Chinese Government has a veritable army of anonymous social media accounts which it uses to not only present its views but to foment division among our people while silencing critics of its regime. It also distributes government-funded newspapers within the U.S., little more than propaganda broadsheets, and invests in key media infrastructure to not only support its views but to also mute criticisms of its policies.

Additionally, through massive state support, it also seeks to shape American culture through supporting select movies, such as the 2019 movie Midway, to create division between the alliance of the United States and Japan, as well as prompting the temporary removal of the flag of Taiwan from the jacket of the actor Tom Cruise in the 2022 movie Top Gun: Maverick. Much like the Soviet Union during the Cold War, China uses all of its resources to challenge, coerce, silence, and divide opinions about its policies and actions. It uses cultural influence as much as any other capability at its disposal.

In the Future, China Will Be Dominant. The U.S. Will Be Irrelevant.

Kyle Chan

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For years, theorists have posited the onset of a “Chinese century”: a world in which China finally harnesses its vast economic and technological potential to surpass the United States and reorient global power around a pole that runs through Beijing.

That century may already have dawned, and when historians look back they may very well pinpoint the early months of President Trump’s second term as the watershed moment when China pulled away and left the United States behind.

It doesn’t matter that Washington and Beijing have reached an inconclusive and temporary truce in Mr. Trump’s trade war. The U.S. president immediately claimed it as a win, but that only underlines the fundamental problem for the Trump administration and America: a shortsighted focus on inconsequential skirmishes as the larger war with China is being decisively lost.

Mr. Trump is taking a wrecking ball to the pillars of American power and innovation. His tariffs are endangering U.S. companies’ access to global markets and supply chains. He is slashing public research funding and gutting our universities, pushing talented researchers to consider leaving for other countries. He wants to roll back programs for technologies like clean energy and semiconductor manufacturing and is wiping out American soft power in large swaths of the globe.

China’s trajectory couldn’t be more different.

Revealed: China has secretly installed kill switches in solar panels sold to the West - which could see Beijing plunge its enemies into darkness in the event of WW3

DAVID AVERRE 

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Engineers have discovered 'kill switches' embedded in Chinese-manufactured parts on American solar farms, raising fears Beijing could manipulate supplies or 'physically destroy' grids across the US, UK and Europe.

Energy officials are assessing the risks posed by small communication devices in power inverters - an integral component of renewable energy systems that connects them to the power grid.

While inverters are built to allow remote access for updates and maintenance, the utility companies using them typically install firewalls to prevent direct communication back to China.

But rogue communication devices not listed in product documents have been found in some solar power inverters by US experts who strip equipment hooked to grids to check for security issues, two sources told Reuters.

Using these devices to skirt firewalls and switch off inverters remotely, or change their settings, could destabilise power grids, damage energy infrastructure and trigger widespread blackouts.

'That effectively means there is a built-in way to physically destroy the grid,' one of the sources declared.

The discovery has raised fears Beijing may maintain the capability to wreak havoc on power grids across the Western world such is the reliance of renewable energy systems on Chinese-manufactured parts.

British solar panels use parts manufactured in a variety of countries, including China.

It is not known whether the Chinese 'killswitches' are present in any power converters installed on UK wind or solar farms.

But shadow energy minister Andrew Bowie yesterday called on Labour's Secretary for Energy Security and Net Zero Ed Miliband to carry out an 'immediate pause and review' of its efforts to transition to green power.

Electric Shock: The Chinese Threat To Europe’s Industrial Heartland – Analysis

Jakub Jakóbowski and Janka Oertel

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For decades, the performance of Germany’s economy—Europe’s largest—has been fuelled by selling goods to China. This export-orientated approach was essential to the German industrial-led economic model. But those times are over and Berlin now faces a dilemma.

The world has been hit by two “China shocks” since the turn of the millennium. The first followed China’s accession to the World Trade Organization in 2001, when Chinese-made consumer goods began to flood global markets and displaced manufacturing jobs, particularly in the US. Meanwhile, after the end of the cold war, central and eastern Europe provided a skill-rich, relatively low-wage neighbourhood that suddenly became available to the German economy. Thus, during the first China shock Germany benefited from deep integration with markets in central and eastern Europe—and from its complementarity with a Chinese economy to which high-quality German products and technology transfer were extremely valuable.

This time around, the second China shock is going to harm Germany and its neighbours, potentially very seriously. To compensate for low consumption at home and as part of its national security-driven economic dominance strategy, China engages in predatory trade practices. The colossal Chinese economy exports massive overcapacities of advanced manufactured goods to the world. But these goods are no longer the cheap electronics, washing machines and textiles of 25 years ago; complementarity is a thing of the past. Chinese goods now compete directly with Germany’s core industrial sectors. Current trends have the potential to dissolve Germany’s industrial backbone, including first and foremost its car industry.

Because of Germany’s deep integration with its neighbours, the ramifications of the second China shock will be widely felt. Direct trade between central and eastern Europe and China is comparatively low. But central and eastern European countries are wrapped tightly into German supply chains (and with each other). For years, these countries’ governments have been looking for a sweet spot: attaching themselves to competitive German global value chains, while cosying up to China for additional economic benefits. Yet central and eastern European leaders still fail to grasp that this China shock will be bruising for Germany—but fatal for them.

Trump Dumps Peace Talks

Mick Ryan

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In a certain sense, Putin is even right — to end the war in Europe, we really do need to eliminate its “root causes.” It’s just that the true “root causes” aren’t the existence of Ukraine as a state and as identity, as Russian war propaganda insinuates, but rather the existence of modern Russia itself — a country where, under the complacent gaze of weak Western democracies, a fascist, oligarchic regime has flourished. Illia Ponomarenko, 20 May 2025

The U.S. President, Donald Trump, had another conversation with Russia’s president today. The two-hour conversation focused primarily on Ukraine peace negotiations but also covered other topics related to the America-Russia relationship. Trump posted a precis of his conversation with Putin on social media. Putin issued a media release through his official website. Trump’s statement was more specific about issues discussed, while Putin offered a more general description of the call.

Today’s discussion between Trump and Putin probably indicates that we are at the start of a new phase in the Ukraine War, and in negotiations over war termination. This is an initial assessment of what occurred in the phone call, the key topics discussed, and what it means for the trajectory of the war.

What Were the Key Topics?

The first, and most important topic (at least to most of us) was the peace process in Ukraine. Trump wrote that Russia and Ukraine (note Trump always preferences Russia over Ukraine when he writes about the two) will “immediately start negotiations towards a ceasefire.” In his response to the phone call between Trump and Putin, and his call afterwards with Trump, the Ukrainian president describes how:

Ukraine is ready for direct negotiations with Russia in any format that brings results. Türkiye, the Vatican, Switzerland – we are considering all possible venues. It is not necessary to convince Ukraine, and our representatives are prepared to make real decisions in negotiations. What’s needed is a mirrored readiness from Russia to engage in meaningful talks.

Opinion – Reassessing Military Misconceptions in the American-Japanese Alliance

Julian McBride

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The U.S.-Japanese alliance is one of today’s strongest treaty alliances, shielding threats from China, North Korea, and Russia. Nevertheless, this ironclad alliance is often put to question due to misconceptions about reciprocal defense between Tokyo and Washington. Combining two of the strongest economies, militaries, and soft powers in the world, the Japanese-American alliance has room to grow, even within political turbulence. Against the backdrop of Trump hinting that every U.S. ally should grow its defense apparatus, the POTUS expressed criticism in relation to Japan. On two occasions, President Trump stated that the American-Japanese alliance is “so one-sided.” Furthermore, the President said, “We pay hundreds of billions of dollars to defend them, but they don’t pay anything.” President Trump also told reporters that if America were attacked, Japan would not come to America’s aid. Overall, the President’s arguments ignore historical contexts that could cause a rift in one of the world’s steadfast alliances.

In the aftermath of Imperial Japan’s unconditional surrender, the United States government outlined Tokyo’s constitution, which led to decades of pacifism. In the new American-drafted constitution, Article 9 states that the country cannot have a full-standing military, which is the reason why Tokyo calls their army the Japanese Self-Defense Forces (JSDF). Despite its defensive operational nature, the JSDF consistently ranks in the top 20 armies by firepower amongst all nations. Additionally, Japan’s navy plays a crucial role in the First Island Chain strategy to contain Chinese naval movements in East Asia.

In the aftermath of World War II, the United States hosted permanent military bases in Japan to grow relations with Tokyo, enhance its defense, promote democratic reforms, and maintain a foothold in the Indo-Pacific region. Though Washington pays billions to logistically preserve and strengthen its forces in the Pacific Fleet, the Tokyo government pays for hosting American military bases. Before a 2022 agreement renewal, the Japanese parliament allotted 201.7 billion yen for American military bases. With the renewed agreement, there has been an increase of 250 to 299 billion yen, which equates to 2.6 billion USD. Tokyo also contributes to joint JSDF-U.S. forces training exercises, which take place throughout the Japanese archipelago.

The Arc of Eurasian Crisis: The Russia-Iran Relationship, Military Power, and Multipolarity

Harry Halem

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It has become conventional wisdom, both in policy establishments and the international relations academic community, to endorse the emergence of “multipolarity” between 2020 and 2025. The combination of COVID-19, political volatility in the US, Russia’s war on Ukraine, and the Iran-Israel rivalry cum Middle East crisis are all produced as proof. Yet instead, the key conclusion from the previous five years, and in fact, the last 20 years of international politics, is not multipolarity through American decline per se, but a transformation in the relationship between Russia and its neighbours, whether those be adversaries like Ukraine, or partners like Iran. This stems from a collapse in Russia’s relative power, even as Iran comes under extreme pressure.

International relations debate has quickly accepted the concept of “multipolarity”, almost as rapidly as it accepted American hegemony under the “unipolar moment” 35 years ago. Yet the differences between these situations could not be starker. In 1991, the United States had outlasted its greatest geopolitical rival, the USSR, both by exploiting the fragmentation of the communist bloc after the Sino-Soviet split and through a large-scale military buildup that leveraged new technologies and operational concepts. The Soviet Union shattered, with Belarus and Ukraine splitting from the Russian-dominated Soviet empire. The Balts escaped Moscow’s grip as well. Farther west, the small nations of Eastern Europe, for whose liberty the UK entered the Second World War a half-century earlier, were also liberated from geopolitical domination. The same year the USSR dissolved, the United States ejected Iraq from Kuwait with only 292 combat deaths, nearly half of which came from friendly fire. American power was undeniable, hence the intellectual attraction of unipolarity is clearly explicable.

By contrast, the birth of multipolarity lacks comparable evidence. Long-range trends — ranging from the US share of global manufacturing to US relative economic size, productivity, and the relative rate of dollarisation in international trade — provide evidence of a shifting balance of power. Yet there is little indication of true multipolarity. Russia began its attempt to conquer Ukraine outright in February 2022, staging a lightning offensive meant to stun Ukraine into submission and shock the US and Europe enough to keep Ukraine isolated. Three years later, Russia has lost nearly a million military casualties killed or wounded. Its real inflation rate is likely significantly higher than an already high public figure of 10%. The Russian labour market remains tight, given emigration and war deaths. Russia lacks access to international financial institutions and is heavily reliant on Chinese financial and technological assistance to sustain its war effort and economy. Most critically, Russia is spending between 30 and 40% of its annual budget on military items. The broader Russian economy has been retooled for war, meaning the actual defence spending proportion may be even higher. All this is to conquer Ukraine, a country a fraction of Russia’s territorial extent, population, and economic product.

Russian nuclear weapons, 2025

Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, Mackenzie Knight 

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Russia is in the late stages of a multi-decade-long modernization program to replace all of its Soviet-era nuclear-capable systems with newer versions. However, this program is facing significant challenges that will further delay the entry into force of these newer systems. In this issue of the Nuclear Notebook, we estimate that Russia now possesses approximately 4,309 nuclear warheads for its strategic and non-strategic nuclear forces. Although the number of Russian strategic launchers is not expected to change significantly in the foreseeable future, the number of warheads assigned to them might increase. The significant increase in non-strategic nuclear weapons that the Pentagon predicted five years ago has so far not materialized. A nuclear weapons storage site in Belarus appears to be nearing completion. The Nuclear Notebook is researched and written by the staff of the Federation of American Scientists’ Nuclear Information Project: director Hans M. Kristensen, associate director Matt Korda, and senior research associates Eliana Johns and Mackenzie Knight.

This article is freely available in PDF format in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists’ digital magazine (published by Taylor & Francis) at this link. To cite this article, please use the following citation, adapted to the appropriate citation style: Hans M. Kristensen, Matt Korda, Eliana Johns, and Mackenzie Knight, Russian Nuclear Weapons, 2025, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 81:3, 208-237, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1080/00963402.2025.2494386

Russia is nearing the completion of a decades-long effort to replace all of its strategic and non-strategic nuclear-capable systems with newer versions. But despite Moscow’s continued rhetorical emphasis on its nuclear forces, commercial satellite imagery and other open sources indicate that elements of Russia’s nuclear modernization are proceeding much more slowly than planned: Upgrades to intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and bombers face significant delays, and the “significant” increase of Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons that US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) predicted five years ago has yet to materialize (Richard 2020, 5).

Elon Musk Was Donald Trump’s Useful Idiot

Gideon Lichfield

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Late last month, a chastened-looking Musk admitted that DOGE has been “not as effective as I’d like.” The quasi-agency claims that it has so far saved the U.S. government $170 billion, mostly by firing employees, repealing regulations, and canceling contracts and grants. But it hasn’t provided evidence for—or has greatly exaggerated—most of these savings. In reality, DOGE’s slapdash approach to slashing government will, by one estimate, cost taxpayers an additional $135 billion this year. And actual federal spending has been rising since President Donald Trump took office.

The Inequality Myth Western Societies Are Growing More Equal, Not Less

Daniel Waldenstrom

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Spend a few minutes browsing political commentary or scrolling social media and you will discover a seemingly settled truth: inequality in the West is soaring, the middle class is being hollowed out, and democracies stand on the brink of oligarchy. The idea is seductive because it fits everyday anxieties in many Western countries—housing has grown increasingly unaffordable, billionaire wealth mushrooms unfathomably, and the pandemic exposed yawning gaps in social safety nets. Yet the most influential claims about inequality rest on selective readings of history and partial measurements of living standards. When the full balance sheet of modern economies is tallied—including taxes, transfers, pension entitlements, homeownership, and the fact that people move through income brackets across their lives—the story looks markedly different. Western societies are not nearly as unequal as many believe them to be.

This is not a call for complacency. Concentrated economic power can distort markets and politics; pockets of deep poverty persist in rich countries; and in the United States, the top of the distribution has indeed sprinted ahead of the rest. But focusing only on the eye-catching fortunes of tech founders or hedge-fund managers obscures a quieter, broader transformation: households across the income spectrum now own capital on a scale unimaginable to earlier generations, and basic measures of well-being in Western societies—including life expectancy, educational attainment, and consumption possibilities—have improved for nearly everyone.

Getting the facts right matters because bad diagnosis breeds bad prescriptions. If governments assume that capitalism is inexorably recreating the disparities of the Gilded Age, they will reach for wealth confiscations, price controls, or ever-larger public sectors funded by fragile tax bases. If, instead, the evidence shows that free-market economies have enriched middle classes by expanding asset ownership, that entrepreneurs’ fortunes are associated with advances shared with the broader public, and that much of the post-1980 rise in recorded inequality reflects methodological quirks, then a different agenda follows: states should encourage ambition, protect competition, widen access to wealth-building, and ensure that public services complement—not smother—private prosperity. In short, before treating inequality as an existential crisis, it is worth double-checking the thermometer.

Defending Europe Without the United States: Costs and Consequences

Ben Barry

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The IISS has conducted an independent, open-source assessment of the financial costs and defence industrial requirements for NATO-Europe to defend against a future Russian threat without the United States. Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine, its hybrid war against European states, and demands by the Trump administration for European defence autonomy make it imperative for European decision-makers to consider the military, financial and defence industrial investments needed to reduce dependencies on the US and, in extremis, to prepare for a NATO without any US role.

The objective of the study is to inform European policymakers’ thinking about the military, financial and defence industrial implications of closing key military gaps.

To inform the European defence policy debate, the study assumes that by mid-2025 the war in Ukraine has ended with a ceasefire agreement and that the US government has indicated that it will begin the process of withdrawing from NATO. Declaring its need to prioritise the Indo-Pacific theatre, the US also commences to remove equipment, stocks, supplies and military personnel from Europe. The IISS does not assume this scenario to be inevitable, but it is a helpful construct to clarify policy and capability decisions for European governments today.

Against this background, the study first assesses Russia’s ability to reconstitute its forces after the fighting in Ukraine ends. Our assessment is that challenges notwithstanding, Russia could be in a position to pose a significant military challenge to NATO allies, particularly the Baltic states, as early as 2027. By then, Russia’s ground forces could mirror its February 2022 active equipment holdings through a combination of refurbishment and the production of new systems. Moreover, its air and maritime forces have been largely unaffected by the war.

Consequently, were US forces to disengage from the European theatre from mid-2025, Europe’s window of vulnerability would open quickly. Not only would European allies need to replace major US military platforms and manpower – the latter estimated at 128,000 troops – but also address shortfalls in space and all-domain intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets. They would also need to replace the significant US contribution to NATO’s command and control arrangements and fill many senior military positions in NATO organisations currently occupied by US personnel.

Book Review | The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines Between War and Peace

Ciprian Clipa 

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The Russian Understanding of War: Blurring the Lines Between War and Peace. By Oscar Jonsson. Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2019. ISBN 978-1626167339. Maps. Photographs. Glossary. Notes. Sources Cited. Index. Pp. vii, 208. $26.14.

Oscar Jonsson’s The Russian Understanding of War is a well-timed and thought-provoking explanation of how Russian military thinking has developed to integrate non-military state tools—such as information warfare and ideological subversion—into its understanding of war. By systematically exploring this evolution from the Soviet period to today, Jonsson presents a convincing case: Russia no longer sees war solely in terms of armed conflict but views nonviolent actions as part of a continuous spectrum of conflict. This book is a must-read for policymakers, academics, and armed forces members struggling with today’s geopolitical conflicts and the challenges of so-called hybrid warfare.

Oscar Jonsson, a Swedish security analyst and political scientist, presents in this book the core question of whether Russia’s understanding of the nature of war has evolved to incorporate nonmilitary tools into its conception of warfare. Jonsson’s methodology examines Russian military writing, security policy documents, and public declarations of high-level officials, such as General Valery Gerasimov. The book is chronological in format, starting with the Soviet inheritance and concludes with extensive discussions of information warfare and the Color Revolutions. Throughout, Jonsson’s core argument is that Russia’s concept of war has extended beyond traditional armed conflict to include nonmilitary tools, such as propaganda, cyber operations, and political subversion, as essential components of warfare.

The book’s fresh approach is among its strongest points. Instead of merely analyzing Russia’s military capabilities or official doctrine, Jonsson aims to understand how the Russian thinkers themselves frame the nature of war. This closes an important gap in the literature and introduces a new analytical lens to the subject. The depth of Jonsson’s research is matched by its specificity; he relies extensively on Russian primary materials, everything from military journals and doctrinal texts to speeches, many of which remain untranslated or underutilized in Western scholarship. 

Japan not rushing into a bad trade deal with Trum

Scott Foster

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Japan’s senior trade officials skipped the APEC Ministers Responsible for Trade meetings held last week on South Korea’s Jeju Island.

Neither Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry Yoji Muto nor Prime Minister Shigeru Ishiba’s top trade negotiator Ryosei Akazawa attended the event, missing an opportunity to talk with US Trade Representative Jamieson Greer. Masaki Ogushi, a member of Akazawa’s negotiating team, represented Japan in their stead.

Unlike the UK, Japan is in no hurry to reach a disadvantageous or incomplete trade deal with US President Donald Trump, particularly with elections to the upper house of Japan’s national assembly coming up in July. And unlike the South Koreans, the Japanese are not seeking a low-key compromise.

The impact of 25% tariffs on autos and auto parts on the Japanese economy is simply too great, and America’s renewed assault on Japan’s rice farmers is too sensitive to tolerate.

Ishiba already leads a minority government, his Liberal Democratic Party having lost its majority in the lower house last October. Now he must either stand up for Japan or risk losing the party’s majority in the upper house as well.

Akazawa is expected to visit Washington, DC, for a third round of formal negotiations later this month, perhaps within the coming week. While Ogushi was in South Korea, he met with Chief Cabinet Secretary Hayashi Yoshimasa to discuss strategy. After that meeting, he told the press, “My focus is on our national interests, to protect what needs to be protected and to say what needs to be said.”

Established in 1989 at the suggestion of Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke, Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) describes itself as “a cooperative, multilateral economic and trade forum.” Its 21 members include most of the economic entities around the Pacific Ocean.

The People’s Republic of China, Chinese Taipei and Hong Kong are all members. In an unusual recognition of geographic reality, the Russian Federation is also a member. North Korea is not.

Why Did the Houthis Agree to Peace with America?

James Holmes

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In a narrow, partial sense, air power unaccompanied by a ground offensive may have nudged Houthi calculations toward an outcome agreeable to Washington.

In light of the Houthis’ much-touted agreement to stop assailing shipping traversing the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb Strait, and Gulf of Aden, an aviator friend writes to ask whether air power proved decisive in the irregular naval war against the Yemeni rebels.

To which I boldly say: maybe.

Prompting this exchange, of course, was my late March TNI column siding with Admiral J. C. Wylie, who proclaimed that air power and other “cumulative,” scattershot forms of warfare never decide armed strife on their own. Wylie opines that control—generally speaking, control of key terrain or something on the Earth’s surface—is the purpose of military strategy. Bombarding something from the air is not the same as controlling it. Ground forces, on the other hand, can impose permanent, suffocating control. Ergo, air and missile forces are the “supporting” arm of ground might in any campaign. They’re an enabler, not an end in themselves.

Wylie’s proverbial “man on the scene with a gun”—a soldier or Marine bestriding terra firma while toting heavy firepower—is the “supported” arm. The soldier is the agent of physical control, and thus the final arbiter of martial success. In other words, air power is important, but insufficient to yield victory and enforce the postwar peace. No land power, no durable results.

The Houthi Ceasefire Is Not Peace

Two points. First, to gauge whether some operation or campaign was decisive, it’s helpful to define what decisive means. As with so many terms in the realm of warlike affairs, there is no universally agreed-upon definition of the word. The definition we commonly use in the hallowed halls of Newport comes from Carl von Clausewitz, the military sage of nineteenth-century Prussia. Reading between the lines a tad, Clausewitz defines a strategic attack that leads “directly to peace” as a decisive undertaking.

Members of Congress vow not to split Cyber Command, NSA

Mark Pomerleau

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Renewed calls for severing the so-called dual-hat relationship between the National Security Agency and U.S. Cyber Command received cold water on Capitol Hill Friday.

Since Cybercom was created a decade ago, it has been co-located with NSA at Fort Meade, Maryland, and shared a leader. At the time, this made sense to help the nascent command grow, relying on the personnel, expertise and infrastructure of the high-tech intelligence agency. The arrangement was initially expected to be temporary.

Severing the dual-hat has been one of the most hotly contested issues in cyber policy. Proponents believe the military can benefit from the unique intelligence insights and resources of NSA, leading to faster decision-making and operational outcomes. Opponents argue the roles of NSA director and Cybercom commander are too powerful for one person to hold and relying on the intelligence community’s tools — which are meant to stay undetected — for military activities poses risks to such espionage activity.

At the end of the first Trump administration, officials made a last ditch effort to sever the dual-hat, but it ultimately was not brought to fruition. Press reports prior to Trump’s inauguration for his second term indicated the administration wanted to end the dual-hat relationship.

There “is renewed speculation about the separation of the ‘dual-hat’ relationship between Cybecom and NSA, a construct that proves its value to our national security every minute of every day. This issue has been studied exhaustively but somehow there are still those who believe they know better,” Rep. Don Bacon, R-Neb., chairman of the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Cyber, Innovative Technologies and Information Systems, said in opening remarks during a hearing Friday. “I’ve spoken to my colleagues on this panel and our friends in the Senate, and on a bipartisan and bicameral basis, the Armed Services Committees are strongly opposed to ending the dual-hat relationship. I want to take this opportunity to make very clear to the Department’s leadership that if they believe they have allies on this issue who sit on the Pentagon’s congressional oversight panels, they do not.”

Changing How We Educate Soldiers, Leaders Opinion

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Over the past several months, the Soldiers, NCOs, and officers of 51st Expeditionary Signal Battalion – Enhanced (ESB-E) have had the distinct privilege to put the Scalable Network Node (SNN) into system in the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) Area of Operation, being the first ESB-E to deploy as a battalion under hostile conditions, supporting critical air defense and logistics operations across Southwest Asia.

For many Soldiers, it is their first time in austere environments meeting challenges and overcoming them with skill and gravitas. However, it is not just the Soldiers and leaders of the 51st being tested. This deployment is the first time that the SNNs have faced such a demanding environment, with over 30 nodes actively supporting users across an entire combatant command. The SNNs have been put to the test, facing soaring temperatures and harsh wind and sandstorms. In this process, the Soldiers and leaders of the 51st have learned a truly significant amount about these new systems. They’ve developed crucial tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) and built critical experiences to share with the signal community while providing invaluable feedback to the multiple fielding projects that have fed into the conversion to an ESB-E.

Out of the many lessons learned from the deployment, perhaps the most important lesson learned is the importance of both institutional and unit investments into the education of our junior Soldiers and officers. The signal community must heavily invest in the education of our junior Soldiers, NCOs, and officers; particularly senior NCOs and junior officers at the company level. While it is true that these populations will not necessarily be directly behind the keyboard troubleshooting outages, platoon and company-level leaders, without complete understanding of their equipment, often result in the inability to fully approach the complexities of networking and the ways in which these systems function. An informed, technically adept company-level leader is better able to plan missions and talk to their supported customers, serving as the critical interface point between the teams that they lead and the customers who are often not signal-inclined or technically savvy.

Can You Pass the Army’s New Fitness Test?

Erik Vance

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On June 1, the Army will adopt new fitness standards for soldiers in combat roles. Many of the updates to the test are relatively minor, though the minimum requirement in some events, like the two-mile run, will change more substantially. The most significant shift is that the new standards will be the same for men and women.

Even if you have no ambitions to join the military, the test can be an excellent gauge of overall fitness, experts said, because it balances strength, speed, endurance and core stability.

“There’s a lot of people that do it just for general fitness,” said Josh Bryant, a private consultant who designed a course used by the International Sports Sciences Association to train soldiers, police officers and firefighters. “Whoever designed it did a good job of it,” he said.

Here’s what’s in the test, and what it takes to pass each event.

What is the Army Fitness Test?

The test has existed in some form for more than a century. The latest version has five events: deadlifts, push-ups, planks, a two-mile run and the sprint-drag-carry, a shuttle run involving sleds and kettle bells. These exercises represent a well-rounded mix of functional exercises — for both soldiers and civilians, fitness experts said.

The minimum performances listed below reflect the new standards for a passing score for 30-year-old combat soldiers. They could also be good targets for someone just trying to get in better shape, Mr. Bryant said. For more of a challenge, try to beat the Army’s overall average scores, based on a report by Military.com. (In order to pass the actual test, which is graded based on age, soldiers must score above the minimum in each event and excel in at least one. They also perform all five exercises in a row with minimal rest.)

The India-Pakistan Clashes of 2025: Why Things Are Different (And More Dangerous) This Time

Ankit Panda and Catherine Putz

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The Diplomat’s Asia Geopolitics podcast hosts Ankit Panda (@nktpnd) and Katie Putz (@LadyPutz) discuss the outbreak of violence between India and Pakistan and the scope for escalation in South Asia.

If you’re an iOS or Mac user, you can also subscribe to The Diplomat’s Asia Geopolitics podcast on iTunes here; if you use Windows or Android, you can subscribe on Google Play here, or on Spotify here.

If you like the podcast and have suggestions for content, please leave a review and rating on iTunes and TuneIn. You can contact the host, Ankit Panda, here.

US Narratives Versus Reality on Taiwan

Zhehao Du

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As Sino-US relations deteriorate, the Taiwan question has become an increasingly dangerous flashpoint—one that some analysts believe could even spark a third world war. The dominant, US-led, Western narrative casts the “Fourth Taiwan Strait Crisis” as the product of mainland China’s expanding military power and alleged “authoritarian turn,” illustrated by its handling of Hong Kong and its purportedly coercive posture toward Taiwan. Within this frame, a mainland “invasion” is treated as the logical, almost inevitable outcome of Sino-US rivalry. Conversely, Taiwan is depicted as a lone democracy bravely resisting authoritarian menace, its own cross-Strait policy largely ignored; Taipei appears merely a passive target. Paradoxically, although Western discourse often presents Taiwan as an “independent state,” it simultaneously strips Taiwan of agency—even though Taipei’s policy choices decisively shape cross-Strait stability.

Before analysing the triangular dynamics among the United States, mainland China, and Taiwan, the historical character of the dispute must be clarified. Contrary to the prevailing US portrayal of a major power seeking to invade a small, independent neighbour, post-war instruments—the Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration and the Hirohito surrender broadcast—restored sovereignty over Taiwan to China. After Japan’s defeat, the Chinese Civil War resumed; the Kuomintang-led Republic of China retreated to Taiwan following its defeat by the Chinese Communist Party. Because no peace treaty has ever been signed, the two sides remain, de jure, in a state of civil war.

Regarding Taiwan’s legal status, both the Republic of China (Taiwan) and the People’s Republic of China constitutions claim sovereignty over the whole of China, encompassing both Taiwan and the mainland. The United Nations designates Taiwan as “a province of China,” and the 2016 South China Sea arbitral award referred to its administration as the “Taiwan Authority of China Taiwan Authority of China.” Globally, 180 states maintain diplomatic relations with the PRC: some accept the One-China Principle (explicitly recognising PRC sovereignty over Taiwan), while others, notably the United States, adopt a more ambiguous One-China Policy—acknowledging Beijing’s claim without formally recognising it and opposing formal Taiwanese independence.

As China targets Taiwan's undersea cables, some locals fear 'grey zone' warfare

Kathleen Calderwood, Xin-yun Wu, Fletcher Yeung and Jonah Khu on Penghu Island

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At the Port of Anping in Tainan, Taiwan's ancient capital, a large cargo ship named Hong Tai 58 sits decaying and riddled with rust.

Once ruled by a pirate warlord named Koxinga, who drove out Dutch colonists in the 1662 siege of Fort Zeelandia, Tainan is now where this crumbling vessel and its captain have been detained since February.

One of the ship's anchors is missing, likely left lying on the seabed about 10 kilometres west.

There, it's alleged the captain instructed his sailors to zigzag over the top of Taiwan-Penghu No. 3 communications cable, which connects the 100,000 residents of the outlying Penghu Islands to the rest of Taiwan and the world.

There are 24 of these vital arteries which connect Taiwan to the beating heart of the modern world — the internet — and China has been accused of sabotaging several, including two just this year.

Even though the Chinese Communist Party has never ruled Taiwan, Beijing has labelled what it calls "reunification" as essential to the full rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.

Chairman Xi Jinping has been increasingly strident in his statements, refusing to rule out the use of force to seize Taiwan.

In 2023, the severing of two cables connecting the Matsu Islands, which sit close to the Chinese coast, saw their 14,000 residents nearly completely disconnected from the internet for more than a month.

US prepares for long war with China that might hit its bases, homeland: Peter Apps

Peter Apps

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LONDON, May 16 (Reuters) - Earlier this month, U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Doug Wickert summoned nearby civic leaders to Edwards Air Force Base in California to warn them that if China attacks Taiwan in the coming years, they should be prepared for their immediate region to suffer potentially massive disruption from the very start.

In a remarkable briefing shared by the base on social media and promoted in a press release, Wickert - one of America's most experienced test pilots now commanding the 412th Test Wing - outlined China's rapid military growth and preparations to fight a major war.

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Cutting-edge U.S. aircraft manufactured in California’s nearby “Aerospace Valley”, particularly the B-21 “Raider” now replacing the 1990s B-2 stealth bomber, were key to keeping Beijing deterred, he said. However, if deterrence failed that meant China’s would likely strike the U.S. including nearby Northrop Grumman factories where those planes were built.

"If this war happens, it's going to happen here," Wickert told them, suggesting attacks could include a cyber offensive that included long-term disruption to power supplies and other national infrastructure. "It's going to come to us. That is why we are having this conversation... The more ready we are, the more likely to change Chairman Xi’s calculus."

Senior U.S. officials have repeatedly briefed that they believe Chinese President Xi Jinping has ordered his military to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, although they say no direct decision appears to have been made yet to order that attack.

As Washington and Beijing square up for that potential fight, their military preparations - now taking place on an industrial scale on both sides in a manner not seen in decades - are themselves becoming a form of posturing and messaging.

US prepares for long war with China that might hit its bases, homeland: Peter Apps

Peter Apps

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LONDON, May 16 (Reuters) - Earlier this month, U.S. Air Force Brigadier General Doug Wickert summoned nearby civic leaders to Edwards Air Force Base in California to warn them that if China attacks Taiwan in the coming years, they should be prepared for their immediate region to suffer potentially massive disruption from the very start.

In a remarkable briefing shared by the base on social media and promoted in a press release, Wickert - one of America's most experienced test pilots now commanding the 412th Test Wing - outlined China's rapid military growth and preparations to fight a major war.

The Reuters Tariff Watch newsletter is your daily guide to the latest global trade and tariff news. Sign up here.

Cutting-edge U.S. aircraft manufactured in California’s nearby “Aerospace Valley”, particularly the B-21 “Raider” now replacing the 1990s B-2 stealth bomber, were key to keeping Beijing deterred, he said. However, if deterrence failed that meant China’s would likely strike the U.S. including nearby Northrop Grumman factories where those planes were built.

"If this war happens, it's going to happen here," Wickert told them, suggesting attacks could include a cyber offensive that included long-term disruption to power supplies and other national infrastructure. "It's going to come to us. That is why we are having this conversation... The more ready we are, the more likely to change Chairman Xi’s calculus."

Senior U.S. officials have repeatedly briefed that they believe Chinese President Xi Jinping has ordered his military to be ready to invade Taiwan by 2027, although they say no direct decision appears to have been made yet to order that attack.

As Washington and Beijing square up for that potential fight, their military preparations - now taking place on an industrial scale on both sides in a manner not seen in decades - are themselves becoming a form of posturing and messaging.

Chinese officials deny they are working on a tight specific timeline. However, Beijing has become increasingly assertive in its sovereignty claims over the island where Nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek set up his government in exile after losing the Chinese Civil War in 1949.

The Beiping model: How China could absorb Taiwan without a war

Vincent So

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Much of the current discourse on Taiwan centres around one scenario: war. The prevailing imagery involves amphibious landings, missile strikes, and an Indo-Pacific showdown with global ramifications. Yet the most plausible outcome may be the one least discussed: China could secure Taiwan without firing a shot.

The goal is not to convince Taiwan that reunification is just. It is to persuade it that reunification is unavoidable.

Beijing may already be applying a template that resembles its 1949 takeover of what was then called Peiping (Beijing). Known as the Beiping model, it involved General Fu Zuoyi, commander of the city’s Nationalist forces, negotiating a peaceful surrender to avoid destruction. The Chinese Communist Party took the city intact, quickly cementing its political and symbolic victory. No battle was fought but the war was effectively lost.

This model is increasingly relevant to Taiwan today. It suggests that victory can be achieved not through kinetic escalation but through the slow erosion of political cohesion, economic independence, and societal confidence, all without triggering a Western military response. The signs are already visible.

Political pressure without military escalation

China’s use of grey-zone tactics against Taiwan is well documented. Airspace incursions, cyber attacks, disinformation campaigns, and economic coercion are routine. But their purpose is not purely to destabilise. It is to desensitise, normalise pressure, fragment decision-making, and encourage a sense of inevitability about unification.

What makes this strategy potent is its gradualism. It does not provoke a clear moment of retaliation. There is no single provocation to rally against. Instead, Beijing’s actions invite compromise, delay, and adaptation by Taiwanese elites and international observers. Over time, resistance is not crushed, it is absorbed.

The Trend Shift In China From ‘Exporting’ To ‘Re-Exporting’ – Analysis

Yang Xite

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According to a senior researcher at ANBOUND, China’s foreign trade is currently shifting from an ” export-oriented ” strategy to a ” re-export ” one. This change is driven by the pressure of high U.S. tariffs and the temporary 90-day tariff exemption the U.S. has granted to 75 other countries, before the U.S.-China trade talks in Geneva.

On May 9, China’s General Administration of Customs announced that in April, exports grew by 8.1% year-on-year, down from 12.4% in the previous month. Meanwhile, imports fell by 0.2%, compared to a 4.3% decline previously. The trade surplus stood at USD 96.18 billion, down from USD 102.64 billion. Additionally, China’s direct exports to the U.S. in April plunged 21% year-on-year, with their share dropping to a historic low of 10.5%. In contrast, exports through intermediary markets such as ASEAN and Latin America surged significantly. Notably, exports to ASEAN rose by 20.8% year-on-year to a record high of USD 60.4 billion, accounting for 19.1% of total exports. Re-exports to the U.S. via key hubs like Vietnam, Thailand, and Indonesia also soared. In terms of maritime shipping, as of the end of April, the number of container ships sailing directly from China to the U.S. had dropped by 33.8% compared to April 9, when reciprocal tariffs were implemented. At the same time, China’s overall exports remained relatively stable. Although both the deadweight tonnage of departing ships from the 20 major ports and the cargo throughput at key monitored ports initially declined after the tariffs took effect, they quickly rebounded, reaching levels higher than before the tariffs were implemented. These data points collectively indicate that Chinese enterprises have clearly engaged in short-term “re-export” activities to mitigate the impact of the tariffs.

Re-export trade is an important form of international trade and a key link in the operation of the global trade system. It plays a unique role in optimizing resource allocation and promoting the process of economic globalization. Re-export trade refers to a situation where the trade contract for goods is not directly signed between the producing country and the consuming country. Instead, it is signed separately by the producing country and the consuming country with a transit country, and the delivery is completed in the transit country. In other words, the trade process involves a “transit” in the transit country.

China’s 2025 National Security White Paper: ‘Holistic Security’ Amid Rising Global Tensions

Sanoop Sajan Koshy

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On May 12, China’s State Council Information Office released a white paper on “National Security in the New Era” – an extensive document that outlines China’s evolving security policy in a world the government characterizes as unstable and volatile. It’s not hard to understand why, given the heightened global uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific region, marked by changing power equations, technological competition, and ongoing flashpoints from the Taiwan Strait to the South China Sea.

The white paper presents the idea of a “holistic security” approach to national security that includes politics, economy, military, science and technology, and societal domains under the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Even though the document seeks to present China as a source of stability in the Asia-Pacific, the sections on sovereignty, ideological resilience, and systemic risk management raise important questions about the implications for regional trust, global governance, and domestic freedom.

The “holistic” approach to national security is a framework first articulated by Xi Jinping. It expands the traditional idea of security to cover nontraditional security threats emerging from cyberspace, artificial intelligence, biosecurity, public health, etc. This approach declares the “people’s security” as the final aim, in order to approve citizens’ sense of “fulfilment, happiness and security.” But it strongly prioritizes “political security as the fundamental task” – referring to upholding the CCP’s absolute leadership and the socialist system – and national interests as the guiding principle.

This emphasis on political security is accompanied by an appeal for China to modernize its legal and institutional structures. The white paper highlights the recent laws introduced, covering cybersecurity, data protection, counterterrorism, etc., as part of its efforts to build a strong security shield against “black swan” (unpredictable) and “grey rhino” (high-probability) risks that could disrupt China’s modernization. It also prioritizes technological self-reliance, calling for investment in key infrastructure and indigenous innovation to minimize exposure to foreign sanctions or supply chain disruption.