17 September 2025

Forget China or Russia: America Is the Stealth Fighter King

Reuben Johnson

Key Points and Summary – Many nations market new fighters as “stealth,” but most only manage radar signature instead of achieving true low observability.

-U.S. programs defined successive generations—from angled F-117 to blended F-35—and now aim beyond shaping with Boeing’s F-47/NGAD.

F-117 Nighthawk Stealth Fighter. Image taken on 7/19/2025 in Dayton, Ohio, USAF Museum.

-Core rules still apply: avoid concave reflectors, bury inlets, and control seams with extreme precision and materials.

-Claims that canard-equipped designs rival U.S. standards don’t survive physics; forward surfaces and sloppy joins raise RCS significantly.

-This piece explains what real stealth means, why “managed RCS” isn’t enough, and how NGAD points to the next era of survivability and air dominance.
Stealth: Truly Made in USA

WARSAW, POLAND – It has become a common practice among fighter aircraft designers and producers outside the United States to present new designs and claim them to be stealthy.

To some degree, according to US experts in this esoteric field of aerospace technology, they can describe what they have developed as “stealthy,” but most do not meet US standards in this regard.

Stealth is a term used very broadly in many instances and often inaccurately. The airplanes these other nations have designed are, in the words of those specialists who spoke to National Security Journal, “platforms where the signature or radar cross section (RCS) of the aircraft has been managed or mitigated. They may look like a stealthy aircraft, but in reality, they are far more visible on radar than we are led to believe.

A U.S.-China War over Taiwan: Who Wins?

Andrew Latham

Key Points and Summary – War in the Taiwan Strait wouldn’t yield a clean U.S. win. China’s missiles, submarines and proximity threaten carriers and forward bases.

-Taiwan is shifting to asymmetric defense—mobile missiles, hardened infrastructure, civil resilience—but the U.S. industrial base, munitions stocks and repair capacity lag.

-Likely phases: opening missile/cyber/space strikes; a brutal sea-denial fight against invasion convoys; possible blockades and urban combat if a beachhead forms, with nuclear risk overhead.

-The most plausible outcome is denial—China fails to conquer—but at staggering cost. To deter or prevail, Washington must surge production, harden bases, lock in allied access and prepare publics now.

A Taiwan War: Who Wins and At What Cost?

On any given day in the not-too-distant future, the Taiwan Strait could erupt in war. Missiles and aircraft could race across the Strait’s skies; warships and submarines could fight in its waters. And the world will ask: did America—and its friend Taiwan—have a fighting chance?

This question is not idle speculation. More than a year of stepped-up Chinese military exercises, an expanding Chinese submarine fleet, and accelerating defense reforms in Taiwan have given new urgency to the question.

The answer, uncomfortably, is that the United States can probably prevent a Chinese conquest of Taiwan. But it can do so only at far greater cost, risk, and uncertainty than most public debates suggest.
Preemptive Efforts

Deterrence is the best hope, but if deterrence fails, America will not “win” cleanly. Indeed, the most likely outcome is a bloody denial of Beijing’s objectives, one that depends on the industrial depth of the American and allied response and the strength of Taiwan’s asymmetric defenses.

Xi’s Grand Show Of Force Failed To Challenge The US – Analysis

Collins Chong Yew Keat

Chinese President Xi Jinping orchestrated a strategically and purposely intended display of power and diplomacy, from hosting the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit in Tianjin, to the biggest military parade in Beijing to showcase China’s coming of age to the world. Both events are well crafted to send a direct show of force to Trump, as a warning to Taiwan, and a subtle warning to other potential adversaries and regional powers that China’s power is unrivalled in the region, and is increasingly toppling the American power.

However, despite efforts to frame this new narrative and to consolidate synergy and strength with new allies in elevating this new world order with China firmly in the lead, deep historical wariness and suspicions and this fragile alliance of convenience will not hold, and the entrenched and proven global order led by the US for more than eight decades will continue to endure.

The SCO summit, the largest ever, with Xi being true to expectations in rallying powers to “oppose hegemonism” and reject Cold War bloc politics, in a clear rebuke of Trump and the US.

The biggest military parade marking the 80th anniversary of Japan’s WWII surrender, is being crafted to showcase the latest state of the art military hardware and assets from hypersonic missiles to laser weapons and unmanned submarines, all being intended as a stark warning to all including Washington and Taipei.

Deterrence Signals to Taiwan and Trump

The carefully crafted optic is meant to show Xi has powerful friends in his camp, reinforcing China’s claim to great-power leadership. The inclusion of Indonesia and Malaysia as summit guests was also a deliberate move, signaling Beijing’s intent to broaden its influence beyond its core Eurasian partners.

In Xi’s strategic vision, events like the SCO summit and Victory Day parade were more than just commemorations, they were meant to be platforms to consolidate a China-led coalition on the world stage.

The limits of Xi and Putin’s ‘no-limits’ partnership

Ruby Osman and Dan Sleat

Much has changed since Chinese President Xi Jinping (ç¿’è¿‘å¹³) and Russian President Vladimir Putin last stood together atop Tiananmen Square in 2015. When they did so again this week, it was supposedly as equal partners. Of course, the reality is far more complex.

The conventional wisdom is that China has cemented its position as the dominant partner, especially since Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. After all, it is now Russia’s biggest trading partner, accounting for more than half of Russian imports in 2023, whereas Russia does not even make China’s top five. While Russia relies on China to buy roughly half of its crude oil exports, these purchases account for only 17.5 percent of China’s total oil imports. Simply put, Russia needs China to keep its own economy going.

Yet for all this dependence, China is not dictating outcomes, and the Kremlin is not acting like a junior partner. Consider the war in Ukraine. While it has some significant upsides for China — not least by diverting US resources from the Pacific theater — there is no doubt that Putin is calling the shots on the timing, scope and endgame.

On paper, China might have the leverage to influence Russia’s policy, but it is hard to imagine a scenario in which Ukraine could compel China to use it. Doing so would not only jeopardize China’s relations with a key partner, but also contravene its own core foreign-policy principle of “non-interference.” Putin knows that better than anyone.

Although China has consistently pitched itself as a “peacemaker,” that role has been filled by other countries, including Turkey and Saudi Arabia; and now, US President Donald Trump and Putin have proved capable of engaging each other without a broker.

The limits of Chinese influence are even more striking around its own borders, where Russia’s deepening partnership with North Korea is raising alarms. China might welcome Russian meddling in Europe, but potentially destabilizing the Korean Peninsula is quite another matter.

China and Russia Are Winning the Hypersonic Missile Race

Sam Skove

At China’s massive military parade this month celebrating the end of World War II in the Pacific, Beijing showcased its line of anti-ship hypersonic missiles—an implicit warning that in a future conflict, the United States could see its $13 billion aircraft carriers at the bottom of the sea.

China is not the only U.S. adversary investing in the weapons. Russia has also made strides in fielding hypersonic missiles, whose high speeds and maneuverability make them the ideal weapon for destroying high-value targets.

The Greatest Danger in the Taiwan Strait

Joel Wuthnow

Tension across the Taiwan Strait has raised fears that Beijing and Taipei could soon find themselves at war. Most observers imagine two possible avenues that could lead to conflict. In a so-called war of choice, Beijing could try to capture Taiwan by force after careful consideration of the economic, military, and political risks. Such an aggressive action without explicit provocation would reflect Chinese leaders’ judgment that the island could be taken at minimal cost. Alternately, Beijing might launch a so-called war of necessity if it felt that Taiwan had crossed a political redline that permanently threatened China’s control

Michaela Dodge, Russia Is at War with the West, No. 636, September 11, 2025

Dr. Michaela Dodge

If the victim does not understand the game, the loss of a pawn here or a knight there does not worry him. If his thoughts are elsewhere, he does not see the traps set for him by his opponent. If his will to win in insufficient, his strength is gradually eroded until, when the tide of combat goes clearly against him, he discovers too late that the price of defeat is intolerably high.[1]

The term “hybrid warfare,” defined as a set of activities below the level of armed conflict, is not useful to describe Russia’s activities against the West. In fact, the term masks the severity of Moscow’s actual actions and distracts the West from pursuing the kind of retaliatory measures that would lead Russia to pull back from its campaign against targets in North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) states. By evoking the term “hybrid warfare”[2] (or its close euphemisms like “gray zone conflict,” “shadow war,” or activities “below the level of armed conflict”) rather than acknowledging that Russia is, by its own account, at war with the West, gives the impression that the situation is less serious than it actually is.

Russia’s activities are an element of its comprehensive warfare against the West. Russia’s goals include restoring its former sphere of influence in former Warsaw Pact countries that are now NATO members, undermining the legitimacy of the democratic process, and sowing disputes within NATO.[3] So far, NATO countries have lacked the political will to impose costs that would dissuade Russia to stop its destructive activities that extend well beyond simply the information sphere. Countering Russia’s activities demands a comprehensive response beyond the West’s contemporary defensive measures.[4]

Russia’s Aggression in Europe

Russia’s list of aggressive actions against targets in Europe is long and its campaign is “intensifying” according to NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte.[5] The number of Russia’s attacks quadrupled between 2022 and 2023, and tripled between 2023 and 2024.[6] Russia has conducted over 150 operations on NATO territory since the start of its full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[7] Russia’s activities range from assassinations and murder attempts, attacks against NATO’s infrastructure, to acts of vandalism through people recruited by Russian handlers via social media.[8] Russia is becoming bolder, with its drones violating Polish airspace in September 2025.[9] Poland in cooperation with NATO allies shot several down of these drones.[10] The more immediate goal of the campaign is to weaken Europe’s support for Ukraine and to disrupt supply chains through which aid for Ukraine flows.[11] Russia also wants to weaken NATO and undermine the political consensus within the Alliance.

Incompetent technocracy: The EU miscalculated on Google


The European Commission has not had the best year. It started off with the man they all hoped would go away, Donald Trump, returning to the American presidency. They then became entangled in a massive debate over how many regulations to cut – regulations they had only just put into effect a few years ago. Then, Trump launched a trade war that ultimately forced them to agree to a humiliating, one-sided trade deal which keeps America’s tariffs and will see all the EU’s tariffs ended.

This likely explains the Commission’s announcement last week of a nearly €3 billion fine against Google for abusive practices. Specifically, the European Union found that the company was giving unfair advantage to its own advertising placement services (advertising is extremely lucrative for the platform) and made clear that the only way to avoid the fine would be for Google to sell off its advertising services.

How the Commission reached the fine total (specifically €2.95 billion) is hazy: The guidelines purport to lay out a specific formula, but in reality allow them to levy whatever they feel like, leaving the exact process unknown.

What is not unknown, however, is the response from the American government. Google is an American company, after all, and the American president – Europe’s favourite – was rather upset. President Trump wrote that the fine was “taking money that would otherwise go to American investments and jobs,” adding that it was “very unfair” and that he would “not allow these discriminatory actions to stand.” Trump also wrote that he was considering responding with a Section 301 action, which allows the executive branch to effectively charge Europe for what it deems are unfair practices. It also allows the president to terminate any trade agreements, which could include the recent US-EU trade agreement.

All of this, on the surface, sounds great for Europe. After all, the agreement is extremely unpopular: One survey found that around six out of ten EU citizens are “favourable” to the idea of Commission President Ursula von der Leyen resigning over the deal and slightly over half feel “humiliated” by it. One would think that this Google penalty would be the way out for the Commission: T”hey could let Trump rip up the deal, sound like they are taking a stand against America, throw their international weight around, and show the world that their tangled mass of laws actually have some meaning.

Marine Corps reaches deal with Palantir for Maven Smart System

Jon Harper

The Marine Corps is acquiring a new enterprise license from Palantir Technologies as it looks to proliferate the company’s AI-powered Maven Smart System capability throughout the force, the service announced Wednesday.

The contract was finalized Aug. 15 in partnership with the Pentagon’s Chief Digital and AI Office, the Silicon Valley-headquartered Defense Innovation Unit, and the Army Research Lab, according to a press release.

The announcement did not disclose the dollar value of the contract, and the Marine Corps has not yet provided that information.

Last year, the Defense Department inked a $480 million, five-year IDIQ contract with Palantir for the MSS technology. A few months ago, DOD revealed its decision to increase that contract ceiling to nearly $1.3 billion through 2029, to meet the “growing demand” for the tool.

The Marine Corps’ latest pursuit of these types of capabilities comes as the U.S. military is pursuing a warfighting construct known as Combined Joint-All Domain Command and Control, or CJADC2, with the aim of better connecting its sensors, shooters and data flows through a unified network.

“MSS is a mission command application (MCA) and data integration platform that aggregates data across Service and Joint C2 technology stacks to share a live, synchronized view of the battlespace,” officials wrote in Wednesday’s press release. “This enables rapid sensor-to-shooter engagements through a fully digital workflow, leveraging automation and AI-driven tools for advanced target management.”

Under the new deal, Fleet Marine Force units will have expanded access to Maven Smart System licensing down to the tactical level within each major subordinate command, and the supporting establishment will also use it to “support training, integration testing, and reach-back support,” per the release.

In a statement, Commandant Gen. Eric Smith said the MSS capability will enhance intelligence, targeting and decision-making for joint fires integration and maritime domain awareness.

Trump’s Hyundai Raid Drains U.S. Battery Brains

Christina Lu

For all of its efforts to drive a domestic manufacturing boom in key industries, the United States remains heavily reliant on Asian expertise to build batteries, the powerful technologies that underpin drones, electric vehicles, and much more.

It’s a reality that was laid bare last week when U.S. immigration officials raided an EV battery plant construction site in Georgia and detained around 475 workers, most of whom were South Korean nationals. The plant is co-owned by Hyundai, a South Korean carmaker. U.S. authorities said the raid was the biggest single-site enforcement operation in the Department of Homeland Security’s history.

How 33-hour manhunt ended with Charlie Kirk suspect in custody

Jude Sheerin

The breaking news was announced by US President Donald Trump on a morning television show.

"I think with a high degree of certainty, we have him," said Trump on the sofa of Fox & Friends on Friday in New York City. "In custody."

"Essentially, someone that was very close to him turned him in."

It was Trump, too, who first announced that his political ally, Charlie Kirk, had died after he was shot in the neck while hosting an outdoor event attended by about 3,000 people at Utah Valley University (UVU) on Wednesday.

At a news conference on Friday morning, officials identified the person in custody as 22-year-old Tyler Robinson and said he'd been arrested on Thursday night, some 33 hours after the shooting.Obituary: Charlie Kirk

"We got him," Utah Governor Spencer Cox told reporters. Robinson, a Utah native and electrical apprentice who had been living with his parents "for a long time" according to authorities, will be formally charged on Tuesday.

The suspect lives in St George, Utah, near Zion National Park, about 250 miles (400km) south-west of the campus where Kirk was shot, BBC Verify has found.

He is the oldest of three brothers, and his family is of Mormon faith and active in the church.

According to the BBC's US partner CBS, two law enforcement sources said Robinson's father had recognised his son from images circulated by the FBI.

The sources added that the 22-year-old had confessed to his father, who urged him to turn himself in.

Russia Is Losing the War—Just Not to Ukraine

Jeremy Shapiro

Vladimir Putin, we’ve been told since the start of the war in Ukraine, has goals that extend well beyond territory: He seeks to upend the post–Cold War international order, to reconstruct the Soviet sphere of influence, and to allow Russia to reassume its rightful position as a world power equal to the United States. Bilateral summits, such as the recent one between Donald Trump and Putin in Anchorage, offer a symbolic recognition of that aspiration—as Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov highlighted not so subtly by showing up in Alaska wearing a CCCP (U.S.S.R.) sweatshirt.

But summits and sweatshirts won’t make Russia a superpower. Only a credible show of strength can do that. The war in Ukraine was meant to supply this, but it has instead become a slow-motion demonstration of Russia’s decline—less a catalyst of national revival than a case study in national self-harm.

Moscow has devoted considerable resources, manpower, and political will to its invasion of the country next door. In purely military terms, it has managed not to lose and may even be eking its way toward some sort of attritional victory in the Donbas. But even if it consolidates its territorial gains and keeps Ukraine out of NATO, Russia will have won only a Pyrrhic victory, mortgaging its future for the sake of a few bombed-out square kilometers. In other words, Russia is effectively losing the war in Ukraine—not to Ukraine, but to everyone else.

In virtually any likely end-of-war scenario, Ukraine will remain a hostile, Western-armed neighbor—a permanent sucking wound on Russia’s western flank. Europe will continue to embargo Russian goods and build its energy future without Russia’s Gazprom. The Russian army, having shown itself moderately adaptable to modern warfare, will nonetheless be gutted of equipment, bereft of its best cadres, and reliant on foreign suppliers. To reconstitute it will take years and many billions of dollars. By then, Russia’s supposed mastery of modern drone warfare will probably be obsolete.

While Russia obsesses over Ukraine, its erstwhile friends and clients are quietly slipping away. In Africa, Wagner’s heirs struggle to hold their franchises together, and China and the Gulf states are buying up influence, drawing from far deeper pockets. In the Middle East, Moscow’s old claim to be an indispensable broker appears totally vacuous.

Russian Troops in Ukraine Selling Guns, Harming Unit Effectiveness, and Boosting Crime

Paul Goble

Since Russian President Vladimir Putin began his full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, some Russian troops sent there have been taking their weapons home, undermining unit effectiveness and boosting the amount of violent crime in Russia.

This trend has been exacerbated by the presence of a large number of criminals in the Russian forces as a result of Putin’s massive recruitment of men in prison to fight in Ukraine, and an effort by Russian troops to maintain the high incomes that Putin’s bonus system had allowed.

Today, Russian officials are alarmed because some soldiers appear to be taking weapons without much difficulty, an indication of problems in the military itself and a harbinger of more crime and potentially more political problems at home.

Ever since Russian President Vladimir Putin’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, some Russian troops have been stealing weapons from the Russian military in Ukraine and taking them back to the Russian Federation when released from service. This threatens unit cohesion and effectiveness in Ukraine and boosts the amount of violent crime at home (see EDM, November 29, 2022, February 25). The difficulties of recovering the weapons of demobilized soldiers have been a problem for many armies during or immediately after a conflict. This phenomenon is especially serious in the Russian case because many of the men now fighting for Moscow in Ukraine have criminal backgrounds and are serving there only because Putin has released them from prison if they agreed to serve in Ukraine (Window on Eurasia, June 28, 2024, August 21).

This reflects a deeper problem for Russian society. Russians are paid vast bonuses to join the war effort, and many veterans turn to a life of crime because there is a lack of well-paid work that would allow them to maintain the new lifestyles the sign-up bonuses provide (Window on Eurasia, May 16, June 6). Their readiness to turn to crime, therefore, is an effort to boost their incomes. The upsurge of crime has unsurprisingly alarmed ordinary citizens and Russian officials, and increased hostility toward veterans. Moscow has thus been compelled to take additional steps to curb the criminal behavior (Window on Eurasia, March 29, April 15, July 18, August 6; The Moscow Times, September 9).

Russian Drones Allegedly Swarm Poland in Major Provocation...But Whose?


Last Sunday Russia launched a large-scale drone attack that was again described as the “largest ever” with some sources counting 805 total drones and decoys launched:

It was followed up on Tuesday with another large attack of over 400+ drones and 50+ various missiles. This strike stood out as a significant number of these drones reportedly flew to Poland, and quite deep into the interior of the country at that, which has never happened before.

As always there were two versions of the story, the “topside” propagandized one where Polish and NATO officials tried their best to carve out an angle of deliberate Russian ‘aggression’, not letting the incident go to waste. And then there was the ‘behind-the-scenes’ version, which painted the incident as much more ‘controlled’ than it seemed, where diplomatic channels calmly coordinated the response.

More specifically, Belarus was said to have warned Poland that wayward drones—which were being affected by Ukrainian EW—were headed their way, with reports even claiming some rogue drones had to be shot down over Belarusian territory as well.

The Chief of the General Staff of the Polish Armed Forces, General Wiesław Kukuła, announced that the Belarusian side warned Poland about drones approaching its territory.

In an interview on TVN24, he noted that such an attitude was surprising in the context of the tense situation at the land border. At the same time, he emphasized that the Polish side decided to make use of the provided information and did not abandon cooperation.

This is a good sign. Let us recall that in a conversation with Patrycjusz Wyżga on the program "Didaskalia," Colonel Piotr Krawczyk, former head of the Intelligence Agency (2016-2022), clearly stated that the West’s policy, including Poland’s, toward Belarus should be based on pragmatism to avoid pushing the country into Russia’s hands.

Netanyahu's bet fails The consequences of Israel's attack in Qatar

Lawrence Freedman

Yesterday’s strike by Israel was intended to kill off not only what was left of Hamas’s top leadership as they met in Qatar, but also the peace plan that they were discussing. It failed in the first objective. Did it also fail in the second? The natural assumption is that it is hard to complete even a mediated negotiation with people you have just tried to blow up. But the manner of the attack and its failure to achieve its primary aim changed the power dynamics behind the negotiations. This is especially the case because of the annoyance it caused Donald Trump.

Targeted assassinations have long played a prominent role in Israeli strategy against those organisations committed to its destruction. The value of such an approach is debated less than it should be. In practice these organisations rarely stay decapitated for long and it is not always the case that the successors are less competent or ruthless than those killed. In the case of the pursuit of those responsible for the attacks of 7 October 2023 there is clearly an element of retribution, but that leaves open the question of whether the elimination of particualr individuals makes it harder or easier to deal with Hamas militarily or politically.

At any rate Israel has worked hard on this element of its strategy and has achieved many successes. It has murdered over the years leaders of Hezbollah and of Hamas, as well as Iranian military commanders and nuclear scientists. On 30 August Ahmed al-Rahawi, the prime minister of the Houthi-controlled government in the Yemeni capital, Sanaa, was killed in an Israeli strike along with several ministers. In mounting these strikes, Israel has shown ingenuity in gathering intelligence on the movements and location of its targets. When it has decided to strike it has done so with impunity. The United States, which is the only country with any leverage, has not appeared too bothered by this practice. It has not been averse to targeted assassinations of its own.

The remaining top leadership of Hamas was targeted yesterday. Some in the firing line owed their positions to past assassinations. The most important figure present, Khalil al-Hayya, is the leader of Hamas’s Gaza units. He replaced Yahya Sinwa, the architect of the 7/10 attacks, in 2024. While he survived this attack, his son, chief of staff, and bodyguards were killed, along with one Qatari soldier. Also present was Zaher Jabarin, leader in the West Bank, who had replaced Saleh al-Arouri who had been assassinated in Beirut, also in 2024. Jabarin seems to spend much of his time in Turkey, from where he may have travelled to Qatar for this meeting.

The Widespread Fallout of Israel’s Qatar Strikes

Amr Hamzawy, Andrew Leber, Marwan Muasher, and Sarah Yerkes

The Middle East Program in Washington combines in-depth regional knowledge with incisive comparative analysis to provide deeply informed recommendations. With expertise in the Gulf, North Africa, Iran, and Israel/Palestine, we examine crosscutting themes of political, economic, and social change in both English and Arabic.Learn More

Below, four Carnegie scholars react to Israel’s strikes on Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, and the repercussions for specific countries and the region.

The Gulf States’ Limited Options

Israel’s air strike in Doha on Tuesday was a wakeup call for the Gulf states: There are few limits on Israel’s ability and willingness to use military force in the region.

Qatar’s Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al Thani immediately received an outpouring of support from other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) leaders—not only the usual phone calls of support but high-level visits from leaders such as the UAE’s President Mohammad bin Zayed (with more to follow).

Beyond the ever-harsher rhetoric of official statements, however, it is unclear what meaningful steps the Gulf states can or will take to respond.

Kuwaiti political scientist Bader Al-Saif urged Gulf leaders to use the “tools at their disposal”—chiefly diplomatic and financial pressure—to deter Israel, while Qatar’s prime minister called for a “collective response . . . from the region.” Yet with prominent Gulf commentators already noting that “there is no longer a force capable of threatening Israel,” Tuesday’s attack underscores the GCC states’ seemingly inability to dissuade or deter Israel from further aggression—even on these states’ own soil.

During the decade-and-a-half when Iran dominated Gulf security concerns, leaders in Riyadh and Abu Dhabi could variously lean on the United States to take action against Iran (and affiliated groups) or defuse tensions with Tehran in pursuit of shared economic and security gains.

Neither option exists with respect to Israel.

Report: Pentagon unprepared to defend against emerging drone warfare

Vaughn Cockayne 

A version of this story appeared in the daily Threat Status newsletter from The Washington Times. Click here to receive Threat Status delivered directly to your inbox each weekday.

U.S. forces are vulnerable to drone swarms due to insufficient scale and urgency in efforts to meet the demand for affordable, precise drone and counter-drone systems, a new report says.

Researchers at the Center for a New American Security acknowledged the Department of Defense’s efforts to improve drone capabilities over the last decade, but said it has not been enough. While the Pentagon has invested in drone and counter-drone systems, a lack of urgency has let U.S. rivals take the lead, they said Wednesday in a report.

China has far outpaced the U.S. in development and production, the report says. Without rapid development and production, U.S. forces are at risk of being overwhelmed in a potential conflict with China.

“Without deep magazines of substantially enhanced counter-drone capabilities, the United States risks having its distributed warfighting strategies overwhelmed by massed Chinese drone attacks, and the United States could lose a war over Taiwan,” the report reads.

In a battle over Taiwan, U.S. forces would need to counter an increasingly drone-reliant China, the report says. The People’s Liberation Army has long considered drones to be an integral part of its military apparatus and has launched significant investment programs to improve their effectiveness. In 2024, China ordered 1 million kamikaze drones to be manufactured by 2026 and has continued to invest in research and development.

The report provides numerous recommendations to the Pentagon, emphasizing investments in new and emerging technologies while enhancing training and integration. Specifically, the report advocates for increased counter-drone training across all armed forces, ensuring that all troops can defend themselves against the emerging threat.

Researchers said disaster can strike for lack of that proper training.

Terminators: AI-driven robot war machines on the march

Steven J. Vaughan-Nichols

Opinion I've read military science fiction since I was a kid. Besides the likes of Robert A. Heinlein's Starship Troopers, Joe Haldeman's The Forever War, and David Drake's Hammer's Slammers books, where people held the lead roles, I read novels such as Keith Laumer's Bolo series and Fred Saberhagen's Berserker space opera sf series, where machines are the protagonists and enemies. Even if you've never read war science fiction, you certainly at least know about Terminators. But what was once science fiction is now reality on the Ukrainian battlefields. It won't stop there.

You see, war always accelerates technology's advances. After Russia invaded Ukraine, Ukraine first took drone technology from expensive gear to cheaply made drones that are literally made from cardboard. As the battles continued, both Russia and Ukraine have countered each other's drones by interfering with GPS and jamming the wireless bandwidth used to control the drones.

As a result, both sides have taken to using fiber optic drones, which are unjammable. They're not perfect. You can follow the fiber optic cable back to their controllers, their range is limited to about 20 kilometers, and they are being countered by nets being put up around roads and important sites.

So Ukraine has been working hard on the next logical step of drone warfare: AI-driven drones. It is far from the first. If you try to cross the Korean Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), you might be stopped by a South Korean SGR-A1 sentry robot, which is armed with a K-3 machine gun and 40mm automatic grenade launcher. These static robots have been deployed since 2010.

Israel has also been pushing forward with a variety of AI-driven war machines such as the Harpy and Harop, loitering munitions; and the six-wheeled RoBattle. The US has also been retrofitting its MQ-9 Reaper and XQ-58 Valkyrie drones with AI, while the experimental Longshot comes with AI built-in. And, sorry Top Gun fans, but Maverick won't be able to beat VENOM AI-equipped F16s fighter planes when they're finally deployed.

BAE, Lockheed Martin plan large jammer drone as door opener in combat

Rudy Ruitenberg

LONDON — BAE Systems and Lockheed Martin are teaming up to develop a family of uncrewed autonomous air systems, with an initial focus on electronic warfare, the companies said at the DSEI UK defense show here on Tuesday.

Details remained scant as the companies announced their collaboration. The system will be in the 1-tonne range and able to carry different payloads, according to Dave Holmes, the managing director of BAE Systems’ FalconWorks division.

The goal is a cost-effective vehicle that’s easy to modify as well as easy to deploy, be that air dropped or launched from ground or maritime platforms, said OJ Sanchez, the general manager of Lockheed Martin Skunk Works.

The design will include “modularity and adaptability,” according to the partners, who cited a need to quickly develop and field affordable combat mass.

Drone and missile makers are increasingly touting systems that can be tinkered with to keep them relevant, as well as cheaper and faster to produce.


Pan-European missile maker MBDA presented a one-way effector with 800 kilometer range at the show on Tuesday that can be built using different off-the-shelf components and armed with various warhead types.

BAE and Lockheed Martin will disclose specific applications for the system as those are being developed, with cost “an important variable” for the design team, Sanchez said.

The system is not considered a missile and will be designed to return, while still being of “an attritable nature,” according to Holmes. The return mechanism would be something other than landing gear, possibly a parachute, the executive said.

As Drones Swarm Battlefields, Militaries Seek Cheaper Defense

Bloomberg

(Bloomberg) -- The proliferation of uncrewed systems in the Ukraine-Russia war has highlighted the importance of drone defense capabilities. But the dilemma militaries around the world face is that the attack weapons tend to be far cheaper than the response to destroy them.

Drone costs can range from just a few hundred to several thousand dollars, and their price tag is rapidly depreciating as innovation and mass production pick up. That’s a fraction of the outlays for most air defense missiles, which at the high end command price tags of tens of millions for a single shot.

Efforts to solve that conundrum were on display this week at the DSEI defense expo in London, where the halls were packed with lasers, missiles, jammers and even other drones designed to defeat small, uncrewed threats. What they all had in common was an attempt to bring down the “cost per kill.”

Drones — or uncrewed systems, as the larger versions are often called — have come to the forefront of warfare since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in early 2022. As the conflict chews through more conventional battlefield tools like artillery, both sides of the conflict have leaned heavily on drones for surveillance, defense and attack missions.

“In Ukraine, it’s really scaled drone-on-drone warfare,” said Jan-Hendrik Boelens, CEO of anti-drone company Alpine Eagle GmbH. “And our interceptor is essentially a small drone, so it has the price tag of a small drone.”

Electronic warfare, including jamming and spoofing that confuse drones’ controls systems, is another defensive method. Dozens of companies at DSEI promoted such technology, which has the benefit that it can potentially intercept multiple drones at once.

“It would then essentially wipe out the electronics in the entire swarm, and they fall to the ground,” Mike Sewart, the chief technology officer for Thales SA’s UK subsidiary. “Rather than a point-and-shoot model where you are literally targeting those drones one by one.”

16 September 2025

Art and Culture with Devdutt Pattanaik | How Afghan and Turkic invaders transformed Indian warfare

Devdutt Pattanaik

We know that from the 10th century, horse‑breeding groups from Afghanistan and Central Asia invaded India in successive waves. The early invaders simply looted the gold‑rich temples of the land. The later invaders, after the 12th century, established Sultanates to exploit India’s vast agricultural wealth and to control trade routes.

Religious aspects of these invasions often receive enough attention – how temples were replaced by mosques, minarets, tombs, palaces and forts. But this communal narrative usually overlooks technological transformation. Few discuss the new technologies that arrived with these invaders—technologies that Indians initially looked down upon.

It is known that Rajput warriors of India preferred death to dishonour and even glorified defeat – so long as they did not turn their backs on the battlefield. Their values were shakti (strength) and bhakti (passion, devotion). Yukti, or strategy, was looked down upon..
Military strategies of Afghans and Turks

By contrast, the Afghans and Central Asians who entered India brought new military strategies that helped them win wars – strategies they used to survive on the Central Asian steppes and mountainous terrain, closely related to their horse‑breeding practices.

The Afghans and Turks knew the Parthian shot, an ancient steppe‑developed technique in which a mounted archer, while riding away, would twist his body to shoot backwards—feigning retreat, then ambushing enemies who presumed victory. This was seen as cowardice and trickery by Rajputs but as a brilliant war manoeuvre by Central Asian tribes.

It is not that the Rajputs did not know archery. The Prithviraj Raso speaks of how the Rajput king can shoot targets even when blind because he knows the art of locating a target by simply hearing the sound (shabd-bhedi baan). In Hindu mythology, though, kings who could shoot such arrows without looking at the target were seen as overconfident, who suffered for their pride.

Rafale Jet & Pakistan’s “Great Firewall”! How French Firm Is Quietly Helping Pak To Monitor, Censor & Intimidate Its Citizens

Shubhangi Palve

When people hear the name Thales, they usually think of fighter jets, radar, and electronic warfare. The French defense giant is best known for providing the electronics backbone of the Rafale, a fighter jet that has become a symbol of France’s aerospace industry.

But a new investigation by Amnesty International shows that Thales is also quietly connected to something far less celebrated – Pakistan’s notorious digital firewall.

According to Amnesty’s report “Shadows of Control,” Pakistan’s mass surveillance programs are not homegrown. They rely on a hidden supply chain that stretches across Germany, France, the UAE, China, Canada, and the United States.

The year-long investigation was conducted with Paper Trail Media, DER STANDARD, Follow the Money, The Globe and Mail, Justice For Myanmar, InterSecLab, and the Tor Project.

Together, they tracked how Pakistani authorities obtained advanced technology through a hidden supply chain of surveillance and censorship tools.

At the heart of this system sit two programs: the Web Monitoring System (WMS) and the Lawful Intercept Management System (LIMS). Together, they form the backbone of Pakistan’s internet surveillance architecture.

Building Pakistan’s Firewall

Pakistan’s national firewall, known as the Web Monitoring System (WMS), has gone through several iterations. The first version, set up in 2018, was built on technology from the Canadian company Sandvine, now operating as AppLogic Networks.

For a few years, Sandvine provided the backbone of the system. Trade records even show that as early as 2017, the company had shipped equipment to at least three Pakistani firms with government ties: Inbox Technologies, SN Skies Pvt Ltd, and A Hamson Inc. But when Sandvine pulled out in 2023, Pakistan quickly looked elsewhere.

India's IT sector nervous as US proposes outsourcing tax

Haripriya Suresh and Urvi Manoj Dugar

BENGALURU, Sept 11 (Reuters) - India's massive IT sector faces a lengthy period of uncertainty with customers delaying or re-negotiating contracts while the U.S. debates a proposed 25% tax on American firms using foreign outsourcing services, analysts and lawyers said.
The sector is likely to be on the receiving end of a bill which, though unlikely to pass in its nascent form, will initiate a gradual shift in how big-name firms in the world's largest outsourcing market buy IT services, they said.

Still, with U.S. firms having to pay the tax, those heavily reliant on overseas IT services are likely to push back, setting the stage for extensive lobbying and legal battles, analysts and lawyers said.

India's $283 billion information technology sector has thrived for more than three decades exporting software services, with prominent clients including Apple (AAPL.O), opens new tab, American Express (AXP.N), opens new tab, Cisco (CSCO.O), opens new tab, Citigroup (C.N), opens new tab, FedEx (FDX.N), opens new tab and Home Depot (HD.N), opens new tab. It has grown to make up over 7% of GDP.

However, it has also drawn criticism in customer countries over job loss to lower-cost workers in India.

Last week, U.S. Republican Senator Bernie Moreno introduced the HIRE Act, opens new tab which proposes taxing companies that hire foreign workers over Americans, with the tax revenue used for U.S. workforce development. The bill also seeks to bar firms from claiming outsourcing payments as tax-deductible expenses.

How Pakistan has become opium capital of the world with Afghan expertise

Sushim Mukul

Kabul's opium throne has shifted east. The Taliban's 2022 ban on poppy farming in Afghanistan has driven cultivation across the border, with neighbouring Pakistan overtaking it as the world's new opium hub. Satellite imagery has revealed sprawling poppy fields in the volatile province of Balochistan, which is home to several armed militant groups like the Islamic State, reported The Telegraph of the UK. This is likely to be a concern for New Delhi, not only because the heroin from it could reach India, but because the narco-money could be used to fund terrorism against it.

This shift could funnel millions into the hands of terrorists and militants, destabilise the region further and is capable of "reshaping security dynamics across the region", said The Telegraph.

The unrestrained poppy cultivation in Pakistan has surged past the historic highs of Afghanistan, which once produced more than 80% of the world's opium. It's through Afghan farmers' expertise, desert irrigation, and their role as share-croppers that Pakistan, which was declared "poppy-free" in 2001, is turning into the world's primary opium hub.

Poppy isn't used just for opium but for semisynthetic narcotics like heroin, which is wrecking havoc across the world.

Reacting to what he called the "bad news from Pakistan", American diplomat and foreign policy expert Zalmay Khalilzad said, "If true, there are many risks: financing terror and violent groups; increased criminalisation of the economy and politics, and increased narcotics addiction of the population".

"It is also a threat to the neighbours and beyond. Does Pakistan have a plan to deal with this menace?," Khalilzad, who was the US special representative for Afghanistan reconciliation (2018-2021).

The flower of the poppy plant is the source of opium. It is the source behind other deadly drugs like morphine, codeine, heroin, and oxycodone, according to the US DEA.

Gen Z Seeks A Larger Role in Nepal's Politics

Sonal Nain

The morning sun barely pierced the haze over Maitighar Mandala, yet the atmosphere was electric.

Tens of thousands of young people had gathered, banners in hand, voices rising in unison. Bikash Singh, a legal expert and observer on the scene, recalls the overwhelming sight: "By late morning, the crowd had swelled into tens of thousands chanting, waving placards and marching toward The Everest Hotel in New Baneshwor. The mood was hopeful, almost celebratory, as if we were witnessing a new chapter of accountability and freedom unfolding."

The procession carried a clear message: an end to entrenched corruption, bureaucratic red tape and political nepotism. Social media had become their meeting place, a space where young voices came together and coordinated their actions—even as the government banned 26 platforms, including Facebook, WhatsApp, Messenger and Instagram, citing registration and data rules.

The ban fueled the frustration that was already simmering among the youth. Blocking these platforms, Singh, 28, argued, violated their fundamental right to information and freedom of expression and turned an already tense situation into something far worse.

Nepal has spent the last ten years under the leadership of KP Sharma Oli, Sher Bahadur Deuba and Pushpa Kamal Dahal, who have cycled through the prime minister's office. The protests may have been triggered by social media restrictions, but the people of Nepal were already deeply aggrieved with the government.

The protests, primarily organized by Gen Z through loosely connected youth groups like Hami Nepal, were united in purpose: transparency, opportunity and accountability. Ashvina Basnet, 32, a Nepali social worker and women's rights advocate, explained the roots of the movement: "This is a mass revolution. The youth are showing that change is possible." The "Nepo" campaign, highlighting the undue privileges of politicians' children, struck a particular chord with young people frustrated by systemic inequality.

Semantics as Strategy: Interpreting China’s Official Discourse on South Asia

Shruti Jargad & Constantino Xavier

China’s engagement with South Asia has grown significantly over the past decade, particularly under its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). While research on the material aspects of China’s engagements in the region has expanded, including by measuring its growing economic capabilities and security footprint, the discursive and ideational aspects remain understudied. As China’s role in the region becomes more complex, this limited knowledge of Chinese semantics could lead to practical consequences, such as the loss of valuable signals and consequent policy misjudgements about China’s goals and intentions in the region.

This paper uses discourse analysis to examine and interpret hundreds of mostly Chinese-language texts. These include official speeches, interviews, and signed articles by the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) leadership between 2013 and 2023. To explain Chinese narratives on South Asia, we structured our research around key questions: How do Chinese officials define the region’s boundaries? How do they see the predominant role of India, as well as its relations with Pakistan and other smaller states? How do they perceive the economic and democratic models of governance in South Asia? And how do PRC officials conceptualise China’s own role in the region?

This study reveals critical insights into how China perceives and communicates its role in the region. By systematically engaging with Chinese narratives, India and other South Asian countries can craft more informed and effective policies to navigate their complex relationships with China. Strengthening regional collaboration, developing independent research capacity, and maintaining a diversified strategic outlook will be key to managing China’s influence in South Asia.

Key Findings in Chinese Discourse on South AsiaFlexible Definitions of South Asia: Chinese officials adopt multiple perspectives to define South Asia, including ecological, economic, geopolitical, and civilisational. Ecologically, South Asia is framed around the Himalayan region, emphasising shared environmental concerns. Economically, the region is viewed as an underdeveloped space requiring integration into broader Asian connectivity frameworks. Geopolitically, South Asia is portrayed as a contested space where external, non-Asian powers should not interfere. Civilisationally, it is depicted as part of a larger Asian identity that shares historical and cultural ties with China.

FDD Uncovers Likely Chinese Intelligence Operation That Began More Than 3 Years Ago

Max Lesser

A firm calling itself Foresight and Strategy Consulting Ltd. posted an ad on May 15 looking for a remote analyst with “a minimum of 3 years of professional experience in policy research, preferably within international organizations [or] government agencies.”1 The firm and the job are bogus. They are likely part of a Chinese intelligence operation looking to recruit new assets.

The Foundation for Defense of Democracies (FDD) uncovered the operation while investigating a similar group of fake consulting firms we dubbed the Smiao Network.2 While the websites in the Smiao Network were registered in 2024, the sites in this newly detected network — which we call the Foresight Network — date back to 2021, indicating the operation has persisted for more than three years. There are multiple known cases of Chinese intelligence conducting virtual espionage campaigns.3 Often, these involve nonexistent companies that post job listings both on their own websites as well as on external recruiting sites and online platforms such as Craigslist.

The Foresight Network may have capitalized on the global shift to remote work during the COVID-19 pandemic. When the recent wave of federal layoffs and forced retirements created a fresh pool of targets, the years-old operation quickly posted new listings on Craigslist.4 While there is no way for FDD to discern from the posts themselves if the operation has been successful, the fact that it remains active indicates there has likely been some return on the investment made in running it.

Publicly available records of online activity demonstrate that the three main websites in the network share key infrastructure, including a dedicated email server. All three were registered in China in a 90-day period beginning in December 2021. The sites were built with the same design tools and use nearly identical language. One of the three main sites claims to represent a Taiwanese firm. The inauthentic nature of these websites is not difficult to spot. One of the firms has a supposed CEO named “John Doe.” There are no entries for these firms in major Asian corporate directories. And the language on these sites is stilted and full of grammatical mistakes.

'I don't dare go back': BBC visits Cambodian villages caught in Thai border conflict

Jonathan Head

Rolls of razor wire now run through the middle of the village Cambodia calls Chouk Chey, and on through fields of sugar cane.

Behind them, just over the border, tall black screens rise up from the ground, concealing the Thai soldiers who put them up.

This is the new, hard border between the two countries, which was once open and easily crossed by people from both sides.

Then, at 15:20 local time on 13 August, that changed.

"The Thai soldiers came and asked us to leave," said Huis Malis. "Then they rolled out the razor wire. I asked if I could go back to get my cooking pots. They gave me just 20 minutes."

Hers is one of 13 families who have been cut off from houses and fields on the other side of the wire where they say they have been living and working for decades.

Signs have now been erected by the Thai authorities warning Cambodians that they have been illegally encroaching on Thai territory.

In Chouk Chey, they argue, the border should run in a straight line between two stone boundary markers which were agreed and installed more than a century ago.

Thailand says it is merely securing its territory, given the current state of conflict with Cambodia. That is not the way Cambodia sees it.

Months of tension along disputed parts of their border erupted into open conflict in July, leaving around 40 people dead. Since then a fragile ceasefire has held, although a war of words, fuelled by nationalist sentiments on social media, has kept both sides on edge.

The BBC has been to border areas of Cambodia, meeting people caught in the middle and seeing some of the damage left by the five days of shelling and bombing.